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Animal Studies

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**JCAS Volume 10, Issue 1, 2012**

**EDITORIAL BOARD.....1**

**EDITORIAL**

*Richard J White.....5*

**ESSAYS**

**Revealing the ‘Animal-Industrial Complex’ – A Concept & Method for Critical Animal Studies?**

*Richard Twine.....12*

**Psychoanalysis & “The Animal”: A reading of the metapsychology of Jean Laplanche**

*Nicholas Ray.....40*

**The Dialectical Animal: Nature and Philosophy of History in Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse**

*Marco Maurizi.....67*

**Fishing For Animal Rights In *The Cove*: A Holistic Approach to Animal Advocacy Documentaries**

*Carrie Packwood Freeman.....104*

**From the Mortician’s Scalpel to the Butcher’s Knife: Towards an Animal Thanatology**

*Sarah Bezan.....119*

**POETRY**

**‘A Death’ and ‘Righteous’**

*Alyce Miller.....138*

**POSTER**

**Queering Veganism: Adventures in Reflexivity**

*Nathan Griffin.....141*

**INTERVENTION**

**Challenging Whiteness in the Animal Advocacy Movement**

*Anthony J. Nocella II.....142*

## INTERVIEW

**Dr. Kim Socha, author of *Women, Destruction, and the Avant-Garde: A Paradigm for Animal Liberation*.**

*Interviewed by Anthony J. Nocella II*.....155

## CONFERENCE REVIEW

**“Eating Meat. The Social Relationship of Humans and Animals and the Meaning of Meat.” Conference Organized by the Group for Society and Animals Studies at the University of Hamburg, July 2011**

*Reviewed by Marcel Sebastian* .....160

**The 2<sup>nd</sup> Annual European Conference for Critical Animal Studies: “Reconfiguring the ‘Human’/’Animal’ Binary – Resisting Violence” Prague, October 2011**

*Reviewed by Sonja Buschka*.....163

**Conference Proceedings Report: Anarchy and Animal Liberation Workshop**

*Reviewed by Kim Socha* .....180

## FILM REVIEWS

**Reconsidering Representations: Animals in children’s films and possibilities for animal advocacy**

*Brian M. Lowe* .....186

**Rio**

*Reviewed by Carol L. Glasser* .....193

**Kung Fu Panda 2**

*Reviewed by Steve Romanin*.....197

**Puss in Boots**

*Reviewed by Matthew Cole and Kate Stewart* .....200

**Rango**

*Reviewed by Ralph Acampora* .....211

**Bold Native**

*Reviewed by Adam Weitzenfeld* .....213

**BOOK REVIEW ESSAY**

**Accounting for the Women of the Animal Rights Movement/  
Emily Gaarder (2011) *Women and the Animal Rights Movement*. Rutgers University  
Press: London  
Reviewed by Jessica Gröling .....219**

**BOOK REVIEWS**

**Richard Twine (2010) *Animals as Biotechnology: Ethics, Sustainability and Critical  
Animal Studies*, Earthscan: London  
Reviewed by Chris Washington .....230**

**Lisa Kemmerer (Ed.) (2011) *Sister Species: Women, Animals, and Social Justice*.  
University of Illinois Press  
Reviewed by Lindsey McCarthy.....236**

**Paul Waldau (2011) *Animal Rights: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford University  
Press: Oxford  
Reviewed by Carlo Salzani .....242**

**A REFLECTION**

**Marti Kheel  
Richard Twine/ The Editorial Collective .....247**

**JCAS: AUTHOR GUIDELINES.....248**

## EDITORIAL

**Richard J White**

### Introduction

This is the fourth year that I have been involved with editing the *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, and it is pleasing to note that this tenure has coincided with a tremendous upsurge of interest in critical animal studies involving an ever broadening range of academic, activist, policy-making and other public communities. I am convinced that the consistently wide-range of deep, stimulating, insightful, and relevant contributions that we have published within the pages of this journal have not only been instrumental in pushing back the boundaries of critical animal studies, but in their considerable educational value and relevance, have helped bring critical animal studies into a more public and mainstream awareness.

Earlier this year, this conviction was certainly reinforced from a most unexpected (but welcome) source. On January 2 the *New York Times* published an article written by James Gorman called “Animal Studies Cross Campus to Lecture Hall<sup>1</sup>”. Following a reference to Derrida's “*The Animal That Therefore I Am*” the article considers the (critical) overlaps between humans (“previous outsiders”) and other animals. It is here that the spotlight of attention is cast in the direction of the journal:

The academy does, it seems, recognize and understand Derrida and, sometimes, follow in his word tracks. Consider, for instance, “Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics as Extension or Becoming? The Case of Becoming-Plant<sup>2</sup>” in a recent issue of *The Journal for Critical Animal Studies*. Other writing is quite approachable. The moral arguments about eating animals are clear.”

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<sup>1</sup> Gorman, J. (2012) Animal Studies Cross Campus to Lecture Hall, *New York Time* is available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/science/animal-studies-move-from-the-lab-to-the-lecture-hall.html?\\_r=1&hpw](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/science/animal-studies-move-from-the-lab-to-the-lecture-hall.html?_r=1&hpw) (last accessed 16 January 2012)

<sup>2</sup> Houle, L. F. (2011) Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics as Extension or Becoming? The Case of Becoming-Plant, *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, Volume IX, Issue 1/2, pp. 89-116.

Let us hope that such a mainstream and popular article, one which at least introduces the complex and uneven (power) relationships that humans impose on other animals, will encourage people to question these/ their human-animal relationships at all times, in all contexts (in places of education, at work, at home and so on). It is also worth noting that this *New York Times* article is a good reminder that bringing critical animal studies to the attention of a more mainstream, speciesist audience, does not inevitably have to involve excessively watering down or “selling out” on key arguments that those who identify with the aims and objectives of critical animal studies - and animal abolition/ liberation approaches more generally - strive to uphold.

Before focusing on the content of this issue, I want to highlight two significant and exciting changes that will inform the nature of the journal in future. The first of these concerns a significant re-configuration of the Editorial Board. There have been many intense discussions over the last six to eight months within the existing editorial board that have focused, essentially, on how best to move away from more traditional - and hierarchical - editing relationships, toward a model which engages a more anarchistic, egalitarian and inclusive structure of participation and engagement. Against this background the idea of an Editorial Collective was proposed and agreed upon. The **Journal for Critical Animal Studies Editorial Collective**, of which a great deal more will be written in the next regular issue, will be made up of five key individuals who come to critical animal studies with a diverse range of interests and interventions, but with similar goals and ambitions, not least where promoting the importance and relevance of the Journal for Critical Animal Studies is concerned. I am delighted to be joined on the Editorial Collective by Vasile Stanescu, Richard Twine, Susan Thomas and Matthew Cole. A **tribute**, authored by the Editorial Collective, to the wonderful writer and activist Marti Kheel who sadly passed away on November 19 2011, is published at the end of this issue.

The other notable change to the Editorial team that I would like to draw your attention to concerns Nicole Pallotta. Nicole has decided to step down (for the moment at least) from her long-standing position as Associate Editor. This move will enable her to concentrate more energy on a range of new writing and teaching commitments (in the field of critical animal studies) that Nicole is enjoying, in addition to other regular work commitments. Nicole has excelled in all areas in her time with the journal - it has been wonderful working with her - and I wish her all the very best.

The second major change to be aware of is that future issues of the *Journal for Critical Animal Studies* will be published through the **Open Journal Systems** (OJS). OJS “is a journal management and publishing system that has been developed by the Public Knowledge Project through its federally funded efforts to expand and improve access to research” (see <http://pkp.sfu.ca/?q=ojs> for more information about this). We are very grateful to Anthony Nocella II for getting Hamline University to agree to house the journal through the new OJS website, and we will be working on developing this further over the next few months.

The link to the new webpage can be found here:

<http://journal.hamline.edu/index.php/jcas/index>

### **Content of the Issue**

**Volume X, Issue 1** opens with Richard Twine’s essay *Revealing the ‘Animal-Industrial Complex’ – A Concept & Method for Critical Animal Studies?* Focusing in particular on Barbara Noske’s (1989) concept of the ‘animal-industrial complex’ the essay aims to “help build CAS capacity in analyzing the role of political economy in shaping human-animal relations”. To this end Richard draws on an impressively wide range of literature in order to critically develop and underpin the essay’s key themes and central arguments. The scholarly attention to detail and clarity throughout ensure that the essay concludes by presenting a range of persuasive and insightful conclusions, all of which have potential relevance for a range of academic disciplines, as well as more mainstream policy making and activist communities.

Nicolas Ray’s original and thought-provoking work *Psychoanalysis & “The Animal”*: *A reading of the metapsychology of Jean Laplanche* is the second essay in this issue. Through examining Laplanche’s work against the concern for the animal and anthropocentrism the essay constructively contributes to answering those broader questions that consider what (if anything!) poststructuralist-style psychoanalysis have to say about the human/animal distinction. And *if* they do, then what particular types of (original and meaningful) insights can psychoanalysis offer?



Critically exploring the role played by (other) animals in Adorno's, Horkheimer's and Marcuse's Theory of Dominion, Marco Maurizi's essay *The Dialectical Animal: Nature and Philosophy of History in Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse* is another wonderfully constructed, critical, persuasive and highly readable essay. As well as developing a range of insightful arguments and conclusions, not least when problematising the notion of praxis as understood by the Frankfurt School to the animal liberation movement, Marco also proposes a range of open questions in the conclusion. Thus, far from being the final word on the matter this, like all the other essays, are testament to the fact that the field of critical animal studies is very much *emerging* and in many respects it is important that the current body of writing reveals new angles of inquiry, and encourages greater critical reflection, on what 'truths' and 'realities' we otherwise take for granted.

Dedicated by the author to the memory of ecofeminist scholar and activist Marti Kheel (1948 - 2011) Carrie Packwood Freeman's *Fishing for Animal Rights in the Cove: A Holistic Approach to Animal Advocacy Documentaries* places the Oscar-winning 2009 documentary *The Cove* under the critical spotlight. Through this essay Carrie is particularly interested in exploring the ethical and social justice implications that *The Cove* considers not only for dolphins (the main species focus of attention in the film) but for the animal rights movement as a whole. *Fishing For Animal Rights...* is a highly readable and accessible essay, which has a high degree of relevance for a wide readership, and certainly for activists and broader public and policy making communities that lie beyond the academy.

The final essay *From the Mortician's Scalpel to the Butcher's Knife: Towards an Animal Thanatology* is written by Sarah Bezan. Taking the corpse/ carcass as a dramatic site of rupture, Sarah explores the material reality and ethical implications of animal and human death. The central aim of the essay is to unsettle the dominant ontology of the corpse/ carcass, and open up new spaces with which to understand the plurality of being. Drawing on an impressive range of examples, and sources, which include an analysis of artistic productions by Janieta Eyre, Damien Hirst, and Gunther Von Hagen (*Body Worlds*), *From the Mortician's Scalpel to the Butcher's Knife: Towards an Animal Thanatology* brings to the fore an array of interesting, critical and insightful arguments and conclusions.

The JCAS **poetry** section publishes two beautifully constructed and deeply moving poems: *A Death* and *Righteous* by Alyce Miller. *A Death* cuts deep to expose the lie behind the idea of

a “humane” slaughterhouse, a dominant idea that is upheld to legitimise the popular animal welfarist rhetoric “it’s *ok* to eat other animals as long as we treat them well.” For, as Alyce writes, (in direct reference to Grandin’s ‘livestock handling systems’) “No matter how curved/ the chutes are”... “we (cows) die piece by piece, hammered and sliced.”

In *Righteous* Alyce’s initial point of departure is the idea of (divine) privilege and sacrifice that humans have over other animals, as recounted in the Old Testament story of Noah and the Flood. These themes of power and responsibility are written into the fabric of *Righteous* in order to confront the reader - living in an age that is bearing witness to the Earth’s sixth mass extinction of animal life - with questions focused on the animals *we* privilege, and *we* choose to sacrifice.

Nathan Griffin’s highly creative and original *Queering Veganism: Adventures in Reflexivity* is the first **Poster** submission that has been accepted for publication in JCAS. The use of cartoons to help display and disseminate arguments of relevance to critical animal studies is a particularly interesting development, one that offers many intriguing possibilities whether incorporated as a complement to, or a viable alternative from, traditional text-based means of communication.

Anthony J Nocella II’s *Challenging Whiteness in the Animal Advocacy Movement* is the first **Intervention** piece published by the journal. Concise in length and polemical in nature, we hope that the submissions to this section of the journal will look to confront and “take on” particularly contentious and/ or controversial issues of relevance to critical animal studies. The particular Intervention problematises white hegemony within the animal advocacy movement, and argues that greater commitment toward developing more diverse and inclusive social justice frameworks for animal advocates to situate themselves within, and draw upon.

This issue’s **Interview** is with Dr. Kim Socha, author of the first book published by Rodopi Press as part of their Critical Animal Studies series, *Women, Destruction, and the Avant-Garde: A Paradigm for Animal Liberation*. Kim is interviewed by Anthony J. Nocella II. In a wide ranging and interesting exchange Kim reflects openly on her wider background, inspirations and influences before focusing more specifically on her new book and what she hopes it will bring to the discourse of critical animal studies.

The review section of the journal opens with three excellent **Conference Reviews**. First, Marcel Sebastian reflects on the conference “*Eating Meat. The Social Relationship of Humans and Animals and the Meaning of Meat*” which took place in July 2011. The conference was organized by the “Group for Society and Animals Studies” at the University of Hamburg. The second conference review is provided by Sonja Buschka. Sonja was one of 140 attendees at the highly impressive and successful *2nd Annual European Conference for Critical Animal Studies: “Reconfiguring the ‘Human’/‘Animal’ Binary – Resisting Violence*” which took place in October 2011 in Prague. The final review, by Kim Socha, reflects on her experiences of helping run a workshop on the topic of animal liberation and anarchism. This workshop took place at the *Twin Cities Anarchist Book Fair* in September 2011.

The presence of non-human animals within films targeted toward younger audiences is as old as the film industry itself, and last year was certainly no exception. Carol Glasser (JCAS Film Editor) proposed that this issue’s **Film Review** section address a number of these popular films, with the intention of explicitly unpacking the dominant narratives and conclusions from a critical animal studies perspective. This theme is introduced and explored by Brian Lowe in *Reconsidering Representations: Animals in children’s films and possibilities for animal advocacy*. This is followed by four excellent film reviews. The first review is by Carol Glasser, who focuses on the CGI animated film, *Rio*. The second review, written by Steve Romanin, explores *Kung Fu Panda 2*. Matthew Cole and Kate Stewart then review the 2011 DreamWorks animated film *Puss in Boots*. The final film review of this section is by Ralph Acampora. Ralph focuses on *Rango*, a film which inspires the memorable sub-heading, “Reptile on the Range: The Western as Absurdist Animation.”

The final film reviewed in this issue is *Bold Native*. *Bold Native*, which received the Institute for Critical Animal Studies *Media of the Year Award* in 2011 is expertly critiqued by Adam Weitzenfeld.

The **Book Review Essay** category is designed to accommodate those extended book reviews submissions which, though focused on a particular book, are developed within a much broader and wider literary context. Jessica Gröling’s focus on Emily Gaarder (2011) *Women and the Animal Rights Movement* reviews the book on its own terms, and sets this against wider contours of women and the animal rights movement. *Women and the Animal Rights*

*Movement* includes significant discussion around the gendered division of labor and disavowal of emotion within the animal rights movement; accounting for women's majority status in the movement; coping strategies, sacrifices, and personal reward; and intersecting oppressions and controversial tactics.

Three superb **Book Reviews** conclude this issue. The first book review, by Chris Washington, focuses on Richard Twine's (2010) Earthscan publication *Animals as Biotechnology: Ethics, Sustainability and Critical Animal Studies*. Chris's extensive review is extremely favourable, referring, for example, to the book as being "amazingly complex and comprehensive" and "impressively erudite and impeccably researched."

The second review, by Lindsey McCarthy, focuses on *Sister Species: Women, Animals, and Social Justice*, edited by Lisa Kemmerer and published by the University of Illinois Press in 2011. In order to allow a deeper and more insightful review to emerge, Lindsey focuses our attention toward a number of reoccurring themes, in particular 'empathy', 'silence', 'trauma' and 'voice'. Her conclusion reflects on the power and revolutionary possibilities that this book offers: "If people are willing to listen, the book has the capacity to change one's thinking."

Finally, Carlo Salzani provides a highly considered, nuanced and detailed review of Paul Waldau's (2011) *Animal Rights: What Everyone Needs to Know*, published by Oxford University Press. Agreeing with the principal that everyone does indeed need to know about animal rights/ animal protection issues, Carlo considers the greatest strength of this book to be seen in the way that it brings much needed clarity and synthesis to the literature on this complex and complicated subject of animal and (their) rights.

I hope that you take something of great relevance and meaning from within this issue of the *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, and are able to apply this directly into making a positive and constructive difference 'out there'. Happy reading!

**Richard J White**  
**Editor- in-Chief**

## ESSAYS

### Revealing the ‘Animal-Industrial Complex’ – A Concept & Method for Critical Animal Studies?

Richard Twine

#### Abstract

This paper returns to Barbara Noske’s (1989) concept of the ‘animal-industrial complex’ in order to develop and re/present it as a key organizing frame of analysis and research collaboration for the field of critical animal studies (CAS). In presenting various ways of refining its definition and illustrating some intersections between both *different* forms of animal use *and* with other ‘complex’ concepts, the aim is also to help build CAS capacity in analyzing the role of political economy in shaping human-animal relations. Whilst keeping the permeability of the boundaries of the complex very much to the fore, this paper nevertheless focuses on farmed animals and case studies virtual methods of apprehending ‘livestock’ genetics companies as one approach for potentially bringing the animal-industrial complex into a more clearly delineated space of scholarly and public critical scrutiny.

**Key Words:** Animal-industrial complex, Barbara Noske, political economy, genetics, methods.

Global farmed animal production is increasingly understood as both a problematic and emblematic controversy in debates around the unsustainability of global capitalism. The ongoing expansion of this sector under the material-semiotic rubric of the so-called livestock<sup>1</sup> revolution (notably in ‘developing’ countries) sits in marked tension with the various sustainability question marks increasingly placed around these sets of globalized practices. Naturalized via an assumption of inevitable human population growth and the global dissemination of a hegemonic ‘human’ that, by definition, consumes meat (and a lot of it) the ‘revolution’ – for it truly is at least in terms of economic, social, environmental and interspecies relations – represents both a considerable capitalization move by globally positioned ‘livestock’ corporations and is effectively an attempt to normalize a wide range of identities, relations and practices via the conduit of dietary change.

Here sustainability concerns include, at the very least, direct environmental pollution, greenhouse gas production, human health impacts of consumption and labour, effects on communities, zoonotic disease and ethical questions around the killing of animals. There are

a further set of questions concerning how these issues are being elaborated by the molecular turn (biotechnology) and the ways in which such novel breeding techniques are proffered by scientists and industry as the means to secure the livestock revolution (see Twine, 2010a) - to usher in a new era of productivity which assumes the surmounting of pre-existing (especially biological and environmental) limits as a *technological* problem and inevitability. This is galvanized by an emerging Western policy discourse of food security that uncritically reiterates an urgent need to double food production in order to meet the demands of a growing human population (see Tomlinson, 2011). In tension with cultural calls for the reduction of the consumption of animal products the assumption of a productivist livestock revolution also involves varied attempts to make animal agriculture more efficient in lieu of changes to consumption levels that could threaten pre-existing markets. Such attempts include manipulating genetics in animal breeding and also measures to capitalize upon the waste products of animal production such as the corporation Cargill's scheme to generate energy from beef processing waste in Alberta, Canada. We can note simultaneously a vision of a 'green' livestock revolution and one that adds significantly to the present approximate annual global kill figure of 56 billion land animals. Genomics and biotechnology generally are fetishized by scientists and policy makers as the means by which to reinvent capitalism as a new more efficient and environmentally benign project often under the banner of the knowledge based bio-economy (Cooper, 2008; Twine, 2010a) which in its very enunciation pretends to portend to ideas and not somehow also to material, bodily repercussions (see Kenway et al, 2006). For meat scientists, an under-theorized constituent of the animal-industrial complex, conjoined in alliance with corporations and policy makers, 'developing' countries comprise a particular object of biopolitical scrutiny and potential resource. This is not only because their human populations are simply not (yet) eating 'enough' meat and dairy products and are therefore zones of under-capitalization, but because their populations of farmed animals are similarly conceived as biopolitically backward, possessing 'inferior genetics'. With such examples capitalist biopolitics suspends a moral human/animal binary in order to promote capitalization<sup>2</sup> (see Holloway & Morris, 2007; Twine, 2010a, especially chapter 3) and is arguably informed by the historical lineage of discursively placing various classed and racialized human others as 'closer to animal'. In this manner capitalism strategically employs contradictory accounts of human/animal difference that are enabling for various development and accumulation projects. Thus we can note attempts at knowledge transfer (often framed philanthropically) to improve the genomics infrastructure of developing countries, to train farmers therein, to assess herd genetic

diversity, to catalogue, to introduce biopolitically superior Western stock, but also further up the commodity chain, to introduce more intensive farming technologies. Such policies incorporate an assumption not only that Western levels of meat/dairy consumption are superior and somehow more constitutive of normative ‘ways of being human’, but also that Western production methods are superior.

This paper explores this techno-capitalist imaginary by (re)turning to the concept of the ‘animal-industrial complex’ (Noske, 1989), a significant component of the broader global food system. Through such a return this is a proposal to reinvent and rejuvenate Barbara Noske’s work and to encourage further research and activism that can address urgent matters of animal, ecological and human flourishing which are shaped by and within the practices of the complex. The paper aims to ‘reveal’ the ‘animal-industrial complex’ in two senses. Firstly by returning to Noske’s concept the aim is to tease out its original perceptive dimensions but also to add further rigour so that it is less of a rhetorical term but actually begins to be embodied by a delineated set of actors, relations and usable definitions. Whilst a hyperbolic sense of the concept has not been without use in the sense of a shared discourse between those politically interested in challenging its power; working toward, in this paper, a more refined definition can provide the critical animal studies research agenda much more focus, shape and coherence. Moreover, this can be valuable for understanding the context of the complex within broader relations of political economy, for a better appreciation of intersectionality<sup>3</sup> and in allowing the concept to do better political work for those engaged in its critique. Whilst this paper can only make a modest beginning in this endeavour it can, it is hoped, initiate a collaborative process whereby the concept can be refined, mapped and utilized by academics, activists and activist-academics as befits the goals of critical animal studies. Secondly this paper begins to explore which methodological approaches critical animal studies researchers<sup>4</sup> can use to reveal the complex itself. Here I briefly consider the utility of a virtual online method for explicating the relations of the animal-industrial complex which aim to articulate its global reach and local specificity. Since, as I will contend, it is impossible to avoid a definition of the complex as broad and overlapping I shall necessarily illustrate this method using a more manageable, narrow, yet important, constituent element of the global production of animals for food, namely, ‘livestock’ genetics corporations.

## **What is the Animal-Industrial Complex?**

The first discernable scholarly mention of the term is found within the work of Dutch anthropologist Barbara Noske's text *Humans and Other Animals - beyond the boundaries of anthropology* (1989). Noske devotes an entire chapter to discussing the concept. It has not been used very much since in academic work<sup>5</sup> but seems to have at least in a limited sense entered critical discourse around human-animal relations. My concern is that its use and meaning may have become simply assumed and almost rhetorical; deployed monolithically to represent, but also to reduce, the myriad complexity of the multiple relations, actors, technologies and identities that may be said to comprise the complex. I think one of the central tasks for the nascent field of critical animal studies has to be, via its championing of interdisciplinary analysis, to return to this concept, and to restore and tease out a sense of its nuance and complexity. This is not to say either that this is a small undertaking or, indeed, that research is not already being done to perform exactly this task, even if this might not be explicitly embedded within CAS or directly using the Animal-Industrial Complex (A-IC hereafter) terminology.

Noske's concept, without any refinement, already piques the CAS interest for two clear overlapping reasons. The first revolves around her intention to contextualize the use of animals as food not primarily within a rubric of inadequate ethical frameworks but as part of the wider mechanics of capitalism and its normalizing potential. Thus a large part of the answer to the question of 'why do 'we' exploit so many animals' is found here in terms of the way in which "animal industries are embedded in a capitalistic fabric" (Noske, 1989: 22) combined with an assertion that the "main impetus behind modern animal production comes from monopolistically inclined financial interests rather than from farmers, consumers or workers here or in the Third World" (ibid.). This is not to deny a distributed and networked agency at play in the A-IC but to underline that corporate capital accumulation has been a significant factor in the emergence of globalized industrialized animal production. Moreover corporate interests have had a direct interest through marketing, advertising and flavour manipulation in constructing the consumption of animal products as a sensual material pleasure and one that can be an easily acquired identity resource for a wide range of consumers. Additionally technological innovation in the production process is often sold to farmers as directly benefitting their business yet the largest returns tend to be experienced



much higher up the production chain. Noske's attempt here to clarify whose interests are served by the emergence and intensification of the A-IC complement well the stated aim of CAS to foreground political economy and to intersect a critical analysis of human-animal relations with a critique of capitalism (Nibert, 2002; Best, 2009; Twine, 2010a). This interest is also part of the CAS commitment to interdisciplinarity (Best, 2009). Mainstream animal studies shares this interdisciplinarity but makes no special case for either political economy or the importance of capitalism in shaping human-animal relations.

This takes us conveniently to the second main reason behind CAS affinity with the idea of the A-IC, namely Noske's emphasis on intersectionality. Whilst her interest in political economy already signals an attentiveness to the relationship between the human exploitation of other animals and economic structures and power relations she also covers such issues as health risks to human workers in, for example, slaughterhouses, the impact of the complex on developing countries, environmental consequences, antibiotic use, and elsewhere in the book she discusses intersections of gender, nature and animality. It is significant that when discussing the A-IC she also includes a section on animal research. Whilst nowhere does she offer a clear working definition of the 'animal-industrial complex' or a schematic to show what it might comprise she does draw our attention to important matters of scope and scale that are crucial to refining the concept. By gesturing to the issue of animal research Noske essentially questions whether agribusiness can be said to delineate or exhaust the boundary of the complex and she answers this, correctly, with a resounding, no. Such attentiveness to the permeability of the boundaries of the A-IC is crucial for teasing out the material and ideological interconnections between different spatial and cultural contexts of human/animal relations. Furthermore scope should also mean theorising the interconnections between the A-IC and other sectors of the global economy.

Although Noske does not reveal her sources it seems a reasonable assumption that her A-IC concept is in part influenced by the older idea of the military-industrial complex. Whilst there is much popular and scholarly writing on the use of animals in war this connection is similarly not noted. The military-industrial complex concept emanates from the speechwriters of former US President Eisenhower's farewell address in 1961 who warned the country of the power of this emerging complex, taken to refer to the close relations between a government's military policy, the various armed forces and the corporations that support the military. Some versions of this also included the role of academia and scientific knowledge.

In this way it is not dissimilar to the later idea of the ‘triple helix’ (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorf, 1997) put forward to characterize the changing role of the academy in the global knowledge economy in terms of its increasingly close relationship with government and the corporate sphere. This triple helix is itself enmeshed within the contemporary A-IC (see Twine, 2010a). Since the 1960s a partly analogous host of ‘industrial-complex’ terms have been used in various ways. They potentially provide a useful means by which the material and semiotic overlaps between on the face of it apparently different parts of the global capitalist economy can be theorized.

There are at least three further examples to be noted here of other complexes. Firstly the ‘prison-industrial complex’, defined as a set of bureaucratic, political, and economic interests that encourage increased spending on imprisonment, regardless of the actual need (Schlosser, 1998) is a considerably more widely used and cited term than the A-IC and could be drawn upon to highlight links between the incarceration of animals, of humans animalized by ‘race’, class or gender and also of humans convicted of attacking the A-IC in the context of the increasing criminalization of some forms of activism<sup>6</sup> (Potter, 2011). Animals are also used therapeutically in some prisons and as Fitzgerald (2012) points out, in the US and Canada many inmates are employed in the slaughtering and ‘processing’ of animal bodies. This is a source of cheap labour which symbolically pairs animalized humans and animals or ‘nature’ together in a similar manner to the phenomena of environmental racism (see Higgins, 1994) as well as perhaps providing an economic rationale for the perpetuation of a specific prison population. Fitzgerald correctly alerts us to a particular problem of employing inmates in this way given other research findings that suggests a tendency toward psycho-social brutalization in such labour. Consequently such labour could seriously frustrate inmate rehabilitation.

Secondly, the idea of an ‘entertainment-industrial complex’ has been in circulation since the 1980s (e.g. Christopherson & Storper, 1986) and was initially coined to refer to structural changes in the US film industry. This could be broadened out to think through the intersections with the A-IC in the way that zoos, theme parks and ‘pet’ keeping have become considerable forms of profitable ‘entertainment’ and more generally can be linked into other theoretical approaches most obviously the valuable, if problematic, work on the ‘culture industry’ by members (especially Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer) of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School. Indeed Shukin’s (2009, see ch.2) recent skilful argument for an historically intersecting triangulation between animal capital, the film industry (the use of gelatine being

perhaps the most obvious material enmeshment) and the automobile industry is a good example of both the sort of analysis required and the porosity within and between different ‘complexes’.

Thirdly sociological research has also engaged with the idea of a ‘pharmaceutical-industrial complex’ (Abraham, 2010) which speaks to the ‘pharmaceuticalization’<sup>7</sup> of Western societies defined as “the process by which social, behavioural or bodily conditions are treated or deemed to be in need of treatment, with medical drugs by doctors or patients” (Abraham, 2010: 604). There are at least four main points of overlap between the ‘pharmaceutical-industrial complex’ and the A-IC. Firstly a major point of intersection revolves around the use of animals as experimental subjects in the research and development of new drugs. Thus if the ‘pharmaceuticalization’ thesis is in a sense a critique of Western societies for using drugs to try and treat what in effect are mental and physical illnesses with a considerable social, economic and political aetiology then this also calls into question those forms of animal exploitation that are especially caught up in this trend. Secondly many of the world’s leading pharmaceutical companies including Abbott, Pfizer and Ely Lilly/Elanco have considerable capital interests in producing drugs for animals across various sectors. Such drugs are often represented under a rubric of ‘animal health’ but in the agricultural or sporting context health and welfare can often be proxies for the productivity of the animal body (Twine, 2007). Typically these are administered to farmed animals to alter meat or milk in some way. Sometimes this becomes more visible and prominent in the shape of *human* health scares. Although growth hormone in milk is a well known example, more recently, in June 2011 Pfizer subsidiary Alpharma was told by the FDA to cease sales of Roxarsone (also known as 3-Nitro) when a carcinogenic form of arsenic from the drug was found in the livers of broiler chickens. In the case of Roxarsone it has been used to improve both productivity (weight gain) of animals and the aesthetics (meat pigmentation) of meat. Thirdly, and relatedly, the aforementioned pharmaceuticalization phenomenon also extends across species with, for example, the application of anti-depressant drugs to dogs. Although the 2011 US FDA approval of Ely Lilly/Elanco’s canine anti-depressant known as Reconcile (see <http://www.reconcile.com>) *could* be read as a welcome subjectification of companion dogs it would be remiss not to interpret this in terms of familiar capital accumulation strategies and to underline the potential side effects to dogs (and others) of being administered such drugs. Fourthly there is good evidence (e.g. see Twine, 2010a, ch.7) to suggest that the consumption of animal products at certain levels now surpassed in many

Western diets (and increasingly in non-Western ones) is productive of a wide range of health problems which in itself is generative of pharmaceutical capital (and of course more animal experimentation). This is worth underlining since it also highlights intersections within the A-IC between the often separated issues of animal experimentation and meat/dairy consumption.

From these additional complexes we can note how capitalism creatively commodifies its own excess, its own ailments. Approaches to climate change mitigation via a carbon tax are arguably the latest case in point. Many of the aforementioned ‘complexes’ outline examples where the mass production of various commodities arguably not conducive to human or animal well-being are anyhow pursued and capitalized upon. Thus war, human incarceration, meat and dairy production, and mental and physical illness have been transformed into profitable enterprises that, in turn, set up economic interests in their perpetuation. Although all of these have been naturalized by a familiar ideology that would root them in an assumed ‘human nature’ (as has capitalism itself) they in fact reveal major tensions between corporate agency and democratic oversight. Contextualising the A-IC within its broader milieu of such other complexes is an important initial step that is reflexive to questions of scope and generative of intersectional and critical knowledge around our contemporary hegemonic economic and cultural forms.

Questions of scope also arise in the importance of cautioning CAS away from a political vision (especially as it encompasses veganism) that a) might reduce politics to consumption, and b) might assume the consumption of all non-animal products to be morally benign. When in 2006 food writer Michael Pollan spoke of the ‘vegetable-industrial complex’ in relation to E.coli scares<sup>8</sup> it served inadvertently as a reminder that any consideration of the A-IC must also consider its interdependence with the crop and vegetable industries most notably, though not solely, in the form of animal feeds. There is thus no moral dichotomy here for a pro-vegan CAS in terms of a simplistic valorisation of non-animal products. This underlines the often made point that veganism is more than ‘just a diet’ and is better seen and practised as a systemic and intersectional mode of critical analysis and a useful lived philosophy counter to anthropocentrism, hierarchy and violence<sup>9</sup>. Similarly it is not surprising that the geographer of the global food economy Tony Weis has used the concept of the ‘temperate grain-livestock complex’<sup>10</sup> (2007). He uses this in an interdisciplinary manner to evoke the historical, spatial and political economy dimensions of an important feature of global food

relations. He outlines how during the twentieth century both grain and animal production came to be centred on a small number of domesticated species and that increasingly, especially through the growth of soybean production, the 'livestock revolution' and intensive high-input crop production became very much interconnected. Thus any analysis of the globalizing dimensions of the A-IC cannot avoid factoring in economic, historical, spatial and technological changes in plant crop production as crucial to what Weis refers to as the 'meatification' of the global diet whereby population has approximately doubled globally since the 1950s but meat production has increased almost fivefold in the same period (2007, pp16-20). Including crops necessarily complicates the analysis of the A-IC and encourages a focus on areas such as the local impacts of soy production, corporate practices, plant biotechnology, transnational food regulations and standards as well as governmental agricultural policies. Furthermore it makes more likely the narrowing of the gap that is often noted academically and politically between the question of the animal and that of ecology.

It is worth pointing to a note of caution toward the discourse of the complex in the sense that it may suggest something akin to a conspiracy theory. On the one hand it points to relatively powerful alliances and networks in particular sectors of the global economy that strive to maintain a hegemonic position. It underlines how capital accumulation and resource control may become the overriding rationale in spheres such as global food production or military conflict and how these relations are implicated and used as conduits for geopolitical strategies. Yet it would be a mistake arguably to overplay the degree of control that particular actors and actor-networks are assumed to have. In other words the discourse of the complex ought not to become fatalistic.

Clearly it is not only the exploitation of animals for their meat, milk, eggs and skin that has come under the rubric of capitalist processes but also such practices as the use of animals in sport, animal experimentation, the companion animal sector and the zoo industry. If CAS scholars are to take on, as I suggest they should, the A-IC as an organising concept, then the continued mapping of these interconnections between overlapping sectors is a significant task therein. If these may be referred to as questions of scope then Noske also points us toward the issue of scale. Alluding to the rhetoric of agribusiness that creates a promissory discourse that represents global 'livestock' corporations as somehow benign and even philanthropic providers to the developing world (a discourse that has since been much recycled in the context of biotechnology), Noske (1989: 29-34) begins to briefly outline some of the

economic and consumption inequities that comprise the unmistakably global character of the complex.

I would assert that CAS lacks a sophisticated understanding of how the complex endures across different regional, national and global scales. This degree of complexity makes clear that a rhetorical concept of the complex is wholly inadequate and needs to be radically strengthened with expertise from, for example, sociologists, science and technology studies (STS) scholars, geographers and critical economists. These disciplines have established traditions, theoretical and methodological approaches to examining, for example, the global food system, that are of obvious relevance to CAS scholars interested in understanding the A-IC. I briefly outline some of these later. Simultaneously there is a need for non-CAS scholars in these disciplines to become reflexive to the multi-levelled importance of examining the A-IC and to be invited to engage with CAS. This is a useful strategy for the dissemination of CAS overall.

#### - **The Three Meanings of Complex**

In thinking through how we might further add to Noske's A-IC concept I want to briefly consider three common uses of the word 'complex' as I think they can be heuristic overall. Firstly 'complex' means 'difficult to understand', complicated, hidden, and impenetrable. Secondly it means a conglomerate, a network, structure, system, an association. Thirdly, to have a complex is to have 'a psychological problem' to experience emotions such as anxiety, fear, disgust and obsession and to unreflexively exploit social psychological processes such as stereotyping, denial and projection. It is not too difficult to see how these three meanings can inter-relate in the context of the A-IC.

The complicated partly hidden character of the A-IC is bound up in the process of denial which can be framed in the terms of sociologist Norbert Elias (1978) who argued that Western society underwent what he referred to as a 'civilizing process' between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century. This involved the emergence of a whole set of classed bodily and affective dispositions (Elias specifically focussed on manners) that can be read as the social construction of a new 'human' relationally defined against constructed understandings of both animality and human otherness. He illustrates how a multitude of embodied practices such as eating habits become emotionally charged with embarrassment and shame. There is a

wealth of literature during this time outlining the proper way to act in terms of etiquette and manners. These employ animal and classed others (peasants) as examples of how not to behave. Elias writes “the use of the sense of smell, the tendency to sniff at food or other things, comes to be restricted as something animal-like” (1978: 203). The meanings attached to various embodied practices in the 16<sup>th</sup> century have changed and become in a sense ‘domesticated’ by the nineteenth. The thresholds of embarrassment and shame have shifted. In one sense this process was about concealing the ‘animal’ in the ‘human’, dealing with the ‘shame’ of our connectedness to materiality<sup>11</sup>. This theory speaks to what I have previously referred to as the ‘internally torn’ model of the human which comes to be constructed around the idea of a human/animal binary which is productively called upon to perform (intra) human difference (see Twine 2010a: 10). We can note here a disavowal of the ‘animal’ within the human, but also, in part, an external banishment of human violence toward other animals. Thus significantly, this ‘civilizing process’ also involved the partial concealment of violence from visible everyday life and can be interpreted as one driver behind the social sequestration of animal slaughter. If this was part of a general shift against the overt public display of violence as counter to emerging social norms rather than something more specific to human/animal relations then it also had the effect of quelling the potential disruptive potency of this violence to call into question the naturalization of human/animal hierarchy. Thus this means that it is inaccurate to argue that the sequestration of slaughter can be reduced to a conscious decision to conceal violence for political-economic ends but was in fact embedded within a broader socio-historical trend. Nevertheless this new Western ‘human’ consolidated its power over and against the ‘animal’ and was able to an extent to keep its barbarism hidden from view and self-constitution.

From a CAS perspective these points underline a major contradiction of claims for Western civility and echo accordingly with the description by Bauman of modernity as ‘janus-faced’<sup>12</sup> (1989). Yet it is precisely the affective processes of denial and projection that are apt to help explain both the possibility and precarity of such a social formation of the ‘human’, inseparable from its histories of class, gender, ‘race’ and species domination. In what is now a very familiar argument from CAS, and earlier from ecofeminist writing (e.g. Plumwood, 1993), the moral significance of harming those deemed inferior has been denied by projecting a whole interconnected cluster of discursive meanings onto ‘them’, where, for example, the ‘animality’ of ‘animals’ is merely assumed, and the ‘animality’ of various ‘humans’ is (also) culturally produced. Denial here is also applied to the material labour and active agency of

the inferiorized (Plumwood, 1993) and the way in which that denial is materially expressed spatially, in the design of technologies and buildings that, in our case of animals, help to secure the relative invisibility of the violence acted out against their bodies. Thus meanings one and three of ‘complex’ can do the appropriate work to outline the inseparable material-semiotic dimensions of the A-IC<sup>13</sup>. The second meaning of ‘complex’, to mean network, conglomerate or system is similarly useful for thinking how the A-IC achieves and sustains what we can refer to as ‘material-semiotic’ hegemony. What networks are at play? How do they interconnect? How are particular speciesist norms naturalized, carried and circulated? Why are such norms so successful at recruiting adherents? Relatedly, this second meaning of ‘complex’ is also further useful to addressing our interest in scope and scale. A pertinent question here is to ask what role the mass online and offline media plays in consolidating the symbolic dominance of the A-IC (see Cole & Morgan, 2011), and to analyze how this is being resisted? Relatedly, an important research question is to probe the extent to which dominant assumptions (and practices) around the human/animal binary have extended culturally and how might local resistances have expressed themselves?

This exploration of the three main meanings of ‘complex’ is intended to contribute to definitional work around the A-IC though an actual definition ought to be a collective work-in-progress amongst the CAS community. Here I offer an initial basic and succinct definition of the A-IC as *a partly opaque and multiple set of networks and relationships between the corporate (agricultural) sector, governments, and public and private science. With economic, cultural, social and affective dimensions it encompasses an extensive range of practices, technologies, images, identities and markets.* I place agricultural in brackets only to highlight my personal interest in this paper. As I have already indicated, a working definition of the A-IC must not to be confined to this domain. However empirically it is both useful and essential to narrow down the analysis and to focus on case studies within each sector of animal exploitation while attempting to also draw useful broader connections. I see this as setting one of the most important research agendas for CAS. Whilst this is obviously a mammoth task it is worth reiterating that some CAS and much non-CAS identified research already conducted is of obvious relevance. I would also add that the CAS community needs to move to a model of research that is more collaborative and international, not unlike that found more typically in the natural sciences, in order to pool labour and better grasp the aforementioned issues of scale in the globalizing trajectory of the A-IC.



The emergence of CAS of course is part of a tension, a politics within the broad academic interdisciplinary field of studying human/animal relations. Non-CAS identified work in this field is still going to be very much of use but even beyond this there is much academic work that CAS ought to be happily parasitic upon, and influential toward<sup>14</sup>. For example when thinking about the A-IC in terms of agriculture; sociologists, science and technology studies (STS) scholars, geographers and critical political economists are all of relevance. As mentioned above, such disciplines have established traditions, theoretical and methodological approaches to theorizing the global food system. I will briefly discuss some of these now as pointers for future research.

The social-scientific study of food has very much become a growth area over the last twenty years contextualized by a growing interest in environmental issues, the intersections of social inequality with food and related questions of public health. One well known area of research is based around analyses of the commodity chain<sup>15</sup>. Instead of focussing on a particular sector of the food industry this approach follows the commodity as it moves through different stages of production and consumption with the intention of understanding what are referred to as 'commodity stories' in order to better grasp moments of commodification and the complicated relationships between 'people, places and commodities' (see Hughes & Reimer, 2004: 1). It is not surprising then that this work overlaps with an interest in the A-IC even if that concept is not deployed. For example, the well known geographer and political economist Michael Watts has written in this tradition specifically looking at the US hog (pig) and broiler chicken industry (2004). Watts probes the extent to which the hog industry has followed in some respects and differed in others from the trajectory of the broiler industry in terms of, for example, mechanization, contract farming and the impact of the biology of the animals themselves. Although the tone is largely (politically) humanist, studies such as this are immensely useful to CAS efforts to explicate the A-IC. Analyses based around commodity chains represent one approach from Marxist political economy broadly construed.

The emergence of actor-network theory (ANT) during the 1990s offered an alternative conceptual and methodological approach to studying social phenomena that has been influential upon social scientists interested in food and agriculture. Some of these points of tension between political economy and ANT revolve around how to conceptualize globalization, how to understand scale and how to understand agency. There have been influential attempts to argue that ANT offers more convincing approaches to the social

scientific research agenda on food and globalization (e.g. Whatmore & Thorne, 1997) as well as perspectives that are more mutual and conciliatory between the two approaches (e.g. Busch & Juska, 1997; Castree, 2002). Although it is not new to recognize that ANT is of potential use to the study of human/animal relations (Whatmore & Thorne, 2000) in large part due to its insistence upon the agency of nonhuman actors<sup>16</sup> within a given network, some of its other premises are also of interest to how CAS scholars might approach and think the A-IC. As well as being critical of political economy approaches for assuming a passive nature, Busch & Juska argue that they tend to reify corporate actors whereby one begins to speak of particular companies acting in this or that way, which somehow renders opaque that particular people are involved in making particular decisions and actions possible (1997: 691). They state that this is not a retreat to an asociological focus on individuals but a methodological call for analyses to focus upon how different actors achieve power within the context of specific networks, “a plea to begin to think of the globalization of agriculture in terms of the extension of actor networks” (ibid. p692). Of course this does not mean that we no longer analyze corporations but that we think more specifically about what particular people within a corporation are doing, as well as how the corporation overall is linked into other networks. Similarly ANT uses the idea of the actor-network to deconstruct the traditional social science distinction between micro and macro. Here globalization is understood as an extension of actor-networks made possible through the strategic enrolment of particular technologies that allow the power of ‘action at a distance’ to occur (ibid. p694). Again the research focus is on how networks link together and endure, the extent to which they can be made open to scrutiny, on particular enabling technologies, and how weak points may be pinpointed. Although this merely provides a very brief flavour it is clear I think that the confluence of political economy and ANT approaches to food and agriculture are exactly the sorts of social science work that CAS should be networking itself into. In attempting to better understand the A-IC this can mitigate against the repetition of potential methodological and conceptual mistakes, provide a range of useful approaches and ultimately give CAS a presence within these fields.

### **CAS Methodology – A brief look at Livestock Genetics Corporations**

In this final section of the paper I employ virtual methods to emphasize various online modes of data gathering and presentation that are of use to the wider CAS community in

understanding elements of the A-IC. Within my focus upon animal agriculture I in turn centre in on the operation of livestock genetics corporations. Indeed I advocate that future research ought to deploy particular case studies (for example of specific companies and their various actors) and that generally a high level of specificity is required in order to try and understand the more complicated network of the A-IC. Moreover it is only through such grounded empirical research that CAS can build up a viable picture of the actors and relationships involved in different yet connected parts of the A-IC. In a sense the vast majority of people are actors in the A-IC by virtue of being consumers of animal products; the practices and relations of the A-IC are socially ubiquitous even if the average consumer is unlikely to reflect upon their own everyday practices as being part of a wider complex. Here the CAS interest is in making the animal reappear, revealed and rematerialized from varied capitalist processes of fragmentation and absencing (e.g. Adams, 1990). Critical thinking around the A-IC first requires that it is brought into general relief<sup>17</sup>.

Livestock genetics corporations (LGCs) are an interesting part of the A-IC partly due to their social invisibility. Even though they all have very visible web-sites and play an important role in the A-IC they constitute part of the unconscious of animal consumption to the majority. If the tradition of political economy and more recently ANT has been adept to re-historicize, re-spatialize and so re-politicize the commodity we can note an affinity with a vegan critical animal studies that wishes to demystify the various ways in which animals become commodities and also to contest their commodity or property status itself. Work to reveal LGCs then can be a small but significant part of outlining the A-IC. As I have previously argued, social science research can act “against the sequestration of networks of science and commerce in animal breeding. Here social science can have a civic role to help a broader public adequately scrutinize novel configurations of food production, science, technology and the economy” (Twine, 2010a: 103).

But what role do LGCs play in the transformation of animals into commodities that are consumed by humans? The role of people working for these companies is essentially in the research, development and distribution of new genetic lines of the major farmed animal species. They are often networked into academic animal science departments by providing funding, and they sometimes receive funding from national governments. This forms a biopolitical coalition disciplining the animal body and inciting new strategies of capital accumulation from farmed animals. LGCs are increasingly global corporations that have

expanded into new territories that have traditionally had lower rates of animal product consumption vis-à-vis the West. They are involved in the export of animal gametes but also live animals around the world. All are researching new opportunities from the capitalization of genomics as applied to animal breeding<sup>18</sup>.

Although the internet is undoubtedly a surveillance and communication technology that developed out of the military-industrial complex it is, as WikiLeaks have shown, a medium of revelation and dissemination. Just as the case of the Israeli activist group Anonymous for Animal Rights subverting CCTV technology to live broadcast on their web-site 24/7 coverage of battery caged hens<sup>19</sup> has shown, the internet itself is perhaps our best contemporary example of the uncontrollability of technology. It can inadvertently or purposively make visible dimensions of the A-IC that before its existence would not otherwise have been so easily unveiled. This is not to say that researching LGCs is straightforward since their competition with other companies provides another driver for secrecy alongside that of being involved in a business that has to be affectively managed due to its involvement in the mass slaughter of animals. In the case of corporations involved in the A-IC this informs the specific modes of mediation of online communication and presentation. One further caveat is that an over focus on virtual methods could simply reinforce a rather abstract perspective to the study of other animals and so no claim is made here that it ought to be valorized over other research methods. Yet the use of the virtual sphere as an aid to capitalization and as a means of communicating to shareholders ensures that doing social research online is now a valuable approach for apprehending the A-IC. This is also partly because the internet has become the means for storing and communicating data. A specific focus upon how the internet may have changed aspects of corporate-customer relations and helped enable new modes of capitalization in this sector is important but beyond the scope of this paper.

Whilst this subject is arguably less amenable to other well discussed virtual methods such as virtual ethnography (Hine, 2000), the virtual domain is, as I shall illustrate, an obvious space for sourcing data, deconstructing representations, and creating maps related to the A-IC. Whilst in many senses I only scratch the surface here, I touch upon four modes of the virtual that are of use. Firstly I want to highlight the rather obvious case of the corporate web-site. Although clearly a rather managed 'text' the corporate web-site however can provide important data on how LGCs construct animals, how they operate and who they are

networked with. Figure 1 illustrates a screenshot from the web-site of Genus plc, the world's largest LGC, outlining its global operation which includes sales in over 70 countries and corporate locations in 30 countries. Like several of the larger LGCs Genus plc is a multi-species corporation focussing on bovine (ABS Global) and porcine (PIC) genetics. Its web-site includes a wealth of data mostly in the form of annual reports and detailed information on its 'product ranges'.



**Figure 1 – Screenshot from the web-site of Genus plc**

This and other web-sites provide discursive evidence for how LGCs construct their economic and social role and specifically of how animals and their genetics become transformed into commodities. Figure 2 shows an illustrative sample of a style common to LGC web-sites which illustrates the particular quantities and qualities of their animal commodities, advertised to attract potential buyers. Whilst occasionally the language used to describe

animals is uncanny in its subjectification (see Twine, 2010a: 110-11), for the most part it is starkly instrumental to the extent that it could, I think, give people who consume animal products, pause for thought. The visual politics of the way animals are represented on LGC web-sites also merits scholarly attention. Here the animals are strikingly clean, appearing alone as if occupying significant space. This representation of clean animality seems far removed from the risky, dirty and confined environment of the factory farm. In this way the web-site as it necessarily exposes in a controlled manner elements of networks of the A-IC also simultaneously contributes to the veiling over of the violence of the complex.



Figure 2 – LGC web-sites featuring samples of ‘product ranges’

A second mode and a valuable source of data useful here in attempting to understand LGCs is to approach corporate patent portfolios. Although there is diversity between LGCs in the extent to which they take out patents that relate, for example, to techniques, genetic markers or actual animals, this data nevertheless represents a way to analyze the research interests and possible future trajectories of a given LGC. Information from each patent also brings into




view individual scientists and how a given company may be linked in with specific, for example academic, networks. In trying to chart the intellectual property terrain of LGCs I have used the Aureka database by Thomson Reuters<sup>20</sup>. This allows for specific searches by corporation or by inventor. It also allows for forward and backward citation searches which are especially useful in order to map out ‘patent families’; where patents have come from, and how and who have since used them. Figure 3 shows patents owned by the Pig Improvement Company (PIC), part of Genus plc. Without even further trawling each patent for further data the list already tells us that PIC/Genus plc have had a close working relationship with animal scientists working at Iowa State University, and that they now hold several patents for genetic markers related to breeding more productive pigs. This is methodologically useful also because it begins to give us a sense of what individual people working for such companies actually do and how they do it.

Document ID	Title	Assignee	Inventor	Pub Date	App Date
EP1492805B1	SYSTEM FOR TRACING ANIMAL PRODUCTS	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	PLASTOW, Graham S., Sygen International	2010-03-24	2003-04-08
US7371521B2	Methods	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	Andersson, Leif	2008-05-13	2004-07-28
US7285385B2	Methods for analyzing animal products	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	Andersson, Leif	2007-10-23	2004-01-18
US7229784B2	System for tracing animal products	Pig Improvement Company (UK) Ltd.	Plastow, Graham S.	2007-08-12	2003-04-08
EP1492805A4	SYSTEM FOR TRACING ANIMAL PRODUCTS	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LTD	PLASTOW GRAHAM S	2007-05-02	2003-04-08
EP1381698B1	METHOD TO ANALYSE THE KIT GENOTYPE OF PIGS	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	ANDERSSON, Leif, Melica HB	2007-03-21	2002-04-24
WO2006099055A2	SEQUENCE, POLYMORPHISM, AND MARKER TEST TECHNOLOGY FOR DISEASE RESISTANCE AND GR...	IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FOUNDATION...	TUGGLE, Christopher, K.	2007-03-08	2006-03-09
US20070002395A1	APPROACHES TO IDENTIFYING GENETIC TRAITS IN ANIMALS	IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FOUNDATION...	Rothschild, Max	2007-01-04	2008-08-24
EP1613727A4	APPROACHES TO IDENTIFYING GENETIC TRAITS IN ANIMALS	UNIV IOWA STATE RES FOUND INC	ROTHSCHILD MAX F	2008-11-15	2004-03-11
WO2006099055A2	SEQUENCE, POLYMORPHISM, AND MARKER TEST TECHNOLOGY FOR DISEASE RESISTANCE AND GR...	IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FOUNDATION...	TUGGLE, Christopher, K.	2008-08-21	2006-03-09
EP1581043A4	METHODS FOR SELECTION FOR EFFICIENT ANIMAL GROWTH	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LTD	GALINA-PANTOJA, L	2008-08-09	2003-08-20
US7081335B2	Prolactin receptor gene as a genetic marker for increased litter size in animals	Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc.	Rothschild, Max F.	2008-07-25	2001-07-08
US7078928B2	Genetic markers for improved disease resistance in animals (BPI)	Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc.	Tuggle, Christopher K.	2008-07-04	2002-05-31
EP1613727A2	APPROACHES TO IDENTIFYING GENETIC TRAITS IN ANIMALS	Iowa State University, Research Foundation, Inc.	ROTHSCHILD, Max F.	2008-01-11	2004-03-11
EP1581043A2	METHODS FOR SELECTION FOR EFFICIENT ANIMAL GROWTH	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	GALINA-PANTOJA, L., Sygen International/PIC USA	2005-10-05	2003-08-20
WO2004000009A3	METHODS FOR SELECTION FOR EFFICIENT ANIMAL GROWTH	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LIMITED	GALINA-PANTOJA, Lucia	2005-08-11	2003-08-20
EP1397511A4	GENETIC MARKERS FOR IMPROVED DISEASE RESISTANCE IN ANIMALS (BPI)	IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY RES FOUND	TUGGLE CHRISTOPHER K	2005-04-20	2002-05-31
EP1425414A4	GENETIC MARKERS FOR IMPROVED DISEASE RESISTANCE IN ANIMALS (NRAMP1)	UNIV IOWA STATE RES FOUND INC	TUGGLE CHRISTOPHER K	2005-04-13	2002-05-31
US20050055912A1	Methods for analyzing animal products	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LIMITED	Andersson, Leif	2005-03-17	2004-01-16
EP1492805A2	SYSTEM FOR TRACING ANIMAL PRODUCTS	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	PLASTOW, Graham S., Sygen International	2005-01-05	2003-04-08
EP1481415A2	FILTRATION SYSTEM	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	VAN DER STEEN, Hein, c/o PIC Group	2004-09-29	2002-08-18
EP1425414A2	GENETIC MARKERS FOR IMPROVED DISEASE RESISTANCE IN ANIMALS (NRAMP1)	Iowa State University, Research Foundation, Inc.	TUGGLE, Christopher, K.	2004-08-09	2002-05-31
WO2002102989A3	FILTRATION SYSTEM	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LIMITED	VAN DER STEEN, Hein	2004-05-21	2002-08-18
EP1418271A1	METHOD OF SCREENING PIGS FOR RESISTANCE TO SALMONELLOSIS	Pig Improvement Company UK Ltd	KREUKNET, Marjke	2004-05-19	2002-07-30
WO2002097058A3	GENETIC MARKERS FOR IMPROVED DISEASE RESISTANCE IN ANIMALS (NRAMP1)	IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FOUNDATION...	TUGGLE, Christopher, K.	2004-04-08	2002-05-31
WO20003887785A3	SYSTEM FOR TRACING ANIMAL PRODUCTS	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LTD.	PLASTOW, Graham S.	2004-04-01	2003-04-08
EP1397511A1	GENETIC MARKERS FOR IMPROVED DISEASE RESISTANCE IN ANIMALS (BPI)	Iowa State University, Research Foundation, Inc.	TUGGLE, Christopher, K.	2004-03-17	2002-05-31
EP1381698A2	METHOD TO ANALYSE THE KIT GENOTYPE OF PIGS	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	ANDERSSON, Leif, Melica HB	2004-01-21	2002-04-24
WO2004000009A2	METHODS FOR SELECTION FOR EFFICIENT ANIMAL GROWTH	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LIMITED	GALINA-PANTOJA, Lucia	2003-12-31	2003-08-20
WO20003887785A2	SYSTEM FOR TRACING ANIMAL PRODUCTS	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LTD.	PLASTOW, Graham S.	2003-10-23	2003-04-08
EP1354081A2	NOVEL PRKAG3 ALLELES AND USE OF THE SAME AS GENETIC MARKERS FOR REPRODUCTIVE AND ME...	Iowa State University, Research Foundation, Inc.	ROTHSCHILD, Max, F.	2003-10-22	2001-09-10
WO2003012138A1	METHOD OF SCREENING PIS FOR RESISTANCE TO SALMONELLOSIS	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LTD	KREUKNET, Marjke	2003-02-13	2002-07-30
EP1272030A1	METHODS FOR SEXING NON-HUMAN MAMMALS	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	MILEHAM, Alan PIC Group	2003-01-08	2000-11-03
WO2002102989A2	SYSTEM	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LIMITED	STEEN, Hein van der	2002-12-27	2002-08-18
WO2002097058A2	GENETIC MARKERS FOR IMPROVED DISEASE RESISTANCE IN ANIMALS (NRAMP1)	IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FOUNDATION...	TUGGLE, Christopher, K.	2002-12-05	2002-05-31
WO20002097138A1	GENETIC MARKERS FOR IMPROVED DISEASE RESISTANCE IN ANIMALS (BPI)	IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FOUNDATION...	TUGGLE, Christopher, K.	2002-12-05	2002-05-31
US6291174B1	DNA markers for pig litter size	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	Li, Ning	2001-09-18	1999-08-10
EP983387A1	METHODS FOR ANALYZING ANIMAL PRODUCTS	Pig Improvement Company UK Limited	ANDERSSON, Leif	2000-03-08	1998-05-27
WO1999037189A2	PROCESS FOR MAKING A PORK PRODUCT AND PORK PRODUCT MADE THEREFROM	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LIMITED	STADLER, John, A.	1999-07-29	1999-01-21
WO1998054389A1	METHODS FOR ANALYZING ANIMAL PRODUCTS	PIG IMPROVEMENT COMPANY UK LIMITED	ANDERSSON, Leif	1998-12-03	1998-05-27

Figure 3 – Patents from the Pig Improvement Company (PIC), part of Genus plc

An alternative way in which to use the patent system to yield data about the A-IC is to recall that it also functions as a catalogued library of innovation. So instead of searching by inventor or corporation one can search by subject matter<sup>21</sup>. Indeed, as may be noted in Figure 4, it is revealing that innovations around the slaughtering of animals are classified under ‘human necessities’ and pertain to the whole array of devices used to restrain, kill and

‘process’ the animal. Delving in to this and other sections of the catalogue provides a valuable method whereby different dimensions of the A-IC may be researched. Indeed given that patent data stretches back to the nineteenth century (for example the Aureka database holds data from 1836 onwards) this is an especially valuable research tool for any historical analysis of the emergence of the complex.



**Figure 4 – Sub-section of the Patent Catalogue: Slaughtering**

The third virtual mode I wish to note as a valuable means by which to garner data about LGCs and the A-IC generally is the use of Google Scholar. This database captures the vast majority of scholarly publications. If a particular piece of research conducted by scientists working for, or in collaboration with, LGCs is published then it can be picked up by a simple search. Moreover since LGCs act as funders to various animal science departments around the world, the authors of a publication will typically acknowledge the funder within their paper which then can be picked up by a search. Once again this is an especially useful way to reveal the sort of research particular LGCs are engaged in. As Figure 5 illustrates, a search



on the PIC yields a database of 815 documents (including journal articles and patents) for further analysis.





Figure 5 – Illustrating the use of Google Scholar to search for LGC associated research

The fourth and final mode also enrolls Google in the form of exploiting its mapping software<sup>22</sup>. Within Google maps it is possible to create annotated maps and to plot locations, directions and routes. Usefully for research purposes there is also a collaborate feature allowing more than one person access in order to work on or simply view the map. This is arguably specifically of use to researching the A-IC since this tool can bring into spatial visibility various dimensions of the complex. Here I wish to argue that this simple method can act to counter the social and affective invisibility of LGCs from everyday life. It is possible to envisage a complex layered up use of this method to render visible multiple connecting layers of the A-IC that would emphasize the prosaic proximity of the contemporary violence enacted upon farmed animals in our local, regional and transnational geographies. Figure 6 shows locations of selected Livestock Genetics Corporations (LGCs) in Canada<sup>23</sup>. Location data was obtained from company web-sites. A map such as that shown in figure 6 brings into relief some of the important infrastructure for the A-IC and hints at questions primed for further research. For example, why does there seem to be a concentration of LGCs in Ontario? Is there an historical, social and economic significance to

the presence of specific species related LGCs in various geographical areas of Canada? Are these locations shaped in part by their proximity to academic animal science departments? How have their operations been influenced by trends for vertical and horizontal integration within the LGC sector? Moreover, how are they connected to a) other actors in the A-IC?, and b) to other global locations of the same or that of partner corporations?



**Figure 6 – Locations of Selected Livestock Genetics Corporations (LGCs) in Canada**

The various ways of working in virtual space I have outlined provide points of empirical potential that should be of interest to people working in Critical Animal Studies and are accessible to those outside of the academy. Whilst acknowledging that methods are in an important sense performative (Law, 2004: 56), in that they partly construct the reality they

purport to present, social research here is notable for in the case of the A-IC they make a reality that previously, in a sense for many people, due to hegemonic affective investments in veiling and denial, did not in fact exist. I have case studied one small sector (LGCs) of one dimension (the meat/dairy industry) of the A-IC. This can serve to point CAS scholars in the direction of more specificity with regards to this case study and to pique interest in how these or similar methods could be employed to explore other dimensions of the A-IC.

In this paper I have intended to begin a crafting of the concept of the ‘animal-industrial complex’, to pick up where Barbara Noske’s initial birthing came to a premature end. I have sought to give the concept more definition and I have begun to explore the questions that must be considered in order to make the A-IC truly heuristic for CAS. This effort should also be situated within the wider context of attempts to outline the conceptual and methodological terrain for the future of critical animal studies (CAS). The approach here has been to explore how the A-IC relates to other ‘industrial-complex’ concepts, to consider three meanings of the word ‘complex’ as a means to better define the A-IC and to argue that CAS scholars when considering the complex should better situate their work within pre-existing social science research around, for example, global dimensions of food and agriculture. This latter point is further stressed as a means to allow CAS to travel into new inter/disciplinary spaces to argue its relevance to the academic mainstream.

Using LGCs as a case study in this paper similarly speaks to the relevance of the contemporary importance of critically addressing the animal-industrial complex; not merely to a small set of critically minded scholars but underlining that this reflexivity is now vital to the entirety of humanity. LGCs play a role in promoting the contemporary ‘livestock revolution’ and all that entails in terms of carbon emissions and violence against all animals alike<sup>24</sup>. Given that business-as-usual carbon intensive social practices entail highly probable environmental disaster, and that the ‘livestock revolution’ significantly exceeds business-as-usual levels of production and consumption it represents an exceptional case for intervention, change and mitigation. Bringing the animal-industrial complex back into scholarly and social consciousness and conscience helps make this case. Critical Animal Studies stands then as a crucial contemporary form of knowledge production that argues this case by contesting persistent norms of the ‘human’ and the ethical and spatial invisibility of the ‘animal’.

## **Acknowledgements**

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## **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> The word 'livestock' is clearly from within a frame of thinking that thoroughly naturalizes the commodification of animals. I therefore prefer not to use it but choose to on a few occasions to critically address the particular discourse of the 'livestock revolution' and self-titled 'livestock genetics companies'. My use of scare quotes around this word is intended to indicate a critical distance from the assumptions of this word. In this paper I have also decided non-ideally to use the word 'animal/s' instead of 'nonhuman animals' which I have used before. Both are problematic and I think that eventually CAS must challenge the discourse and binary of 'human and 'animal' in more satisfactory ways.

<sup>2</sup> To clarify, capitalist biopolitics do typically operate via an assumption of human/animal hierarchy, but collectively resource humans and animals alike for capitalization often in the same places and at the same times (for example, farm workers and farmed animals, slaughterhouse workers and farmed animals).

<sup>3</sup> The notion of intersectionality has various histories and was originally a humanist concept born out of a concern to better understand the intersections of classed, raced, and gendered power relations. Obviously here I intend it also in a more-than-human sense (see Twine, 2010b).

<sup>4</sup> I write here through the lens of a sociologist, albeit one who is sympathetic to post-disciplinarity, mindful of the interdisciplinarity of critical animal studies and sensitive to the status and needs of non-academic researchers.

<sup>5</sup> It has around 50 hits on Google Scholar which are mostly citations of Noske, or of the article by Carol J Adams, "'Mad Cow" Disease and the Animal Industrial Complex: An Ecofeminist Analysis' (1997).

<sup>6</sup> Please see the forthcoming (2012) special issue of JCAS on 'Prison and Critical Animal Studies'.

<sup>7</sup> For the distinction between 'medicalization' and 'pharmaceuticalization' see (Abraham, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> See Pollan's New York Times article here, <http://www.newmedia29.com/wrt105/vegetable-industrial.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> A good example here would be to ask whether the production and consumption of palm oil is actually vegan given its intersection with the killing of orang-utan populations, see [http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front\\_page/newsid\\_8523000/8523999.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_8523000/8523999.stm)

<sup>10</sup> I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out also the use of the concept of agri- or agricultural industrial complex. According to Google Scholar there are 112 uses of agri-industrial complex and 166 uses of agricultural-industrial complex. Whilst space restricts me from an analysis of how this has

been used it would be an excellent and worthwhile follow up project to map out the extent to which these terms occlude or include questions of the animal.

<sup>11</sup> Of course the rise of vegetarianism and veganism could also be read in terms of the 'civilizing process' thesis. However if such practices were read as a banishment of 'animality' from the 'human' this view would be based on a false conflation of the animal with carnivorous practices. The civilizing process theory of Elias is not wholly separate from Foucauldian theories around the transition from sovereign to biopower and how they pertain to the visibility of violence (e.g. see Foucault, 1976, 1977).

<sup>12</sup> Bauman was speaking here in terms of the relationship between forms of rationality and the WWII holocaust. Thus war and colonialism are also major dimensions of Janus-faced modernity. We can note a comparable management of violence in the operations of the military-industrial complex. Whilst most media report the violence of war very few show it in its graphic, potentially disruptive, detail. In this sense it is also sequestered.

<sup>13</sup> In a subsequent paper I will focus in more detail on this third meaning of complex: the affective and social-psychological dimensions of the animal-industrial complex.

<sup>14</sup> There is no intention to imply that no CAS or animal studies scholars have yet to engage with these approaches.

<sup>15</sup> For a critical appraisal of the commodity chain approach and its variations please see Jackson et al (2006).

<sup>16</sup> Of course there is a danger in ANT that in the granting of agency to animals that they become either conflated with non-sentient objects, or remain homogenized as 'animals', in contrast to the 'human'. Although ANT is certainly interested in ontological posthumanism, it is, like Marxist political economy, far from the *political* posthumanism insisted by CAS. For a short list of early ANT works that discuss animals, see <http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/centres/css/ant/ant.htm#ani> For a review of some criticisms of ANT see (Murdoch, 2001).

<sup>17</sup> Visibility however does not guarantee politicization or changes in practices. Jovian Parry has convincingly argued that strands of the 'New Carnivore' movement, as expressed in various media (especially television), revel in a new visibility of animal slaughter that is bound up in particular reassertions of gender norms (Parry, 2010). This, I think, is further fuel for exploring the psychological and affective dimensions of the A-IC.

<sup>18</sup> For a more detailed analysis of LGCs see (Twine, 2010a; and especially Gura, 2008).

<sup>19</sup> See <http://anonymous.org.il/art731.html> Moreover several states in the US have witnessed recent (so far failed) attempts at so-called Ag-Gag legislation whereby it would be deemed illegal for animal activists to obtain video footage from factory farms or slaughterhouses. These attempts illustrate well the tension between secrecy and visibility in the A-IC. For more information on Ag-Gag legislation see <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/>

A recent animal cruelty case in a UK slaughterhouse did not (to date) result in prosecution because the video footage was deemed to have been obtained illegally (see <http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/jul/chealmeats>). One positive outcome of this has been that the UK's Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) who originally refused to prosecute the slaughterhouse owners have now been stripped of their powers of prosecution. Animal Aid had argued that DEFRA were too close to industry and thus could not be deemed impartial. Finally Animal Aid has long campaigned for UK slaughterhouses to be equipped with CCTV. This campaign has recently met with success and major UK supermarkets have been enrolled to demand that the slaughterhouses they use have CCTV. This raises many issues around the

visibility/secretcy nexus. Moreover is this merely a biopolitical disciplining of slaughterhouse workers rather than any sort of meaningful systemic challenge? Is it a classically 'welfarist' reform that might placate the majority of people who may have cruelty concerns but have no interest in changing their practices?

<sup>20</sup> Access to this database requires a paid license. However there are several freely available Patent Databases, for example, Google Patents, see <http://www.google.co.uk/patents>

<sup>21</sup> For more on the classification system, see <http://www.wipo.int/ipcpub/#refresh=page>

<sup>22</sup> This software is free and requires a Gmail account. It is located at <http://maps.google.com/>

<sup>23</sup> The choice of Canada is close to arbitrary. However a previous version of this paper was presented at the ICAS sponsored 'Thinking about Animals' Conference, Brock University, Ontario, Canada, March 31st/April 1st, 2011.

<sup>24</sup> Corporate and state promotion of the over/consumption of animal products can be conceptualized, I think, as a form of material and cultural violence against humans as well.

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## Psychoanalysis & “The Animal”: A reading of the metapsychology of Jean Laplanche

Nicholas Ray<sup>1</sup>

When I hear talk of enigmas, I prick up my ears.  
[*Quand j’entends parler d’énigme, je dresse l’oreille.*]  
(Laplanche, 1992b: 254)

### Abstract

The primary driver behind this paper is the recognition that psychoanalysis is not yet able to answer with confidence and legitimacy for the conceptual delimitations between “human” and “animal” on which it fundamentally relies. The essay calls for a concerted effort to interrogate the psychoanalytic categorization of “the animal” and for a much greater vigilance against psychoanalytic re-inscriptions of anthropocentrism. In order to exemplify the possibilities for a non-anthropocentric psychoanalytic thought, the paper gives a detailed reading of the human/animal relation in the work of the eminent French psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche, and places it into critical contact with a number of other thinkers whose work has major implications for animal studies. With a particular focus on the topics of biology, instinct and drive, and the myth of the ‘beast’, the essay argues that Laplanche’s work overall offers an account of the human/animal relation which is marked by a profound theoretical and ideological vigilance – one that may be indispensable in interrupting what Agamben calls the “anthropological machine”.

**Keywords:** psychoanalysis; anthropocentrism; human/animal delimitations; instinct and drive; Laplanche’s general theory of seduction.

To what precisely does psychoanalysis refer when it invokes, as it so frequently does, the category of the “human”? Upon what specific exclusions does the delimitation of this category depend within psychoanalytic thought? With what critical rigor has psychoanalysis put in question the theoretical propositions and presuppositions which dominate Freud’s thinking in this regard? And with what confidence and legitimacy is psychoanalysis capable of answering for the conceptual circumscription – or circumscriptions – of the “human” on which it relies?

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The urgency and the complexity of questions such as these are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Recent years have witnessed a steady upsurge of critical interest in conceptual delimitations of the “human being”, not just within psychoanalytic discourse but in diverse fields far beyond it. The essential concern which has driven this work has frequently been with interrogating the authority of theoretical distinctions between human and non-human animals – distinctions which have formed implicit but constitutive points of orientation within even the most prevalent branches of philosophy, ethics, critical theory and the “human sciences”. Broadly speaking, the aims which govern this work have been to aggravate putative human/animal distinctions, to identify the significant but often marginal voices of historical resistance to them, and to open the way towards a thought which would not be governed by a manifest or latent anthropocentrism.

With respect to psychoanalysis specifically, critical work in the area of what is sometimes broadly termed “animal studies” remains at a fairly incipient stage. There have, to be sure, been some groundbreaking interventions by major philosophical authors – in particular Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri (1980) on Freud, and more recently Jacques Derrida (2004) on Lacan – as well as some important clinically based reflection led by practitioners such as Salman Akhtar and Vamik Volkan (2005a and 2005b). However, the so-called “question of the animal” still has a relatively limited circulation within psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic studies. The human/animal relation has yet to become a subject of common or even broad reflection among theoreticians and clinicians, and the immense task of examining the theoretical evolution of the human/animal relation across the different analytic traditions has barely begun.

The present essay is conceived as a contribution to this incipient field of study. It is an attempt to track the conceptualization of the relation between human and non-human animals in the work of the distinguished French psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche. Laplanche’s work has hitherto attracted little interest from the field of animal studies, and his conceptualization of the human/animal relation has received no substantial commentary from scholars and clinicians who are already familiar with his work. Nonetheless, this conceptualization is, I suggest, both a key aspect of Laplanche’s thinking *tout court* and a dimension of his work that argues for its importance to the field of critical animal studies.

Broadly speaking, the theme of “the animal” manifests itself in two different ways across Laplanche’s oeuvre. Firstly, and for the most part, it plays a continuous yet largely functional role in Laplanche’s ongoing account of subjectivity. Here, it is the object of relatively little sustained or systematic development; rather, a mostly cautious but relatively emphatic set of delimitations between human and non-human animals underpins the entire

theoretical apparatus. And secondly, there are the more localized moments, notably in some papers dating from the late 1990s, in which Laplanche tackles the question of the animal in an explicit and decisive way within his broader reflections on sexuality, cruelty and the figure of the “beast” (*la bête*). My purpose in the essay is threefold. 1. To examine these related and hitherto overlooked aspects of Laplanche’s work, and to situate them within the overall trajectory of his thought; 2. To demonstrate the ways in which they respond to and recast the human/animal relation as it emerges in certain aspects of Freud’s own thinking; 3. To propose that in spite of what may sometimes appear to be an anthropocentric tendency in Laplanche, his work overall offers an account of the human/animal relation which is marked by a profound theoretical and ideological vigilance – one that offers significant and original points of potential resistance to anthropocentric thought and practice.

What follows, then, is an emphatically theoretical discussion. However, it is one driven by the conviction that tackling head-on the tendentious disavowals and failures of thought which have so pervasively characterized attitudes to the human/animal relation is integral to the work of critical animal studies; that a non-anthropocentric praxis must not itself rely on deficits of thought but must ground its oppositional project in rigorous and precise conceptual reflection; and that psychoanalysis – or at least a certain careful recension of its orthodoxies – may have something significant contribute to this work. I begin with a broad recapitulation of the way in which Laplanche frames his ongoing theoretical project.

### **Freud’s Unfinished Copernican Revolution**

To many in the Anglophone world Laplanche remains best known for the vocabulary of psychoanalytic terms which he co-authored with Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (1964). Two further texts on Freud – a paper from 1964 on fantasy, also co-written with Pontalis, and a monograph on *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis* (1970) – have also generated serious interest in the UK and the US and have done much to establish Laplanche’s reputation as a rigorous and brilliant explicator of the Freudian corpus. However, his trajectory as an independent thinker in his own right has evolved across a series of subsequent lectures, books and articles, many of which have yet to be translated into English.

It is in these works that Laplanche has systematically developed a radical metapsychology and laid down very distinctive “new foundations” for psychoanalysis.<sup>2</sup>

In the present context, the most pertinent point of entry into this work is its ceaseless invocation of the “Copernican” dimension of psychoanalysis. Since the early 1990s Laplanche has characterized his theoretical project as a critical development of what he calls Freud’s unfinished Copernican revolution (Laplanche, 1992a). This nomenclature derives from Freud’s 1917 paper “A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis” where the psychoanalytic discovery of the unconscious is equated with the blow struck by Nicolaus Copernicus against human narcissism: as the Copernican revolution revealed the earth not to be the center of its universe, so psychoanalysis revealed egoic consciousness not to be the center of the human subject’s *psychic* universe.

Laplanche has repeatedly demonstrated that although Freud expressly seeks to “de-center” human subjectivity – displacing the ego from its illusory position of mastery – he is rarely able to avoid recentering it elsewhere by comfortably re-grounding the subject in some other essential core. The most illuminating example of this Laplanche frequently derives from the same 1917 essay (see Laplanche, 1992c and 1997b). There, Freud insists that the psychoanalytic postulation of man’s heteronomy is founded on its discovery of an otherness, something “alien” or “foreign” (i.e. the unconscious) which dislodges the centrality of the ego: “In certain diseases”, Freud says,

thoughts emerge suddenly without one knowing where they came from [...] These alien guests even seem to be more powerful than those that are at the ego’s command [...] Or else impulses appear which seem like those of a stranger, so that the ego denies them; [...] the ego says to itself: “This is an illness, a foreign invasion”. (Freud, 1917: 141–142).

No sooner has Freud described this decentering foreign presence, however, than he proceeds to reduce its foreignness altogether. “Psychiatry [in general]”, he continues, “denies that such things mean the intrusion into the mind of evil spirits from without”; and “psychoanalysis [specifically] sets out to explain these uncanny [*unheimlich*] disorders”. It says to the ego:

Nothing has entered into you from without; a part of the activity of your own mind has been withdrawn from your knowledge and from the command of your will [...] [Y]ou do not recognise it as a derivation of your own rejected instincts [...]. (142).

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<sup>2</sup> As I have argued elsewhere, there is, however, no clear separation between Laplanche’s intensive critical re-readings of Freud and the gradual elaboration of these “new foundations”. See Ray (2006).

The decentering of the ego is thus affirmed at the cost of domesticating the intruder, of reducing the alterity of the invading other to another part of the subject which the subject does not recognize as such. For Laplanche it is the conclusion of Freud's address to the ego which is most telling: "Turn your eyes inward, look into your own depths, learn first to know yourself". In Freud's invocation of the Delphic imperative, "Know Thyself", the subject becomes comfortably re-grounded once more. Certainly the ego is displaced from its central position, but only to be replaced by the unconscious, the latter now taking on the role of the subject's innermost core, a self of which his ego denies ownership but which it is the task of psychoanalysis to help him re-assimilate. Nothing has entered into you from the outside: everything that intrudes upon you from an origin which seems so obscure in fact emerges from inside you, from the profoundest depths of your self.

The domesticating gesture which Freud commits upon the alien of the unconscious in 1917 can, Laplanche argues, be endlessly demonstrated throughout Freudian thought. The claim to a Copernican decentering of the subject ceaselessly gives way to the same "Ptolemaic" recentering of the subject back upon himself, with the consequence that Freud is habitually drawn towards promulgating endogenous models of psychic development which tend to provide quasi-programmatic groundings to the human subject. Laplanche calls these retrograde theoretical movements – of which there are multiple manifest avatars – 'goings-astray' (*fourvoiements*).<sup>3</sup> Within them Laplanche sees endless attempts to give the subject a "foundation", but one which is already somehow proper to the subject, which as it were already "belongs" to him, and leaves the notion of a centered subject ultimately intact. Data presented in an analysis is thus always reducible to the depths of the subject's own interior, his self, which it is the task of analysis to enable him to know better.

Now, to return to Laplanche's Copernican reference, it is true, as Lacan pointed out many years ago, that Copernican astrology effectively replaced geocentrism with heliocentrism (Lacan, 1960). However, within the latter system the apparently fixed position of certain stellar constellations also led to the conclusion that they were at a distance from earth incommensurable with the internal distances of the solar system. Copernican heliocentrism, in other words, made conceivable the infinity of the universe and thus *the possibility of the absence of any center whatsoever*. It is this more radically de-centering aspect of the Copernican revolution which Laplanche pursues analogously within the psychoanalytic field.

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<sup>3</sup> For a fuller explication of this term, see Laplanche (2006b)

## **Darwin's Absence**

Below I shall offer an account of precisely how Laplanche effects this pursuit. First of all, it is important to note what is a striking point from an animal studies perspective: namely, that by inscribing his theoretical project under the heading of the Copernican revolution Laplanche appears to dispense explicitly with the other great precursor cited by Freud in "A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis". On Freud's view the discoveries of Charles Darwin, which had abolished the grounds on which human beings had for so long asserted their essential separation from animals, was the second of the great scientific blows to human narcissism before psychoanalysis. Darwin's complementary presence in the "Difficulty..." paper begs the question of what motivates Laplanche's consistently exclusive theoretical appeal to "the Copernican".

Unsurprisingly, the exclusion is not arbitrary. It is motivated by the conviction that the Darwinian discovery is in fact at odds with the Copernican potentiality of psychoanalysis. In a brief passage in "The Unfinished Copernican Revolution" (1992c) Laplanche gives two reasons for this. The first is that he doubts whether the Darwinian gesture *per se* of "reconnect[ing] man to his biological, animal lineage" really does "decenter and humiliate" the human being (80). On the contrary, Laplanche argues: since the revelation of the human connection to the chain of evolution has not inhibited humans from perceiving themselves as its *telos* and crowning glory, the Darwinian discovery has in fact given man the assurance of "a much firmer basis":

Solidly in place, firmly centered on the animal pyramid, man does not fail to consider himself its culmination, the blossom of the family tree: a doctrine like that of Teilhard de Chardin's has clearly wiped away the so-called humiliation of evolutionism. (81).

If these observations give Darwin himself rather short shrift – as though an overtly religious re-inscription of the theory of evolution has somehow demonstrated the theory's essential limitations – Laplanche offers a second reason for dispensing with the Darwinian reference, this time with a more immediate pertinence to the Freudian project. It consists in the "dangerous" magnetism exerted upon Freudian thought by the doctrine of evolution. This influence is typically manifested in the major *fourvoiement* of Freud's work – its countless appeals to heredity of one form or another. Freud's theoretical reliance on hereditary factors –

by which Laplanche means “phylogenesis, the hereditary nature of the drives [*pulsions*] and even of scenarios and fantasies” – has the effect of minimizing precisely those intersubjective and epigenetic determinants of psychic life in which, as we shall see, Laplanche recognizes the most potential for a thoroughly decentered account of subjectivity. Instead, the true “alienness” of sexuality and the unconscious is effaced, and these are passed off as little more than “the expression of somatic forces, on which the evolution of the species – and beyond that, of life itself – has left its indelible imprint” (81). The recourse to evolutionism in Freud, however radical it may initially appear, thus effects precisely the kind of Ptolemaic recentering of the human subject which Laplanche criticizes in “A Difficulty in the Path...”, each human being entering the world equipped with a ready-made instinctual and even mnemonic core. So at odds is this evolutionary perspective with what Laplanche sees as the true theoretical potential of the psychoanalytic project that the two things appear structurally incompatible: “The invocation of [heredity]”, he avers, “comes to the fore every time psychoanalytic decentering recedes from view” (81). Thus whereas for Freud the figures of Darwin and Copernicus are complementary models of revolutionary thought, for Laplanche they are essentially contradictory and even mutually exclusive – at least as inspirators of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic thought is most “Copernican” when it is least “Darwinian”, most radical when it is most free of the impulse to reduce what is psychically “alien” in the human being to what is most “animalistic” within him.

### **Instinct and Drive in Freud**

Laplanche’s thought, then, and his entire re-elaboration of metapsychology under the aegis of what he calls the “general theory of seduction”, is partially organized around the rejection of that *tendency* in Freud’s own work to view desire and unconscious psychic life as a primordial or “natural” dimension of human existence, as the genetic link to human prehistory and thence to man’s animal ancestry. This is a tendency which reaches its apex with the postulation of a primordial id in the second topography, but which is present in Freud from a much earlier date.

The passages from Laplanche (1992c) cited above offer numerous points of entry into the problem of heredity in Freud: phylogenesis, fantasy and the drives. However, in order to delimit my focus here I shall take up explicitly only the theme of the sexual drives, since it is in connection with this theme that the human/animal relation becomes most manifest in Freud and becomes most overtly resituated in Laplanche’s subsequent theoretical developments.

The indispensable starting point within Freud's work in this regard is the recognition of the existence of two separate terms in Freud's German: *Instinkt* and *Trieb*. In a series of texts reaching back to the *Vocabulaire* with Pontalis, Laplanche has been highly critical of the decision by James Strachey – the Anglophone translator of the *Standard Edition* of Freud's work – to translate both terms with the single English word “instinct”. He has gone on to make a compelling case for retaining separate words in translation: “instinct” (Fr: *instinct*) for *Instinkt* and “drive” (Fr: *pulsion*) for *Trieb*.<sup>4</sup> *Instinkt* and *Trieb* can be used interchangeably in German, but their differential derivations (Latin and Germanic respectively) furnish the resources for distinguishing one from the other. Although Freud never gives any explicit elaboration of such a distinction, Laplanche observes that his use of the two terms is sufficiently differentiated as to suggest that a latent conceptual boundary initially undergirds their use. The word *Instinkt* is rare in Freud,<sup>5</sup> but its usage is consistent. *Instinkt* is invoked to refer to innate, preformed patterns of behavior, which are genetically derived, adaptive in their aim and more or less fixed within individuals of a single species. Freud's habitual point of reference is, unsurprisingly, the behavior of non-human animals: e.g. ‘If inherited mental formations exist in the human being – something analogous to instinct [*Instinkt*] in animals...’ (1915: 195); ‘...manifestations of instinct [*Instinktäußerung*] in animals...’ (Freud, 1933: 106). *Trieb*, on the other hand, is at once less stable semantically in Freud and richer in theoretical potential. Freud introduces the term in his groundbreaking *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* in 1905 in order to name sexual drives (*Sexualtriebe*) which are not necessarily common among all individuals of a species and which are not fixed but variable in terms of their aim and object. It is at the level of *Triebe* that the polymorphousness of infantile sexuality and of the perversions is situated. It describes an impulse which is non-adaptive, fungible, even anarchic, and which unlike instinct is capable of undergoing “vicissitudes”.<sup>6</sup>

And yet, as Laplanche has repeatedly shown, however suggestive the *Trieb/Instinkt* distinction might initially appear in the *Three Essays*, Freud's work will henceforth “frequently tend to collapse the drive back into an instinctual model” (Laplanche, 2000a:

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<sup>4</sup> Subsequent to the *Vocabulaire* Laplanche approaches the issue in a much more developed way in *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis* (1970). He has returned to it again in detail in Laplanche (1993) and (2000a).

<sup>5</sup> As Laplanche has pointed out more than once, however, Lacan's well-known assertion that Freud *never* uses the term *Instinkt* is simply wrong.

<sup>6</sup> The German title of Freud's (1915) paper on this subject is *Triebe und Triebschicksale*, which does not refer to instinct (*Instinkt*). As John Fletcher (1999) has pointed out, Strachey's translation of this into “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” is in fact a contradiction in terms, since instinct cannot, strictly speaking, undergo the *schicksale* of which Freud speaks (25).



11).<sup>7</sup> Freud's explicit endorsement of Strachey's conflation of *Trieb* and *Instinkt* in the single word "instinct" is instructive here. But the progressive "instinctualisation of the sexual", as Laplanche terms it, is also abundantly identifiable in Freud's own writing (Laplanche, 2003: 26). Most obviously, one can track the increasingly "organized" account of infantile sexuality in the successive re-editions of the *Three Essays* (in 1910, 1915, 1920 and 1924). Here, in contrast to the account given in the first edition,<sup>8</sup> we see an ever deepening emphasis on progressive "stages" of sexuality, each with its appointed time of efflorescence, biologically grounded in the organic development of the soma and teleologically oriented towards genital maturity. This movement reaches its apogee in Freud's second theory of the drives, first set out in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920). From this point on sexuality becomes entirely assimilated to what Freud now refers to as the "life drives" (*Lebenstrieb*), to reproductive functioning and thus to the survival of the species. In this connection, Laplanche is quick to point out the contradiction in Freud's two major invocations of the Aristophanic myth of the hermaphrodite from Plato's *Symposium*. In the *Three Essays* of 1905 this myth is attacked precisely insofar as it relates to the "popular" opinion of sexuality as a preformed instinct for reproduction. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* it is cited as the very model of sexuality under the rubric of what Freud now calls "Eros" (Laplanche, 1996: 46ff.).

Thus, although Freud continues to use the term *Trieb* in the context of the second "drive" theory (*Lebenstrieb*: "life drive"; *Todestrieb*: "death drive") its original specificity has been lost, and with the postulation of "Eros" we are in fact decisively back in the domain of instinct. The importance of this from our perspective is that the progressive instinctualization of the drives entails the inevitable corollary of an *animalization* of them. Animals are thus increasingly called upon as the behavioral model and biological guarantor of human drives. Sexuality as Eros now emerges as a fixed, adaptive impulse shared by human and non-human beings alike, illustrated and authorized by Freud's "admiring invocation" of animal behaviors – "of the great animal migrations, the upstream climbs of salmon [...] migrating birds impelled by instinct" (Laplanche, 1993: 120). In a word, what Laplanche characterizes as Freud's great biologizing *fourvoiment* (1993) is accompanied by an increasing emphasis on the kinship between human and animal in which the drive risks being depleted of its erstwhile specificity. Thus by 1925 – in a paper which again invokes Copernicus and Darwin – Freud cites precisely this emphasis as one of the major causes of

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<sup>7</sup> Quotations from this essay and others collected in the volume *Sexual: la sexualité élargie au sens freudien*, are taken from the forthcoming English translation, *Freud and the Sexual: Essays 2000–2006*, trans. Jonathan House and Nicholas Ray; ed. John Fletcher (International Psychoanalytic Books, 2012).

<sup>8</sup> On the evolution of the *Three Essays* across its re-editions see Laplanche (2005).

“resistance to psychoanalysis”. His critics, he observes (filtered by Strachey’s translation), bridle at the scandalous psychoanalytic revelation that all “cultural achievements”, including “art, religion and social order”, are “derived from elementary animal [*elementaren animalischen*] instinctual sources [*Triebquellen*]” (Freud, 1925: 269).

### **Resituating Instinct and Drive I: “The Fundamental Anthropological Situation”**

One of Laplanche’s principal concerns has been to resist this biologizing reduction of drive to instinct, and thus to disintricate and develop the specific character of Freud’s earliest formulations of the *Triebe*. In the following two sections we shall explore the means by which he does this under the Copernican rubric of his “general theory of seduction” – a critical resumption and expansion of the theory of traumatic seduction (*Verführungstheorie*) famously developed then abandoned by Freud in the mid-late 1890s.<sup>9</sup> Our preoccupation in this, however, will be with the implications of Laplanche’s position with respect to the so-called question of the animal. As a theoretical endeavor, Laplanche’s project in this regard is, of course, fraught with problems. For if the drive is one of the major conceptual sites on which Freud will increasingly assert the supposedly scandalous kinship between human and non-human animals, the effort to resituate drive with respect to instinct can easily collapse into the most traditional form of anthropocentrism, merely re-inscribing and re-securing the caesura between man and animal. In order to address this critical issue in some detail, let us examine some of Laplanche’s fundamental propositions about the human animal.

From his earliest to his most recent metapsychological work, Laplanche has labored to situate his account of seduction within a field that is peculiarly human. In his first major monograph on metapsychology, *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis*, the early chapters on sexuality and seduction offer several attempts to differentiate between, for example, “the elementary vital mechanisms in the newborn infant” and “what happens in animals” (Laplanche, 1970: 47), or the “denaturation of sexuality in humans in relation to animals” (35). In this regard, Laplanche’s remarks in *Life and Death* sometimes risk the appearance of a fairly standard brand of generalized anthropocentrism. The tradition to which I refer is the one scrutinized by Jacques Derrida (2002 and 2004), in which the category of “the animal” appears massively undifferentiated – a violently homogenizing terminological repository for every non-human living being, which is almost invariably pressed into service as a means of

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<sup>9</sup> Among Freud’s key works on seduction see esp. the case of ‘Emma’ in Freud (1895) and Freud (1896).

shoring up differentially the ontological specificity of *Homo sapiens*. Such a categorization, Derrida argues – bridging the putative gap between theory and praxis – “is not simply a sin against rigorous thinking, vigilance, lucidity or empirical authority; it is also a crime [...] against animals” (2002: 416). In recent years, Laplanche’s insistence on the specificity of the human situation – at least as far as psychoanalysis and theory are concerned – has only deepened, with Laplanche increasingly positing the general theory of seduction alongside what he terms the “fundamental anthropological situation”. However, this still more explicit emphasis on the anthropological has in fact gone hand in hand with an effort to refine the human/animal differentiation posited in his earlier material, and to supply, vis-à-vis this differentiation, precisely the conceptual rigor, clarity and vigilance whose absence Derrida rightly equates to a violence. It is from this that we shall take our bearings in examining Laplanche’s metapsychological positions in depth.

A first point on which to lay emphasis is that the category of instinct, as a point of contact between human and non-human animals, remains an essential dimension of Laplanche’s thought and, significantly, of the fundamental anthropological situation. There are two aspects to this, which we shall deal with in turn. First of all, self-preservation.<sup>10</sup>

In Laplanche’s account an instinct for self-preservation is shared by all living beings. However, he makes a critical distinction between those self-preservative behaviors which require the intervention of an other and those which do not. In the latter category he includes automatic functions, such as the homeostatic operations which maintain the level of carbon dioxide or serum glucose in the blood. Among the self-preservative behaviors which cannot operate autonomously he includes the need for warmth, food and attachment. It is among these behaviors that we begin to witness more emphatic differentiations between species, since it is first of all on this territory that different levels of communication between infant and adult are made necessary. For example, in respect of warmth there is an essential difference between homeotherms and poikilotherms. Homeotherms, unlike cold-blooded animals, have the ability to maintain a specific internal temperature, but this ability is imperfect at the outset; it has to be developed in a gradual fashion and requires the intervention of the parent animal. Thus, “[n]ewly hatched fishes (poikilotherms) have no need of the other, but homeothermic species (which are only imperfectly homeothermic at birth) must communicate in order to maintain warmth” (Laplanche, 2000a: 16). Similarly, the instinctual insufficiency of certain animals requires greater communication with the parent

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<sup>10</sup> I shall address the second aspect in the following section.

than others, such as, for example, nesting chicks which must be fed by the mother, in contrast to newly hatched chickens which immediately begin to peck on the ground for food themselves (Laplanche, 1987: 97).

On Laplanche's view, what distinguishes the human in this context is, critically, the *extent* of its instinctual insufficiency at birth. His gesture here is certainly comparable with that made by Lacan in his early text on "The Mirror Stage". There, Lacan deploys a wealth of secondary ethological research on animal maturation and mimicry in order to support his account of the infant's imaginary capture by its mirror image. But, as is well known, Lacan also distinguishes the young human from the privileged examples of the pigeon, the locust and the monkey on account of the "dehiscence at the very heart of the [human] organism", the human's "*specific prematurity of birth*" (Lacan, 1949: 78) i.e. precisely its inability to fulfill certain of its instinctual functions in an autonomous fashion. It is worth emphasizing in this context, however, precisely how it is that in attempting to conceptualize the human from his own ethologically informed perspective, Laplanche's account of the human being remains very much an account of a "human animal". For not only does Laplanche recall the autonomous instinctual functioning which links human beings to the most elementary living organisms; he stresses that the other insufficiencies of the instinct for self preservation within humans – the point on which Lacan, and Freud before him, laid emphasis – are definitively *not* peculiar to *Homo sapiens*. Thus, before any differentiation which might isolate the ontological specificity of the *anthropos*, the human being is for Laplanche characterized by its kinship with other homeothermic animals whose instinctual mechanisms necessitate a significant degree of interaction with the (adult/parental) other. That is to say, ontologically speaking, that the human/animal distinction must be regarded as secondary to a more elementary differentiation between species in which individual survival depends upon parental interaction and communication, and species in which it does not.<sup>11</sup>

It is, then, on the basis of this prior differentiation that what Laplanche calls the "fundamental anthropological situation" emerges. In what does it consist? Firstly, and on the side of the infant, there is the sheer extent of functional or instinctual dependence, which exceeds that of other non-human animals. The need for communication and interaction with the adult world is an essential point of contact between *Homo sapiens* and many other animal species, "but it perhaps man", argues Laplanche, "who has the greatest need for [such]

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<sup>11</sup> It is worth noting Laplanche's support for the claim of Michel Juvet that the dividing line between animals which dream and animals which do not is the same line as that dividing homeotherms and poikilotherms. "It seems to me", Laplanche argues, "that this dividing line is also that between species that rely on infant/adult communication and species that do not" (Laplanche, 2000a: 16–17).

interaction” (Laplanche, 2000a: 17). In support of this claim, Laplanche frequently calls on the evidence of experimental psychology and on Freud’s intuitive discussions of the human infant’s *Hilflosigkeit* (helplessness). A typical example is the absence in the child of any adaptive notion of danger or fear.<sup>12</sup> Human beings are in no sense the only animals which come into the world insufficiently adapted to its elementary exigencies, but they are the least well-equipped in this respect. With regard to instinctual functioning at least, the anthropological situation is made distinct on the side of the infant by virtue of a quantitative rather than specifically qualitative difference.

It is on the side of the adult in the infant/adult relation that a qualitative difference from non-human animals does emerge. If the peculiar dependency of the human infant makes its exposure to adult intervention and communication more prolonged and intensive, the developmental imbalance between the two protagonists also makes the adult intervention peculiarly *enigmatic*.

In this connection it is worth recalling a short excerpt from Freud’s great anthropological work *Totem and Taboo*, which, tellingly, Laplanche takes as an epigraph to his expository essay on “The Theory of Seduction and the Problem of the Other”:

Children [says Freud] have no scruples over allowing animals to rank as their equals. Uninhibited as they are in the avowal of their bodily needs, they no doubt feel themselves more akin to animals than to their elders, who may well be enigmatic to them. (Quoted in Laplanche, 1997b: 653).

What is notable about this fortuitous passage is the suggestion that the relationship between children and animals is in fact more symmetrical than that between children and adults of the same species. In other words, the adult human other is more other to the infant than is the animal! This is because the human adult is first of all other to himself: that is, he is possessed of that “other thing” (*das Andere*) which psychoanalysis names the unconscious. The infant, on the other hand, is not. For Laplanche, this point is *the* great theoretical repression which has inhibited the Copernican project of psychoanalysis, within and since Freud; and it is on the basis of its recognition that Laplanche’s “general theory of seduction” is founded. The little human shares with other infant homeotherms an essential dependence on the adult world. But the presence of an unconscious in the human adult (as distinct from non-human adults)

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<sup>12</sup> “The behavior of a young child faced with a void can be compared with that of a young bird belonging to a species which normally nests in holes in cliffs. It is a simple experiment: a completely transparent sheet of glass is placed over a hole and the subject is placed on the glass. The baby steps forward as though nothing were wrong, whereas the bird refuses to walk out over the void” (Laplanche, 1987: 99).

places an emphatic dissymmetry at the heart of their relation – a dissymmetry which is more radical than that between animal infant and animal adult, *and more radical even than that between human infant and non-human animal*. The presence of the unconscious in the adult human means that the bilateral exchanges of attachment, whereby the infant's instinctual needs are met, are consistently infiltrated and compromised by the repressed desires and fantasies of the carer. Freud's special or pathological theory of seduction of the 1890s sought to identify datable acts of infantile trauma in which adult sexuality was violently imposed upon or intromitted into a passive victim. Laplanche's general theory, however, removes seduction from the realm of pathology and places it at the heart of normative psychosexual development. In his account, the intrusion of the adult other's sexuality into the infant's world is not a single or punctual event but a structural condition of the human infant's relation to the adult and an indispensable correlative of the other's attention to its basic instinctual requirements.<sup>13</sup>

The attachment relation in humans is therefore never purely functional. Within the very first hours of life, the adult contribution to the care of the infant consists also of verbal and non-verbal *messages* which are "enigmatic" – not only to the little addressee who is unequipped to decode them, but to their originator, since their unconscious sexual determination exceeds his or her intentional capacity. For the infant, the other's enigmatic messages are at once exciting and baffling. They demand an active work of response and interpretation on the part of their recipient. What has been addressed to – or, "implanted" in – him/her by the other must be broken down, bound and integrated. In a letter to Fliess in 1896 Freud proposed a definition of repression as a "failure of translation" (Freud, 1957: 6/12/1896). In Laplanche's view, the work the infant must do with enigmatic messages is specifically a work of translation from verbal and non-verbal adult language. But this labor, like all translation, is necessarily imperfect. It entails, as a by-product, a residual space of non-translation. The unconscious is born of the unmasterable residue of this translation of the other's messages, of the irreducibly opaque elements which remain excluded, unsymbolized and unintegrated by the infant.

Now, this model of originary seduction has massive critical implications for metapsychology, which Laplanche has developed extensively over many years of teaching.

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<sup>13</sup> Laplanche's account of this fundamental relation of human dissymmetry clearly owes much to Freud's colleague Sándor Ferenczi's (1933) well-known elaboration of developmental inequality between the adult and child. Ferenczi's account does, however, remain preoccupied with adults whose behavior towards children is explicitly pathological. Laplanche's development is to insist that even the most quotidian adult behaviors towards the child are parasitized by opaque significations from the parental unconscious. Cf. Laplanche (1993: 77ff).

Given our present concerns, let us stick to examining its implications for the theory of the drives. In Freud's *Three Essays*, where the specificity of the *Triebe* first comes into view, the sexual drives emerge as a natural by-product (*Nebenprodukt*) of the satisfaction of the infant's basic needs and remain anchored to the zones associated with those needs. The paradigmatic example here is the mouth, where the experience of enjoyment concomitant with the instinctual function of sucking at the mother's breast gradually becomes detached from the function and emerges as an enjoyment sought for its own sake, for example in autoerotic activities such as thumb-sucking. But as Laplanche has pointed out, "already in the [non-human] animal, the sites of passage and exchange which are the body's orifices are also the preeminent focus of care and cleanliness" (Laplanche, 1993: 62). Laplanche's account of primal seduction rewrites the Freudian structure significantly, emphasizing the constitutive dissymmetry which he sees as being peculiar to the situation of human animals:

It is because the [human] adult's gestures of self-preservation are the bearers of sexual messages that are unconscious for the adult and unmasterable by the child that, in the so-called erotogenic zones, they produce the movement of splitting and drifting that may lead to autoerotic activity. But the obligatory vehicle of autoeroticism, that which stimulates it and brings it into existence, is the intrusion and then repression of the enigmatic signifiers supplied by the adult. (Laplanche, 1984: 129).

From this perspective the paradigm of the suckling infant may be recast to include an acknowledgement that the breast itself is a sexual organ *for the adult*, and as such is a carrier of maternal fantasy and desire. It is this that introduces the sexual into the infant, but in an essentially opaque fashion which is "impossible to circumscribe" (1984: 128). The uncircumscribable remainder of the enigmatic encounter then constitutes the "source" (*Quelle*) of the drive – or "source-object", as Laplanche re-names it so as to recognize its initially exogenous derivation.

Thus the Laplanchean drive is in effect "a measure of the difference or disequilibrium between what is symbolizable and what is not in the enigmatic messages supplied to the child" (1984: 130). As such, whereas for Freud the source of the drive is the organic stimulation of a localized somatic zone (mouth, anus etc), and something upon which repression will eventually supervene, for Laplanche the drive is itself a consequence of the translation-repression of enigmatic stimulation from the adult world.

In *New Foundations for Psychoanalysis* Laplanche draws a remarkable conclusion from this difference, which is worth stressing in the present context. "If", he argues, "the drive originates in messages [...] we have to conclude that there is no initial or natural

opposition between the dimension of the drive and the intersubjective, or between the dimension of the drive and the cultural [*entre le pulsionnel et l'intersubjectif, entre le pulsionnel et le culturel*]” (1987: 137).<sup>14</sup> In Laplanche’s account, in other words, the drive is definitively not reducible to an internal or purely organic pressure which would subsequently come into conflict with the cultural world; it is the very mark or imprint of the earliest modality of acculturation itself. The entire apparatus of Laplanche’s thought, then, while being founded on an acknowledgement of the instinctual continuity between human and non-human animals, guards rigorously against any “animalization” of drive as such. Drive is neither “elemental” nor “animal”, as Freud is led to describe it in the late paper on “Resistances to Psychoanalysis” cited earlier. It is an *epigenetic acquisition* which marks the very trace of differentiation between human and non-human beings.

### **Resituating Instinct and Drive II: Anthro-Decentering**

The obvious question that this raises from an animal studies perspective is, what in the end prevents this account from becoming another avatar of a very familiar model of theoretical humanism? In spite of the prior emphasis on *Homo sapiens*’ initial *instinctual* continuity with certain animals, to what extent does the Laplanchean drive amount to yet another addition to the vast epistemological repository of what Derrida (2004) calls “propers” – attributes, characteristics or dispositions which are endlessly ascribed to man alone and which ultimately function to shield the privileged ontological integrity of the human being in its very difference from “the animal” (laughter, reason etc)? Does not this apparently *decentered* account of human sexualization work to re-inscribe or essentialize the human/animal divide in such a way as to risk itself the charge of *anthropocentrism*?

Yes and no. There are two major points to be remarked on this head. Firstly: to be sure, Laplanche is not averse to making eminently “deconstructible” claims of precisely the kind of which Derrida is wary;<sup>15</sup> but the implications of his account of human subjectivity are

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<sup>14</sup> I have altered Macey’s translation here. In this passage Macey renders Laplanche’s *pulsionnel* as “instinctual”, which seems to miss Laplanche’s point and revert to the terminological confusion of Strachey’s Freud from which Laplanche is laboring to exit. Since there is no adjectival form of “drive” in English I have opted for “dimension of the drive”, which is inelegant but has at least the virtue of not confusing Laplanche’s precise terminological choice here.

<sup>15</sup> See especially “Time and the Other” (1992b): “[T]here are many things proper to man: *erectus, habilis, sapiens*, or rather *sapiens sapiens*; laughter is proper to man, language is proper to man” (241). On the latter point cf. Laplanche’s extraordinary claim in the otherwise careful paper “Pulsion et instinct” (2000a) that “animals have systems of communication but they do not have true language [*langage vrai*]” (18) – (continued)



further reaching than such explicit but relatively localized statements might initially suggest. While the drives and the unconscious itself are articulated as being “fundamentally anthropological”, Laplanche’s account of their genesis has the virtue of precisely unsettling their putative “properness” to the human being. At various points in his work, and from as early as *Life and Death*, Laplanche has equated the sexualization entailed in originary seduction with *becoming* human. Thus, in one of his most sustained elaborations of his theory of the drives he explicitly describes “the early sexualization of human beings” as a process of “humanization” (Laplanche, 1984: 126). Now, it must be emphasized that Laplanche guards himself against the charge of positing an originally “innocent” moment of infancy by insisting that a phase anterior to the humanizing intrusion of the adult other can only ever be theoretically or speculatively deduced: seduction, Laplanche argues in *Life and Death*, is “primal [...] in the sense that it is so linked to the process of humanization that it is only through abstraction that we can suppose the existence of a small human ‘before’ [it]. For [...] to speak of a child who was initially ‘innocent’ would be to forge a myth exactly symmetrical to the myth of seduction [in Freud’s special or pathological theory of the 1890s]” (1970: 46). In this way Laplanche’s account of primal seduction navigates carefully between on the one hand the Scylla of a metaphysics of innocence, and on the other the Charybdis of psychosexual Ptolemaism in which everything is supposed to come organically or spontaneously from the inside. The drives and the unconscious are *essential to the human animal but without being innate in him*. They are the epigenetic derivatives of an intersubjective process, but one which is always already in motion. As such, if Laplanche posits drive as a distinctive trace of differentiation between human and non-human animals, his account of the origination of drive simultaneously aggravates the notion of its “properness” to the human being. It is an acquisition, a time before which, however, would only ever be hypothetical. What is thus “proper” to the human animal – that which “makes him human” – is also ultimately “improper” to him. A secondary acquisition in relation to which we can only deduce a virtual primary condition, the drives are at once essential *and* non-indigenous, proper precisely insofar as they are improper and structurally derivative.

The second point to emphasize is that if the dimension of drive is, on Laplanche’s view, a distinctive characteristic of the human animal, this does not mark off human sexuality in its entirety from that of non-human animals. It was stated above that there are two aspects

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...a statement which of course only begs the question of what on earth Laplanche means by “true” language. As will be seen below, it is precisely claims of this kind which Derrida criticizes in the account of the symbolic order given by Laplanche’s old teacher Jacques Lacan.

of instinctual life which in Laplanche's account mark points of continuity between human and non-human beings. Having dealt above with the self-preservative instincts, it must be underscored that Laplanche has also placed increasing stress on an innate sexual instinct in humans – an instinct which, once again, represents a major point of contact with “the animal”.

This is the mode of sexuality attendant upon the gonadal maturation of the organism in animals, and no less in human animals from the time of adolescence. This sexuality is fully instinctual insofar as it relates to organic changes in the body and leads to “sexual behaviors that are more or less pre-programmed and are aimed at the self-preservation of the species” (2000b: 43). The peculiarity of human sexuality thus consists not in the absence of innate instinctual impulses but in the paradoxical fact that in the human being the acquired – the drives – emerges chronologically prior to adolescent flourishing of the innate. It must be pointed out, moreover, that the sexual instinct is in no sense the “legitimate heir” (48) of human drive sexuality upon which it supervenes: “the sequence of infantile stages described by Freud”, Laplanche avers, “is a barely credible fiction” (44). The sexual instinct emerges as a “rupture” rather than as a continuation of infantile sexuality (2000a: 22). The two categories are marked by irreducible qualitative differences with respect to the object (instinct aiming at the “complementary” total-object of the opposite sex; drive impelled by the repressed fragmentary source-object)<sup>16</sup> and with respect to the economy of enjoyment (instinct tending towards orgasm and the reduction of tension; drive tending towards the pursuit of excitation). At adolescence, then, we have not the apogee of infantile sexuality but the “confluence of two rivers [... with ...] nothing to guarantee their harmonious convergence” (2000a: 23).

The drives must be integrated into the instinct – Laplanche sometimes invokes the Freudian example of their being redeployed in “forepleasure” – but there is no organic determination which would secure this articulation coherently. The integration of the drives into the instinct is thus always only partial. Total non-integration, of course, characterizes what Freud in the *Three Essays* names the “fixation on preliminary sexual aims”, and thus perversion. On the other hand, Laplanche has asked in a brief but suggestive observation in “Pulsion et instinct”: “if the drive's pursuit of excitation were completely integrated into the sexual instinct, what would become of human creativity?” (2000a: 24). The implications of this question are relatively straightforward if it is taken on its own: sublimation operates not

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<sup>16</sup> Laplanche derives the term “complementary” from Philippe Gutton. While recognizing the term's usefulness, Laplanche's wariness about normalizing the heterosexual impulse it describes is indicated by his tendency to retain quotation marks around it. See Laplanche (2000a: 22). It may be added that although Laplanche acknowledges the existence of a reproductive instinct, it loses any heterocentric claim to ontological privilege – not least of all by virtue of its secondary moment of emergence once the libidinal field is already saturated by the polymorphous drives.

upon the instinct – which is not susceptible to transformational “vicissitudes”<sup>17</sup> – but upon unintegrated remainders of the demands of drive sexuality. However, its significance for us emerges in its distance from the position taken by Freud in “Resistances to Psychoanalysis”. In “Resistances...”, it will be recalled, Freud imputes the scandalous character of psychoanalysis to its demonstration that even our greatest “cultural achievements” derive from what is most animal within us. Laplanche’s account turns this Freudian model on its head. Cultural production is not the sublimated artifact of what is most animal in human beings. On the contrary, cultural production is the sublimated trace of what within man has not been adequately integrated or assimilated into what is most “animal”.

In order to underline the importance of this reconfiguration it is instructive to make a further brief diversion through Derrida, and specifically his discussion of Lacan – Laplanche’s erstwhile teacher – in *The Beast and the Sovereign* (2004). Derrida recognizes a number of significant points of resistance to anthropocentrism in Lacan’s thought. However, apropos of the symbolic order, which in Lacanian theory – as distinct from Laplanche’s model of seduction – forms the great constitutive acquisition of the human being, Derrida criticizes the anthropocentric limitations which organize its elaboration. Lacan’s exposition in the “Rome Discourse” (1953), Derrida argues, distinguishes human from animal forms of communication on the basis of an uneasy correlative separation between “reaction” and “response”. The “codes” and “system[s] of signaling” which in Lacan’s view form animal communication allow only for a reactivity which is fixed and programmed, whereas the language of human beings enables subjective, non-programmed responses to the other (quoted in Derrida, 2004: 116). Judiciously, Derrida is less concerned with endowing non-human animals with subjectivity or an unconscious as Lacan defines them in the human than with demonstrating that the division between reaction and response – far from being simply commensurate with the distinction between human and animal – is a division already structural to human communication. One of his essential moves in this connection is to invoke Lacan’s own claims elsewhere that the symbolic order is itself “the code of the Other” from which “the subject receives even the message he emits” (quoted in Derrida, 2004: 120) – which means that at least a minimal reactivity cannot be expelled from any putatively “responsive” human signifying act.<sup>18</sup> In a long footnote, Derrida reflects more generally on

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<sup>17</sup> See note 6 above.

<sup>18</sup> In this connection compare the extreme formulations of a Lacanian text such as the “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’”: “the signifier’s displacement determines subjects’ acts, destiny, refusals, blindnesses, success, and fate [...], and [...] everything pertaining to the psychological pre-given follows willy-nilly the signifier’s train [...]” (Lacan, 1956: 21).

the exclusive imputation of reactivity and “hardwired behavior” to non-human animals; not, he insists, with the aim of bestowing animals with the responsivity which has thus been theoretically denied them – “even though that is sometimes possible” – but in order to ask whether “the same type of analysis could claim just as much relevance in the case of man, for example in the ‘wiring’ of his sexual and reproductive behavior” (116 n. 35).

While Laplanche’s thought does endeavor to think the human being in its distinctness from other animals, it thus represents a significant advance on certain aspects of the Lacanian model, and along precisely the lines Derrida here suggests. To be sure, Laplanche’s work affirms the heterogeneity of drive and instinct; but one of its most significant strengths from an animal studies perspective consists in its emphatic refusal to identify that difference exclusively with a binary separation between non-human and human animals, the one being confined to “hardwired” patterns of sexual behavior, the other defined specifically by its irreducibility to such hardwiring. The division between drive and “animal” instinct already inhabits, and in a constitutive fashion, the sexual conflict identified with the specifically “human” domain of being.

Thus Laplanche’s metapsychology at once “humanizes” drive, even as it undermines its very properness to the human, and carefully re-inscribes the constitutive function of a “hardwired” sexual instinct whose behavioral fixity humanistic thought has traditionally ascribed to animals. What these points enable us to observe is that Laplanche’s thought simultaneously guards against a naïve conflation of human and non-human animals *and* theoretically repositions their profound instinctual kinship in a subtler yet more trenchant way. Insofar as it thus links the radical decentering of subjectivity to that which is “fundamentally anthropological”, the general theory of seduction ought to be characterized as *anthropo-decentric* without being anthropocentric in any unreconstructed sense. Laplanche does not seek as it were to throw out the Darwinian baby with the bathwater of psychoanalytic Ptolemaism. In spite of *certain* appearances, his work does not repudiate the “Darwinian revolution” which Freud was so fond of invoking; it resituates the function of that revolution more rigorously and consistently within a renewed theory of the human subject – a subject whose very “humanness” is as derived and internally conflicted as it is essential.

### **The Animal and the Beast: Bio-ideo-logy**

Having explored Laplanche’s ongoing endeavor to recast the psychoanalytic understanding of the biological kinship between human and non-human animals, I would like, finally, to touch

on his related treatment of what he describes as the bio-ideo-logical position of animals as a point of reference in man – an aspect of his thought that meshes suggestively with certain key claims that have emerged within the field of critical animal studies.

Laplanche's account of psychic translation positions the human as a hermeneutic, self-theorizing animal, continuously endeavoring to narrativize and process the other's alterity and, eventually, its own. But the operation of translation does not presume that the human being translates in a vacuum. It is enabled by "narrative structures, codes and myths offered to the infant by the social world" (1998: 29). These schemas – insofar as they derive from the social world – are not innocent or objective but ideologically tendentious. "[Their] knowledge value [...] is non-existent", Laplanche observes, "but their potential for binding and giving form is undeniable" (29). His elaboration of their function leads to a critical relocation of many of the most sacrosanct components of psychoanalytic theory. He takes psychoanalysis to task for having consistently misrecognised as irreducible structures or primal fantasies what are in fact "infantile sexual theories", facilitated by such culturally offered codes, whose function is essentially defensive. On Laplanche's view even structures such as castration and the Oedipus must be theoretically resituated accordingly. Far from being sources of anxiety, these represent translational schemas called upon by the little human to *master* anxiety and bind the enigmas which impinge upon it, initially from the outside world and then increasingly from within its own psychic recesses.<sup>19</sup>

In his lecture "Psychanalyse et biologie" (1997a) Laplanche suggests that perhaps the most pervasive and enduring of the myths and codes available to the human being in his ongoing task of self-theorization is a bio-logy (*bio-logie*) – not the science of biology but an evolving and ideologically freighted set of theories about living beings (*vivants*), which it has sometimes been the mistake of psychoanalysis to confuse with biology proper. One of the

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<sup>19</sup> To take the example of Oedipus, Laplanche argues that the classical formulation of the complex, which positions the little Oedipus as source and agent of the drives in question, contains a profound "misattribution" with regard to its initiation, since "the [original] initiator of messages bearing sexuality is actually the parent. The incestuous one, potentially, is the adult" (Laplanche, 2006a: 297). Instead of perceiving the Oedipus as a complex of (endogenous) libidinal impulses, Laplanche perceives it as first and foremost a "system of self-theorization" – one among many offered culturally to the individual since childhood and deployed hermeneutically by him as a means of binding and synthesizing the enigmatic adult stimuli by which he is interpellated. The misattribution which characterizes the classic Oedipus is thus in fact the mark of rudimentary subjective re-elaboration and even narrative systematization on the part of the individual. It is the mark of a hermeneutic process in which the enigmatic stimulation of the fundamental anthropological situation is reconfigured and partially mastered, the individual's originary passivity becoming masked over by the imaginative assumption of the active role of the "hero", of the "subject" and no longer just the "object" of desire. Laplanche's discussion of the castration theory as the child's defensive means of stabilizing the complexity of gender is also discussed in Laplanche (2006a), and in greater detail in Laplanche (2003). An incipient version of these arguments, which have taken center stage in Laplanche's work, is already legible in the early paper with Pontalis (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1964).

most significant aspects of such foundational bio-theorization – certainly its most “universal” aspect (138) – is its constitutive role in “forging a myth of animality” (139). In this connection, Laplanche insists on the necessity of distinguishing between “the animal” (*l’animal*) as an empirical entity and “the beast” (*la bête*) as a wholly ideological formation that defensively regulates the human relation to “the animal”. He offers two key illustrations of this structure. Firstly, in relation to classical myth Laplanche cites the Minotaur – a hybrid of man and bull who, in molesting as well as devouring his victims, is at once grossly sexualized and an embodiment of cruelty. Secondly, he cites the wolf as a figure of voracious savagery. Here he acknowledges the classical adage *Homo homini lupus* (“man is a wolf to man”) which is taken up by Hobbes, and later by Freud in *Civilization and its Discontents* in support of the claim that the “horrors” and “atrocities” of history “[reveal] man as a savage beast” (Freud, 1930: 69).<sup>20</sup> Here, however, Laplanche attempts to separate biological reality from the defensive work of human self-theorization. He observes that what is imputed to the *beast* within man (the bull component of the Minotaur; the savage wolf inside us all) has little to do with the biological *animals* which such imputations invoke: “the wolf, the *real* wolf, is cruel neither to other wolves, nor to its victims, nor to man”; its attitude to its prey is – with “rare exceptions”, Laplanche cautiously adds – governed by a need for self-preservation and not by the sheer enjoyment of destruction (1997a: 138–139).<sup>21</sup> Thus, paradoxically the category of the beast, of the bestial, emerges as the displaced expression of what is “proper” – with all the caveats indicated above – to man: that is, precisely, the unconscious and the sexual drives (*sexuel pulsionnel* (141)):

Man is sometimes a beast [*bête*] [...], depraved and sexual. He is often a cruel Leviathan; and more often still he is both. But this reference back to the animal is purely ideological: it allows us to discharge our own unconscious by attributing it to the non-human within us, to the so-called “pre-human” which would be hidden deep inside, while in reality it is man who has created within him this bestial non-human, this *it/id* [*ça*]. (1997a: 139).

Laplanche’s point here, of course, resonates with positions set out by animal liberationist thinkers vis-à-vis the “lies” (Dunayer, 2001: 1) and “ideological camouflages” (Singer, 1995: 186) that inhabit the fabric of normative discourse, nourish everyday speciesist presuppositions and rhetorically legitimate speciesist practices. Despite appearances,

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<sup>20</sup> Laplanche’s reflections on the *lupus* may owe something to Lacan’s discussion of the same adage (Lacan, 1950: 120ff.). If so, the debt goes unacknowledged.

<sup>21</sup> This and subsequent passages from the same essay use my own translation.

Laplanche insists, the acknowledgement of what is called human “bestiality” in fact has a reflexive and stabilizing function whereby man narcissistically misrecognises both himself and the animal. The ostensible acknowledgement of the scandal of drive sexuality and unconscious desire is immediately undermined by their being simultaneously imputed to what is inhuman within us. As such, the “humanness” of the human being is left ultimately intact – defined precisely *in opposition* to a supposedly animalistic core – while the animal is made to represent tendencies with which its peculiar alterity can only very rarely, if ever, be said to be compatible.

The constitutive role of this speciesist myth of animality is clearly indicated in Laplanche’s claim that the “whole history [of man] is the history of emancipation from the order of living beings [*vivants*]” (143). In this recognition his thought also, and perhaps surprisingly, comes close to that of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben.<sup>22</sup> In *The Open* (2002) Agamben offers a description of the human being as “*the animal that must recognize itself as human to be human*” (26; Agamben’s italics). Critically, this imperative is not simply a matter of determining how other animals are not human – although this is inevitably entailed. Agamben is more preoccupied with the ways in which epistemological separations of that kind are made possible because “the caesura between the human and the animal passes first of all within man” (16):

It is possible to oppose man to other living things, and at the same time to organize the complex – and not always edifying – economy of relations between men and animals, only because something like an animal life has been separated within man, only because his distance and proximity to the animal have been measured and recognized first of all in the closest and most intimate place. (15–16).

In other words, the systematization of the differences between humans and animals is a correlative of man’s own bio-political (or, “bio-ideological”) endeavor to distinguish between what is human and what is animal within him. Far from the traditional conception of a conjunction of body and soul, nature and *logos*, the human being on Agamben’s account is constituted as a result of an *internal separation* between human and animal. Agamben identifies two major modalities of the operations of this process, which he strikingly

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<sup>22</sup> In the space available I am unable to develop a further, related area of interest shared by Laplanche and Agamben: the figure of the werewolf. Laplanche’s rich but condensed account of the fantasy of the werewolf as the untranslated “residue” of the domestication of the dog (1996: 58–59 n. 12) no doubt warrants sustained and detailed comparison with Agamben’s more overtly political discussion of the *wargus* as “outlaw” in *Homo Sacer* (1995: 104–111).

describes in terms of an “anthropological machine”. Its modern modality functions by isolating the non-human within the human and is legible in, for example, the figures of the Jew under National Socialism or the so-called “neomort” of contemporary biomedicine. The pre-modern modality is exemplified, symmetrically, in “the non-man [...] produced by the humanization of the animal: the man-ape, the *enfant sauvage* or *Homo ferus*, but also and above all, the slave, the barbarian and the foreigner as figures of the animal in human form” (37). In both configurations one can recognize the determination of the familiar Agambenian figure of “bare life” (Agamben, 1995: *passim*) – a biopolitically circumscribed domain of existence which must be transcended, mastered or transformed in order for “humanness” to reflexively supervene.

The closeness of Agamben and Laplanche thus consists in a vigilance they share with anti-speciesist thinkers and activists vis-à-vis the creation of zones of “exception” within man, on the basis of which he at once stabilizes himself narcissistically and excises or disavows some essential aspect of his being. For both Laplanche and Agamben, the need to interrogate the ideological apparatuses which produce these zones is inseparable from the project of rethinking the human/animal relation as it appears “in the real”. Laplanche observes, of course, that “even Freud did not escape” the gravitational pull of the bio-ideological myth of animality that he (i.e. Laplanche) outlines (1997a: 139). And Freud’s progressive “animalization” of the drives is a veritable exemplum within psychoanalysis itself of exactly the reflexive production of the mythical “beast within” which Laplanche and Agamben set forth. It thus represents a deeply problematic conflation of “theories”: the self-stabilizing theorization of the human individual adopted into, and so perpetuated by, the supposedly *analytical* apparatus of Freudian theory.

The anthro-decentrism of Laplanche’s work is not simply a reconfigured humanism, since it is oriented towards resisting at the level of formal theory those constitutive myths of the animal-in-man which, beyond their superficial audacity, function primarily to insulate the category of the human. If any traction is to be gained on the broad critical questions with which we opened, regarding the consistency and vigilance of psychoanalytic delimitations of man and animal, an essential starting point is to ask how deeply the constitutive myth of the beast pervades the rhetoric and the conceptual apparatuses of psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalysis undoubtedly warrants a position within the project of critical animal studies, but it must continue to rethink the human/animal relation and to retain a critical distance from the tendentious “camouflages” of thought and the almost ineluctable bio-ideologies which have sometimes obscured its thinking. The general theory of seduction stresses the radical



alterity of what is “fundamentally anthropological”, even as it productively complicates the human/animal relation and urges a consistent vigilance with respect to the risks of any such theoretical formulations. As such, Laplanche’s “new foundations for psychoanalysis” offer one very rigorous means for post-Freudian thought to resist becoming another cog in the great “anthropological machine”.

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## **The Dialectical Animal: Nature and Philosophy of History in Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse**

**Marco Maurizi<sup>1</sup>**

A cross section of today's social structure would have to show the following: At the top, the feuding tycoons of the various capitalist power constellations. Below them, the lesser magnates, the large landowners and the entire staff of important co-workers. Below that, and in various layers, the large numbers of professionals, smaller employees, political stooges, the military and the professors, the engineers and heads of office down to the typists; even further down what is left of the independent, small existences, craftsmen, grocers, farmers e tutti quanti, then the proletariat, from the most highly paid, skilled workers down to the unskilled and the permanently unemployed, the poor, the aged and the sick. It is only below these that we encounter the actual foundation of misery on which this structure rises, for up to now we have been talking only of the highly developed capitalist countries whose entire existence is based on the horrible exploitation apparatus at work in the partly or wholly colonial territories, ie, in the far larger part of the world. [...] Below the spaces where the coolies of the earth perish by the millions, the indescribable, unimaginable suffering of the animals, the animal hell in human society, would have to be depicted, the sweat, blood, despair of the animals. [...] The basement of that house is a slaughterhouse, its roof a cathedral, but from the windows of the upper floors, it affords a really beautiful view of the starry heavens. (Horkheimer, 1985: 379-380; 1978: 66-67)

### **Abstract**

This article describes the role played by animals in Adorno's, Horkheimer's and Marcuse's Theory of Dominion. Critical Theory identifies the shortcomings of Civilization with the mysterious process that bounds and opposes Man and Animal, Nature and History. All the 'noble' fulfilments of human history are thus born out of an ontological and symbolic exclusion of the 'not-human'. As humans begin to exploit 'outer' nature and cultivation of 'inner' nature start to distinguish them from the other animals, they also begin to conceive of themselves as not-animals. Accordingly, uncontrolled nature ends up representing the 'bestiality' that threatens the pureness of the spirit or the 'object' of scientific manipulation that is destined to be scrutinized and reduced to the planning schemes of instrumental reason. These conclusions have nothing to do with fantasies of a 'return to nature'. It surely unmasks

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the 'ideological' function of human 'Culture', seeing in its higher 'values' a justification of social oppression and violence against nature. At the same time, far from resorting to 'reductionist' conclusions, it asserts that any idea of Good implies the need to 'transcend' nature. Civilization is at its best an unsteady synthesis of both drives: although being a 'superstructure' of repression, concepts like 'Reason', 'Good' and 'Justice' express also the human protest against violence and death as we experience them in natural relations.

**Keywords:** Civilization, Dominion, Nature, Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse

### **The Frankfurt School and the Animal Question**

With the publication of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* in 1944 Adorno and Horkheimer laid down the theoretical ground of what was later to become the 'Frankfurt School'. The book proposed a devastating critique of 'instrumental reason' and of man's 'mastery of nature', a critique that – in Adorno's and Horkheimer's intention – was directed against the industrial and scientific praxis of manipulation of nature that was progressing on *both* sides of the Iron Curtain. Although not interested in a metaphysical critique of *Technik*, Adorno and Horkheimer shared Heidegger's and Anders' opinion about the political neutrality of instrumental reason. In their view, USA and USSR were both growing on a wrong premise: that nature is at our complete and arbitrary disposal. Even Marcuse, whose political commitment with revolutionary Socialism is well known, assumed a position against the idea of an unlimited exploitation of nature, and instead endorsed what was later to become the German Green Movement in the late 70s.

With PETA's campaign 'Holocaust on your plate', even Adorno has gained some acknowledgment in the animal rights movement, contributing some beloved quotes along with an endless list of 'famous personalities' who are either vegetarians or say something smart in favor of animals. Unfortunately, most animal rights activists prefer to read his carefully manufactured quote on slaughterhouse, than to engage in any serious reading of his difficult prose.<sup>2</sup> This is a shame, because – as I will try to show here – there's much more that Adorno (along with Horkheimer and Marcuse) could contribute toward a better understanding of our relationship with nature and to animal studies in general.

Herein I shall underscore that thanks to their dialectical and dynamic understanding of nature Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse have enabled us to escape the alternative between

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<sup>2</sup> See PETA's campaign *Holocaust on your Plate* that used, for purely agitatory ends, a sentence falsely attributed to Adorno (Patterson, 2002; 51). For an antispeciesist critique of this misuse of Adorno see Susann Witt-Stahl, *Auschwitz liegt nicht am Strand von Malibu und auch nicht auf unseren Tellern - Kritische Anmerkungen zum "KZ-Vergleich"*, <http://www.tierrechts-aktion-nord.de>.

animal ‘reductionism’ and human ‘exceptionalism’. These critical theorists neither establish an *absolute difference* between humans and non-humans (something that would sever us from the animal kingdom), nor do they preach some sort of *absolute identity* between them. The first option is typical of those who look for intrinsic qualities (such as reason, language, morality, soul etc.) that could be described as specifically human, and can thereby justify the assumption of our uniqueness in nature. According to those who follow the second option, there would be *nothing* in human beings that could distinguish them from other animals; in short: we could (and should) therefore study humans according to the same ethological principles we apply to other animals.

It is clear that what is at stake in the most noble attempts to save our uniqueness from ethological reduction, is a battle for freedom. From the other side, those who campaign against such attempts are guided by the moving intent to defend the armless; seeing in human exceptionalism a way to justify our alleged right to postpone the interests of other species to ours, many animal rights activists are often tempted to welcome scientific findings that explain human behavior in terms of biologically programmed mechanisms. Singer’s commitment with socio-biology is a telling example of this kind of approach (Singer, 1999). Is there a way out of this double bind that presents itself in the guise of a ritual sacrifice? Must we choose, like Descartes<sup>3</sup>, between human freedom and animal lives? I think the Frankfurt School teaches us that such an alternative is apparent.

Critical Theory’s vision of the animal could be defined *anthropopoietic*<sup>4</sup>: according to such view, the animal is essential to the making of man, and ‘man’ is a product of a certain relationship to the ‘animal’. This is not to be intended in merely Darwinian terms: we were indeed – as Rachels remembers – ‘created from animals’ (Rachels, 1990), although such undisputable evidence does not explain the specific role that our *differences* from the other animals plays in the making of the nature/culture opposition. At the same time, this role should neither be understood in merely *symbolic* terms (as happens in ‘zooanthropology’: See R. Marchesini et al., 1999 and C. Tugnoli et al., 2003). Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s conception, as we could derive it from their critique of the Enlightenment [*Aufklärung*]<sup>5</sup>, understands such relationships in a very specific and concrete composition, where both the evolutionist and the symbolic sides of the man/animal difference cooperate in a dialectical

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<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Descartes: “if they [the non-human animals] thought as we do, they would have an immortal soul as we do”. R. Descartes, Letter to the Marquis of Newcastle (Decartes, 2000: 277).

<sup>4</sup> From the Greek *anthropos* (man) and *poiesis* (to make). The expression alludes to the productive role held by the other animals in the making of the human identity.

<sup>5</sup> The German word *Aufklärung* does not simply cover the Enlightenment (*Lumière, Illuminismo*), since it describes the process of ‘rationalisation’ intrinsic to the history of civilization.

theory of animality. Here, 'man' is understood as a *negation* of the animal. In the relationship between human and non-human, this 'non' is conceived as a generative otherness; a process of making of both the 'human' and the meaning of his human-like experience as human. It is the man/animal relationship that produces the human *Self* through the constant negation of its animal Other. As I shall henceforth propose, the pretext for such *symbolic* and *real* negation of the animal is ultimately the domination of nature.

Adorno's and Horkheimer's theory is also dialectical since it tries to articulate the relation between theory and praxis: it shows how the most noble and speculative ideas in human culture are deeply rooted in the domination of nature and, therefore, have a practical, although hidden, trigger. At the same time, this leads to the conclusion that theory itself *is* a form of praxis and that any attempt to free ourselves and the rest of nature from oppression, necessary means to start thinking differently, overturning the logic of domination, accepting alterity as the repressed and yet undeletable counterpart of reason.

### **From the Institute for Social Research to the 'Frankfurt School'**

Like many philosophical and cultural labels, it has been often discussed whether the expression 'The Frankfurt School' has a univocal meaning or not. The authors usually held for members of the school were, in some way, affiliated with the Institute for Social Research founded in Frankfurt am Main in 1923 by Felix Weil. Although originally oriented towards 'orthodox' Marxism, under the direction of Max Horkheimer the Institute rapidly broadened its theoretical horizons and became an interdisciplinary research center. The *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* – the Institute's journal – hosted contributions by such diverse figures as Erich Fromm, Leo Löwenthal, Friedrich Pollock, Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Leopold Neumann. Also associated with the Institute were Walter Benjamin, Alfred Sohn-Rethel and Siegfried Kracauer. Because of the political positions and the Jewish origins of many of its members, the Institute was forced to emigrate during the Nazi era. It thus moved to the USA until 1951, when most of its members got back to Germany and the Institute could re-open under Pollock's direction.

After World War II, as the popularity of some of the leading figures of the Institute increased, the expression 'Frankfurt School' became popular in the German sociological and philosophical debate. Admittedly, none of the members of the Institute had ever thought of him/herself in such terms, although the phrase was finally welcomed by Adorno himself (1997c: 351; 1976: 66).

If one assumes a strictly historical point of view, it is clear that no such thing as ‘The Frankfurt School’ exists. It is impossible to recollect all the philosophers, psychologists, economists, sociologists, literary critics, that were actually members or simply collaborators of the Institute under an undisputable and coherent label. Any attempt to outline such philosophical *Weltanschauung* is destined to fail.

It is true that during the late 20s and the 30s, under the direction of Horkheimer, the Institute gave an important contribution to the analysis of capitalist society, working inside a theoretical frame that could be defined a sort of ‘scientific paradigm’ *à la* Kuhn. Facing an international situation that could hardly be explained in purely Marxian terms – such as the impact of modern mass society in Europe, the growing influence of Fascism in Italy and Germany and the dogmatic involution of Russian socialism – Horkheimer managed to direct the collective efforts of the Institute to update its original orthodox Marxist orientation. Instead of simply rejecting Marx, Horkheimer encouraged his colleagues to investigate both the objective and the subjective sides of social reality, the latter being usually dismissed as irrelevant by official communism. Concepts and analysis derived from ‘bourgeois’ thinkers like Nietzsche, Freud, Durkheim or Weber were taken into account, in an attempt to explain social phenomena in a more global and complex way.

What Horkheimer and the other members of the Institute understood as their general ‘philosophy’ during this time was called ‘Critical Theory of Society’. According to Horkheimer (1992; 1975) and Marcuse (1965; 1988), while ‘traditional’ theory relied on a contemplative and unilateral relation between subject and object, a ‘critical’ theory assumed a more practical and dialectical approach. This was a necessary premise of social science, since any attempt to consider the subject of knowledge independent from its object (society) would end up in that kind of subjectivism that Marx had criticized as ideological. At the same time, Critical Theory questions both the economic objectivism of orthodox Communism and Durkheim’s conclusion about the impossibility for the subject of sociology to transcend its social environment. It rather believes that it is possible to *understand* society while trying to *change* it and that the only way to escape the alternative between void rationalism (the subject determines the object) and blind irrationalism (the object determines the subject) is assuming a reciprocal determination of the two poles. Under this respect, although less optimistic about the revolutionary possibilities of the Proletariat in more advanced societies, Critical Theory still derived from Lukács’ *History and Class Consciousness* the necessity of a ‘unity of theory and praxis’.

It is usually remarked that the main theoretical innovation proposed by the Critical Theory in the 20s and 30s was the attempt to merge Freud’s psychoanalysis with Marx’



critique of political economy. As a matter of fact, some contributions to the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* openly drew a parallel between Marx' dialectics between material basis and ideological superstructure of society and Freud's theory of an unresolved tension between the Id and the conscious activity of the individual. The Institute was thus actively working on a new concept of *ideology*, showing the role played by hidden libidinal drives in the organization of modern rational societies: a clear attempt to explain why centuries of civil, moral and material progress couldn't prevent Europe to experience a catastrophic step back into irrationalism.

Anyway, the idea of a parallel reading of Marx and Freud was not specific of the Institute of Social Research at the time (let's just think of the pioneering work of Wilhelm Reich), nor was characteristic of all its members and collaborators: some of them, like Neumann, simply rejected it, some others, like Benjamin, never openly integrated Freudian concepts in their work. It should also be noted that even Erich Fromm – who had produced the most important contributions for the *Zeitschrift* to such parallel reading – eventually left the Institute and his personal attempt to integrate Marxism and psychoanalysis was then openly criticized by Horkheimer, Marcuse and Adorno. Thus, even the formula Marx+Freud could hardly be considered a trademark of the school.

In the end, although I don't think it is possible to use the expression 'Frankfurt School' to describe the thought of *all* the members and collaborators of the Institute during *all* its phases, I suggest it could still be used in its original meaning: it thus describes the theoretical frame of its leading figures during the 50s and 60s, ie the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse. In the following text, I will limit my analysis to these thinkers. In so doing, I am not simply selecting them because of their historical influence. I do believe that the way their work was received in the philosophical and sociological post-war debate was somewhat aware of what they had in common. I suggest that the crucial turning point in the theoretical history of the Institute is in fact the publication of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* with its new, dialectical concepts of reason and nature. It is not for chance that the book appeared after Adorno joined the Institute and begun his intellectual partnership with Horkheimer (while, in the previous years, Horkheimer had tried to outline, along with Marcuse, the broad philosophical vision of Critical Theory). The central thesis of the book – which I will try to articulate in the following pages – laid down the basis for the following years of interdisciplinary work at the Institute. Some of its longtime members, like Marcuse, recognized the great relevance of the book and, although not officially affiliated with the Institute after the emigration, worked in the theoretical path opened by it. Some other, like Fromm, didn't: they simply left the Institute and took a totally different route (it is sufficient,

for instance, to read Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* – written in the same years as *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* and working on very similar themes – to see how traditional, ie anthropocentric and undialectical, is Fromm's treatment of nature). Some others, like Habermas, started as orthodox defenders of Adorno's and Horkheimer's theses, but ended up rejecting their innovative and scandalous core (Whitebook, J., 1994: 65-92).

### **From nature to animals**

In the present essay, while trying to isolate the key elements of Adorno's, Horkheimer's and Marcuse's theory of dominion, I will provide the missing links that could make it fruitful for the animal liberation movement. In its general terms, such theory denounces the reduction of *nature* to mere object of manipulation, showing how its exploitation is strictly related to the oppression of humans. At the same time, these authors often expressed contempt for our mistreatment of *other animals*, underlying the important role played by the repression of animality in the construction of human identity. But how does this open critique of our mastery of nature relate with the more specific sensibility shown by Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse for the violence committed against animals?

Although their comments on animal oppression are constant and sound in their denunciation of anthropocentrism, it is clear that these authors never focused on such specific theme and it is a task of the reader to draw the line between natural and animal oppressions. I will firstly describe the broad theory of dominion as it was sketched by the authors themselves and then try to specify the position of the animal in this general scheme. In doing so, I will rely more on anthropological and historical details than the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* does. Such brief excursus will prove helpful in explaining more concretely how animals contributed to the making of civilization, a process which essentially implies both their material and symbolic oppression (ie, domestication and anthropocentrism). In addition to this, I hope to show that the theory of civilization outlined in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* was sufficiently general to survive more accurate archeological and anthropological research, and that it was enough rooted in historical and natural reality to be something more than a vague, *a priori* philosophy of history.

Finally, a brief methodological remark. Some readers might find the following discussion lacking of a clear definition of what Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse intended with the word 'nature'. Although it is usually better to help the reader with a preliminary definition of the technical terms used, I think it is not possible to do so in the present case. As

a matter of fact, one of the central aims of this essay is exactly to explain what Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse understand with that term. Their concept of nature must, therefore, be the conclusion and not the premise of the argumentation. This necessity derives from the structure of the object itself: the authors consider nature not as something static but rather as a process, a becoming. Accordingly, its essence must be described as a dynamic structure, involving phases, tensions between poles and even open possibilities. As a consequence, at the present stage of the essay, nature can only be defined negatively, ie by explaining what nature is *not*. According to Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, nature is neither an external reality (they talk of inner and outer nature), nor is simply identical to culture. As I will try to make clear, the opposition between nature and culture is both real *and* false and the whole process of civilization is a tragic attempt to come to terms with such paradox.

### **The Structure of Domination**

I think it's plausible to distinguish in Adorno and Horkheimer, three main declinations of domination:

1. *Domination upon nature*, articulated in
  - (a) domination of 'external' nature (ie of *non-human* nature);
  - (b) domination of 'internal' nature (ie of human sensibility).
2. Domination upon 'man' itself in terms of *class dominion*.
3. The *hierarchical distinction* between spiritual/intellectual labor and physical labor.<sup>6</sup>

In the first chapter of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that all these forms of oppression, although relatively autonomous and independent, work according to a similar logic. As Hegel pointed out in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, the relation of dominion [*Herrschaft*] implies a hierarchical and oppositional distinction between its terms (Hegel, 1977). Being opposite poles of a mutual relation, the two elements cannot be defined outside it but only exist once the relation itself is established. The dominating pole defines itself as the negation of the dominated one and *vice versa*. According to Adorno and

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<sup>6</sup> A more accurate understanding of the structure of dominion would imply taking into account the oppression of the individual by the collective (the so called process of 'socialization') and the gender oppression. For the sake of brevity we will not discuss them here.

Horkheimer, all the aforementioned forms of domination converge and intertwine in the capitalist mode of production, which can be described as the perfect heir of an ancient history of sufferance and exploitation which involves the human body and soul, as well as nature as a whole.

The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is thus an amazing attempt to understand the entire history of civilization as a history of domination. Since the book is an attempt to understand the remote causes of the self-destruction of Modernity – it is, in a sense, a *genealogy of Fascism* – the focus of the authors is on the development of *Western* civilization. At the same time, their use of the word civilization [*Zivilisation*] still holds something of the general meaning that was typical of 19<sup>th</sup> century anthropology: it thus indicates, in opposition to ‘barbarism’, the ‘evolution’ from nomadic to sedentary cultures and the birth of written history and cumulative knowledge. Adorno and Horkheimer were, in a way, foreshadowing Lévi-Strauss’ distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ societies: “the former seeking, by the institutions they give themselves, to annul the possible effects of historical factors on their equilibrium and continuity in a quasi-automatic fashion; the latter resolutely internalizing the historical process and making it the moving power of their development (Lévi-Strauss: 1966: 233–234). Cold societies try to avoid oppositions and conflicts both inside and outside human society: their relation towards nature is respectful and ‘mimetic’. Hot societies, on the contrary, live through inner and outer conflicts: they tend to consider nature an object of exploitation and something exterior to the human spirit. While humanity once lived in what Adorno and Horkheimer called the mimetic stage, some cultures slowly realized the oppositional way of life characteristic of hot societies. In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* such move is sometime evoked through the expression ‘mythical stage’.

In a sense, Adorno and Horkheimer describe the way a particular hot society had become the hottest of all, choosing development for development’s sake as its golden rule. At the same time, they suggest that such move in direction of a purely historical and cultural evolution is *apparent*. The height of Western civilization shows human history moving in a *circle*: far from being a sequel of unpredictable events, history is nothing but the perpetual repetition – under different phenomonic forms – of those domination-relationships upon which the entire structure of human society is built. As we shall see, the same radical opposition between nature and culture – which is one of the driving forces in the development of Western society – is denounced by Adorno and Horkheimer as a terrible *quid pro quo*.

## **The specific role of animals in the general scheme of domination**

A vast amount of time stretches between what Adorno and Horkheimer called the mimetic and the mythical phases of society, ie between animistic nomadism and the birth of primitive centralized States and hierarchical religions. I think one can identify such long period of time with the passage from the Neolithic to the Bronze Age. It is sure, that the transition from nomadic to sedentary society didn't produce in itself the reduction of nature to mere matter (it takes a long time to 'forget' that animals and plants were once worshipped as quasi-divine entities), yet, it did provide its *material basis*. Although 'Neolithic culture'<sup>7</sup> don't conceive itself as totally superior to a disqualified nature, the material side of our domination of nature began with the *domestication of animals* and *agriculture*: thanks to these, nomadic hunter-gatherer societies – economically characterized by simple reproduction – 'evolved' into sedentary societies, starting to exert a growing *control* over natural resources. Domination is not a mere act of violence directed against another being: it implies submission and a loss of independence from the part of the weak member of the relationship. One could describe in terms of domination every kind of regulation of the biological cycles of other species on behalf of our exclusive interest. Such enslavement of non-human nature is the *condition sine qua non* of speciesism, ie the material basis by which humans can consider themselves 'masters'. It is also notable that such step was followed by an amazing *acceleration* in human evolution: between 8000 and 3000 years BC the political, economic, scientific and technological structures of Western civilization were laid down. At the end of such process, we find hierarchical societies where class division is established and a centralized, anthropomorphic religion preaches the superiority of a force that is not immanent to nature (*mana*), but, rather, controls it from above: the spirit [*Geist*]<sup>8</sup>. A male-dominated, hierarchical order, in which religion and philosophy justify Man's supremacy is born.

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<sup>7</sup> Some social anthropologists have borrowed from archaeology the expression 'Neolithic revolution' assuming that the peculiar combination of nature exploitation and social stratification that took place in ancient Mesopotamia is not typical of Western history but is a more general phenomenon. Lévi-Strauss, for instance, considered the 'Neolithic revolution' the necessary (although not sufficient) precondition for the existence of 'hot' societies (Lévi-Strauss: 1966). Anyway, since Adorno and Horkheimer focused themselves on Western civilization, I am here speaking of the Neolithic in archaeological terms, although it could be an interesting task to see how their theory could describe a dynamic intrinsic to human social organisation as such.

<sup>8</sup> In the following pages, the words 'spirit', 'spiritualistic' and 'spiritualism' imply a dualistic, transcendent conception of religion. They all refer to a disincorporate power that is supposed to control nature from the outside. Under this respect, any true animistic notion is not 'spiritualistic', since it doesn't articulate such opposition. It must be noted that the terminology in use among the Institute of Social Research is Hegelian: thus, the opposition between nature and spirit is dialectical and not static. Hegel supposed that the divide between spirit ...and nature was apparent, since nature is nothing but the unconscious activity of the spirit itself. According to Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse the contrary is true: all culture, including its spiritual sublimation, is nothing but natural activity.

As a matter of fact, such sort of dominion of external nature is inseparable from an analogous control exerted on human nature; what we above designated as internal nature. Although these two processes are somewhat independent from one another, it is clear that the *labor discipline* imposed on those humans that moved from hunt-gather economies to primitive state-systems, is only possible when a *psychological mechanism* of control and repression of the instinctual drives is at work. Parallel to the economic transformation of human society, a *political* change takes place: with the birth of a political and religious elite (ie of social strata not directly committed with material production) social relationships begin to be defined in hierarchical terms.

How all this happened is still not clear. Although imbued with deep historical knowledge, the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* doesn't describe the making of Western civilization *historically*. Thus, it is not always easy to understand which are the 'causes' and which are the 'effects' in the process of civilization. The authors are more interested in describing how the different phases of Western civilization articulated the several layers of dominion. When they talk of mimetic or of mythical stage, they are clearly talking of a particular constellation of diverse elements such as the dialectic between culture and nature, reason and sensibility, labor-direction and labor-force etc. Adorno and Horkheimer, however, underline the central position assumed by the exploitation of nature in the making of the entire mechanism of domination. Since this layer of violence and oppression of the non-human-other reaches its peak at the height of civilization, Adorno and Horkheimer believe that it can help us to reconstruct *a posteriori* its secret trigger. Of course, this does not mean that the exploitation of nature is the direct and exclusive cause of human oppression, but it is surely one of its *conditions of possibility*. In other words, it is the necessary (although not sufficient) precondition of it.

This is what Horkheimer likely contemplated when he wrote: "Domination of nature involves domination of man. Each subject not only has to take part in the subjugation of external nature, human and non-human, but in order to do so must subjugate nature in himself. Domination becomes 'internalized' for domination's sake." (Horkheimer, 2004: 64). The structure of dominion is essentially *circular* and *spiral-like*: it is true that our domination of nature made possible the accumulation of social surplus necessary to the birth of political hierarchy and slavery. Alternately, it was the social division of labor (between spiritual/intellectual activities and physical labor) that made possible the elaboration of the knowledge necessary to cement the *exploitation of nature*.

Although spiritual activity and intellectual labor are not synonymous, the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* suggests their respective spheres evolved according to the same logic (ie by

distinguishing what is superior to what is inferior and by giving the first the role of commanding the second) and were often intertwined. They can be therefore considered moments of one and the same process of differentiation and refinement inside human society and the human soul. In such process we see the inferior side of the opposition (be it the body in relation to the soul, the senses in relation to the intellect, slaves or workers in relation to the ruling classes) symbolically marked as natural or animal-like. At the same time, it is precisely such societal, spiritual and intellectual cleavage that increases the accumulation power of society as a whole, thus reinforcing the exploitation rate of animals and plants.

I think we can see all these elements at work in what anthropologists today call ‘chiefdom’, a social organization more developed than a tribe but less complex than a state, where a central authority – which is often religious and political at the same time – organizes the distribution of economic resources. According to some social anthropologists, if the chiefdom is successful in establishing the rule of alienated labor, its religious and political elite can eventually make the leap and give birth to a primitive State. In the early States the central religious and political authority became an institution that not only coordinated the economic efforts of society but that made *profit* out of it. While the majority materially produces all the means of subsistence, the State stores the products of agriculture and feeds those who don’t work (the political and religious elite) or whose work doesn’t produce food: like the metal workers whose manufactures were also dedicated to the elite and reinforced their status. The *temple* – where the resources are stored for redistribution – is often considered to be the axial point of the whole process. The authority of the chiefdom disincorporates and power becomes impersonal; at the same time, the State incarnates the idea of religious transcendence: the abstract product of social antagonism is imposed over society as a being-in-itself. If this corresponds to what really happened, Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s distinction between the mimetic and the mythical phases of civilization would be historically correct.

Alienation [*Entausserung*] from nature, and dominion upon nature were thus two sides of one and the same process (“Human beings purchase the increase in their power with estrangement from that over which it is exerted”, Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 1997: 25; 2002: 6): the *cognitive structure of objectivity* arises as the logical and conceptual counterpart of class relations. “The distance of subject from object, the presupposition of abstraction, is founded on the distance from things which the ruler attains by means of the ruled.” (Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 1997: 25; 2002: 9).

It is clear that, according to Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s explicative model, human history knows no Fall from grace: instrumental reason, labor constriction, spiritualization and alienation from nature are intertwined phenomena and one could hardly put his/her finger on

the moment when ‘everything went wrong’. Yet, one can’t deny that such history knows a qualitative leap with the decline of the hunter-gatherer economy – enclosed in a magic and mimetic world, where humans still feel their unity with nature and the numinous power (*mana*) that embrace them – and the dawn of primitive states and patriarchal religions, where the divine eventually loses its nocturne and maternal shape, and the domination of man and nature is justified as the work of an autonomous and superior spirit.

According to Adorno, a real, emphatic concept of society should properly be applied to those societal forms in which individual life is fully determined by such process of ‘socialization’ [*Vergesellschaftung*]. (Adorno, 2003: 54ff; 2000: 29ff.)

In the first stages of nomadism the members of the tribe still played an independent part in influencing the course of nature. [...] In that order the world was already divided into zones of power and of the profane. The course of natural events as an emanation of *mana* had already been elevated to a norm demanding submission. But if the nomadic savage, despite his subjection, could still participate in the magic which defined the limits of that world, and could disguise himself as his quarry in order to stalk it, in later periods the intercourse with spirits and the subjection were assigned to different classes of humanity: power to one side, obedience to the other. (Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 1997: 37-38; 2002: 15-16)

It could be said that the magic and nomadic world is characterized by *horizontal* relations both within and without society: its economic and political egalitarianism has no room for class rule and its organic exchange with outer nature prevents the overturn of other species’ biological cycles to unilateral satisfaction of human needs. All this is clearly expressed on a symbolic level: the spiritual element is still fused and transfused in an animated and living nature, where edges are blurred and every transformation of a substance into another is possible. Human symbiosis with the animal is total and real, the hunter experiences a sort of mystical identification with it. Humanity cannot dominate the-other-than-itself if such symbolic otherness can’t be conceived.

It is precisely the symbolic genesis of such ‘other’ that was made possible by the Neolithic culture, which inaugurates permanent mechanisms of control over nature, paving the way to class society. At the end of the Neolithic transition we find, at every level, relationships that can be defined, as opposed to what has been observed so far, *vertical* and *hierarchical*. Primitive class societies, thus, elaborated early mythologies and institutional religions, which symbolically reflected a force operating in natural and social relationships, bringing forth an ontological and hierarchical divide. It is only when someone can make profit out of them that animals become things and men become slaves. This does not mean



that Mesopotamian kings actually *saw* their oxen as mere things. Nevertheless, the yoked oxen were a precondition of the existence of the Mesopotamian State, as they made possible the necessary surplus accumulation to feed the state bureaucracy. Once animals become themselves gears in the machinery of dominion they're subjugated not to man but to the superior necessity of the State. It is only when a hierarchy *inside* society is established that the relation between humans and non-humans becomes hierarchical: men control men who control animals. It's a dialectical process: if it is true that the enslavement of the oxen made the enslavement of man possible, from the other side, human enslavement reinforced the distance between the top of the social pyramid and its basis. The split between man and animal, alongside their mutual contradiction, ideologically reflects the division and polarization that has its basis in the real dominion upon natural processes, and the progressive hierarchization of social relations.

## **The Dialectical Animal**

### **1. "The triumph of Culture and its Failure"**

The domination of nature and man is thus imposed as the *natural* law of society and individuals are forced to align to it, under the threat of exclusion from human community. The image of the dominating man becomes the idol to which everything is sacrificed: relationship with nature, with others and with oneself. The 'taming' of a human being according to societal rules is the *conditio sine qua non* of his/her social being, premise and consequent of that dominion that human society as a whole exercises on its natural other.

Not only is domination paid for with the estrangement of human beings from the dominated objects, but the relationships of human beings, including the relationship of individuals to themselves, have themselves been bewitched by the objectification of mind. [...] For civilization, purely natural existence, both animal and vegetative, was the absolute danger. Mimetic, mythical, and metaphysical forms of behavior were successively regarded as stages of world history which had been left behind, and the idea of reverting to them held the terror that the self would be changed back into the mere nature from which it had extricated itself with unspeakable exertions and which for that reason filled it with unspeakable dread. Over the millennia the living memory of prehistory of its nomadic period and even more of the truly prepatriarchal stages, has been expunged from human consciousness with the most terrible punishments. [...] Humanity had to inflict terrible injuries on itself before the self – the identical, purpose-directed, masculine character of human beings – was created, and something of this process is repeated in every childhood. (Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 1997: 45-50; 2002: 21-26)

Reification [*Ver-dinglichung*], ie the reduction of living relations to ‘things’, to objects at disposal, to matter for manipulation, includes *our relation to the animals that we are*. The reification of the Self is a process that underlines the entire history of civilization, propelling and fastening its destructive potential towards nature. According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the cornerstone of Self-Reification is the violence exerted on the animal. In particular, the underpinnings are constituted of a form of implicit violence against the human animal. Adorno dramatized the function of such violence in a vibrant passage of his *Negative Dialectics*: “A child, fond of an innkeeper named Adam, watched him club the rats pouring out of holes in the courtyard; it was in his image that the child made its own image of the first man. That this has been forgotten, that we no longer know what we used to feel before the dogcatcher’s van, is both the triumph of culture and its failure.” (Adorno, 1997b: 359; 1990: 366)

It is important to stress the dialectical, antinomical nature of a process that can therefore only be expressed in contradictory terms: the affirmation of the Self is determined by the negation of the other-than-itself and such ontogenetic and philogenetic process should be read as the triumph *and* failure of culture. Whereas civilized humanity accomplishes a complete extirpation of its natural origin, we celebrate our victory over nature. At the same time, repressing and forgetting the memory of what we nevertheless *are*, we fatally miss our goal: the realization of a ‘humane’, ie not ‘bestial’, society. Our destructive attitude towards (human and non-human) animality becomes the shibboleth that eventually denounces our illusions, unmasking the ‘bestiality’ of our society in the face of our ideological celebration of the superior and eternal values of civilization as opposed to the blind violence and greed of nature.

## **2. The False Alternatives of Civilization**

It is on such interpretation of the history of civilization that one can fully appreciate Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s words on the man-animal relation:

Throughout European history the idea of the human being has been expressed in contradistinction to the animal. The latter’s lack of reason is the proof of human dignity. So insistently and unanimously has this antithesis been recited by all the earliest precursors of bourgeois thought, the ancient Jews, the Stoics, and the Early Fathers, and then through the Middle Ages to modern rimes that few other

ideas are so fundamental to Western anthropology. (Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 1997: 283; 2002: 203)

It is possible to understand the whole history of civilization according to such conceptual polarization because it is not only an exterior scheme, but it derives from historical and objective structures of domination, originated through the evolutionary process and that *still* determine the political, economical and cultural forms of human society. According to Adorno and Horkheimer, it is in fact the present level of violence that we exert against nature that allows us to read the entire past history as a history of domination.

When Adorno and Horkheimer describe the analogy between vivisection and ritual sacrifice (Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 1997: 283; 2002: 203-204) they are not speaking metaphorically: both are an expression of our desire to put *all living reality under control*. The aseptic truth of science, along with the rigid distinction between subject and object in any experiment, is just another way to express the alienation between human and non-human nature, the ideological quintessence of their hierarchical polarization. The core of such control does change even if it is no longer exercised by the priest on behalf of a transcendent deity, but it is now totally in the hands of the man-scientist who considers himself – to add insult to injury – a fully *natural* being, driven by a *materialistic* world view, *emancipated* from theological beliefs etc. Yet, such ‘immanentization’ of dominion upon nature not only repeats the violence of all time, it strengthens it: the false consciousness of a neutral and selfless knowledge casts all scruples away and makes it harder to reveal the continuity between traditional-irrational and modern-rational forms of oppression.

Magic implies specific representation. What is done to the spear, the hair, the name of the enemy, is also to befall his person; the sacrificial animal is slain in place of the god. [...] Science puts an end to this. In it there is no specific representation: something which is a sacrificial animal cannot be a god. Representation gives way to universal fungibility. An atom is smashed not as a representative but as a specimen of matter, and the rabbit suffering the torment of the laboratory is seen not as a representative but, mistakenly, as a mere exemplar. (Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 1997: 26; 2002: 6-7)

The mind [*Geist*], and all that is good in its origins and existence is hopelessly implicated in this horror. (Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 1997: 254; 2002: 185)

One point should be clear: the defeat of magical enchantment by conceptual distinction, the affirmation of the Self etc. are certainly forms of progress which Adorno and Horkheimer do not intend to give up, nor did they ever abstractly equate magic and science, thus rebutting the very idea of progress in the field of natural knowledge. Yet, if stressing the difference between magic and science is necessary, this does not imply one has to blind oneself to the

destructive potential hidden in their common origin. What the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* put into question is the *philosophy of history*<sup>9</sup> implicit in the *ideology of progress*; namely the idea that the hierarchical relations among humans and between humans and the other animals are philosophically *justified* in the name of a metaphysics by which historical time is linearly oriented ‘for the better’. Adorno and Horkheimer do not deny such linearity actually *exists*. They write of the ‘circularity of history’, *Kreisähnlichkeit der Geschichte*, (Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 1997: 52; 2002: 27) which is, in fact, the effect of the *spiral mechanism* we have already examined: all societies grounded on the domination of human and non-human nature tend to expand and broaden their power. The point is precisely to scrutinize such process in its premise and consequences to see if civilization effectively moves inexorably toward the best. It is the very notion of the hidden mechanism at work in the process of civilization that allows them to rebut its official ideology of civilization: “No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb.” (Adorno, 1997b: 324; 1990: 320)

Adorno and Horkheimer are often criticized for their unilateral and pessimistic view of History. Further, their efforts to denounce instrumental reason, is attacked as contradictory (Habermas, 1987). The problem is that much of such criticism works with a static and likewise unilateral concept of reason, whereas the Frankfurt School articulates the relationship between reason and nature, trying to disclose their historical entanglement. The contradiction here is objective, not subjective: it is a historical mechanism, not a logical shortcoming, thus it cannot be attributed to those who seek to master it conceptually. The charge of irrationalism aimed at the Frankfurt School is itself part of the social and ideological mechanism that both Adorno and Horkheimer try to criticize. Being a historical product, rationality is a fully objective process, although such objectivity does not at all mean it cannot be put into question. The intrinsic logic of such unstoppable historical force (in the face of whom individuals are utterly powerless) is, in fact, entirely *binary*: yes / no, reason / madness, progress / reaction, science / magic. Those who hesitate in front of these alternatives, those who try to question the genesis of such options are automatically excommunicated and expelled from the circle of reasonable people.

From the other side, Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s dialectical reason is destined to evoke the skepticism of ‘primitivists’ à la John Zerzan who see in civilization nothing but a Fall from the golden age of hunter-gatherer societies, rather than an ongoing process that

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<sup>9</sup> See the note entitled “On the Critique of the Philosophy of History” (Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 1997: 253-256; 2002: 184-187).

expresses, even through its lacerations and its horror, a potential for hope. This kind of primitivist vision is one of false alternatives (culture *or* nature). It therefore embodies the same logic of civilization, which it claims to criticize. This logic of abstract negation – in Hegelian terms – represents a unilateral refusal that fails to understand that intrinsic law of development of civilization that we have tried to articulate so far. Since the 40s, Adorno and Horkheimer had clearly in mind that such ‘inevitable’ alternatives were actually part of the problem they were facing: “the fronts are clearly drawn; anyone who opposes Hearst and Göring is on the side of Pavlov and vivisection; anyone who hesitates between the two is fair game for both.” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 291-292; 2002: 211). Only a correct understanding of the dialectics of civilisation can save the empathy for animals from the charge of being sentimentalistic, while at the same time avoiding any collusion with the Nazi love for uncontaminated nature: “In this world liberated from appearance in which human beings having forfeited reflection, have become once more the cleverest animals, which subjugate the rest of the universe when they happen not to be tearing themselves apart - to show concern for animals is considered no longer merely sentimental but a betrayal of progress. In the best reactionary tradition Göring linked animal protection to racial hatred, the Lutheran-Germanic joys of the happy murderer with the genteel fair play of the aristocratic hunter” (Ibid.)

### **Materialistic Solidarity**

The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* was intended as a materialist theory of culture, an attempt to bring the false alternatives and ideological oppositions of civilization to their real base, ie the exploitation of the human and non-human life. The scientific ideology of progress is thus denounced as the other side of traditional metaphysical thinking as it shares with it the idea of independence of thought from its social and natural substrate.

“The establishment of total rationality as the supreme objective principle of mankind”, writes Adorno, “spell the continuation of that blind domination of nature whose most obvious and tangible expression was to be found in the exploitation and maltreatment of animals” (Adorno 1996: 215; 2001: 145). The animal here is the shibboleth of supremacist spiritualism: “animals play for the idealistic system virtually the same role as the Jews for fascism.” (Adorno, 1993: 123; 1998: 80). This link is so deep that it can be proved *e contrario*. As we have already seen, the mechanism of racial hatred seems to need the symbolic negation of the animal in order to be psychologically triggered.

Perhaps the social schematization of perception in anti-Semites is such that they do not see Jews as human beings at all. The constantly encountered assertion that savages, blacks, Japanese are like animals, monkeys for example, is the key to the pogrom. The possibility of pogroms is decided in the moment when the gaze of a fatally-wounded animal falls on a human being. The defiance with which he repels this gaze – ‘after all, it’s only an animal’ – reappears irresistibly in cruelties done to human beings, the perpetrators having again and again to reassure themselves that it is ‘only an animal’, because they could never fully believe this even of animals. (Adorno, 1997a: 116; 2005a: 105).

As a consequence, a characteristic feature of Adorno’s, Horkheimer’s and Marcuse’s materialism is their declared intention to make room for other animals in the project of human liberation. Such approach distinguishes Critical Theory both from positivist naturalism (which recognizes the animality of man, but without expanding the circle of ethical consideration to non-human animals) and spiritualism (which, even if it shows ‘compassion’ towards other animals, it denies the animal nature of man himself). It is only by recognizing their *mediating* role in the relationship between man and nature that animals help us to put the dialectic of civilization in the right context. If this doesn’t happen, our look on civilization will be out of focus, and our answers to the problems raised by our control over nature will be misled by bad conscience and self-justification. It is no coincidence, then, that Critical Theory has been so often misunderstood and rejected, simultaneously accused from opposite sides of irrationalism and rationalism, materialism and idealism.

Even among Marxists there were misunderstandings. Although Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse still considered Marx the only possible ground for a critical analysis of capitalist *economy*, their critique of Western civilization went far beyond Marx. For the Frankfurt School, it was only via a different relationship with the animal – based on compassion and solidarity with the ‘damaged life’ – that it was possible to see and denounce the hidden idealistic sides of Marxist materialism. Surely Marx could not imagine the alienating and destructive development that the domination of man over nature would have brought in 20<sup>th</sup> century. Yet, Marx’ and Engels’ unshakable belief in the goodness and rationality of such dominion reveals an inability to conceive a *limit* in our appropriation of nature, a limit that would have forced them to accord nature the status of the *subject*.

Marx and Engels could not accept this, since they believed that man could free himself only by breaking the *mystical* connection, the ‘umbilical cord’ (Engels, 2001: 161) with nature, something that ‘primitive’ cultures symbolically and ideologically express through a series of anthropomorphic projections. As shown in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, although being an important phase in the historical process of human emancipation, the disqualification of the animal and its reduction to an object turns against humans, since such

*de-anthropomorphisation* of the world ends up in a state of absolute *inhumanity*: the Nazi barbarism, totalitarianism and the ‘administered world’. Along with the idea of an endless domination over nature, Marx and Engels have passively accepted the above mentioned circularity of progress that characterizes the history of civilization. In so doing, they betrayed the materialistic inspiration of their thinking. (Marcuse, 1972: 68-69) The limit that humans meet in their transformative praxis is not constitutive of nature qua *object*, but of nature qua *subject*. It is therefore a limit that can only be traced once humans re-discover *the nature that they are*. It is not a question of finding such limit as an external force compelling us (as happens in Malthus and in most contemporary ecological discourse), it rather means to empathically trace it as *our own limit*. Only by seeing ourselves as nature we see in nature a limit to our desire to dominate. Since we did – or began to – emancipate ourselves from nature and yet we are still and completely nature, we can learn to listen to a will which is not our own, although it surely speaks through us. Experiencing empathy toward nature, we hear nature asking us to lay down our weapons. This happen, however, only *through the animal*. It is important to stress, that such reconciliation ideal is not to be understood here – as happens in Ernst Bloch – in the sense of an ‘absolute Subject which mediates itself with itself’ (Schmidt, 1971: 159), but rather in the sense of an encounter *between individuals*. This is possible only by giving back animals their repressed subjectivity, recognizing them as alter egos of the human subject. Critical Theory is not an updated version of romantic *Naturphilosophie*: Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse do not start from a self-generating ‘principle of being’ (Marcuse, 1972: 68. Cf. Noske, 1989: 191n) but from a Darwinian understanding of nature. Here, through random clashes and competitive encounters, human subjectivity discovers itself alienated in non-human nature.

No matter how paradoxical this may sound, Critical Theory believes that Marx’ refusal to acknowledge the *subjectivity* of nature as a limit to human expansionism produced a *flaw* in his materialist vision. In an attempt to correct the idealistic consequences of such premises, Marcuse wrote: “no free society is imaginable which does not, under its ‘regulative idea of reason,’ make the concerted effort to reduce consistently the suffering which man imposes on the animal world” (Marcuse, 1972: 68)<sup>10</sup>. Such an act of solidarity would

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<sup>10</sup> Schmidt hopes we “will learn to a far greater degree to practise solidarity with the oppressed animal world, and that in the true society the protection of animals will no longer be regarded as a kind of private fad”. (Schmidt, 1971: 113). Adorno, too, spoke of a ‘cranky idea’ when dealing with Schopenhauer’s defence of animals, but added: “my own view is that a tremendous amount can be learnt from such crankiness” (Adorno, 1996: 215; 2001: 145). The important treatment of moral philosophy in the *Negative Dialectic* ends up with a critique of Kant’s indifference towards animality. “the individual is left with no more than the morality for which Kantian ethics—which accords affection, not respect, to animals —can muster only disdain: to try to

supersede the idealism implicit in our global praxis and, by closing the circle of materialism, would open up new relationships with non-human nature.

Apparently, Marx and Engels wrote something very similar: “The identity of nature and man appears in such a way that the restricted relation of men to nature determines their restricted relation to one another, and their restricted relation to one another determines men’s restricted relation to nature.” All this “just because nature is as yet hardly modified historically” (Marx and Engels, 2004: 51). Still, the decisive move is missing: the route back *from man to nature* that would help to overcome our narrow and egoistic look and break the circularity of domination. By seeing nature as a mere *substrate* of domination, refusing to see it as a subject (ie something *active, vital*, with whom we can engage in a relationship of mutual *understanding*), Marx and Engels betrayed their materialist dialectic, forgetting<sup>11</sup>, among other things, Hegel’s key-lesson on the master-servant relation. Commenting on this famous passage in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, Georges Bataille came very close to some insights expressed by Adorno and Horkheimer in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*: “To subordinate is not only to alter the subordinated element but to be altered oneself. [...] Nature becomes man’s property but it ceases to be immanent to him. It is his on condition that it is closed to him” (Bataille, 1989: 41).

The Italian Marxist Sebastiano Timpanaro wrote in his famous essay *On Materialism*: “materialism is much more than a gnoseological theory<sup>12</sup>. Materialism entails also the recognition of man’s animality (superseded *only in part* by his species-specific sociality); it is also the radical negation of anthropocentrism and providentialism of any kind, and it is absolute atheism. Thus it represents a *prise de position* with regard to man’s place in the world, with regard to the present and future ‘balance of power’ between man and nature, and with regard to man’s needs and his drive for happiness” (Timpanaro, 1975: 249). Curiously, Timpanaro does not draw any *practical* consequence from the observation of our animality and doesn’t question the fact that the relationship between species is always declining according to *our* needs and *our* happiness. The Frankfurt School has, in turn, underscored

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live so that one may believe himself to have been a good animal.” (Adorno, 1997b: 294; 1990: 299). See also the aphorism “*Sur l’eau*” (Adorno, 1997b: 176-177; 2005a: 155-157).

<sup>11</sup> It is no chance that, according to Hegel, “the absolute right of appropriation which human beings have over all ‘things’” is the factual proof of Idealism and the practical confutation of both realism and Kantianism: “The so-called ‘philosophy’ which attributes reality in the sense of self-subsistence and genuine being-for-and-within-itself [*Für- und In-sich-sein*] to unmediated single things, to the non-personal, is directly contradicted by the free will’s attitude to these things. The same is true of the other philosophy which assures us that the mind cannot apprehend the truth or know the nature of the thing-in-itself. While so-called ‘external’ things have a semblance [*Schein*] of self-subsistence for consciousness, intuition, and representational thinking, the free will idealizes such actuality and so is its truth.” Hegel, 2008: 60.

<sup>12</sup> Theory of Knowledge. From the Greek *gnosis* (knowledge) e *logos* (discourse).



how a materialistic ethic should ground itself in the *solidarity* between beings who share suffering, pain and death. As Horkheimer wrote in *Materialism and Morality* (Horkheimer, 1993: p. 36):

Human beings may [...] struggle in concert against their own pains and maladies what medicine will achieve, once it is freed from its present social fetters, is not to be foreseen although suffering and death will continue to hold sway in nature. The solidarity of human beings, however, is a part of the solidarity of life in general. Progress in the realization of the former will also strengthen our sense of the latter. Animals need human beings.

In 1933, he suggested the well-known metaphor of the skyscraper to describe the structure of the capitalist society which is quoted at the beginning of this article. One could say that, even when they acknowledge our animality, Timpanaro and all those Marxists who do not see the inherently idealist/spiritualist structure of dominion, remain comfortably seated in the cathedral. They never plan to descend into the depths of the animal horror. Hence the narrowness and contradiction of their materialistic point of view: a unilateral vision that doesn't investigate the *genesis* of the alterity between human and non-humans, but limits itself to assert it as an undisputed fact.

### **A New 'Dialectic of Nature'**

Critical theorists pushed their *dialectics of nature* far beyond Engels, who acknowledged humans as part and parcel of a wider natural order, but could only conceive of our action in terms of desire for *power* and *control* over non-humans.

All the planned action of all animals has never succeeded in impressing the stamp of their will upon the earth. That was left for man. In short, the animal merely *uses* its environment, and brings about changes in it simply by its presence; man by his changes makes it serve his ends, *masters* it. This is the final, essential distinction between man and other animals, and once again it is labour that brings about this distinction. Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel the first. [...] Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature – but that we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly. [...] But the

more this progresses the more will men not only feel but also know their oneness with nature, and the more impossible will become the senseless and unnatural idea of a contrast between mind and matter, man and nature, soul and body, such as arose after the decline of classical antiquity in Europe and obtained its highest elaboration in Christianity (Engels, 2001: 260-261).

Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse more radically argue that it is by opening up the possibility of a different relationship with nature that humanity will reveal nature as intrinsically *dialectical*. Engels and Marx believed – long before reading Darwin – that a true materialist interpretation of the universe should see nature as becoming, history. This is the reason why they constantly attacked the restricted view they labeled ‘vulgar’ materialism. It was the landmark of such reductionist materialism to conceive nature as a static and unchanging (ie non-dialectical) order. Yet, when it comes to our relationship with non-human nature, Engels assumes that natural history is destined to endlessly repeat itself. According to such a perspective, a liberated society cannot but be “a vast joint-stock company for the exploitation of nature” (Adorno, 1996: 216; 2001: 145). The Frankfurt School, on the contrary, makes it clear that a *different* relationship with the environment and the animals is possible. Recognizing itself as part of natural history, human culture would in fact produce a radical turn that could deny the necessity of violence and interrupt the eternal perpetuation of dominion (what Adorno called *das Immergleiche*, always-the-same)

## **1. Nature as Remembrance**

The return of the identical in the history of civilization, the repetition that makes progress move in a circle, *is nature itself*. Conceiving the history of civilization as a *continuation* of natural history, in fact, human culture is unmasked as *doubly false*, as it claims to be ‘other’ than a purely natural mechanism of violence. As a matter of fact, it is this very blind violence that human culture inherits from nature. “The whole ingenious machinery of modern industrial society”, write Adorno and Horkheimer, “is no more than nature dismembering itself” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 292; 2002: 210-212). The point is not to *imitate* an imaginary, idyllic nature – a move made by the nazi and that resulted in mere “anti-intellectualism, lies, bestiality” – but to let the “remembrance of nature” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 292; 2002: 210-212) come to surface as the suffering counterpart of reason. Contrary to the Nazi myth of origin, such function of such memory would not be regressive: “recollection [...] is not remembrance of a Golden Past (which never existed), of childhood innocence, primitive man, et cetera. Recollection as epistemological faculty rather is synthesis, reassembling the bits and fragments which can be found in the distorted

humanity and distorted nature” (Marcuse, 1972: 70). The memory of nature is the memory of the ‘brutality’ hidden in the mechanism of civilization. Only through the remembrance of its natural origin, could the human spirit solve its intrinsic antagonisms and recede from its ontological battle against the rest of the living world. “In mind’s self-recognition as nature divided from itself, nature [...] is calling to itself.” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 57; 2002: 47). This is because “the world of nature is a world of oppression, cruelty and pain, as is the human world; like the latter, it awaits its liberation.” (Marcuse, 1994: 156).

## **2. The Liberation of Nature**

The liberation *of* nature is at the heart of the dialectic of nature taught by the Frankfurt School. It should however be understood in both senses of the genitive (subjective and objective) and thus seen as (1) emancipation of humans *from nature* and (2) emancipation *of nature itself*.

### **2.1. The Emancipation from Nature**

In the first sense, one could speak of the emancipation of humans from nature, ie from natural relations understood as blind necessity, as the realization of what human civilization has always promised through the spirit (justice, unity, harmony, etc.) and never really achieved. In the first instance, the redemption of nature would be the liberation of human culture from the yoke of natural selfishness. All the binary schemes, all the false alternatives of civilization that we mentioned before are symbolical reworkings of that very mechanism of violence that the human animal learns from the natural struggle for existence. “The world controlled by *mana*, and even the worlds of Indian and Greek myth, are issueless and eternally the same. All birth is paid for with death, all fortune with misfortune” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 32-33; 2002: 11-12). Such mythical image is nothing but a mimetic and symbolic response to “natural conditions”, an unchanging order of cycles which human beings must accept *as it is*. The horror of death is not only the sublimation of the flight instinct, but also the awareness of an evil that is inherent in things: cruelty, suffering, disease. The redemption of humanity would be in the first instance its redemption *from* nature: the metamorphosis of a natural being that could empathize with the *universal suffering* in a way that other animals do not know. This does not mean that there are no instances of ethical behavior or respect for others in the animal kingdom, but they do not take the form of *universality*, which is characteristic of the concept.

Justice, spirit, freedom and all concepts belonging to the spiritualist tradition, indicate therefore an otherness from nature that still *has to be realized*. This leads to a redefinition of both reason and nature. If reason would *help* rather than oppress nature, through this very act it would break the circle of crude necessity and thus be *born* as reason, thereby performing a qualitative leap (which, as we will see, is a transformation in/of nature itself). In this regard, in his *One-dimensional Man* Marcuse wrote that “the ill-treatment of animals [is] the work of a human society whose rationality is still the irrational” (Marcuse, 2002: 242). It is only in dialectical relationship with nature that reason (the form that the principle of self-conservation assumes in human culture) can be determined as rational or irrational.

A free human-animal relationship becomes here the shibboleth of reason, ie of a rational attitude that has emancipated itself from violence and oppression, since it is only the *radical impotence* of non-human animals that could move reason to make a *step back*. Such empathic withdrawn would in fact realize the *distance* from the Other, the separation necessary to make such Other appear and manifest itself in its otherness. It is thus from this possible relationship with the Other that the essence of humanity is both *realized* and *superseded*: it is only from a changed relationship with the animal that our otherness from the context of natural violence would finally *be real* and the jump from the *realm of necessity* to the *realm of freedom* would be accomplished. Such act of solidarity would show the falsity of the spiritualist illusion while meeting its broken promises: the history of solidarity with nature would belie the history of the domination of nature, realizing that Alterity that there never was. This critical awareness organically changes the *whole* constellation reason/nature and sets the dialectical overturn that allows us to speak of redemption of nature as a work of *nature itself*.

## **2.2. The Emancipation of Nature**

In the second sense of the expression ‘liberation of nature’, in fact, one can speak of emancipation of nature itself from *animal selfhood* (which in the human animal ends up absurdly with the dream of a totalitarian control over the rest of the living world). In the very moment in which a free human order would make room to such long repressed and annihilated alterity, its qualitative leap would not be something that happens to nature, but *in* nature. Such human change would lead to a path of *cooperation* and *solidarity* between species far beyond what the selective mechanisms may have produced in the course of

evolution. Nature itself would thus inaugurate, through the humility of humans, a concept of universal peace.

The image of nature as ‘stepmother’ is in fact the ideological image of an *alien* reality, that opposes humans threatening them. Yet, as Adorno emphasizes, such image is nothing but the grim face of humanity itself, as it counteracts other living beings in the struggle for life; once the war mask is abandoned, nature too would appear to us as an order in which justice is *finally possible*. If, as we have seen, reason, even humanity, *have never been*, since they remain unrealized potentials (historical suffering is, so to speak, the only negative track and hope for such possibility), then *nature* itself awaits for its realization and calls humanity for relationships with the Other made of care, listening and respect.

Human history is, therefore, a bow between the animal terror – the fear of a return to the undifferentiated – and the state of conciliation between different beings. It is in such an order – the result of a millenary process, made of violence and domination but also of untapped possibilities – that the relationship between identity and difference could find its own equilibrium and reconciliation.

### **3. The Reconciliation of Nature**

It is clear that the Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse think of nature not in terms of *substance*, but of *relation*. The relational essence of nature is evident in the phenomenon of *empathy* and it’s based on *mimesis*. This is why our relationship with the other animals needs to be articulated at the level of *expression* and not of that of *intentionality* (ie as intersubjectivity, not as object-relation). Adorno outlined a cosmic-historical vision in which the dialectic of nature includes the emancipation of nature itself in his analysis of natural beauty. In his last, unfinished work, the *Aesthetic Theory*, Adorno writes not only that Man, but that nature itself *does not yet exist*.

The image of what is oldest in nature reverses dialectically into the cipher of the not-yet-existing, the possible [...] The boundary established against fetishism of nature – the pantheistic subterfuge that would amount to nothing but an affirmative mask appended to an endlessly repetitive fate – is drawn by the fact that nature, as it stirs mortally and tenderly in its beauty, does not yet exist. [...] Vis-à-vis a ruling principle, vis-à-vis a merely diffuse juxtaposition, the beauty of nature is an other; what is reconciled would resemble it (Adorno, 1997d: 115; 1997e: 73).

This means that nature, as we know it, embodies potentialities still waiting to be unleashed. Human liberation and liberation of nature are thus moments of the same process, a process,

however, not to be intended – *à la* Rousseau – as a liberation of some pristine nature oppressed by civilization, since – as mentioned above – civilization is nothing more than “nature dismembering itself, nature that is tearing apart itself.” Nature appears to us as ‘memory’, a ‘lost dream’ because it evokes in us the image of what we could achieve by listening to his suffering voice. In the first case we have a pantheistic runaway, ie the negation of the natural history of man as a mere mistake; in the second, we read such history as an attempt – a terrible, hallucinatory attempt – to heal the pain of the world.

Only in a *reconciled*, pacified order, ie in an order that has *dialectically overcome* the antithesis between nature and culture, the human/non-human relation can be articulated beyond the false choice between mere identity (biological reductionism) and absolute difference (spiritualism). “Peace”, writes Adorno, “is the state of differentiation without domination, with the differentiated participating in each other” (Adorno, 1997c: 746; 2005b: 247). The ‘differentiated’ is what eludes both the ‘principle that dominates’ (the same) and the ‘widespread fragmentation’ (the difference): it manifests itself only when identity and difference open up and leave room to otherness in the form of mutual communication and understanding. Such a state presupposes the entire history of civilization but at the same time it denies it by realizing its promise of happiness.

If the relationship between human and non-human, between reason and nature cannot be defined in abstract, static, biological and ontological terms but only *in practice*, as the *relationship* between subjectivities, the whole bioethical question of reductionism appears to us in a different light. The man-animal relationship is in fact destined to remain a mere speculative question and we are forced to choose between false alternatives if it is treated on a purely ‘scientific’ level. The Frankfurt School teaches us to think such a relationship as *real*, avoiding the simple answers of both flat naturalism and metaphysical transcendence. Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse teach us that it is only by an *act of solidarity* that humans can decide what happens to them and their Other. In other words, it is only in *praxis* that the question of what the human being ‘is’ can be decided.

### **Open Questions and Final Remarks**

The analysis conducted so far have attempted to define the meaning of the reason/nature constellation in the thought of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse. I consider these authors representatives of a precise stage in the history of the Institute for Social Research: essentially, the three decades following the publication of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, which roughly

correspond to the consolidation of the label ‘Frankfurt School’ in the German sociological debate of those years. I shall now try to briefly address some unresolved issues from both the theoretical and the practical point of view. These are aspects which, as we have seen, cannot be rigidly separated, although for the sake of clarity I will try to avoid overlapping them. First, we’ll see what problems arise from the idea of a dialectical conception of nature (and reason), especially regarding our relationship with other animals and the way in which mankind must understand their liberation. Secondly, we shall refer to the notion of praxis as understood by the Frankfurt School, outlining the problems it poses in itself and to the animal liberation movement.

As we have seen, according to Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, it is only fighting against the domination of (external and internal) nature and class oppression that the permanent threat to civilization could find an end. If any of these aspects is not put into question, then, the entire mechanism of *Herrschaft* is destined to perpetuate itself. It is undeniable that the understanding of nature implied in such theory (particularly in Adorno’s most subtle passages) is rather difficult. Many interpreters have therefore considered it obscure, if not entirely contradictory. First of all, the idea that reason and nature are poles of a dialectical relation means that it is not possible to consider reason a purely exterior power that violates nature. Contrary to a common cliché, far from supporting an anti-civilization impulse, the Frankfurt School’s critique of Enlightenment is an attempt to accomplish the traditional stances of civilization itself. According to Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, even in a social order where the exploitation of human and non-human nature has come to an end, it will not be possible to abolish technique altogether and the repression of instincts, since this would mean to deny the positive achievements of civilization (or, at least, its unexpressed potential for freedom, creativity and satisfaction). It seems then impossible for these authors to separate clearly the good from evil in the history of civilization. Even thinkers who appreciated the global vision of the *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* – like Murray Bookchin, for instance (1982: 283) – had criticized such position. According to them, only if we distinguish the destructive side of reason from the constructive one it is possible to logically articulate a critical theory of dominion<sup>13</sup>.

It must be recognized that such a risk in reading the works of the Frankfurt School is real. When, for example, Horkheimer writes “reification is a process that can be traced back to the beginnings of organized society and the use of tools” (Horkheimer, 2005: 28), it is

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<sup>13</sup> Marcuse was probably more inclined to follow such line of reasoning, particularly in *Eros and Civilization*, a work that was not welcomed by Adorno and Horkheimer.

tempting to conclude that there is no way out of the disease that afflicts reason. However, though it may sound overly abstract and speculative, I think that the path outlined by Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse goes into another, more intriguing direction.

Firstly, as we have already seen, these authors assume that dominion didn't *happen* sometimes in history, nor was something that happened *to reason*. The urge to manipulate and control the other, on the contrary, dwells on of the deeper layers of reason itself.

From the time when reason became the instrument for domination of human and extra-human nature by man—that is to say, from its very beginnings—it has been frustrated in its own intention of discovering the truth. This is due to the very fact that it made nature a mere object, and that it failed to discover the trace of itself in such objectivization, in the concepts of matter and things not less than in those of gods and spirit. One might say that the collective madness that rages today, from the concentration camps to the seemingly most harmless mass-culture reactions, was already present in germ in primitive objectivization, in the first man's calculating contemplation of the world as a prey. Paranoia, the madness that builds logically constructed theories of persecution, is not merely a parody of reason, but is somehow present in any form of reason that consists in the mere pursuit of aims. (Horkheimer, 2005: 119)

This seems to be at odds with the idea of a mimetic world that does not oppress nature or consider itself superior to it. Yet, as the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* suggests, magic had a manipulative side too, and it was also an attempt to control and, in some way, to dominate the external world. The difference is the way it did it and the limited effects such urge to control had on internal and external nature. Thus, magic didn't produce the split between the human and the not-human, although it was the beginning of the historical process that led to it. It didn't produce such split because magic works through the *law of similarity*: as Marcel Mauss put it, the principle of magic is: “one is all, all is one”, “nature triumphs over nature” (Mauss, 2001: 92). Magic implies the idea of an invisible force, hidden behind the nature we see: it is such force that explains natural phenomena and makes it possible for the magician to work with them. It's the beginning of the spiritual illusion, but it was also the beginning of an *explanation* of nature, since magic was religion, art and science at the same time. So, contrary to the idea expressed by Lévi-Bruhl, according to which the ‘savages’ were unable to think logically, instrumental reason is part of the mimetic culture, although here it does not have the preeminence it gains in later civilization.

If magic did not create the split between our self-consciousness and the rest of the natural world it was anyway the first *expression* of a split that had already taken place. Such split seems to be a characteristic of culture as such, the principal cause of all ambiguities that anthropologists observe in rites and myths. It is as if no symbolic system could do without



*signalizing its alterity from the rest of nature*. It is in fact the crucial task of rituals to annul the difference between culture and nature while, with the same gesture, reproducing it over and over. The ambiguity of magic systems does not end with the dawn of spiritualistic cultures. On the contrary, its paradoxical traits grow exponentially. Yet, according to Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, while taking human culture's ambiguity towards nature to the extreme, the process of civilization is also a frightening attempt to solve it.

It is true that, differently from the mimetic world, civilization produces a *negative image* of what it oppresses (nature, the lower classes, the body) and this image serves to justify the rule of a disincarnated *logos*. Reason must understand nature as its opposite, projecting negative, destructive qualities on it, in order to enthrone itself. As a matter of fact, though, the mechanism of domination produces exactly the violence and chaos that it pretends to deny: nothing is more destructive of civilization as this fantasizes to be the opposite of nature. But, as we have seen, civilization is not just a lie. Its values and goals are not false in themselves, although they become untrue as soon as we use them to exploit nature or we believe that only by oppressing nature they can be achieved. The point is not to deny justice, equality and freedom, but to realize them. So, civilization is nature and human culture – with all its ambiguous and contradictory tensions – is the specifically human way of relating to oneself and the Other. The question is: what would it mean for civilization, if a change in its egoistic attitude towards the rest of the living would take place? If we'd stop oppressing the non-human world, if we gave up our stereotypes of nature being a monstrous otherness, we would fully realize the ideals of civilization while rejecting their basic assumption, namely, that they exist to counteract the violence of nature. Their lies would become truth. This is because the violence we experience in nature and that we use to justify our domination is also real. In a sense, civilization has exponentially multiplied all the horrors and wonders of nature. From one side, it does nothing but perpetuate violence, oppression and death as can be found in all the living world; from the other side, its universal ideas of justice, liberty and care (foreshadowed by the religious idea of a peaceful life after death) are a clear protest against them. I believe this is the point where the Frankfurt School meets the demands of the animal liberation movement, providing an interesting philosophy of history that can explain the origin and the goal of the fight against speciesism.

It is probably no chance that the antispeciesist movement, carrying out attitudes of empathy toward *all* suffering life, moved its first steps in the wake of the Western tradition<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> It is true that Buddhism and Jainism could, within certain limits, be regarded as ancient philosophies that anticipate antispeciesism in their professed respect for all beings. At the same time, antispeciesism emerges as

It is true that feelings of benevolence towards other suffering species can be found amongst other animals and in so called ‘primitive’ cultures. Anyway, non-human nature and ‘primitive’ human societies are anchored at a local level: this means that their violence can not be compared with the devastating violence perpetuated by Western civilization; at the same time (and for the same reason), by overcoming such localism, civilization produces the idea and practice of a global and inter-specific solidarity<sup>15</sup>. Just because non-human nature and ‘primitive’ human societies experience empathy and violence on a minor scale they can’t conceive of a universal non-violent way of life like contemporary antispeciesism does.

The question of human exceptionalism, too, needs to be reconsidered in a new light. According to a sound antispeciesist critique, an ethical problem arises not when one identifies some psychological or social trait that is specifically human, but when such exceptionality becomes the pretext of domination, excluding from ethical consideration all those beings that do not possess such characteristics. But what would happen if this exception consisted in the care for the universal suffering? When Horkheimer writes that the very aim of civilization is not the repression of nature but its conciliation and that to dominate non-human nature is a false and tragic attempt to transcend it (Horkheimer, 2004: 64) his vision introduces us to the possibility to transcend nature without negating or disqualifying it. Though antispeciesism was yet to come, I think the animal liberation movement is the closest thing to the social and natural utopia dreamt by the Frankfurt School. In fact, it could be considered a way to transcend nature in the very moment we discover to be totally part of it. To *transcend* it, because we face *all* its violence, decay and death and still don’t accept it as the last word, but we rather learn to listen to the voice of those who suffer, regardless to their species. But this will never be possible unless we admit to be *part of it*. To put it simply, while mimetic cultures think of themselves as part of nature without being able to articulate their

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a completion of Western universalism and a specific tradition of affirmation of rights; in a word, it is essentially a secular and immanent theory (though, of course, people can always personally be antispeciesists and embrace a particular religion). In addition to this, one could emphasize how the non-violence expressed by those religions arose from a highly developed and hierarchical civilization and - as suggested by Marvin Harris – it was probably the product of a reaction against a violent and unjust social order (Harris, 1985). Thus, the birth of Buddhism and Jainism might show interesting historical analogies with the present idea of antispeciesism being a dialectical overturn of Western civilization.

<sup>15</sup> In a sense, the privilege of ‘universality’ traditionally accorded to Western civilization is real, although it does not prove its ‘superiority’ nor that it carries intrinsic philosophical qualities not to be found in other cultures. It simply means that its power growth globalizes its horizon (along with that of all those cultures obliged to take part to its political and economic expansion), making it possible to face other cultures and nature itself as global phenomena.

transcendence from it, and spiritualistic societies push such transcendence too far, forgetting to be part of nature, an antispeciesist culture could realize the synthesis between the two<sup>16</sup>.

Finally, some quick remarks on the question of praxis. Since the animal liberation movement was still at a primordial stage of development, it is clear that Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse never got the chance to seriously engage with its theory and action. Although they perceived and denounced the horror of slaughterhouses, they also criticized vegetarianism for being sectarian (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 272; 2002: 197) and “pre-mature” (Marcuse 1972: 68). Thus, it is not what they wrote about the animal advocacy of their time that is interesting today for us, as the implications of their theories. Throughout the present essay, I’ve constantly tried to extend the range of their thoughts and see if and how they could support the animal liberation perspective.

It must be noted that what the Frankfurt School understand with the word praxis is something more general than commonly accepted by contemporary political groups (included the animal liberation movement). Although the question of political commitment has been interpreted differently by Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, they agreed on one point: namely that praxis, ie the transformation of social reality, should take account of the domination of nature. No transformative praxis could ever really change the world if it doesn’t also put an end to the exploitation of nature. The importance given to praxis by Critical Theory, however, did not mean that any form of activism aimed at the transformation of reality should be accepted as such. Since the problem that needs to be addressed in the context of domination is the paranoid need to manipulate and control (ie the characteristics of instrumental reason), if political action does not contradict this logic, its results will most

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<sup>16</sup> Does this means that humanity should force the lion to sleep with the lamb? With this objection we face a possible charge of anthropocentrism. Humanity would end up imposing its ethical rule on the rest of the living, a task that is both totalitarian (it would limit the freedom of, say, the lion to eat the lamb) and factually impossible. We would project on nature our idyllic image of it, thus falling back into anthropocentrism. I think this last objection is superseded by the dialectical argument we have developed before. By learning from the struggle for life to pull back from such struggle, to choose to listen to the suffering rather than pursuing self-preservation at any rate, humanity would act as an internal force of nature. Humanity *is* part of nature, so everything that happens in its conscience is itself part of natural history, an inner development of it. If ethical concern is part of nature, then the idea of a universal solidarity is nothing but a coherent evolution of it. If, on the contrary, ethical concern is *not* a natural phenomenon (since being part of nature means to accept violence, decay and death), then it should be explained how such idea came into existence in the human mind in the first place (and why other animals can show empathy for members of other species). Secondly, even if the idea of feeding the lion with synthetic proteins would probably be acceptable to both the lamb and the lion, this is not necessary the conclusion that must be drawn from what proceeds. Since my intention here was only to outline the overall vision of the dialectic of civilization, I can be content to define the regulative ideal (in the Kantian sense) that follows from it and check if such idea is consistent with the antispeciesist perspective. But it is clear that the idea of a universal solidarity can find more moderate applications, in addition to attempts to impose our own ethics on all living creatures. And since a dialectical theory of civilization doesn’t dismiss technique as ‘evil’, it is possible to imagine scientific developments that could make it easier for humanity to pursue such brotherhood with all other species, while saving their freedom.

likely perpetuate it. This happens, for example, when political activity overshadows its goals and overestimates the organizational level (a problem that typically plagued traditional leftist groups). Even direct action, however, is not exempt from such risks. Although Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse had slightly different positions on the question of violence (Adorno, 1997c: 759-782; 2005b: 259-278; Marcuse, 1966: 133-147 Marcuse, 2005: 57-75), they all criticized the idea that liberation could be realized through violent means. They criticized the ideology of those groups that pursued action for action's sake, denouncing their impatience as a product of frustration and impotence. Adorno used the expression 'pseudo-activity' to underline how such actions could not transcend the *status quo*, but only reinforce it (1997c: 771; 2005b: 269). This does not mean, however, that *all* organizations and *all* direct actions are to be condemned as such. What Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse underline is that only if organizational efforts and direct actions are consistent with the idea of human and non-human liberation, they can hope to trigger the epochal change they dream of. Yet, to be consistent with such idea, as we have seen, implies that the entire structure of civilization is put into question. How can political groups and single activists coordinate such a task with their everyday activity, in the urge of economic and ecological crisis, while facing the horrors of human and non-human exploitation?

Some critics attacked this position, considering it defeatist and elitist. It can be assumed that after the disappointments of the 20s (when the Socialist revolution failed to seize power in Europe and Russia experienced the Stalinist involution), Adorno and Horkheimer gradually lost faith in the possibilities of a successful revolution. From this point of view, it is certain that the thought of Marcuse provides more footholds for revolutionary politics than that of his friends (although in *Counterrevolution and Revolt* and in his later essays on aesthetic the differences with Adorno and Horkheimer seem to dwindle). However, I would like to emphasize that the apparent impossibility of conceiving action from the part of Adorno and Horkheimer probably respects a focal point of their theory of civilization. A point that needs to be carefully taken into consideration.

Although, as we have seen, Critical Theory differs from traditional theory insofar as it aspires to change its object rather than taking a speculative attitude, on the other hand, it must be noted that traditional theory is by no means purely speculative. The traditional theory of knowledge (as it was developed by Greek philosophy and modern science) thinks the subject as an independent, autonomous reality. Although the metaphysical subject and the subject of science are profoundly different and even opposite in some ways (Horkheimer, 2004: 3-40), both are based on the domination of nature. In either case the foundation of knowledge is the estrangement from nature. In the metaphysical reason, such alienation implies the belief that

the subject dwells somewhere ‘above’ nature: it belongs to a spiritual kingdom destined to dominate the body and external reality. With scientific reason, such estrangement does not simply disappear, it rather turns into a formal method of investigation (mathematics and experiment) which denies the existence of a spiritual reality but not the necessity to control and manipulate nature (which is reduced to mere matter). The social need to dominate non-human reality is thus the basis of knowledge and its fundamental and hidden drive. If this is true, the abstract subject of traditional theory is only the mask of a concrete interest in the exploitation of the living world. It shows a speculative attitude because this reinforces its *distance* and its *power* over the object. The position of Critical Theory on this point is exactly the opposite. It openly admits to be *involved* with the object, it aspires to *change* society alongside with our relationship with the environment and the other animals. Thus, its subject does not consider itself a separate and independent reality: it sees itself as part of the entire transformation process. It thus aspires to realize that ability to observe without intervening that the traditional subject (of both metaphysics and science) could only pretend to be. Traditional thinking claims to be free but it is a slave of necessity, a servant of the war that humanity has declared on the non-human nature. In traditional theory, freedom of thought is a precondition: it means freedom *from* nature, namely freedom of the master over the servant. In Critical Theory, freedom of thought is the ultimate goal. It means freedom *of* nature, the freedom of a relationship between equals. Absurd and shocking as it may seem, the idea of praxis advocated by the Frankfurt School, seeks to articulate such demand. Effective political action must correspond to this need to overturn the logic of domination. In a way, it reverses the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: humans so far have only changed the world, in various ways; the point is to contemplate it. A difficult task indeed, as we have seen, one that only those who free themselves from the idea that the exploitation of non-human nature is necessary to human existence can consistently conceive, and hopefully, realize. Veganism is thus the necessary, although not sufficient, step towards a proper understanding of what a free relation between natural individuals means, a step that Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse didn’t make themselves. But in order to make the vision of interspecific solidarity real, we must probably learn from them that only a different organization of *society* can put an end to the history of domination and necessity and let the epoch of freedom begin: if social totality is wrong, no individual engagement, no matter how intense and altruistic, can be true (Adorno, 1997a: 43; 2005: 39).

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## **Fishing For Animal Rights In *The Cove*: A Holistic Approach to Animal Advocacy Documentaries**

**Carrie Packwood Freeman<sup>1</sup>**

### **Abstract**

The Oscar-winning 2009 documentary *The Cove* serves as a thrilling and poignant advocacy tool promoting activism to save free-roaming dolphins off the coast of Japan from kidnapping, enslavement in marine parks, and slaughter for meat. This essay evaluates the ethical and social justice implications of *The Cove* not just for dolphins but for the animal rights movement as a whole, particularly in terms of how it could challenge the ethicality of humans killing any nonhuman animals for food. Strategic media recommendations are made for how animal protection advocates could better deconstruct the human/animal dualism that is at the root of speciesist exploitation and how they should avoid privileging one charismatic species at the expense of other animals.

**Keywords:** Animal rights, dolphin, meat, fish, humanism, speciesism, media.

Raising global awareness about the capture and slaughter of dolphins for meat and entertainment, *The Cove* (Stevens and Psihoyos, 2009) earns the honor of being the only nonhuman animal protection film to win an Academy Award for best documentary.<sup>2</sup> This professionally produced moral tale delivers drama, adventure, suspense, and even some laughs, serving as a strong advocacy tool for the rights of cetaceans (whales, dolphins and porpoises) to maintain their lives and freedoms. Yet, while celebrating this important documentary as a panelist at an eco-film festival in Athens, Georgia, I began to question the extent to which *The Cove* served as a stepping-stone to promoting respect for the subject status of all sentient beings and for promoting animal rights more broadly. To examine this concern here, I discuss the documentary in terms of its deconstruction of the human/animal dualism, messages related to the ethicality of eating animals, appeals to human self-interest

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versus altruism for other animals, and implications for the animal rights movement and its strategies.

As a scholar of media and critical animal studies, as well as a vegan and animal rights activist, I use *The Cove* as a case study for promoting the broader idea that animal protection media are particularly beneficial when they seek ideological transformation in the speciesist human-animal relationship. Even when primarily advocating for a certain species, media-makers have the opportunity to help humans view all other animals, and the animal in themselves, more respectfully.

### **What's Happening in *The Cove*?**

*The Cove* records the quest of Earth Island Institute activist Ric O'Barry to stop fishermen's annual slaughter of over 20,000 dolphins in a cove in Taiji, Japan. In an "Oceans 11" high-tech spy adventure format, O'Barry and his team of American and European volunteers risk arrest setting up underwater cameras that end up successfully recording the slaughter so it can be exposed to the International Whaling Commission and the world for critique. A polemic, the documentary serves as an animal advocacy tool for a "Save Japan Dolphins" campaign. The film's ending includes this call to action: "The dolphin slaughter is scheduled to resume each September. Unless we stop it. Unless you stop it. Text dolphin to 44144 or go to [takepart.com/thecove](http://takepart.com/thecove)."

I share reviewer Laura Shield's (2010) admiration for the film's encouragement of grassroots activism on behalf of fellow animals; the film's perspective assumes viewers side with the animal activists (protagonists) and against the fishermen and Japanese government (antagonists) in opposing what is overtly portrayed as illegal and cruel killing. While nonfiction, documentaries are not journalism and can be partisan. So *The Cove's* subjectivity dispenses with journalistic attempts to neutrally portray both sides of the debate. I would argue that this advocacy orientation helps amend the commercial public sphere's deficit of respectful discourse toward nonhumans (Freeman, 2009; Freeman and Jarvis, 2012).

To clarify my ethical perspective, I believe animal *rights* in comparison to the more ubiquitous animal *welfare* viewpoint shares some similar goals, namely to reduce the suffering of nonhuman animals at the hands of humanity. But as a counter-hegemonic movement, animal rights also contains some key ideological distinctions from welfare, namely that nonhuman animals are not resources for human use, no matter how "humanely"

humans treat them (Francione, 1996). Similar to human rights, the basis for extending rights or liberties to nonhuman animals is their sentience and status as fellow subjects of a life (Regan, 1983). Peter Singer (1990) describes humanity's unjust discrimination of other species as *speciesism*; and post-humanist scholars have built upon this to indict *humanism*, more specifically, as the cause of animal exploitation (see Wolfe, 2003). I refer to humanism also as a "human superiority complex" – a socially constructed human privilege and moral exceptionalism that naturalizes and implicitly justifies institutionalized speciesism.

Promoting both rights and welfare, *The Cove* critiques dolphin *use*, not just killing, as the documentary takes viewers on O'Barry's moral journey from dolphin trainer to dolphin activist/liberator. He explains why he now seeks to dismantle the lucrative dolphin and whale captivity industry that he helped to produce with his 1960s television series *Flipper*, starring Kathy a bottlenose dolphin he trained. After Kathy committed suicide by drowning herself in front of O'Barry, demonstrating her free will and agency, he could no longer promote the myth that dolphins were willing and happy participants in their own captivity. *The Cove* reveals that aquarium employees worldwide come to buy certain marketable individuals from the dolphin communities trapped in the Taiji cove. Afterwards, the unclaimed dolphins are speared to death for meat sold in the Japanese market.

*The Cove* does a convincing and inspirational job of promoting rights for cetaceans, particularly dolphins, gorgeously showcasing them as they should be – swimming freely in their family units. It exemplifies the animal rights premise that sentient individuals deserve to be free from exploitation: "it's all about respect now, not exploitation" O'Barry declares in the film. But animal rights is narrowly applied here to one category of animal species. While the film values marine mammals *inherently* as individuals, non-mammalian marine animals are valued *instrumentally* as a species/group. For example, the film highlights wild fish's utility as human food and as a key species maintaining the vitality of the ocean ecosystem, but they are not valued as sentient individuals. This narrative choice has significant implications for limiting public perceptions of animal rights because, to win support for a specific campaign, filmmakers privilege one culturally-beloved, intelligent species as more deserving of rights than other animals. This distinction creates a moral hierarchy that downgrades the value of other nonhuman animals by comparison.

## **The Human/ Animal Dualism and *The Cove***

As a movement to end speciesist discrimination of sentient beings, animal rights can be compared to human rights movements that strive to end the legally-sanctioned discrimination, objectification, and exploitation of women and racial or ethnic minorities based on arbitrary and unjust hierarchies (Francione, 1996; Singer, 1990; Spiegel, 1997). Animal rights activists in *The Cove* are implicitly similar to human rights activists in their willingness to take risks breaking laws (nonviolently) in order to save victims suffering injustice.<sup>3</sup> Rhetorician Kevin DeLuca (1999) suggests that activism on behalf of nonhuman life be put in historical and cultural context of civil rights, as it helps to legitimate this newer cause. This follows sociologists' advice that counter-hegemonic activists frame their unfamiliar ideas using historically-familiar frames for increased cultural resonance (Polletta, 2006; Ryan, 1991; Tarrow, 1998). Specifically, linking animal rights with human rights can be seen as frame extension, a frame alignment process that bridges one cause with another similar cause so adherents of one can identify with the other (Benford and Snow, 2000). But *The Cove* did not take the opportunity to make direct comparisons between animal activists who free enslaved *dolphins* and abolitionists, such as Harriet Tubman, who freed enslaved *humans*.<sup>4</sup> One way the comparison could be made is by referring to the fishermen's capture of dolphins as "kidnapping." Other animal protection documentaries, such as *Earthlings* (White and Monson, 2005) & *Behind the Mask* (Keith, 2006), more directly link activism on behalf of nonhumans to activism on behalf of humans (Freeman and Tulloch, 2012).

From a utilitarian standpoint, *The Cove* producers might not have wanted to risk insulting a largely humanist audience by discussing humans on par with "animals," as the latter term has been used to denigrate groups of people as subhuman, thereby "justifying" their denial of human rights. But I argue that, in support of broader animal rights goals, *The Cove* should have more directly confronted the human superiority complex that is the root of the species-based discrimination against dolphins and all nonhuman animals. In contrast, Katherine Perlo (2007) critiques comparisons to human rights as counter-productively relying on appeals to human supremacism to gain credibility for nonhumans. Similarly, Kelly Oliver (2010: 269) claims "to insist, as animal rights and welfare advocates do, that our ethical obligations to animals are based on their similarities to us reinforces the type of humanism that leads to treating animals—and other people—as subordinates." I too want to avoid reinforcing humanism, yet I advocate these comparisons of human-nonhuman social justice

*movements* here because they are equitable in terms of liberating sentient beings unjustly held captive against their will. And equating these comparisons promotes animal rights in a broader, universal sense by deconstructing the human/animal dualism.

The human/animal binary is culturally constructed and discursively maintained in many human cultures as a taken-for-granted “reality” that naturalizes speciesism (Freeman, 2010a). Binaries function as violent hierarchies, in Derridian (1976) terms, where one category is privileged by virtue of its opposition to the “lesser” category. Therefore, I contend this “us” and “them” dichotomy must, in large part, be actively deconstructed and blended in animal activist rhetoric. This should demonstrate the uncertainty of boundaries used to separate groups. This entails more than just convincing humanity that certain nonhuman animal species are cognitively like humans and possess subjective agency, but more importantly, that humans are like most animals in many positive respects. Yet in emphasizing the kinship of animality, activists should also foster respect for diversity (among and between species) to counteract a tendency to create hierarchies based on species who most resemble humans cognitively (Freeman, 2010a).

While *The Cove* doesn’t compare animal rights and human rights *movements*, the film does compare dolphins and humans in terms of their *cognition* in order to bolster audience respect for dolphins as sentient individuals. O’Barry says “it’s not about intelligence. It’s about consciousness. They are self-aware like humans are self-aware.” In addition to providing examples of dolphin consciousness, O’Barry and biologists explain how humans connect so easily with cetaceans because we are both so communicative. Whale song recordings sparked the “save the whale” campaign decades ago because it demonstrated whales’ sophisticated communication skills – a capability humans respect as it is one we value in ourselves as the source of our rationality. Several times the documentary claims that dolphins might be more intelligent than humans; therefore humanity needs to be humble enough to learn from them instead of teaching them tricks and human sign language.

Certainly, these examples of cetacean agency, rationality, and sentience offer useful moral rationales to extend a notion of rights toward nonhuman animal species. But in her review of *The Cove*, Shields (2010: 229) critiques this approach, saying “there is no need for the filmmakers to appeal to an anthropocentric worldview in which references to dolphins’ human-like behavior underwrite their right to liberation.” I agree that, by doing so, *The Cove* implies that cetaceans are special and *more* deserving of rights than other nonhuman animals who aren’t as humanlike.<sup>5</sup>

Consider that when one of the documentary's villains, Morishita, Japan's delegate to the International Whaling Commission (IWC), says he has not ever heard a convincing reason why whales are so special, viewers are presumably supposed to view him as mean-spirited, profit-motivated, and culturally-backward. Many viewers would likely respond that whales are special because they feel and think on a par similar to humans and therefore should be privileged above less intelligent animals. The film leads viewers to this conclusion. However, I assert that Morishita, an animal exploiter, unwittingly expressed an animal rights sentiment by questioning why humanity privileges cetaceans over other animals. Morishita's challenge to species-based exceptionalism brings up a valid argument that could contest the legitimacy of *any* hierarchies among species; while this was not Morishita's likely intention, his comment could cause us to envision all animals as morally equal, ecologically-interdependent beings in a state of global environmental crisis. In this case, one could question the need for an International *Whaling* Commission instead of a more broadly construed International Commission on *Ocean Animals* (or fishing/hunting more generally).

Taken further, while Morishita's question about specialness was meant to exclude humans from the category of "animal," the documentarians could have used it as an opportunity to suggest that viewers be humble enough to question why we privilege our own species as more morally relevant than any other animal. For example, when the female IWC delegate from Antigua supports whale hunting on the basis that the species has replenished to the point where they are again fair game, we can rightly ask if it would be morally acceptable for her to discuss culling *human* animals based on such scientific, utilitarian calculations. The answer is surely not; and film viewers were not asked to see the humanist hypocrisy of a statement like hers. Instead, viewers presumably would critique her statement through a humanist lens, judging it as unethical primarily on the basis that it promotes economically-motivated cruelty to a special nonhuman animal that shares many "developed" traits of humankind.

Animal protection ethics are judged according to a humanitarian ethic where value is placed upon the life of each *individual*. But the Antigua delegate was using an ecological ethic where value is placed on the preservation of the *whole species*. Environmentalism is humanist in that it usually applies a humanitarian/individual ethic only to the human animal and an ecological/holistic ethic to all nonhuman species. In the latter case, individual nonhumans only become special when they are endangered, such as whales, in this case.<sup>6</sup>

## **The Ethics of Eating Animals**

*The Cove* brings marine mammals into the humanitarian/individualistic sphere of ethical concern, but it leaves all other sea animals under the holistic umbrella of environmental ethics. For example, filmmakers discuss cetacean lives in terms of their inherent value as sentient individuals and not as a food source, but they identify other sea-based animals as legitimate human food sources. The film segment on fishing does not discuss suffering, as the dolphin-killing segments do, and the fish are shown en masse as commodified bodies in the market warehouse or being graphically carved up. The film claims the issue is not that fish are killed but rather that the rate of fish-killing is unsustainable. Fish are discussed collectively in terms of being ecologically-valuable species rather than inherently-valuable individuals.

In contrast, the segments on dolphin-killing critique their individual loss of life and enslavement in marine parks. Consider this poignant moment when the female human free-diver, there as part of the rescue and surveillance team, weeps while describing the scene we witness where one wounded dolphin successfully struggles to get over the fishermen's barrier. The bloodied dolphin swims toward the activists, only to take a few last breaths before sinking to his/her death. For me personally, and many other viewers I suspect, it is the most heart-wrenching scene in the film because we make a personal connection with an individual, dying dolphin. The struggles of individual fish receive no such poignant profile.

Even though the film's focus is on supporting the right to life of dolphins, and the film understandably cannot take on all issues, the slaughter of other sentient sea animals, when discussed, deserves a similar rights-based critique. Instead, the film couches the issue of industrial fishing in ecological and public health terms. For example, overfishing is framed as a public health crisis for people globally since 70% of the human population reportedly depends on "seafood" as a major protein source. This killing is not framed as a problem or injustice for the fish themselves, as it is for the dolphins themselves. And when filmmakers promote eating "seafood," viewers understand it is not supposed to include dolphin or whale meat, although the reason for this exclusion is never morally justified. When filmmakers privilege human interests above nonhuman interests when framing fishing, and claim many humans need sea-based protein, then it opens the door to question whether people should sustainably eat cetaceans too in addition to fish.

If one wanted to argue that the documentary is more motivated by environmentalism than animal rights, then the solution would have been a holistic discussion of keeping the hunting of dolphins at ecologically-sustainable levels, not abolishing it. But it is primarily an animal protection film, not just an environmental film. So when it discusses an ecological crisis due to overfishing, viewers should be introduced to a vegetarian solution or a plea to decrease fish-eating, which would have supported animal rights not just dolphin rights.

The documentarians know that most people, including most Japanese, do not culturally-support eating dolphins, so they emphasize how dolphin meat is often mislabeled as other kinds of species, such as whale meat (more culturally-acceptable in Japan). This should presumably scare meat-eating viewers into worrying that they may inadvertently be purchasing dolphin flesh. Yet it also presents a missed opportunity to ask viewers whom it is they are consuming anytime they buy flesh wrapped in cellophane at the store. Even if meat-eaters know what *species* they are eating (whether dolphin, tuna, cow, chicken, etc.), they still often do not know whom they are eating in terms of which *individual* – someone with a family, with a story, and with a desire to live.

Humanity's practice of meat-eating, and the fact that the film fails to criticize or morally analyze it, poses a major source of tension in this animal protection film. For example, the hypocrisy of self-proclaimed "humane" cultures eating animals serves as comic fodder for the American satirical cartoon *South Park* (2009), which devotes an episode to the East versus West culture war over whale and dolphin hunting. The *South Park* episode critiques the irony of Americans denigrating the Japanese as angry murderers of dolphins and whales, yet viewing the Japanese as "normal" only when they switch to solely killing cows and pigs like Americans in the show's happy ending. Similarly, one news story on *The Cove* said the Japanese government culturally defends hunting and eating cetaceans because it is not any different from slaughtering pigs and cows, as practiced in the West (Kageyama, 2010).<sup>7</sup> Despite the legitimacy of these cross-cultural critiques, *The Cove* does not condemn or discuss the human practice of farming or eating animals, which presents a missed opportunity to challenge animal enslavement and exploitation more broadly and to explain why cetaceans are deserving of special protection not afforded to other sea or land animals.

This bias against *non-marine* mammals goes unquestioned by the filmmakers and, likely, the largely Western audience probably because most Western nations prohibit trade in marine mammal parts but legalize the mass killing of fish and domesticated land animals. These laws enable species-specific industries to profit, which in turn shape cultural dietary practices accordingly. The legal, political, and economic factors that support a nation's



discourse on “meat” therefore influence the cultural meaning of whom that society sees as food. Put simply, it’s easier to sell Americans on dolphin and whale protection because Americans don’t eat them.<sup>8</sup>

### **Appealing to Self-Interest Versus Altruism**

In the section of the movie devoted to meat, protagonists bolster the anti-dolphin-slaughter moral arguments with a utilitarian or human self-interest argument that dolphin meat bio-accumulates toxic levels of mercury and is therefore poisonous to humans. The film’s appeal to public health risks characterizes the Japanese government and fishing industry as greedy and socially irresponsible, and it also ensures that if some audience members (presumably of Japanese descent) do not care about dolphin lives, maybe they will be interested in stopping the dolphin slaughter to save their own lives or families.

Not surprisingly, antagonists in *The Cove* also use appeals to human self-interest to bolster their pro-hunting arguments. For example, the IWC representative and Taiji fishermen both argue that cetaceans are depleting the human food supply of fish, describing dolphins and whales as competition or “pests” who threaten the economic interests of the fishing industry. Appealing to humanism, IWC representatives employ populist rhetoric claiming the fishing of whales is necessary to keep small fishing communities from starving.<sup>9</sup> *The Cove* counters the fishermen’s argument by demonstrating that it is humans (especially the Japanese fishing industry), not cetaceans, who are the cause of decreases in fish populations.

To defend animal rights in this instance, it would be useful here for the film’s protagonists to emphasize an altruistic or justice-oriented appeal, stating that the human animal is morally obligated to share the earth’s resources with other species. But the film’s activists, like many animal activists, use anthropocentric appeals to human health and wellbeing<sup>10</sup> – what Perlo (2007) and Crompton & Kasser (2009) critique as “extrinsic” appeals. Similarly, I contend that the legitimate utility of the extrinsic or self-interested appeals should not outweigh the authenticity of the altruistic or intrinsic appeals in priority, as animal rights should maintain its integrity as an other-directed moral movement for social justice (Freeman, 2010b). Perlo (2007: para 6) notes the aim of animal rights is a moral paradigm shift:

What is truly needed to free billions of animals is a *qualitative transformation* in people’s thinking. Without a *moral paradigm shift*, the public may never be

motivated to overcome either its own self-interest in using animals or governments' aggressive protection of animal-abusing industries.

To usher in this moral transformation in speciesist worldviews, *The Cove* could emphasize ethical principles of rights and avoidance of unnecessary harm. For example, even if humans were in competition with dolphins for fish to some extent, it could be noted that dolphins have the right to survive and have no choice but to eat fish, while many humans often have other, non-violent options for survival, such as plant-based proteins (making that the more ethical food choice). One could allude to Peter Singer (1990), noting that it is speciesist to privilege humans' minor or non-life-threatening interests over the major interests of other animals, in this case over sea animals' interest in surviving and having a food supply. Populist arguments on behalf of working-class human communities, where legitimate, become less speciesist and more ethically justifiable if certain humans must subsist on some animal flesh for their own survival, as must some other omnivorous (and carnivorous) animals.<sup>11</sup> Promoting this perspective would help to deconstruct culture/nature and human/animal dichotomies as is necessary for widespread ethical transformation.

### **Effects of the Film for Audiences & Activists**

In the last line of the film, O'Barry explains his motivation: "I am focusing on that one little body of water where that slaughter takes place. If we can't stop that, if we can't fix that, forget about the bigger issues. There's no hope." Yet, several years after the popular film's release and its Oscar award receipt, positive media coverage, and massive petition campaign, the dolphin killing still continues (see [www.savejapandolphins.org](http://www.savejapandolphins.org) for an update).<sup>12</sup> Pragmatically, it makes sense as an activist to focus on one egregious practice you have a chance of stopping (Singer, 1998), in this case the globally-unpopular practice of brutally killing highly intelligent, sentient mammals beloved by most human cultures. So I agree with O'Barry's sentiment that if we cannot even save the nonhuman animals that people *say* they most respect and admire, there appears to be little hope for the environmental and animal rights movements' goals of saving other species that humans either dislike, profit from using, or don't care about.

That is precisely why I argue activist campaign goals need to be broader in terms of changing *worldviews* about ourselves as animals rather than just changing *behaviors* toward

certain animals.<sup>13</sup> This is not to say that there cannot be targeted campaigns that focus on saving particular species, but the campaigns should be constructed so as to additionally cultivate a nonspeciesist ideology. In the case of *The Cove*, the documentarians' choice to privilege marine mammals as subjects while (or by) reinforcing prejudices about fish as objects, harms the animal rights movement as a whole. The *Cove's* focus on cetaceans reinforces a humanist bias, or what Bekoff (2007) calls cognitive speciesism, that positions humans (and mammals most like us) at the top of an imaginary evolutionary hierarchy of moral relevance. Granted, strategists may make a legitimate utilitarian argument that this reform-oriented path utilizing bridge species might eventually usher in widespread respect for all other animal species.<sup>14</sup> But this conclusion is uncertain and can also have its drawbacks. If the cause of the exploitation and objectification of nonhuman life is humanism, then this unjust bias must be overtly challenged just as colonialism, patriarchy, and white privilege have begun to be more openly challenged.

The question then becomes whether *The Cove* could have been as rhetorically persuasive and as acclaimed if it had, in addition to primarily defending dolphins, spent some time also challenging the human/animal dualism and questioning the unnecessary hunting and killing of any animals. It is true that mainstream audiences might shy away from a film that is more openly "animal rights." But how is the notion of rights for nonhuman animals to be embraced as a legitimate social justice issue if even animal protection films ignore or diminish it? It does not make strategic sense for this under-funded movement to address the myriad types of animal and habitat exploitation issues as separate, individual species-based campaigns when, instead, every animal or environmental campaign (whether reformist or abolitionist) could also cultivate an animal rights ethical perspective more holistically.

But the activism on this issue still has time to evolve in the direction I suggest. *The Cove* produced a spin-off nonfiction television series *Blood Dolphins* on the Discovery Channel's Animal Planet cable network, featuring O'Barry and his son saving dolphins and working with coastal cultures worldwide (see <http://animal.discovery.com/tv/blood-dolphins>). It is in the vein of Animal Planet's popular *Whale Wars* reality series that chronicles the exploits of the Sea Shepherd animal activists as they combat Japanese whaling ships. It is no coincidence that all of Animal Planet's reality series whose themes might be construed as animal rights or protection-based are geared towards species who are already privileged by mainstream American society, such as cetaceans and companion animals (see all the "Animal Cops" shows featuring the ASPCA officers). When Animal Planet or some more progressive media producers decide to respectfully chronicle animal activism on behalf of fish and free-

roaming land animals (including less beloved animals such as reptiles, rodents, and amphibians), and *all* animals exploited in industry (with themes on anti-vivisection, anti-farming, anti-hunting, and anti-captivity), then it will signal that the rights of *all* animals are being taken seriously as a moral issue and humanist worldviews are evolving.

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I would like to dedicate this article to the memory of ecofeminist scholar and activist Marti Kheel (1948 - 2011).

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## Notes

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<sup>2</sup> The Oscar-winning environmental/nature documentaries *March of the Penguins* (2005) and *An Inconvenient Truth* (2006) could also possibly count as animal protection.

<sup>3</sup> Although, in the film, nonviolent law-breaking to obtain evidence is used as a last resort after trying to apply pressure, through legal avenues, to no avail.

<sup>4</sup> To be more culturally-inclusive, iconic Japanese freedom fighters could be referenced in addition to referencing American human rights heroes.

<sup>5</sup> Evolutionary biologist Marc Bekoff (2007) argues against the cognitive speciesism inherent in referring to animals as higher or lower in relation to humans, as it mistakenly implies humans are the epitome of evolutionary progress. He contends that species evolve to meet survival needs unique to them; species don't all evolve on a single, linear trajectory where the human end of the spectrum represents an ultimate developmental end goal.

Yet I recognize the paradox that mainstream animal rights philosophy itself could be perceived as excluding some animals (such as some invertebrates) who don't appear to qualify as fully sentient or conscious subjects. All identity-based movements rely on boundaries and exclusions, even though they work on extending current boundaries to incorporate new groups, extending opportunities for equality. It's possible that a feminist ethic of care (Kheel, 2008) or phenomenological ethics (Oliver, 2010), both of which base ethical concern on inter-species relationships and emotional and empathetic experiences, can overcome some of the limitations which come with identity-based approaches.

<sup>6</sup> For ethical scholarship on animal rights and environmental protection philosophies (similarities and distinctions), see Kheel, 2008; Regan, 2002; Taylor, 1993; and Varner, 1998.

<sup>7</sup> While I support cultural relativism for its goal of being open-minded, understanding of diversity, and aware of cultural bias, I defend the filmmakers' right to critique another culture's harmful practices. Most rights movements (for example, consider the UN as a supporter of human rights), are based on *universal* principles advocating that a marginalized subject, in any culture, be provided the fair opportunity to live free from unnecessary/unwarranted harm. Where any society crosses that line, unfairly discriminating against or exploiting a subject group, they open themselves up to legitimate critique from those who seek to protect the marginalized subjects (especially when those subjects cannot protect themselves).

Consider that in the last chapter of *Nature Ethics*, author Marti Kheel (2008) promotes veganism as an ethical ideal and is called to defend this ideal against claims of cultural relativism and cultural imperialism within her field of ecofeminism. She clarifies first that "not all cultural practices are morally defensible" and also that "advocating ideals is not the same as seeking to impose one's beliefs on other people and other cultures" (p.236). While acknowledging her privileged position in Western culture, she also notes that certain non-Western cultures (both dominant and counter-cultural) have promoted ethical vegetarianism throughout history, likely without being charged with cultural insensitivity.

I would add that because we humans exist in an ecologically-interdependent global web of life, and nonhuman animals are a fundamental part of that fragile web, we cannot limit our concern to national borders. But we can encourage all human cultures to find their own culturally-resonant ways to protect life and relate fairly with the nonhuman world.

<sup>8</sup> However, Western society does allow the trading of *live* dolphins and whales for the captive entertainment industry (aquariums), a practice *The Cove* openly critiques.

<sup>9</sup> The Canadian government and fishing industry use a similar populist and quasi-ecological argument to justify killing marine mammals (seals in their case). See <http://www.seashepherd.org/seals/seal-hunt-facts.html>

<sup>10</sup> For example, Freeman's (2010b) study of vegan advocacy noted some reliance on anthropocentric appeals to economics, disease-prevention, sex-appeal, hunger relief, or a clean environment.

<sup>11</sup> In supporting veganism as an ideal, Kheel (2008) acknowledges the diet may be difficult for some cultures based on "environmental and climatic factors" (p. 236).

<sup>12</sup> It is hard to definitively quantify "effects" of the film in terms of efficacy. I do not want to belittle its positive impact, as the hunt might stop in years to come, perhaps quietly after the hype dies down, or perhaps the negative attention will cause other fishing cultures to avoid killing cetaceans for fear of similar bad press.

<sup>13</sup> See reports from the WWF's change strategist Tom Crompton. [http://www.wwf.org.uk/what\\_we\\_do/campaigning/strategies\\_for\\_change/](http://www.wwf.org.uk/what_we_do/campaigning/strategies_for_change/) He and his co-researchers advocate that the environmental and animal protection movements should focus their campaigns on promoting core, respectful values and altruistic identity rather than extrinsic appeals to human self-interest or small, painless behavioral changes.

<sup>14</sup> This may be especially salient in the legal/judicial route to gaining personhood status for nonhuman animals, as it relies on expanding notions of human rights. See Wise, S. (2000), *Rattling the cage: Toward legal rights for animals*, Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books.

## **From the Mortician's Scalpel to the Butcher's Knife: Towards an Animal Thanatology**

**Sarah Bezan<sup>1</sup>**

[The] coming apart of thought and reality belongs to flesh and blood.  
-Cora Diamond, "The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy"<sup>xiv</sup>

To problematize the matter of bodies may entail an initial loss of epistemological certainty, but a loss of certainty is not the same as political nihilism. This unsettling of 'matter' can be understood as initiating new possibilities, new ways for bodies to matter.

-Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter*<sup>xv</sup>

### **Abstract**

Proceeding from Judith Butler's evocative suggestion that unsettling the matter of bodies initiates "new ways for bodies to matter" (*Bodies That Matter*), this paper investigates the material reality and ethical implications of animal and human death, taking the corpse/carcass as a dramatic site of rupture. While a number of anthropocentric projects from Linnaeus to Descartes have attempted to consolidate the matter of animal-human relations into a cohesive epistemology that emphasizes the alterity of animality, this study regards Death itself as the ultimate Other, and suggests that it is upon the recognition of our shared mortality that an ethical foundation is formed.

Through an examination of the history of veterinary medicine, the carnivalesque corpse and the practice of public dissection, along with an analysis of artistic productions by Janieta Eyre, Damien Hirst, and Gunther Von Hagen (*Body Worlds*), I argue that the ontological "unsettling" of the corpse/carcass opens up a productive space in which the plurality of being is understood.

**Key Words:** Thanatology / animal / corpse / death

### **Introduction: The Ethics of Matter**

Sinews, ligaments, muscles, eyeballs, blood, tongues, skin, bones: the mass disassembling of animal and human bodies that takes place in slaughterhouses, laboratories

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and morgues is evidence of the way in which matter is continually being “unsettled.” Yet the literal severing, sawing, and separating of material bodies into parts is not equivalent, obviously, to an epistemological overhaul. As Judith Butler suggests, new ethical and ontological possibilities emerge when matter, and what *matters* philosophically, are problematized (Butler, 1993: 30).

The trouble with much of philosophical discourse, however, is that bodies have often been treated as conceptual surfaces, consolidated and ordered into “readable” forms. Yet it is precisely when matter is “settled” that bodies become assembled into semantic surfaces: exteriors upon which rigid distinctions, including reason/unreason, materiality/immateriality, presence/absence and subjectivity/non-subjectivity (to name just a few), are inscribed. Since animal and human bodies have – with violent intervention and on an enormous scale – been materially disassembled and philosophically re-assembled, the following project is committed to the *continual unsettling* of the animal/human corpse. Through the symbolic separation of dead flesh into fragments, pieces, bits, and parts, an epistemological framework inclusive of the *plurality of matter* is established. Such a project is indebted to Jacques Derrida’s own rigorous work on the question of the animal, in which he explodes the “singular, indivisible line” that separates animal from human into a “multiple and heterogeneous border” (Derrida, 2008: 31). To build a framework upon multiple corporeal fragments, therefore, is not to violently categorize, rationalize, or bring to order these pieces; rather, it is to emphasize their complex heterogeneity. Thus, taking the figure of the corpse as a site of rupture – as the space within which distinctions between humans and animals collapse – this thanatological framework of body parts draws from the long history of death and disease that form the basis of the animal-human relationship, and reveals both human and animal death to be inimitably unstable concepts.<sup>xvi</sup> It is at this crucial intersection of animal and human death, I will argue, that a productive ethical foundation is created upon which traditional anthropocentric concepts driving a wedge between the animal and the human are made fit for burial. Taking together post-mortem fragments and bits, it is my objective to facilitate deep and meaningful comprehension of our shared mortality with animals, along with our differences – in short, to foster understanding of *our singular and plural sense of being*.

To begin, it is important to note that this philosophical project *does not* attempt to conflate human and animal bodies as if the violence done to both were equivalent. The slaughtering of animal bodies by far exceeds the numbers of dissected human cadavers – and furthermore, necessarily entails the *copious killing* (rather than the natural death) of animals. This thanatological approach is, therefore, jointly materialist and deconstructionist in that it

critiques not only the vacuum-sealed packaging of meat for consumption, but also the anatomical dissection of bodies for the purposes of acquiring medical knowledge. These problems (divided in this essay into their respective sections: “Eating,” followed by “Gazing”) invite philosophical critique, since they depend upon unitary constructions of the material and symbolic realities of dead bodies. This critique will be similar to the way in which Nicole Shukin admirably tracks “*animal and capital...in genealogical relation to one another [so that] they will break down as monolithic essences and reveal their historical contingencies*” (Shukin, 2009: 15).

The history of death and disease that structures the human-animal relationship serves as the starting point for the task of philosophical disassembly, since the localizing, homogenizing discourses of medicine that so rigorously draw distinctions between animals and humans emerge as a direct result of the attempt to prevent mortality due to illness. So for a moment, then, it is imperative that we explore the figure of the sick or diseased body in relation to both veterinary practice and clinical medicine. Joanna Swabe argues in *Animals, Disease, and Human Society: Human-Animal Relations and the Rise of Veterinary Medicine* that animal medicine largely provided “preventative” rather than “curative” treatment, meaning that care was “aimed at preserving animal resources, to keep animals fit and healthy in order that they may efficiently service human needs” (Swabe, 1999: 151, 154). However, Swabe argues that the domestication of animals since the inception of agrarian civilization was a “mutually beneficial” relationship, ensuring the survival of both humans and animals (36). Swabe does not comment on the fact that animal death was prevented by veterinary medicine only insofar as it remained profitable to humans, nor does she acknowledge the grim reality that livestock and other large domesticated animals are eventually butchered. Moreover, that veterinary medicine – especially since the industrialization of livestock productions in the eighteenth century – did not generally provide curative treatment, but instead isolated and killed sick animals (Swabe 92), suggests that sick animal bodies have throughout history been deemed threatening and rendered disposable. While Swabe argues that one of the most significant, though much overlooked, repercussions of animal domestication “was the advent of infectious disease on an epidemic scale...resulting in great mortality – amongst both *animal* and human populations” (44, my emphasis), the swift isolation and mass decimation of *sick animal bodies as opposed to human bodies* demonstrates the way in which rigid distinctions and ethical judgments were (and perhaps still are being) made in veterinary discourse.

In medical discourse, the existence of illnesses shared by animals and humans, including measles, influenza, “mad cow disease” or Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), smallpox, avian flu, and swine flu, are similarly localized: imagined, in fact, as distinct “entities” (Helman, 2007: 123). Indeed, as Michel Foucault explains in *Birth of the Clinic*, diseases were even “grouped into orders, genera, and species” in the human body (Foucault, 1976: 42, italics mine). As Foucault later explains, distinctions were made between the person and the disease, and the medical gaze effectively “read” the symptoms of the body from within and without. The body was “observed in terms of symptoms and signs...distinguished from one another as much as by their semantic value as by their morphology” (90). In other words, despite the separation of the sick body into parts (healthy person, unwelcome disease), the surface of the body was still “read” as though it were an uncontaminated whole. Despite the fact that the human-animal relationship is one indelibly marked by interspecies infection and shared sickness, scientific discourse rigorously and hygienically separates itself from that which is deemed to be non-human. Yet that animal and human tissue are already rendered indistinguishable through such infection makes sense of the current panic surrounding inoculation and what Shukin suggests is “the medical rationalization of human-animal commingling that pandemic speculation universally mandates” (Shukin, 2009: 189). Derrida’s comments on auto-biography and auto-infection further complicate this point, since they suggest that inoculation threatens subject formation: “an immunizing movement...is always threatened with becoming auto-immunizing, as is every autos, every ipseity, every automatic, automobile, autonomous, auto-referential movement” (qtd. in Shukin 221). That the injection of “a ‘sick’ bit of an animal’s body into one’s own” results in a kind of self-attack illustrates the anxiety that surrounds interspecies identification as “distinct” and subjectivity as “self-same” (Shukin, 2009: 221). While my intention is not to linger on the conceptual framework of sick bodies, it is important to note that the infections spread between animals and humans initiated, to some degree, the emergence of scientific discourses that attempted to localize and isolate animal bodies, and that these same distinctions were carried over to the corpse. Moreover, the gross fact that cross-species transmission of disease has historically resulted in mass human and animal death (such as the large numbers of deaths incurred from the bubonic plague, avian flu, and swine flu) becomes staggering when added to the current decimation of animal livestock. It is from this traumatic past and disconcerting present that a study of the corpse begins, and it is thus to the material and symbolic constructions of bodies that I now return.

Like the parts of the sick body that are ordered and “read,” the corpse is similarly settled into a semantic surface. Yet what makes the corpse a site of dramatic rupture is that the kinds of distinctions placed upon it, particularly those that are hinged upon the possession of rationality, spirit, cognition, and subjectivity, are never entirely stable concepts. More intriguingly, the kinds of definitions that are circulated in medical discourse regarding the essence of the corpse (that it is a body of non-reason, materiality, absence, and non-subjectivity) have been assigned over and over again not only to dead, but more compellingly, to *live animal bodies*. The Cartesian animal, a soul-less, non-reasoning, biological automaton, does indeed bear a resemblance to current medical conceptions of the corpse. That *both* animal bodies (as with the dog, “Bobby,” in Levinas’s autobiographical work) and human bodies (as with the Jews, destroyed in the death camps) can be “animalized” as David Clark suggests (Clark, 1997: 45), opens up another space in which, perhaps, living animal and human bodies are “corpsified.” Are corpses, in addition to living beings, “corpsified”? Indeed, what is a corpse? Institutional human sciences and the language of medical knowledge insist that the corpse is a site of truth, observation, and experimentation (Jones, 2001: 166), but do so assuming that its essence is understood. As Foucault writes,

With the coming of the Enlightenment, death, too, was entitled to the clear light of reason, and became for the philosophical mind an object and source of knowledge...[I]n the boldness of the gesture that violated only to reveal, to bring to the light of day, the corpse became the brightest moment in the figures of truth. Knowledge spins where once larva was formed.

(Foucault, 1976: 125)

The image of larva in this excerpt is one of both festering worms feeding upon a decaying body, and of disembodied spirits (*larvae*) – indeed an intriguing conflation. For even in the “clear light of reason,” Foucault’s cadaver is problematically both immaterial *and* in a state of decay.

Though static and vulnerable, the corpse is ultimately not in a latent state: even when embalmed or stored in formaldehyde, it cannot be taken for granted as a “fixed category” (Evans, 2002: 1). Alternatively, to use a Butlerian turn of phrase, the *matter* of the corpse ought never to be wholly settled upon in philosophical language. As Katherine Young suggests in her work, *Presence in the Flesh: The Body in Medicine*, the aristocratization of medical language symbolically “purified, etherealized, and disembodied” the corpse (Young, 1997: 137) by suppressing “the grotesque, the material lower bodily stratum” (114). Like Foucault’s cadaver, what is intriguing about the “decorporealized etherealism” of the corpse

in Young's discussion of aristocratic discourse is that it concomitantly avows and disavows the materiality of death (Young 90). At once a negation and an allowance, the inconsistencies of medical discourse reveal the way in which matter cannot be altogether settled. Rather, the "material lower bodily stratum" is always contaminating the pure, aristocratized medical language. Drawing from Mikhail Bakhtin's work on the carnivalesque, Young's engagement with the grotesque body explores, among other things, the roasting and taking up of meat, or the '*Carne levare*' of carnival (113). Intriguingly, this engagement with the ambiguity of flesh and the roasting of meat is situated pre-eighteenth-century, a time before the corpse was inexorably invented and fabricated by scientific language (Young 3). It is at this juncture of meat and the carnivalesque body that a more systematic "unsettling" of matter can take place. More specifically, it is in the space of the carnival that categories of dead animal and human bodies are disrupted.

### **Eating: Cannibalism and the Carnavalesque Corpse**

Autopsy is threatened by the breaking through of grotesque realism, by the thought, the hint, the whiff of sausages.

-Katherine Young, *Presence in Flesh: The Body in Medicine*<sup>xvii</sup>

As the epigraph to this section suggests, the blurring of human and animal flesh as "meat" problematizes the boundary separating that which is edible and inedible, human and non-human. Within the context of the carnivalesque, the human and animal body are interminably entangled. In his discussion of tripe, for instance, Bakhtin notes that it

is linked with death, with slaughter, murder, since to disembowel is to kill...it is linked with birth, for the belly generates. Thus, in the image of tripe, life and death, birth, excrement, and food are drawn together and tied in one grotesque knot..[it ] is the center of the bodily topography in which the upper and lower stratum interpenetrate each other.

(qtd. in Young 112).

In a grotesque mixture of self/other, human/animal, and life/death, eating meat is thus an establishment of subjectivity (but of course, a problematic one, as I will soon explain). As Cora Diamond profoundly states, "we learn what a human being is in – among other ways – sitting at a table where *we eat them*" (Diamond, 2008: 324). Similarly, in "Eating Well," Derrida argues that subjectivity "dislocates or divides itself in gathering itself together to

answer to the other, whose call somehow precedes its own identification with itself” (Derrida, 1995: 261). The boundary separating self from Other is one structured by an appetitive economy: the consumption of self-knowledge (or in another words, the consumption of *another* in order to establish *oneself*). What is significant, however, about the consumption of another is that it is, to draw upon the Kristevan logic of abjection, a kind of *reverse*-abjection. Since abjection and self-sedimentation come through an acknowledgment of, and separation from, another (3), eating flesh problematizes self-identification. While it may seem that to eat flesh is to be more full of life, as J.M Coetzee suggests in “On Appetite,” it seems that one is actually to be more full of death (Coetzee, 1999: 119). For the corpse, “the most sickening of wastes” is, as Julia Kristeva remarks, “a border that has encroached upon everything” (Kristeva, 1982: 3). Furthermore, the human corpse is “waste, transitional matter, mixture, it is above all the opposite of the spiritual, of the symbolic, of the divine law” (Kristeva 109). But could not the same be said of the animal corpse? If so, why eat animal flesh? Kristeva suggests that eating animal meat is a “necessary evil” – an “acknowledgement of a bent toward murder essential to human beings” (96). Such an authorization to eat another, Kristeva goes on, “was the recognition of that ineradicable ‘death drive,’ seen here under its most primordial or archaic aspect – devouring” (96). The death drive, that thanatological impulse spinning from order to disorder; from life to death, is thus strangely counter-intuitive in its bend towards self-destruction. To eat another, then, is *at once to settle and unsettle oneself*.

However, the question still remains: since we eat animals, why do we not eat human flesh? Is not my fellow human nevertheless an Other? Despite the disorder that the “devouring” aspect of the death drive leaves in its wake, Kristeva suggests that eating and subjectivity are structured around an ordered system of “established taxonomy” (98) – that is to say, a system of clean/unclean beings. More generally, it is a system of animals that do not eat one another (clean), and those that do (unclean). While I will return to the messy notion of eating bodies made up of the other bodies, I will for now suggest that the eating of unclean bodies is undesirable or (ritualistically) taboo in that it multiplies and aggregates the border of the self, thereby threatening it. With this in mind, does the Western world not eat their fellow human beings for the same reason that they typically do not eat carnivorous animals? The act of dissection, for instance, is not much different from the rendering of the animal into items that fill the meat case, since it presumably depends upon the notion that the matter being excised is not connected to a present subject. Moreover, comparative anatomical studies have found that human and animal flesh are indistinguishable from one another. The

evolutionary studies undertaken by Charles Darwin, for instance, suggest that “there is no sharp break between human beings and animals” (de Waal in Calarco 62). Similarly, in her work, “Chardin’s Fur: Painting, Materialism, and the Question of the Animal Soul,” Sarah Cohen writes:

The question of what constituted the human soul, in the face of the physiological facts uncovered by anatomical studies, posed...a significant challenge to early modern understandings of souls as immaterial and immortal...[W]ith comparative anatomy revealing the human and quadruped bodies to be so alike, one had to wonder what, in fact, distinguished humanity at all

(Cohen, 2004: 44).

The relative indistinguishability of animal and human flesh scratches the surface of our discomfiture: for to have flesh like an animal is, not surprisingly, to *be an animal*, and more importantly, *to be reminded that we are animals*. Or to agitate the (t)issue further, it is the suggestion that the human corpse bears traces of personhood, and that the animal corpse too is embedded with immateriality, presence, and subjectivity – and is thus demanding of integrity. For even the machinic, automated animal, according to Descartes, had a material soul: the *esprit* (animal spirit) was supposedly housed in the blood of the animal that circulated in the brain, nerves, and muscles (Cohen 44). With the possibility of the material existence of an animal spirit, would it not be conceivable that the human soul is also contained within flesh?

Along the same hyperbolic vein, then, would the idea of animals feeding on other animals be just as perturbing? “[A]nimal cannibalism,” also known as “the agroindustrial practice of feeding rendered remains of ruminants back to livestock” (Shukin 205), reveals the way in which body parts are consumed and materially re-distributed into other bodies. Since these dead animal body parts are literally recycled into living bodies (similar to the way that animal meat products consumed by humans are broken down and used by their bodies), it is significant to explore for a moment the semantic surface constructed upon the “*eater*” and the “*eaten*.” While the supposedly whole, replete body that eats and digests body parts is at once multiplied and fragmented, the corporeal markers of the species divide are imbibed and absorbed, leaving no trace of a heterogeneous body on the surface. Eating meat, then, in effect collapses the species divide through ingestion and osmosis. While it is productive to consider a collapse of the species divide (since it aids in problematizing the supposedly stable distinctions placed upon animal and human flesh as radically separate), it is also worth noting that a maintenance of this border in relation to the consumption of flesh can, with as much rigor, unsettle the matter of the self.

In the photographic work of Janieta Eyre, for instance, with its uncanny and discomfiting representation of grotesque doubles and rotting carcasses, the human-animal boundary is fraught with the intermingling of selves and bodies. Eyre's work demonstrates the process by which subjectivity is fragmented and consolidated; how it transgresses the boundary separating the animal from the human, the edible from the inedible. In Eyre's "Pissing Silverfish" (1995) for example, the secretions of the body (already an abject substance) are poured into a glass jar, revealing the attempt of the subject to define or limit the bounds between self and other.



**Fig. 1. Janieta Eyre. Pissing Silverfish. Fibre-based selenium toned print. 1995. CristineRose Gallery.**

However, the secretions of the body are no longer liquefied – they are (or have been transformed into) small silverfish – or else they have remained whole since their ingestion. This nonsensical urination reveals the way in which, as Bakhtin argues, the carnivalesque, grotesque body is not separate from the rest of the world, but is “blended with the world, with *animals*, with objects” (Bakhtin qtd. in Russo 8, my emphasis). This work confounds the attempt to label or compartmentalize, since the presence of fish rather than “proper” bodily secretions is absurd to say the least. In a ludicrous and comedic gesture, the fully dressed self on the left disgustedly (or prudishly) turns up her nose, suggesting that the act of urination (in terms of establishing self from other) is, in and of itself, a farce. Moreover, defecation and excrement are revealed to be revolting in that the consumed fish enters and exits the body without being separated into parts. In a profound reversal, the expected settling of matter (the fish as organically liquefied excrement) is unsettled precisely in that it is “not-settled.”





**Fig. 2. Janieta Eyre. *On the Imperfections of my Lover*. Black and white print. 1995. Diane Farris Gallery.**

Conversely, in the photograph, “On the Imperfections of My Lover” (1995), Eyre separates the liquefied corpse into labelled jars; markers of self-containment. Yet, the composite nature of the liquid resists identification, for the body parts of the corpse are stewed together in a *mélange* of bits. The twins, matched in headpieces and belted gowns, appear before a kitchen table covered with jars that read, “HAIR,” “TEETH,” “EYES,” “MOUTH,” “NOSE,” and “NAILS.” The varying amounts of dark liquid in each jar have been poured from the teapot by the seated self. Precisely whose hair, teeth, eyes, etc., are contained within these jars is unclear: perhaps it is a composite of both the seated and the standing self, or an unidentified other. The liquefied body in this photograph is startling as it signals a solubility and fluidity of the self, as well as an austere compartmentalization of it. The look of dismay upon the face of the standing self suggests the repugnance of bodily secretions, and the subsequent attempt made by the seated self to categorize the liquid into labelled jars clearly reveals the way in which the corporeal body (and its secretions) are abject. For the secretions of the body are, as Julia Kristeva maintains, “opposed to I” (1); they both reinstate and destabilize the self as they occupy the boundary separating self from other (4). That such flesh-fluid is presented in the space of the kitchen as jarred food (one thinks of jam and jelly preserves), is certainly a Bakhtinian play with the carnivalesque body and the indistinguishability of animal and human flesh. It is disconcertingly similar to the

gelatinous, amorphous mixture created when “animal stock [is] strained from the boilers of rendering plants” (Shukin 74).

Eyre’s work unsettles subjectivity and bodies by rendering them, in one moment, into indeterminate matter, and refusing such rendering, at the next. Consuming the other, in Eyre’s “Pissing Silverfish,” is a surprising “non-settling” of matter: in refusing to collapse the species divide, it also negates the attempt made by the self to absorb, decompose, and subsequently expel animal tissue. In keeping the animal corpse (silverfish) intact, Eyre admirably unsettles our expectations of the material and symbolic reality of bodies – and with it, the animal-human divide. And in “On the Imperfections,” Eyre steeps and simmers the self into an indeterminate fluid, categorizing it in a move that is disturbingly cannibalistic. In refusing to sacrifice the animal, it is decidedly *anti-carnophallogocentric*. Eyre’s transgression of the animal/human and edible/inedible boundary is similar to Young’s intimation that autopsy is threatened by the “whiff of sausages” (129). The illicit meat trade in the eighteenth-century, for instance, in which “knackers travelled to farms far and wide to collect cadavers with their dog carts, even digging up rotting carcasses to be brought back to the knackers’ yard to be processed into pies and sausages” (Swabe 114), evokes disgust not only because of the decaying, rotting meat that is being converted into food, but also because it elucidates the unsettling fact that human bodies are mortal, material and edible. Other examples, especially the tradition of anatomical drawings before the eighteenth-century, were “quite gruesome and even perverted, with unnecessary depictions of roped, twisted bodies’ and sometimes, ‘reminiscent of the appearance of meat on the block in a shambles’” (Tomlinson qtd. in Caldwell 332). The meat and deli aisle at the supermarket, to update this carnivalesque example, may well be, similarly, a semiotically-transitional space: a kind of morgue, a funeral parlour.

### **Gazing: To (Dis)Order and (Un)Name**


I am getting lost again in the chasm that I see opening, for my part, wherever I,  
wherever the “I” crosses gazes – to the point of drowning there – with an animal  
that sees me seeing it seeing me naked.

-Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*<sup>xviii</sup>

While an exploration of the carnivalesque corpse in relation to food and flesh does much to unsettle the boundaries of subjectivity/non-subjectivity (the self), presence/absence

(interiority), and material/immaterial (spiritual and cognitive traits) – the nude, dissected, and anatomized body is a site of rupture that destabilizes notions of language (naming), order, and essence.

First, however, an exploration of the history of dissection and publicly anatomized bodies ought to be undertaken. Before the inception of private dissections of the dead human body in the eighteenth-century, in which the body became objectified as a site of knowledge and inquiry, the carnivalesque tradition of public dissections “were sites of disruption, raucous outburst, and bawdy display” (Klestinec, 2007: 434). These publically dissected bodies were carnivalesque, as Katherine Young argues, in that they were “split, severed, dismembered, eviscerated, turned inside out” (114). In addition to the public dissections, anatomical drawings during the Renaissance period often played with the boundary separating life and death: corpses assisting in their own dissections, walking around – even eating (Caldwell, 2006: 330). As Janis McLarren Caldwell writes, “Subject or object, alive or dead, inside or outside, anatomized person or revived corpse? The convention, until the late eighteenth-century, was always confoundingly both, refusing the dividing lines between what now seem to us as clear and coherent oppositions” (340). The animated cadavers in earlier anatomical drawings reveal the way in which the corpse was at once inside and outside, dead and alive.



**Fig. 3. Designer Unknown. *Frontispiece Portrait of Vesalius*. Woodcut. 1543. Artstor.**

The presumably standing cadaver in this work from 1543 is partially dressed, and willingly offers his arm to the seated dissector. From his shoulder to his fingers, the tendons, bones, nerves and muscles become increasingly – and painfully, exposed. Such drawings unsettle matter with surprising absurdity and discomfort.

More intriguingly, the animal dissections slightly after this period, such as the 1671 and 1676 editions of the Parisian compilation of drawings, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire naturelle des animaux*, represented animals in conflicting states of life and death. As Anita Guerrini explains in “The ‘Virtual Menagerie’: The *Histoire des Animaux* Project,” the drawings of dissected animals included a taxonomic-anatomic drawing superimposed on top of a presumably “live” animal in its “natural” setting (Guerrini, 2006: 35). Startlingly, these superimposed drawings of spirited and deceased animals disorients – perhaps more effectively than earlier drawings of lively human cadavers – the line between life and death, animal and human. On the one hand, these drawings provide evidence of the way that medical discourse has assigned non-reason, materiality, absence and non-subjectivity to the human corpse *as well as to live animal bodies*: for unlike most drawings of animated cadavers, the dead, dissected animal in the *Histoire des Animaux* compilation was separated from the live animal by separate pages, as if they were separate notions. Yet on the other hand, these images were *nevertheless superimposed* upon one another, demonstrating that live and dead animal bodies are not clearly separable. To animate a dead animal body, as well as a human corpse, is thus to open up new questions: as Anita Guerrini asks, “Could animals convey the same consciousness of mortality, including consciousness of the state of one’s soul, as could a human cadaver?” (37). If we return to the notion that the Cartesian animal as one entirely composed of machinic parts, with *esprit* contained within its flesh, then what does it mean to represent the lifeless animal corpse as conscious and vital? For to suggest the animation of a dead animal corpse is to intimate that its immaterial being is separate from its material existence, and exists apart from itself. To put it another way, it is to suggest that the animal has a soul. Bringing together materiality and immateriality, presence and absence, human and animal, public dissections and early modern anatomical drawings posit the corpse as a site of disruption: in effect, an “unreadable” semantic surface; a taxonomic body in riotous disorder.

More recently, the representation of dead animal and human bodies in art and sculpture – from Damien Hirst’s formaldehyde-encased sharks, cows, and sheep, to the plasticized human cadavers in Gunther von Hagen’s *Body Worlds* exhibitions – similarly intermingle life and death in fascinating ways. Yet unlike anatomical drawings, Hirst’s

corporeal sculptures use and manipulate *real* animal corpses in an attempt to preserve life: to be sure, his sheep and cattle very much bear the resemblance of *livestock*.



**Fig. 4. Damien Hirst. *Away From the Flock*. Mixed media sculpture. 1994. Tate Modern.**

While fascinating, Hirst's sculptures do little to unsettle matter in new ways; if anything, they merely hold death in abeyance and refuse to allow its intermixture with life. And although some of Gunther von Hagen's cadaverous art sculptures represent dead human bodies in the semblance of life (shooting basketballs, gymnastically contorting themselves, posing and performing), a number of these sculptures do little more than replicate the powerful medical gaze that orders and separates the body into nameable, technical parts – as the history of private dissections reveals.

The private dissection/autopsy, a practice that slowly emerged during the late eighteenth century, was interested, as Foucault maintains, in dividing and categorizing the body while at the same time, binding it together (Foucault, 1976: 129). Foucault goes on to argue that the autopsy was first interested in the classification, followed by the geography, of organs: it was “*ordinal*” and then it was “*localizing*” (130). As Caldwell affirms, the rise of medical science corresponded with a new non-animated cadaver, “quite thoroughly dead and in pieces” (343). For instance, the famous set of anatomical dissections, *Gray's Anatomy* (still used widely today), represents the trend of displaying the human body as “shorn of emotion, imagination, agency, individuality, and personhood” (Caldwell, 2006: 343). Moreover, the growing propensity among medical doctors to employ micro-anatomical tests, including “x-rays, plates, scans, [and] printouts of blood test results,” rather than gross anatomical analysis, even further denied the human corpse any association to immateriality or the presence of subjectivity (Helman, 2007: 41). The micro-medical gaze that wields itself as

the “point of concentration and the centre of diffusion” (Foucault, 1976: 31) is joined at the proverbial hip to the anthropological project that attempts to name, gaze upon, and order human and animal bodies. Heidegger’s *Dasein*-centric examination of the essence of humanity in *Being and Time* insisted, as Matthew Calarco relates, that “human beings and animals can be clearly and cleanly distinguished in their essence” (30). However, as Giorgio Agamben notes in his anti-anthropological work, *The Open: Man and Animal*, the taxonomic and evolutionary history of naming and ordering by Linnaeus relied on an imperative assumption of *Homo Sapiens* that was really “neither a clearly defined species nor a substance; it [was], rather, a machine or device for producing the recognition of the human” (26). Furthermore, Paola Cavalieri argues that the naming of humans has relied upon taking the animal as “a negative term of comparison” and a “normative rather than a descriptive concept” (Cavalieri, 2009: 3, 4).

To unsettle everything from the Edenic scene of naming to the current medical tradition of taxonomic ordering, Derrida turns the gaze around. In his discussion of nudity and the gaze, Derrida destabilizes the anthropocentric gaze that has philosophically, scientifically, and anthropologically named and ordered animals. While Derrida explores the shame and self-disidentification that comes when “an animal...sees me seeing it seeing me naked” (66), I want to further complicate the matter by examining the possibilities – or to be more exact – the *impossibilities* that are the result of looking upon, and being looked back by, an animal or human corpse. This approach to thanatological specularity lies in direct opposition to other various intellectual economies of spectrality in relation to animals, such as that employed by Jonathan Burt – who argues that “the permutations of language and death form...around the figure of the animal” (158). Additionally, it is opposed to the argument of Akira Lippit in *Electric Animal*, in which he states that animals do not properly die, and “never *entirely* vanish” (1). To re-state my approach, I am interested in the material and symbolic realities of animals, and so I question, in the manner of Nicole Shukin, the critical approach of hauntology (the animal as a token of the death of language) as a way of “purportedly unse[t]tl[ing] the ontological premises and power structures of Western culture” (29). With that said, I do admire Derrida’s own powerful arguments on language and death, as well as his insistence that we do not have a concept for the human or animal (in Wolfe, “Humanist” 57; Wolfe, “Flesh” 25). In a certain way, it is still from the Derridean framework of (un)language and speechlessness that gazing upon a corpse depends.

## **Conclusion: Sympathetic Imagination and Embodied Living**

To gaze at (and *to be* gazed upon by) an animal or human corpse recognizes the impossibility of naming and ordering death. It is to return to Derrida's "multiple and heterogeneous border":

[T]here is already a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living, or more precisely (to say 'the living' is already to say too much or not enough), a multiplicity of organizations of relations between living and dead, relations of organization or lack of organization among realms that are more and more difficult to dissociate by means of the figures of the organic and inorganic, of life and/or death. These relations are at once intertwined and abyssal, and they can never be totally objectified.(31).

Derrida's suggestion that death and life (in addition to animals and humans), coagulate at the border that separates them demonstrates that animals ought not to be positioned against humans in a state of ultimate alterity. Rather, as Wolfe, Diamond, and others suggest, death itself is the ultimate other – meaning that "our shared embodiment, mortality, and finitude makes us... 'fellow creatures'" (Wolfe, 2008: 7). To toy with Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of "becoming-animal," the shared experience of finitude and mortality is to *become-corpse*. Just as public dissections and early modern anatomical drawings discomfortingly bring together notions of life and death, animal and human, so does the notion of *becoming-corpse* or – to use my earlier term, "corpsification" – allow for the dissolution of the rigid distinctions traditionally separating humans and animals. It is to wonder, as does J. M. Coetzee's character, Elizabeth Costello: "Do I know what it is like for me to be a corpse or do I know what it is like for a corpse to be a corpse?" (Coetzee, 1999: 32). Rather than simply "reading" and inscribing characteristics onto bodies, this kind of sympathetic imagination allows for the recognition that death, and the corpse for that matter, are beyond the reach of reason.

To return to Judith Butler, this unsettling of matter opens up new ethical and ontological possibilities (30). It is at the complicated nexus of death/life, animal/human, subjectivity/non-subjectivity, material/immaterial, and so on – that an ethical relationship between living beings can be founded. In the words of Cora Diamond: "The awareness we each have of being a living body, being 'alive to the world,' carries with it exposure to the bodily sense of vulnerability to death, sheer animal vulnerability, the vulnerability we share with them" (74). That Coetzee refers to Elizabeth Costello's "old flesh" relates back to the lived embodiedness of death: to that shared awareness of death infecting life at every turn. That death is *in* life, animal *in* human, materiality *in* immateriality, absence *in* presence,

results in an outright refusal to settle matter. The mass material disassembly and philosophical re-assembly of bodies – the consequence of anthropocentrism – is fit for burial. A thanatological approach to animal philosophy, as I have argued, ought to be committed to the *continual unsettling* of the animal/human corpse in a move that recognizes the plurality of being. From the settling and unsettling of subjectivity that comes from eating another, to the surprising absurdity of a publically dissected, animate cadaver, a critical framework of death is built on a foundation of un-categorizable, non-rationalizable, and un-orderable corporeal fragments. A thanatology of animality and humanity opens up, with unapologetic violence, a productive epistemological space in which traditional anthropocentric distinctions expire and are no more.

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## Notes

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<sup>xiv</sup> Pg. 87.

<sup>xv</sup> Pg. 30.

<sup>xvi</sup> "Thanatology," simply defined, is the study of death. This includes the conditions of dying along with its moral, ethical, and spiritual implications. More broadly defined, thanatological studies examine corporate deathcare services, funerary practices, body decomposition, forensics, and grief/mourning, among other things. In the case of animal and human death as outlined in this paper, thanatological work is intended to investigate our shared history of death and disease with the animal, along with the ethical obligations that arise due to our shared mortality.

<sup>xvii</sup> Pg. 129.

<sup>xviii</sup> Pg. 66, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*.

## **POETRY**

### **‘A Death’ and ‘Righteous’**

**Alyce Miller<sup>1</sup>**

#### **An Introduction to *A Death***

In California, where I used to live, cows often roamed the pastures and cliffs high above the ocean. You could see them as you drove Highway 1. They were still “farmed animals,” but they had a kind of freedom. It’s hard to say in the age of factory farming which farmed animals have it worse. I settled to write about cows, in part, because of their size and their beauty, and all the ways in which we’ve mythologized them. As is probably clear from the poem, I remain deeply ambivalent over Temple Grandin’s “livestock handling systems” which, yes, apparently reduce stress in animals on their way to slaughter, but the point is, should they be going to slaughter at all?

#### **An Introduction to *Righteous***

In the Old Testament story within Genesis, God instructs Noah to take “clean beasts” by the sevens and “unclean” by the twos. The logic of “seven” was to insure that after sacrificing some of the clean animals, there would still be two to reproduce. As we witness endangerment and extinction, mostly through human carelessness, I began to speculate on the choices we, like Noah, make, about which animals we privilege and which ones we choose to sacrifice, and why.

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## **A Death**

No matter how curved  
the chutes are,  
I still know what you think

I don't, that the hindquarters I'm forced  
to follow do not lead to a green  
swath of pasture, nor have any of us ever

jumped over the moon. Suckled in a  
crush, weaned with nose-rings,  
my children—all three of them--- jammed

in crates so they wouldn't steal  
my milk. Mourning caused the milk  
to dry up, tears were not enough.

Squeezing this cursed belly of tallow,  
pork blood, and chicken feathers  
doesn't stop the jolt of the hot-shot

as we're prodded along toward the killing floor  
and you say I can't know this,  
but I do know

we die piece by piece, hammered and sliced,  
this tongue  
the clapper of a bell long ago placed  
around my neck to lead me home.

## **Righteous**

There's no way in hell  
all these animals can fit in here,  
so we have to start

by naming those we'll keep,  
sorting in two's by size and color,  
the hooved, the pawed, the finned,

and what to do with all that fluttering.  
Think the doves will stay.

Amid the screeching and roaring  
of the excess floundering in the water,  
we lift our hands high for silence.

They think we are talking to heaven,  
and some of the others—the ones about to go overboard--  
drop to their knees and begin to pray.

POSTER: Queering Veganism: Adventures in Reflexivity

Nathan Griffin<sup>1</sup>

**QUEERING VEGANISM**  
ADVENTURES IN REFLEXIVITY!

Author/Artist: Nathan Stephens-Griffin (Doctoral Researcher, S.A.S.S.)  
Supervisor: Maggie O'Neill (Reader in Criminology, S.A.S.S.)

**INTRO/AIMS**  
Hello! I'm Nathan, a Vegan from Pity Me, Durham.  
Being Vegan means I refrain from consuming animal products (such as meat/dairy/eggs) for ethical reasons.  
My Masters dissertation was a piece of research seeking to examine the experience of vegan activists in a 'Queer Context'.

**BACKGROUND**  
Implicit in my research is the influence of animal rights philosophy, in particular that of the feminist Carol Adams. Adams explored the relationship between Patriarchy and animal abuse.  
The research is also influenced by Paulo Freire's theory of Critical Pedagogy. Freire was an education theorist who stressed the importance of less-hierarchical, more-symbiotic teacher-pupil dynamics. This way everybody teaches and everybody learns.

**METHODOLOGY**  
I conducted biographical interviews with vegan activists. These were based on the principles of trust & reciprocity & were intended to allow for a non-hierarchical, symbiotic researcher-participant dynamic.

**CONCLUSION**  
Environmentalism  
Veganism as Un-masculine  
Sexual Repression within the process of activism  
Lifestyle/choice of ethics  
Feminist/Social Theorists  
Morality vs. Legality  
Veganism as a transgression of the practical logic of capitalism.  
# Consumerism = convenience  
# Veganism = inconvenience

**CRITICAL EDASO**  
Freire argued that we all have a responsibility to act on the injustice we encounter in the world. Teaching can and should be a means of empowerment and a vessel for positive social change. I applied these ideas in the design of my research.

**FINDINGS**  
Here is an excerpt from Ruth's comic:  
I've never not gripped the handle!  
I also asked the participants to submit their own comics to the research.  
The data analysis process was collaborative. This meant that the participants had an active role in the coding of their interview transcripts.

**METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS**  
Comics are accessible to people across social & educational backgrounds (O'Neil, 1998).  
Veganism as a challenge to hetero-normativity  
# Pseudonym 1: Normal, natural, mostly  
# Veganism is: abnormal, unnatural, mostly  
These can be evaluated especially in academic circles. Allow the notes of backgrounds to be a valuable audience one which may engage with it in new ways.

**SELECTED REFERENCES:**  
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Freire, P. (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum.  
O'Neil, M. (1998) Understanding the Unsettled. New York: Harper Collins.  
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**Other panels:**  
Queer Theory rejects fixed notions of identity (Warner, 2000); it challenges essentialism & objectivity in its analysis of the social world.  
Studying the experience of vegans in this context means rejecting the idea that a compassionate lifestyle is innately abnormal or unnatural, and acknowledging that labels like 'extremist' are subjective.  
As attitudes change, actions can be recast in a new light.  
VOTES FOR WOMEN  
Whilst doing the research I kept a 'comic' diary. I didn't want to conceal the busy, breathing human being conducting the research, behind prose. There are aspects of myself that no amount of scientific rigour can alter.  
Hippies, Northern, Punk, English, Able-bodied, White, Straight, Middle-class, Male, Human.

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Webpage <http://queeringveganism.tumblr.com>

## INTERVENTION

### Challenging Whiteness in the Animal Advocacy Movement

Anthony J. Nocella II<sup>1</sup>

#### Introduction

This *Intervention*<sup>2</sup> is directed toward people who identify as white within the animal advocacy movement in the U.S. and Canada. While there are many People of Color involved in the animal rights movement, the animal rights movement remains dominated by people who identify as white, both theoretically and in practice. Alas, the issue of white hegemony within the movement has not been adequately addressed. Angela P. Harris forces us to think about race and animal rights when she asks, “Should People of Color Support Animal Rights?” (2009):

First, I argue that it is not surprising that people of color are not more active on behalf of animal rights, because advocates for animal rights often fail to recognize the relevance of racism and racial justice to their work. This ignorance yields more than insensitivity. Animal rights advocates, like environmentalists, risk further entrenching white supremacy, in theory and practice, by ignoring the centrality of social justice to questions of the relationship between humans and the non-human biosphere. Second, I argue nevertheless that people of color ought to support animal rights, just as they ought to support environmentalism. (p. 16-17)

Hence, my argument is that animal advocates need to have a larger social justice framework. Rather than focus solely on speciesism, advocates must examine and act against, rather than just talk about, all systems of domination, such as racism.

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<sup>2</sup> I would like to thank many people for their feedback specifically in no order, Breeze Harper, Sarat Colling, Kim Socha, Susan Thomas, Ernesto Aguilar, Richard White, David Pellow, Dylan Powell, and Alma Williams.

It seems clear that animal advocates must begin to theorize intersectionally and engage in a multi-movement activist approach. First written about by Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), intersectionality is a methodology of studying “the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relationships and subject formations” (McCall, 2005 p. 1771). The theory suggests—and seeks to examine how—various socially and culturally constructed categories such as species, gender, race, class, ability, and other axes of identity and beingness interact on multiple and often simultaneous levels, contributing to oppression. Intersectionality holds that the classical conceptualizations of oppression in society, such as racism, speciesism, sexism, and heterosexism do not act independently of one another; instead, these forms of oppression interrelate, creating a system of oppression that reflects the "intersection" of multiple forms of discrimination.

The field of critical animal studies holds to the value of being intersectional, multi-movement based, and engaged in challenging all forms of domination in theory and practice. Critical animal studies is as much about being vegan as it is about actively reflecting and engaging against all forms of oppression, including racism. Thus, we must be in solidarity with the struggle to end all systems that are racist, especially to end modern day slavery, i.e., prisons and poverty. As an activist championing justice for both nonhuman animals and human animals—men women, lesbian, gay, transgender, queer, disabled, African American, Asian, among others—I am often asked about how to integrate People of Color into white-dominated activist groups, or alternatively, why People of Color are unwilling to engage in the kinds of political and social activism that white-identified people often engage in, such as protesting military action or promoting veganism. Similarly, some people claim that animal liberation is the most important and last true emancipatory movement. These types of questions and assertions are deeply problematic, however otherwise enlightened those animal rights activists who make such claims may be. Suggesting that the animal rights movement is the last true progressive movement ignores the fact that most animal rights scholars and activists have failed to theorize intersectionally or educate themselves about how white hegemony structures the contemporary animal rights movement.

I am a white, queer, educated, human male with disabilities, I hold cultural capital because of my academic degrees, my “race,” my species, and my gender. I recognize that these privileges tie me to the white male anthropocentric patriarchy, even though as a queer man with disabilities, I face different kinds of oppression. This is intersectionality in practice.



While I am oppressed in certain ways, I still must take accountability for those parts of my being that are over-privileged and recognize how my daily actions affect others who are oppressed. I must join in solidarity with the struggle for liberation and equity.

I first learned what a struggle was when I became politically conscious as a person with disabilities. I always knew I had disabilities, but I did not know that I was in a struggle for equity and justice. Before peace, there must be justice. Many organizations that work toward justice are run by People of Color who understand that we must recognize the history of and challenge the current state of oppression (i.e. justice), before we can move forward to a brighter and better day (i.e. peace). The difference between a movement and a struggle is simple. A movement has no universal agreed upon goal and all the time in the world to achieve the movement's objectives. It is made up of many different people with different ideologies, goals, and experiences working against a common problem. A struggle is based on a common experience of oppression, which brings people into the community of activists. A struggle by definition is an experience of hardship and difficulty, an experience that is not voluntary, but forced upon the oppressed by people, institutions, and systems of domination. In "Why 'Vegan Oppression' Cannot Exist," Ida Hammer writes, "In this respect, veganism is an ally movement. It has more in common with male anti-sexist allies, White anti-racist allies and so on, than it does with the struggle of women against sexism or Blacks against racism, for instance."<sup>3</sup>

It seems to me that the animal liberation movement is not a "struggle" per se because the nonhuman animals are not the activists; rather, predominately white human animals from the industrialized colonial world that have historically oppressed nonhuman animals are the very group working to free nonhuman animals.<sup>4</sup> These same activists, while working financially for the end of nonhuman animal oppression, are paradoxically the very same people oppressing nonhuman animals. This does not mean that paid activists should quit their jobs; they should not. They must, however, examine the impact they are having on the macro-social level and cease assuming that veganism is the ultimate and only action to take. It took INCITE!, a group of Women of Color against violence, to publish *The Revolution Will Not Be Funded: Beyond the Non-profit Industrial Complex* (2007) to definitively demonstrate that

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<sup>3</sup> <http://veganideal.org/content/why-vegan-oppression-cannot-exist> September 7, 2011.

<sup>4</sup> <http://veganideal.org/content/why-vegan-oppression-cannot-exist> September 7, 2011.

social justice will not be won by non-profits. There are many social justice organizations that have done a great deal of amazing work, but just as it would be problematic if an organization dedicated to ending racism staffed all white employees, it is equally troublesome that all animal advocacy organizations are run and employed by those from the very species oppressing nonhuman animals. The animal advocacy movement would not be possible today if not for the many nonprofits that exist; therefore, I am not arguing for closing nonprofits, but to recognize and see the problematic nature of the oppressor species working for and not with the oppressed species. This idea of working with other species is outside the purview of this *Intervention*, but the rise of an interspecies dialogue should be a developing area of interest. Jason Hribal's *Fear of the Animal Planet: The Hidden History of Animal Resistance*, may be a place to start that discussion as he makes the strongest and most thorough argument to this point that nonhuman animals can and do resist human domination of nonhuman animals. It should be noted that there is a difference between a vegan and a vivisector, but even if any given individual is vegan, many vegans still use computers and cell phones, drive cars, use medicine, and have domesticated nonhuman animals in their homes. Further, each concerned individual for animal advocacy should ask himself or herself: Do I work in a place of domination such as university or business that exploits nonhuman animals?

The animal advocacy movement is dominated by white people who hold the classic view that the animal liberation movement is the ultimate progressive movement or that animal liberation is the most important and the last true emancipatory movement. Arguing a movement is the ultimate or the last true movement ignores the interlocked connection of the nature of oppression, and it is highly problematic when voiced by activists seeking ways to get more People of Color, people with disabilities, non-U.S., and people that are LGBTQ into the movement.

Tim Wise, a white activist and author who writes a great deal on anti-racism notes an important critical point in relation to comparing oppressions of people of color and the Holocaust in *PETA and the Politics of Putting Things in Perspective* (2005);

PETA appears unwilling to apologize for the slavery and lynching exhibit. And even the apology for the pain caused by the Holocaust comparison seems disingenuous [...] Now I'm sure there will be some animal liberationists who read this and who think that since animals are sentient beings too, and since they have the right not to be exploited for human benefit (positions with which I don't disagree), that comparisons with the Holocaust, or lynching are

perfectly fair. To think otherwise, they might argue, is to engage in an anthropocentric favoring of *Homo sapiens* over other species. But of course, whether they admit it or not, most all believers in animal rights do recognize a moral and practical difference between people and animals [...] To draw any distinction at all—and to not support criminal incarceration of meat-eaters the way one would for a cannibal the likes of Jeffrey Dahmer, indeed, draws that distinction—is to admit, whether openly or not, that there is a difference between a cow and a person [...] That PETA can't understand what it means for a black person to be compared to an animal, given a history of having been thought of in exactly those terms, isn't the least bit shocking. After all, the movement is perhaps the whitest of all progressive or radical movements on the planet, for reasons owing to the privilege one must possess in order to focus on animal rights as opposed to, say, surviving oneself from institutional oppression [...] Perhaps if PETA activists had ever demonstrated a commitment to fighting racism and the ongoing cruelty that humans face every day, they would find more sympathy from those who, for reasons that are understandable given their own lives, view animal rights activism as the equivalent of fiddling while Rome burns, rather than as a struggle for greater compassion for all.

Breeze Harper, editor of *Sistah Vegan: Black Female Vegans Speak on Food, Identity, Health, and Society* (2010), a book dedicated to voices on veganism from Black females, challenges PETA's campaign "The Animal Liberation Project." Harper writes, "The lack of sociohistorical context by PETA is perhaps what is upsetting to many racial minorities, for whom such images and textual references trigger trauma and deep emotional pain" (Harper 2010, p. xiv). While Harper believes Marjorie Spiegel's book, *The Dreaded Comparison* (1996) provides "sensitive, scholarly explorations of these topics [PETA's campaign]", I believe that challenging the comparison of suffering of different oppressed groups is not speciesist, as Spiegel argues, but rather anti-racist and anti-speciesist, as the suffering of groups of oppression in this case nonhuman animals and people that are Black should be respected as different experiences. In contrast, what should be achieved is the working together to understand oppression and domination, while understanding the difference of experience even though the tools of oppression might be the same. Spiegel writes, "Comparing the suffering of animals to that of Blacks (or any other oppressed group) is offensive only to the speciesist: one who has embraced the false notions of what animals are like" (1996, p. 30). This quote is focused on the experience, i.e., suffering, not the system of that suffering, i.e., oppression. Suffering can be caused by personal experience of injury and pain, like stubbing one's toe on a table, while oppression is systematic and experienced by a group based on a particular constructed identity. I would not have a problem with this quote if suffering was replaced with oppression, and I believe the suffering of nonhuman animals at

the hand of humans is very different than the suffering of people of color at the hands of white people of the same species. Further, all suffering is different and is based on an individual experience even if the oppressive tactic is the same, i.e., gassing, hanging, lethal injection, or rape. Hence, every female who is raped suffers differently, while the oppression is the same if by a male coming from a place of sexism and patriarchy. Therefore, the experiences are different, but the causes are the same.

Unless an activist's goal is domination and exploitation, her or his struggle must not be based on privilege or unearned social advantages. White-identified people have a notorious history of dominating, colonizing, enslaving, and oppressing those people and nonhuman animals "unlike" themselves. It is about time that white-identified people realize that the harms that they continue to exact upon others violate our most cherished social values. We liberate ourselves from violent acts as we attempt to help other beings.

One example of white domination of the animal rights movement is the treatment of activists arrested or imprisoned for their role in the modern "Green Scare," a term used to address the political repression targeted against environmentalists and animal advocates. Not a single radical animal liberation activist has been assassinated, put on death row, shot at by police, or been given a life sentence. While activists have certainly been repressed, most of the animal- and eco-activists who have been arrested are over-privileged white able-bodied males who have paid lawyers, college degrees, and socioeconomic privilege. I suspect that if a group of Black youths destroyed a McDonalds by bombing it for political reasons in the name of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), they would likely receive life sentences. One needs only to examine the history of repression of accused People of Color to make this supposition. It is for this reason that many Black liberationists have claimed that all people that are Black are political prisoners, because prison is a modern form of slavery. Further, those individuals that are Black and commit political acts that land them in prison are consequently referred to as prisoners of war. We only need to read the Thirteenth Amendment to prove that slavery in the US exists and is only allowed in prisons (Williams 1993). All forms of repression should be challenged by animal activists, for example, unjust laws, such as RICO, police-imposed curfews, surveillance cameras placed in predominantly poor communities of color, and the daily police sweeps that happen to those oppressed groups. The Green Scare, concerned as it is with a few select animal- and eco-activists, is simply not comparable to the repression that People of Color and people who are poor face daily. Hammer cogently explains the dilemma

of comparing the oppression of the “vegan movement” to that of oppressed racial or sexual group. Hammer writes,

As such, I believe it is inappropriate when we use how other groups are the targets of oppression to describe being vegan or to use their struggles against oppression as a metaphor for the vegan movement. I say this for the simple reason that vegans as a group are not ourselves the targets of oppression.<sup>5</sup>

Animal advocates may be politically repressed, but we are not ourselves oppressed. Animal rights activists must remember that their activism is voluntary. People *choose* to join the animal advocacy movement. They are not forced to join this struggle to survive. Their children will not grow up to be incarcerated, beaten, or given a second rate education because their parents are animal advocates.

Political prisoner Jalil Muntaqim, former member of the Black Panther Party and Black Liberation Army, said it best when he remarked that “we are our own liberators” (Muntaqim, 2010). Many animal liberationists do not understand that. It is possible to liberate oneself and one’s community, as occurred with the Black liberation movement. But one cannot liberate another group or community, including nonhuman animals. The ALF can free an individual from captivity, but liberation is a holistic and transformative experience by the oppressed that takes time. Nonhuman animals and human animals alike express themselves differently when they are liberated, some by throwing dirt, others by fleeing. It is much more difficult for a nonhuman animal to become free, but such incidents do occur. Dogs run away; elephants trample their abusers. That is why the ALF is critical: Activists can free nonhuman animals, but animal liberation is only done by the nonhuman animal who wants to leave that cage, and that being does so when the opportunity avails itself. In short, any nonhuman animal who, given the opportunity to flee, and does not do so out of fear, is emotionally and psychically imprisoned.

A perfect example of this view of liberation is offered in the movie *Instinct* (Turteltaub, 1999), where Anthony Hopkins plays Dr. Ethan Powell, an anthropologist who becomes part of a gorilla family. He has taken a vow of silence after seeing gorillas poached; during the violent struggle, he tries to fight the hunters with a club. Cuba Gooding Jr. plays Dr. Theo

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<sup>5</sup> <http://veganideal.org/content/why-vegan-oppression-cannot-exist> September 7, 2011.

Caulder, a psychiatrist who wants to get Dr. Powell to speak about his experience. Dr. Caulder finally thought it would be a good idea to bring him around gorillas again. The only place to do so was at a city zoo. As Dr. Caulder thought about things, Dr. Powell spoke about his experience seeing the murder of the innocent gorillas being slaughtered by poachers and how the gorillas in the zoo, once wild, were broken, physically, psychically, and emotionally. Dr. Powell proved this by opening the gorilla cage and witnessing the tragic reality that none of the gorillas attempted to reach freedom. They remained still not because they knew the door was going to be closed, but because their minds were, sadly, imprisoned after years of abuse.

A *real* but tragic example of a nonhuman animal breaking free from a physical prison comes from the recent story of an imprisoned bear in China who was daily having her and her cub's gall bladders pumped for "bile" that is allegedly used to cure human ailments. The fact that she first killed her cub and then herself by banging her head into a wall is evidence enough that she most likely wanted "to save them both from a life of torture."<sup>6</sup> This bear was in a struggle, not a movement. More importantly, she was experiencing a repression that most animal advocates today will never understand or experience.

Instead of calling animal rights a "total liberation movement," it might be better to call it a "total justice movement" or an "animal justice movement," an idea that Amy Fitzgerald and David Pellow introduce in the *Critical Animal Studies Reader* forthcoming by John Sorenson and myself. Justice, not liberation, is what the oppressed are demanding from people who are in solidarity. To believe that the oppressor can liberate the oppressed is ignorant and arrogant, and it promotes a savior mentality. Every human is a dominator to nonhuman animals, even if they are anti-speciesist comparable to every white person is a racist, even if the white person is an anti-racist. Humans benefit from access, products, and freedoms that nonhuman animals do not have. Whites, event anti-racists benefit from being white, such as being pulled over less and having better possibilities of being hired for a job.

One possible reason that the animal advocacy movement is plagued with conflict may be that there is not a shared experience of oppression. For this reason, people often come and go

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<sup>6</sup> <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2025388/China-Tortured-mother-bear-kills-cub-herself.html#ixzz1XEsjWeXf> retrieved September 6, 2011.

from the movement to start families, go to college, get jobs, and “live their lives” with no long-term commitment to the cause. Few in the movement share anything universal that forces them together, except their complicity in the exploitation and suffering of nonhuman animals. The bear, the dog in the lab, the gorilla in the zoo, the elephant in the circus, and the mink in the cage all have a common experience of speciesist oppression. Being a human animal and living in a colonized industrialized country allows human animals to dominate nonhuman animals, even those who are vegan, those who recycle, and those who are part of anarchist collectives.

To the white person’s question, “How do we get more People of Color involved in the animal advocacy movement?” I can only reply that fighting for human animal rights *is* fighting for nonhuman animal rights. There are many actions we might take to make the world more just for all concerned: Start a community garden and develop with the community an affordable, healthy cooperative grocery store; when protesting against a McDonald’s or a slaughterhouse, ask employees what you can do to assist them once you shut down their place of employment and they become homeless. Workers at slaughterhouses and fast food restaurants are often poor or living just above the poverty line; they struggle to keep the electricity on and must visit their family members in prison while going to school, taking care of their siblings and dealing with police profiling and minimum wage jobs at the very McDonald’s or slaughterhouse that animal advocates seek to dismantle. Are we helping these individuals to get new jobs, or are we simply calling them evil murderers of nonhuman animals? Are we demanding that the state offer healthy food tax breaks or financial assistance to buy healthy food, or are we just demanding that the oppressed go to a cooperative health food store and buy expensive food? And what if they have physical disabilities that make it difficult or impossible to leave their homes and beds so that they do not have a choice of the foods they are served? How are animal advocates in solidarity with these individuals? The field of critical animal studies engages with these questions and argues that animal advocacy as a social justice issue. Further, critical animal studies complicates the goal of animal advocacy by positioning the movement as an anti-domination and oppressive social justice movement rooted in anarchist theory.

When white people ask oppressed Persons of Color to change their socio-political and economic behaviors, they are practicing domination. Rather than addressing racism and assuming that it does not have anything to do with animal advocacy, they reinforce their

dominant role in society. In the U.S., to be vegan in an urban community may mean expecting youth to walk through a number of gang territories and pay bus fair multiple times to get to a grocery store that sells fruits and vegetables because most of the corner stores in urban communities instead sell mostly liquor and highly processed foods.

Therefore, to engage with other social justice movements and struggles, it would be better to speak of animal justice rather than animal liberation. This is similar to the critiques by radical environmental justice activists of the white dominated environmental movement that is more concerned with wilderness instead of how human being also suffer from environmental racism and exploitation (Bullard, 2005). The environmental movement has a history of excluding People of Color and women, and has even argued that immigration is an ecological problem (Best and Nocella, 2004). Furthermore, very few activist groups direct people to examine systems of domination, such as capitalism and the military industrial complex, instead focusing on similarities between human and nonhuman exploitation while often failing to acknowledge that the experience of oppression is different for everyone.

If we want the world to go vegan, we have to end racism and other human oppressions, which prevents mass segments of society to go vegan. or else we prevent every human from joining an anti-speciesist human-based movement for animal advocacy. Not that we cannot strive for them at the same time, but if you want the whole world to go vegan, the only way to go about this is to provide access to affordable healthy local vegan food market, while also educating community members on the benefits of a vegan plant based diet. Therefore, we must secure justice for all in order to create a vegan global justice movement. This means that we must stop talking and writing about so-called alliance politics and solidarity and get involved in struggles to end racism, poverty, sexism, ableism, and heterosexism, while also working for animal justice. Not simply joining a protest her or there, but to give as much time and energy as you do to animal justice. If this does not happen, animal advocacy will continue to be a movement of wealthy people who shop at Whole Foods, green washing the world and criticizing people who are poor and incarcerated for not going vegan.

Before activists ask why People of Color rarely join the animal advocacy movement, they should first ask themselves: What am I doing to stop racism, beyond not joining the KKK or using racial slurs? If you are not doing anything beyond talking or writing about these issues,



you are doing very little and, at worst, you are reinforcing white hegemony, poverty, patriarchy, ableism, homophobia, and speciesism.

There is much working being done around these connections. For example, Lauren Ornelas founded the Food Empowerment Project which speaks on food, farm animals, farm workers, and makes sure that low-income communities access to healthy food. Another example is my work in introducing animal advocacy to the disability studies and rights community, which very few others have done. In fact, I am co-editing a book on this topic. Further, my re-entry, social justice, and education work for the last fifteen years in Texas, California, New York, and now Minnesota with incarcerated adults and youth has been formally and informally connected to animal advocacy and animal protection. I regularly speak about dog fighting, eco-racism, unhealthy food standards in schools, and poor working conditions for those that work in slaughterhouses with youth and adults that are incarcerated. I also co-founded Outdoor Empowerment, an organization dedicated to addressing environmental justice, education, and ecological protection with urban youth inside and outside of incarceration by taking them on camping, hiking, and outdoor workshops with their community center and schools. There are many tactics to adopt to be a critical animal studies scholar or animal advocate and also be an anti-racist. Here is a list of ten tactics for animal advocates to challenge oppression and anti-racism:

- 1) Read the work of People of Color who are engaged in social justice such as bell hooks, Patricia Hill Collins, Vandana Shiva, Ward Churchill, Andrea Smith, Malcolm X, Cornel West, Michael Eric Dyson, Cesar Chavez, Emma Prez, and Angela Davis.
- 2) Work with People of Color who are critical scholars within the animal advocacy movement.
- 3) Join struggles that are dedicated to ending the oppression of People of color such as prison abolition.
- 4) Do not compare oppression if that comparison is not met with action and is not examined for the purpose of understanding the oppressor.
- 5) Challenge one's own whiteness, domination, and elitism by examining one's social, political and economic locale.
- 6) Participate in and organize anti-oppression workshops and events.
- 7) Strive to make a point when speaking or writing about nonhuman animal oppression to also talk about other forms of oppression that must end as well.

- 8) Strive to have resources at your organization to end different forms of oppression.
- 9) Do not be defensive if someone calls you a racist; rather, embrace it and figure out why they would identify you as such.
- 10) Make your home, work environment, groups, and meetings more inclusive and accessible to those that are oppressed. For example, hold meetings near bus stops, be open to attendees bringing their children and do not hold meetings during regular work hours or too late in the evening.

There are countless other actions for animal advocates to take in resisting racism and working toward social justice. People that are white must also realize that the more they become engaged in anti-racism there will be two constant results – the presence of repression and the lessening of one’s social, economic, and political power and mobility. It is for this reason that many people do not become active public anti-racists. For example, instead of laughing along with others in response to a racist joke at work, speak out against it. The result may be being marginalized by peers and also the repression from management. To commit actions for social justice one must be aware of the possible consequences, e.g., loss of a job, friends, family, and marriage, for if one is not aware of the possible consequences, one will abandon their commitment the moment they are met with repression. In closing, do not give up, do not give in, and do not stop working for social justice with those that are oppressed.

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## INTERVIEW

### **Dr. Kim Socha, author of *Women, Destruction, and the Avant-Garde: A Paradigm for Animal Liberation*.**

#### **Interviewed by Anthony J. Nocella II<sup>1</sup>**

Kim Socha, a Philadelphia native, now resides in the Twin Cities, Minnesota. Holding a Ph.D. in Literature and Criticism, she is an English instructor at Normandale Community College with scholarship on topics such as critical pedagogy, surrealism, critical animal studies and Latino/a literature. As her avocations, Kim has assisted survivors of domestic violence in their recoveries and works in the area of prison abolition social justice activism. Kim is also an animal liberation advocate and sits on the boards of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies and the Animal Rights Coalition. Her book *Women, Destruction, and the Avant-Garde: A Paradigm for Animal Liberation* was published in December 2011 by Rodopi Press.

**Anthony J. Nocella II: Thank you, Kim, for allowing me this opportunity to interview you about your book, *Women, Destruction, and the Avant-Garde: A Paradigm for Animal Liberation* (2011). I am especially excited about this book because it is the first of the Critical Animal Studies Book Series that is edited by Vasile Stanescu and Helena Pedersen, which is published by Rodopi Press.**

**My first question before moving into the book is about you is general. Tell us a little about yourself and where you grew up.**

Kim Socha: I grew up in a suburb outside of Philadelphia. My upbringing was fairly mundane. I was raised in a conservative Catholic household, but as I went through college and then graduate school, I began questioning certain cultural “truths” that have become the

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<sup>1</sup> Anthony J. Nocella II prominent author, community organizer, and educator, teaches Urban Education in the Hamline University's School of Education. He received his Ph.D. in Social Science at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. Nocella focuses his attention on urban education, peace and conflict studies, inclusive social justice education, environmental education, disability pedagogy, queer pedagogy, feminist pedagogy, critical pedagogy, anarchist studies, critical animal studies, and hip-hop pedagogy. He is the co-founder of the field of critical animal studies, eco-ability, critical urban education, and the Institute for Critical Animal Studies.

basis of my activism. I believe that my social awakening, for lack of a better phrase, was enhanced by my love of reading diverse books, traveling abroad and being inquisitive about why people act and think the ways that they do. This brought me in touch with various groups of people and led to many influential and transformative experiences. In retrospect, and without getting too personal, even the most troubling of times benefited me in different ways.

**AN: With coming from Philadelphia, meeting so many diverse people, and having so many powerful experiences, when did you become involved in social justice and more specifically animal advocacy?**

KS: I wish I could report that my social justice activism and animal advocacy started earlier than it did. However, I was a shy child and teen, and this introversion kept me from getting active sooner. Even during my master's program, I was an introvert. It was during my Ph.D. program in 2006 that I realized the importance of acting on my ideologies. When I started my dissertation research on the animal rights movement, I began to take action by volunteering at a no-kill animal shelter, speaking on animal rights at my university and obtaining a para-professional certificate in crisis counseling for survivors of domestic violence and sexual abuse. Once receiving my doctorate and moving to Minnesota for a full-time teaching job, activism became fully entrenched in my life. I now sit on the board of ICAS and a local abolitionist animal advocacy group, and I volunteer in various capacities with incarcerated youth and adults.

As to animal advocacy in particular, three books greatly influenced me: Carol Adams's *The Sexual Politics of Meat; Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?*, which, of course, you edited and contributed to with Steve Best; and Bob Torres's *Making a Killing*. These texts introduced me to interconnected oppressions, but it was the latter two that also got me interested in direct action and anarchism as complements to my animal liberation activism and scholarship.

**AN: There are so many activists that, for good reason, oppose higher education and school in general. Briefly, what are your thoughts about school and higher education?**

KS: The school system, from K-12 to higher education, is flawed, mainly because of standardization and the lack of cohesion amongst segmented subjects that should be interconnected and studied with more creativity. However, I am not opposed to schooling, but

to how schools are run. And, of course, socio-economic and racial biases render all schooling inherently flawed as well.

I also think there is too much pressure on students to go to college, especially right out of high school. Culture—at least American culture—devalues technical skills and the honor that comes from what is traditionally seen as “blue collar” jobs. Further, I do *not* believe that a degree (or degrees) equates with intelligence. I think that everyone should be educated, but that education can come through reading, attending cultural festivals, engaging with those outside our immediate communities, etc. To further explain, I cite a Malcolm X quote with which you are familiar: “Education is the passport to the future, for tomorrow belongs to those who prepare for it today.” I believe this completely. I just do not believe that education must always come through traditional schooling, especially when that schooling paradigm is founded in European, patriarchal models of learning.

My final critique of higher education is that it too often becomes bogged down in theory, ignoring the application of thought to action. This is why I am determined to remain an activist even as I continue to pursue theoretical approaches to the issues that most interest me.

**AN: What specifically influenced you to get a doctorate in English, and did you always know you wanted to teach at a community college? What is it about community colleges that you value and appreciate, as compared to four-year private colleges or huge research universities?**

KS: I’m aware that I just kind of disparaged formal education in my last response, so I hope my response here will clarify some things. The simple answer is that as a shy, sensitive child, I found solace in literature. So, when entering college, it made sense to major in English. My undergraduate instructors were so encouraging of my work, that I decided to pursue a master’s in the discipline. Once I got my M.A. at Rutgers, I entered the workforce and found that any jobs I took on seemed to have a one-year life span (as an editor, administrative assistant, etc.), after which I would resign. Then, on a whim, I applied to a community college and began teaching, mostly composition courses, as an adjunct instructor. I had found a job that I could see myself doing indefinitely, and this is still the case!

However, the job market is rough, so I figured that obtaining a Ph.D. might improve my chances of finding full-time work in higher education; plus, obtaining a doctorate had always been a personal goal. In the meantime, I have had the opportunity to teach at four-year universities, but I never wavered from my desire to teach at a community college because of their policy of open enrollment. College degrees used to be the province of the financially privileged, but I believe that everyone should have the opportunity to be formally educated even though I maintain that the cultural emphasis on formal education needs to be challenged. I teach at an urban college to a truly diverse population of students, many of whom are immigrants from around the globe. I also teach so-called “traditional” students who have just left high school and those returning to school after years of being in the workforce and raising families. In sum, I love working with a diverse student body in an environment where all are welcome.

**AN: Now that we know a good amount about you, what influenced you to write this book?**

KS: In Spring 2007, I took a class with Dr. Mike Sell at Indiana University of Pennsylvania—where I obtained my Ph.D.—called Critical Vanguard Studies, a student of avant-garde literary, artistic and political movements. (In fact, Mike coined the term Critical Vanguard Studies.) My final assignment involved a bibliographical assignment that could serve as the basis for a later, larger project. After learning about the avant-garde, my working thesis became that the animal liberation movement is part of that legacy in significant and socially meaningful ways. My research process solidified my belief in the thesis, and, not to be an “apple polisher,” but reading *Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?* was also a major influence on me and my scholarship. This all led to my dissertation, which served as the basis of my book. I really wanted a text that would be interdisciplinary and socially significant for animals, women and other oppressed groups, and not another lengthy literary analysis coming from an English Ph.D., not that there is anything wrong with lengthy literary analyses!

**AN: What unique point does this book bring to the discourse of critical animal studies?**

KS: I believe this is one of the first texts, if not the first, to directly integrate the animal liberation movement into the history of the avant-garde, with specific focus on the Surrealists. (Whether that is a good or bad application is up to the individual reader to decide.) I also

make this point by fusing animal rights and the avant-garde with anarchism, radical feminist manifestos, performance art, popular culture, true crime, etc. But although there are many threads to this study, animal liberation is always at its core. My hope is that the book's intersectional nature will interest those from other disciplines: feminists, critical vanguard scholars, critical race scholars, etc., thus allowing them to see the webbed nature of oppression, especially the role that nonhumans play therein.

**AN: Not to give this book away for future readers, but could you tell us what you want the reader to leave the book thinking about and engaged in doing?**

KS: This is a difficult question because there is so much I want readers to get from the book. Therefore, I'll answer with a quote from the text that serves as one of its foundations: "*Those who want to change the world have to be willing to give up what they enjoy of that world.*" Many, myself included, benefit and indulge in the very systems against which we contend. Our complicity in authoritarianism and oppression must be confronted by all, even the most righteous and vigilant among us. Inherent in this comment is a challenge to the idea of ownership. So much suffering and oppression evolves out of the belief that others—human/nonhuman, sentient/non-sentient—are ours to own and do with as we will. Worldwide treatment of nonhuman animals epitomizes this belief in ways that confound the mind. I believe all we really "own" are our bodily selves, which is why I argue for corporeal integrity throughout the text, but this should not signify some kind of ego-driven individualism. People need to engage with the world and then consider and fight the ways violence and oppression manifest on micro- and macro-levels.

That sounds like a pretty negative view of life, so I want to end on a positive note: *I think we can do this; I think we can change things.* I'm not forecasting an immediate global revolution ending in an Edenic vegan paradise (although that would be nice). Rather, I am saying that we *can*, as activists, help others see things, including other beings, in a different way—especially nonhuman animals. And when this new vision is adopted by successive individuals, this already beautiful world becomes more radiant.



## CONFERENCE REVIEW

### **“Eating Meat. The Social Relationship of Humans and Animals and the Meaning of Meat.”<sup>1</sup> Conference Organized by the Group for Society and Animals Studies at the University of Hamburg, July 2011**

**Reviewed by Marcel Sebastian<sup>2</sup>**

On July 1, 2011 the scientific conference “*Eating Meat. The Social Relationship of Humans and Animals and the Meaning of Meat*” was held with about 130 participants in the space of the University of Hamburg. This event, organized by the Group for Society and Animals Studies (GSA), was the first scientific conference on human-animal relations with a sociological focus in Germany. The GSA is a research group on human-animal relationships at the Institute of Sociology at the University of Hamburg. In addition to numerous scholars, many representatives of civil society organizations, the press and other interested parties were present at the conference.

In the welcome address and in the introduction speech, given by Prof. Dr Birgit Pfau-Effinger (Scientific Coordinator of GSA) and Sonja Buschka (GSA), the relevance of scientific research to human-animal relationships was articulated. To further this research, the conference programme offered a variety of different perspectives. As keynote speakers Prof. Dr Klaus Petrus (University of Bern), Dr Matthew Cole (Open University), Dr Kate Stewart (University of Bristol), Dr Karen Morgan (Cardiff University), Renate Brucker (Dortmund) and Melanie Bujok (Bochum) were invited to the conference. In addition, two GSA members and nine other speakers, chosen from a call for papers, also gave a presentation. This produced a varied program of high scientific quality, that demonstrated central sociological aspects and social problems of meat consumption. The different speakers also showed that there are strong mutual references and that their contributions have synergistic potential which could enhance understanding of the problem of eating meat.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/projekte/animals-and-society/projekte/tagung-fleisch-essen/>

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In the following, I want to work out some of these common references that could be found in the presentations. Central themes were the different strategies of normalization and social distancing that are associated with meat and violence against animals. Klaus Petrus analyzed the ambivalence in the depiction of animals in advertising, on the basis of an analysis of meat advertisements from Switzerland. Thus it seems, a new form of representation of animals has developed, in which they occur simultaneously as actors, but can later be transformed into dead commodities, usually without the triggering of solidarity or empathy, that normally are associated with the perception of someone as a subject.

The lecture by Matthew Cole and Kate Stewart contained an analysis of how feelings of empathic identification with animals are socially ordered and sometimes suppressed. Using a self-developed scheme they illustrated how the same species receive a different value in different social contexts and thus the allocation of solidarity or empathy is a result of cultural processes of interpretation and material practices, such as confinement. The issue of suppression was then deepened by Karen Morgan, who reported on the “wish not to know.”

The different techniques, strategies and mechanisms that enable the indifference towards violence against animals, were systematized by GSA-member Marcel Sebastian in his paper and explained with an example. Renate Brucker explained how the distance from animals or the absence of the issues of meat also reflects itself in the social sciences, by showing how the human-animal relationship is systematically displaced from their focus. This also refers, Brucker pointed out, to the biographies of socialist or leftist intellectuals, in which their commitment to animals and vegetarianism is often ignored.

Another central aspect was the institutionalized violence against animals in the course of meat production, as well as the slaughterhouse as a place of organized and systematic killing of animals. Melanie Bujok demonstrated in her paper that the sociology of violence has not treated animals as an object of research, though, Bujok stated, the common definitions of violence not only make an application to animals possible, but actually demand it. Arianna Ferrari and Bettina-Johanna Krings lectured about how animals disappear in a fully automated slaughterhouse as subjects and in relation to neoliberal utilization become production units. How strongly our current understanding of animals, nature and carnality is influenced by ancient philosophical theories, was made clear by Hendrik Wallat in his paper on Plato's moral physiology.

That violence against animals is hardly the subject of public debate, was reported by Fabienne Erbacher and Anja Krückemeier, who spoke about different media debates in their

contributions and indicated how certain topics are systematically excluded from media discourses. This includes animals as subjects, animals as victims of violence or vegetarianism as a result of a criticism of violence. GSA member Julia Gutjahr discussed in this context, how in the men's cooking magazine *BEEF* new images of masculinity through violence against animals and meat consumption are offensively constructed. Carol Morris opened with her contribution a further look at the forms of public debate about the consumption of meat. She discussed the various initiatives for 'meat-free days of the week' and analyzed the different motivations which these initiatives are based on.

As with the topic of violence, the theme of ambivalence within human-animal relationships was also a consistent theme of the lectures. It was particularly evident in the contributions about the question of edibility and non-edibility of animals. Martin Seeliger spoke about how the social order and its cultural representations legitimate the distinction of humans and animals and the acts of violence that go along with it. Stefan Hnat clarified these socially constructed distinctions and ambivalences in the example of the different handling of so-called "slaughter-cattle" and so-called "pets". Marion Mangelsdorf applied these perspectives concretely through an ethnographic perspective on the ambivalent relationship between humans and horses that are treated on one side as "partners" but on the other side as "slaughter cattle".

Because of the variety of the program, it was not surprising that the final discussion was very lively and thematically broad. However, all participants agreed that sociological research and discussion on human-animal relationships is in its infancy. Subjects of the debate were, therefore, questions of how German Human-Animal Studies should develop and how the tension between a scientific and methodological openness and politically positioned awareness can be balanced.

The conference was framed by a delicious vegan buffet, a book table and an approximately 2x8 metre work by artist Hartmut Kiewert, who specializes in human-animal relationships and in particular on the phenomenon of "meat". During the breaks, lively conversation developed quickly, and the participants were able to establish many new contacts. The organizers of the conference were very satisfied with the course and the outcome of the conference, and announced that next year, an edited volume with conference papers will be published. The conference has proved to be beneficial for the development of human-animal studies in Germany, and it will be exciting to observe how this young scientific field evolves in the future.

## **The 2<sup>nd</sup> Annual European Conference for Critical Animal Studies: “Reconfiguring the ‘Human’/’Animal’ Binary – Resisting Violence” Prague, October 2011**

**Reviewed by Sonja Buschka<sup>1</sup>**

### **The Conference**

The Second Annual European Conference for Critical Animal Studies “Reconfiguring the ‘Human’/’Animal’ Binary – Resisting Violence” took place in Prague between October 15 and 16, 2011. It brought together an international audience of 140 scholars, activists and hybrids of the two for an exciting weekend of presentations, plenary sessions and debates, up-to-date campaigning reports and two art exhibitions by Jo-Anne Mc Arthur (Canada) and Hartmut Kiewert (Germany). After the welcome speech of the chief conference organizers Tereza Vandrovцова and Richard Twine, which also included two welcome messages of Carol J. Adams and Tom Regan, the conference was divided into three plenary talks and seven sessions with all in all 50 presentations about the various kinds of different human-animal-relations.

### **The Plenaries**

The first plenary talk was given by *Erika Cudworth (University of East London, UK)* about **“Beyond Speciesism: Intersectionality, Critical Sociology and the Human Domination of Other Animals”**. Cudworth argued for a more encompassing sociology which acknowledges the way our lives are co-constituted with a range of non-human species as part of the condition of life and which accounts for these species relations from feminist, (post)colonial and Marxist perspectives. Although for reaching such perspectives the concept of “speciesism” has been helpful, Cudworth criticized it for being limited on discrimination and thus being unable to capture the full range of our social relations with non-human animals. Instead she framed the concept of “anthroparchy” to adequately theorize about species in

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terms of human domination, exploitation and oppression whilst remaining sensitive to differences in the kind and degree of human practices and allowing for some consideration for agency that is not exclusively human.

The second plenary was given by *Tom Tyler (Oxford Brookes University, UK)* about **“Becoming What We Are”**. Tyler made use of Jean Paul Sartre’s concept of “bad faith” according to which individuals endeavour to deceive themselves into believing that the identity, on which they have settled, fully defines and delineates them. Tyler applied this concept to the human-animal-relations arguing that the persistent self-identification as human acknowledges only a narrow, limited part of ourselves and thus instantiates an unnecessary and damaging human-animal binary. With drawings on Friedrich Nietzsche’s imperative of “become what you are” Tyler argued for more encompassing identities by outlining a number of alternative, non-human collectivities to which we each belong and which extend beyond an impoverished self-identification of merely human.

The third plenary was held by *Elisa Aaltola (University of Eastern Finland, Finland)* about **“Non-human Suffering, Representation and the Act of Looking”**. Aaltola explored the centrality of non-human suffering as a common theme in different forms of media of the animal rights movement and posed the question what it means for a human being to capture, show and look at non-human suffering: What is the relation between the confrontation with non-human suffering and the human capacity, will or potential duty to end such pain? In answering these questions she drew on concepts of Susan Sontag, J. M. Coetzee, Jacques Derrida and Elizabeth Costello to explicate in which ways images individualize and familiarize the sufferers and to show the causes of suffering. In doing so, images open up potentialities for a heightened awareness of non-human suffering and resistance against it. To let images do their work Aaltola emphasized the importance to portray suffering animals not merely as passive victims of natural suffering but as complex beings who even under the conditions of human-induced suffering offer resistance and try to deal with their situation as good as possible. Only through this, images can hinder desubjectivization to do its work and can bring ambivalences to mind.

## **The Sessions**

The first session addressed anarchist views on the human-animal-relationship as well as animal experimentation and related topics. In the stream on **anarchism** *Ziporrah Weisberg* (*York University, Canada*) criticized liberal analyses of animal exploitation and liberation as offered by Peter Singer, Tom Regan and Gary Francione as inadequate because they fail to discover the capitalist and patriarchal roots of animal exploitation by ignoring the relationship between property and capitalism as well as by relying on rights to protect animals which presuppose a an inherently violent state to enforce such rights. Instead Weisberg argued for an anarchy-feminist anti-authoritarianist approach to rethink the conception of a political community as a whole and to endorse a cross-species fundament according to which all sentient beings are always already legitimate political and historical subjects. *Richard White* (*Sheffield Hallam University, UK*) then emphasized the importance of anarchist concepts both in academic theory and activist practice and showed how they may support the deconstruction and reconfiguration of the human-animal-binary and help to work out more effective strategies of animal and human liberation.

In the stream on **animal experimentation** *Fabiola Leyton* (*University of Barcelona, Spain*) argued against animal experimentation as a “natural” part of bioethical research. By drawing on philosophical concepts as “moral agents”, “moral patient”, “speciesism” and “consent” she criticized the prevailing anthropocentrism in science and technology and instead offered an account of the implications and consequences of animal research which leads to abolitionist perspectives. Also *Lindsay Diehl* (*University of British Columbia, Canada*) argued against the seemingly givenness and complacency of the rationale of animal experimentation. In doing so, she investigated the animal experimentation practices and their guarding discursive principles of the University of British Columbia (Canada) with a Foucaultian framework to shake up habitual ways of working and thinking. *Arianna Ferrari* (*Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany*) took the discussion on animal experimentation even further by revealing practices of genetic engineering in animals in the name of “enhancement”. Although it is usually stated by scientists or advocates of transhumanism that “enhancement” would be in the best interest of animals and that we might even be morally obliged to it, Ferrari showed convincingly that the engineering mainly serves human interests by “producing” more profitable “livestock” and that the majority of interventions really are disenancements for the animals themselves. She also pointed to methodological flaws in the

trans-/posthumanist arguments which seem to neglect important actual empirical and socio-economic contexts of techno-scientific research. *Greg Murrie (University of Sydney, Australia)* emphasized that the deconstruction of the pretended absolute division between humans and animals is not dependent on trans-/posthumanist genetical engineering of animals but that instead Darwinian evolutionary thought already bears the key to understanding the human-animal-relationship as a relation of kinship. Evolutionary theory in mind he explicated how figures as Anna Kingsford and Edward Maitland developed concepts of spiritual evolution which closely connect a mature human future with a non-exploitative and anti-hierarchical intercourse with animals.

The second session was centred on affects, multispecies justice and policy and arts. In the stream on **affects** *Richard Twine (Lancaster University, UK)* worked out an explication of Barbara Noske's concept of the "Animal-Industrial Complex". By concentration on the meaning of "complex" as a psychological pathology, he explored the question of how affective dimensions shape the Animal-Industrial Complex. For this purpose Twine drew on Jacques Derrida's famous essay "The Animal that therefore I am" and discussed a number of ways to understand some of the emotional and psychological dynamics bound up in the human exploitation of animals and how they have become partly constitutive of the "human". *Marcel Sebastian (Group for Society and Animals Studies, University of Hamburg, Germany)* tied up with these considerations by asking for the conditions and origins of most people's indifference towards the socially organized and institutionalized mass-killing of animals. He systematized the so far only sparse elaborated approaches to the problem and extended them by relevant social and cultural conditions. As result he presented a framework of highly interdependent social mechanisms and strategies which can be assigned to the categories of invisibility, normalization and rationalization of violence and to the construction of identities and cultural frames. *Martina Stephany (Four Paws, Germany)* then developed this thought by connecting it to animated movies as a medium of socialization into human-animal-relationships. She focussed on "Bambi" in order to explain the different roles animated animals may play and why humanization of these animals is sometimes good in order to make people think about animals.

In the stream on **multispecies justice and policy** *Anteneh Roba (International Fund for Africa, USA)* described the plans of international enterprises and organizations to introduce factory farming in African countries. He closely examined the environmental, political and social consequences of these strategies and how an increasingly industrialized,

corporatized and globalized food and agricultural system affects climate, food security, public health, animal welfare and resource allocation in African countries. *Brett Mizelle (California State University Long Beach, USA)* then analyzed the mass slaughter of pigs that have been conducted in Haitian and Egyptian multispecies communities to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. He showed how modernization has taken the form of mass killings of pigs without considering the intertwined lives of people and animals: Locally adapted pigs and traditionally woven relations between these pigs and the people were eradicated under often false or economically biased pretences of health safety and were replaced by industrially “produced” pigs in a neo-imperialist manner. *Rainer Ebert (Rice University, USA)* extended the discussion on multispecies justice to predatory animals in the wild. Explicating that right-based approaches to animal ethics as Tom Regan’s lead to the counterintuitive consequence of the duty to introduce morality to the wild, he argued for either rejecting right-based animal ethics altogether or for developing a more sophisticated libertarian theory of animal rights.

The **art** stream was opened by Jessica Ullrich (University of Arts Berlin, Germany) who studied the work of artists trying to look at the world through animals’ eyes. She presented the main artist strategies as observation, imitation and identification by drawing on the works of Ines Lechleitner, Bärbel Rothaar, Varsity of Maneuvers and Sam Easterson. As a result Ullrich emphasized the idea and the potential of these strategies to “give voice” to animals as agents and individuals and to resist their presentation as screens of human projections. *Dorota Lagodzka (Polish Academy of Science, Poland)* then drew attention to ethical considerations regarding the artist’s work with animals using them as objects or material. Unfolding a clash between the freedom of arts and the freedom of animals she analyzed the entanglement of arts and practices in speciesist discourses thereby arguing that the absolutization of freedom may result in defying freedom itself. *Heather Rose Dodge (Manhattan College, USA)* discussed Sue Coe’s influential visual narrative “Dead Meat” in which Coe presented the ways animals are rendered visible in slaughterhouses. Working with Nicole Shukin’s concept of the double entendre of the termin “render” Dodge proposed a new way of understanding Coe’s slaughterhouse sketches as visual taxonomies of the lives of animals that resist metaphor, representation and interpretation and focus instead on the actual life and death of animals as individuals who become anonymous only through slaughter.

The third session was focussed on theory and visual culture, agency and biomedicine. The stream **theory and visual culture** was opened by *Sara Salih (University of Toronto, Canada)*



presenting the results of her analysis of the meaning of violent images of animal suffering in war-torn neo-colonial spaces such as the Gaza Strip to western viewers. Based on W.G. Sebald she argued that such images fill western viewers with a particular horror since unlike as images of human suffering they have not been censored. Inquiring into the differences between the images of animal suffering in Gaza's zoos and Susan Coe's "Dead Meat" piece, Salih suggested that the former fulfil a culturally reassuring function in distracting western viewers from animal suffering much closer to "home" like factory farming and slaughter while the latter have the potential to draw empathetic attention to the suffering of animals and to change consumers practices. Also *Julia Gutjahr (Group for Society and Animals Studies, University of Hamburg, Germany)* dealt with images: With using the concepts of Carol J. Adams and Raewyn Connell she analyzed images and articles of the German men's food and lifestyle magazine "Beef!" and brought to light interesting intersections of the symbolic gender order and the human-animal-relationship: In the representations and images animals and women were equalled in being objects of male desire, there was a strong connection between (sexualized) women and meat, animals were feminized and sexualized and a construction of hegemonic masculinity was set up through the consumption of meat and the devaluation of vegetarianism.

In the stream on **agency** *Bob Carter and Nickie Charles (University of Warwick, UK)* criticized the rash transference of the concept of agency from human to non-human animals as in the socio-ontological approaches of Bruno Latour or John Law, which sever the connection between reflexivity and agency through extending agency from human to non-human animals and inanimate objects. Instead they argued for a concept of agency which defines it as a social relation and thus as a property only of collectivities. This approach implies that our positions in social relations are involuntary and come before any knowledge we may have of them, whilst recognizing that agential properties must reflexively mediated to shape social action. Therefore agency cannot be extended easily to animals although they may be seen as actors in a specific sense when embedded in social relations with humans. *Jakub Mares (Charles University Prague, Czech Republic)* tied up with considerations of Bruno Latour's Actor-Network-Theory which challenges the human/non-human dichotomy in asserting that we can only truly understand the world when we dismiss our preconception about "the human" and accept the mutually interconnected character of all being. Special attention was given to often questioned critical potential of Actor-Network-Theory by clearly separating the kind of critiques which are abandoned by Latour and the kind of critical potential which is still or newly in place.

*Tereza Vandrovцова (Charles University Prague, Czech Republic)* started the stream on **biomedicine** with a discursive analysis and a qualitative survey regarding the objectification of laboratory animals in the Czech Republic. As result of the discourse analysis and the interviews both with agents of biomedical laboratories involved in animal experimentation and animal rights activists, she presented a mapping of the logic of conflict in this contested field, a sociological analysis of the battleground and preconditions for possible solutions. *Kathrin Herrmann (State Authority of Health and Social Affairs, Berlin, Germany)* focussed on the difficult social and ethical position of veterinarians involved in animal experimentation and the livestock industry: In the first instance veterinarians seem to be committed to the welfare of their animal patients; nevertheless, or surprisingly, they are accomplices in animal suffering in laboratories or farms by ensuring the animals' minimal health conditions for further painful "usage" or profitable exploitation. By referring to relevant surveys, Herrmann highlighted potential causes of this contradiction and possible ways out of this conflict.

The fourth session was dedicated to question of **law** concerning animals. *Friederike Schmitz (Heidelberg University, Germany)* dealt with the explication and clarification with the often poorly defined concept of rights used in animal rights theories. She made up a distinction between moral rights and legal rights arguing that the concept of a moral right is superfluous in this context and that central theses of animal rights positions can be formulated by recourse to legal rights alone. Furthermore the focus on legal rights in animal rights theories can successfully face counter-arguments based on animals not being proper moral agents or on moral rights as being a masculinist, empathy-deprecative conception. Focussing on law as a set of internationalized and globalizing practices, *Alejandro Lorie Escorihuela (Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Finland)* conducted a critical analysis of international law and specific bodies of rules and institutions within as for example the environmental law, the law of the sea and international trade law. Governed by the insight that human-animal-relationships are profoundly mediated by legal institutions on the local and international level, he argues that every promising work on animal liberation needs a comprehensive framework which integrates the relationship between law, property and violence in political liberalism. Through the exploration of the relations between legal institutions of war and conquest, legal theory of slavery and the position of animals in social contract mythology, he undertook a first sketch of such a framework.

The fifth session addressed especially topics of activism, continued with the discussion of theory and visual culture and the human/animal binary. In the stream on **activism** *Dita Wickins-Drazilova (University of Warwick, UK)* critically examined the situation of zoos in the Czech Republic and its public perception. Starting with an analysis of the past, Wickins-Drazilova demonstrated the prominence and the long tradition of keeping animals caught in zoos in the Czech Republic. With currently fifteen zoos, which comes up to one zoo per 700.000 citizens (even more are accredited), the Czech Republic has one of the highest zoo densities in the world. Nevertheless, the animals are held in poor conditions, small cages and concrete bunkers. Wickins-Drazilova challenged the Czech public and especially Czech animal activist groups for being unattentive to this situation: While it might not come as a surprise that the general public views the confinement and suffering of animals in zoos as a minor problem or even no problem at all, the current negligence by animal activists poses a serious problem to the self-conception of the movement. Staying within the activist field, *Nathan Stephens Griffins (Durham University, UK)* presented a research on Vegan Activism based on Queer Theory, biographic interviews and comics as a narrative medium utilizing visual and textual modes of expression. In rendering vegans as queer subjects, he challenged essentialist notions of “normal” human behaviour regarding the treatment and consumption of animals and emphasized the comparative non-violence and gender composition of animal rights groups which contradicts their public labelling as “terrorists”. Central to Griffins presentation was his plea for comics as a medium to convey complex academic theories and results which otherwise are often inaccessible to a wider public. *Stefan Hnat (Vegan Society, Austria)* then took the opportunity to analyze the meaning and consequences of communication, conflict and criticism in the animal rights movement. Acknowledging repression of activists as personally devastating, it also has the potential to increase solidarity and encouragement and to yield a greater media attention to the societal intercourse with animals. Instead, internal conflicts of the movement have the potential to paralyse the whole movement by withdrawing energy and time, which makes ways to deal with them a central topic in the fight for animal rights. In drawing on theoretical concepts of communication, conflict and criticism, Hnat examined their interconnectivity and presented practical strategies to handle conflicts within the movement.

In the stream on **theory and visual culture** *Anat Pick (University of East London, UK)* presented her research on the artist Chen Steinberg’s Kafkaesque short film “Convulsion” which portrays an overturned and struggling beetle. Far from falling prey to simple anthropomorphism she figured out how this film raises important questions about trans-

species proximity and the assumed impassiveness of insects and how the inversion of the allegorical mode turned Franz Kafka's "Metamorphosis" from allegory to realism and thus insectal life into the fold of creaturely fellowship. *Stergia Sarantopoulou* (*National Technical University of Athens, Greece*) analyzed with Foucaultian methods the shift in the visual representation of animals: By tracing back the tradition of displaying animals she showed how the exhibition of animals shifted from collections of mummified or anatomized curiosities in the 18<sup>th</sup> century to contemporary exhibition in zoos and botanical gardens to induce a new kind of knowledge which seemingly represents in situ the universal, continuous and uniform order of the nature. Though animals are thus liberated from the status of curiosities, they are now placed in new technologies of captivity and control. *Marianna Szczygielska* (*Central European University, Poland*) also focussed on the visual aspects the zoos as spaces of fabricated naturalness in which most visibly the division between humans and animals is constructed. In discussing the zoo in its historical context and its intersections between colonialism, the birth of the nation state and the emergence of science disciplines, Szczygielska argued for an understanding of the zoo as a biopolitical space. Using concepts of Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault and Donna Haraway as well as results of her empirical research project about the Budapest Zoological Garden, she proposed that the visual aspect of the zoo – the "zoological gaze" – of modern panoptical menageries creates hierarchies and places where humanness is constantly negotiated (humans were displayed in zoos until the 1950s). Asking with Haraway whether it is possible to think of zoontologies of becoming instead of fixed beings and species boundaries, Szczygielska demonstrated how animals' "gazing back" can destabilize the anthropocentric order that so far has dominated western philosophical thinking.

Picking up the these threads the next stream addressed further topics of the **human/animal binary**. *Catia Faria* (*University of Pompeu Fabra, Spain*) and *Beril Sözmen* (*Istanbul Technical University, Turkey*) examined two seemingly contradicting anti-speciesist positions in moral philosophy. While the first position argues that moral rights have to be assigned to individuals – human or non-human alike – and thus the protection of individuals has to be primarily considered as values in themselves, the second position criticizes the underlying atomic conception of the self and argues that moral rights have to be granted to collectives. From this second position would follow that the moral rights of whole ecosystems override the moral rights of an individual living in it which seems to be contra-intuitive. But the consequence of the first position seems to be contra-intuitive as well: Giving priority to individual humans and animals seem to imply an obligation to protect both

- not only in “civilization” but also in nature, so we would have the duty to intervene in violent processes between animals in the wilderness. Illustrating these two positions and the resulting paradox, Faria and Sözmen argued for a kind of compromise in proposing a non-anthropocentric position which applies the same moral criteria to human and non-human individuals alike but critically questioning the scope of moral agency. Staying within the field of philosophy, *Radim Belohrad (Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic)* investigated the apparent contradiction in identity theories: Despite the fact that most people believe in the biological classification according to which humans are animals of the *Homo Sapiens* species, currently predominant psychological theories of identity take humans and animals to be objects of very different kinds: Humans are claimed to be persons – beings that are not defined by their biological nature but by their mental life consisting of processes and capacities such as memory, self-reflection, language and rationality; and persons/humans are claimed to be superior to non-persons/animals who are assumed to be determined by their biological nature. Belohrad presented several arguments against these psychological identity theories and argued that even their best version, Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution theory, cannot convincingly deal with the duplication problem of mental states and depicts the wrong picture of sortal predicates and essential properties. Due to insights gained by Japanese researchers of ape communities that show cultural behaviour, *David Scarso (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal)* asked the question of the nature/culture - human/animal - divide anew. He searched for a way to conceptualize the relation between human and non-human animals avoiding both naive materialism and mere anthropomorphism. In order to do so, he draws on Tim Ingold’s concepts of ecological anthropology and provokes a propound revision of the human/animal divide by applying Ingold’s attitude of interrogation in asking questions like “what is an animal?”, “do animals build homes?” or “do animals work?”

The sixth session was centred on educational and theoretical approaches to the human-animal-relationship as well as on animal experimentation. In the first stream on **education**, *Clarissa M. Uttley (Plymouth State University, USA)* presented results from a research study she conducted about the inclusion of non-human animals in early childhood classrooms accredited by the National Association for Education of Young Children throughout the United States of America. Of the 1.632 sites that participated in the survey, 60% maintain non-human animals in early childhood classrooms. The reasons given for that were mainly to help children to learn empathy and responsibility and to support the curriculum on topics such as life cycles of tadpoles. Uttley focussed in her presentation on the ethical aspects of

this “animal-in-the-classroom”-policy and demonstrated data from respondents who critically questioned the forementioned learning goals by claiming that caged animals in classrooms do not develop empathy and responsibility but send messages of human dominance and concepts of ownership and property regarding animals to young children. Furthermore insufficient care for the caged animals was mentioned. Based on this survey, Uttley thus asked whether classrooms with non-human animals do really help children in their socio-emotional development or if they are a hindrance to it. Staying within the field of education, *Helena Pedersen (Malmö University, Sweden)* addressed the role of educational practices in animal commodification processes. Focussing on veterinary education, she examined alongside the concepts of Karl Marx and Stefan Helmreich the interplay between education and the animals’ becoming materials, commodities and capital in the livestock industry. As a result, education emerged as a vitalizing guide among other organic and inorganic actants in a heterogenous biopedagogical community. Nevertheless is its work subdued to the risk of being compromised by elements of indeterminacy which are always accompanying educational processes and the transformation of biomaterial into capital. *Wouter Servaas (University of Sheffield, UK)* conducted an interview-based research with children between the age of seven and twelve about their perceptions of rural areas in Belgium and the Netherlands. He found out that animals are an important part in the children’s realities. All interviewed children distinguished “pet animals”, “farm animals” and “wild animals”. However, interestingly, the assignment of specific animals to these classes was not dependent on their economical, common-sense labelling or their place of living but on existing emotional ties. As a result, animal identities became blurred: Children considered ponies, horses and cows as “pets”. Although the concept of owning an animal was constantly mentioned, this was strongly tied with a sense of responsibility for the wellbeing of the “owned” animal and somehow counterbalanced by considering these animals being family members. As conclusion, Servaas argued that a shift and blurring of the boundaries between “pets” and “farm animals” takes place and that positions of animals in postmodern Western societies change from “economic assets” to “human’s best friends”.

The **theory** stream was opened by *Agnieszka Kowalczyk (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland)* who analyzed the viability of Karl Marx’s concept of labour in a posthumanist frame of reference. In Marx’ work “labour” is heavily defined in terms of a human-animal-dichotomy, but drawing upon recent investigations on the moral status of animals in “The Capital” and its environmental readings as well as on works from Ted Benton, Peter Dickens and Jason Hribal, Kowalczyk introduced a non-anthropocentric

perspective into Marxist theory arguing that by reconfiguring the human-animal relations concepts like “trans-species encounter value” from Donna Haraway can inform the struggle against capitalism. *Anne Schillmoller (Southern Cross University, Australia)* presented a paper written as a travelogue, employing geospatial metaphors and concepts from cultural geography, to explore animality. Originally aiming at a non-hegemonic conceptual frontier or a reciprocal ground of animality to surrender humanism, she was confronted with obstacles as anthropocentrism and biocentrism: In having insurmountable difficulties in conceiving and representing other-than-human animality she came to the conclusion that her relationship with the world is negotiated within a matrix of representations in which the animal other is assimilated into a pre-existing humanist narrative. In conceding that her travelogue was not so much about animality but more about the impossibility to think outside her limits of human embodiment, she argued that this insight is the ground from which a non-anthropocentric discourse of animality should start. Leaving the field of posthumanism, *Melanie Bujok (University of Hamburg, Germany)* put forward the concept of the “Cage of Society”. Criticizing that this concept so far only has been used as a metaphor, she argued that the “cage” and its different symbolic and material dimensions are well suited to analyze social inequalities both between humans as well as between humans and animals. Drawing on Birgit Mütherich’s concept of intersectionality and Nobert Elias’ and Pierre Bourdieu’s work on the incorporation of coercion, she reflected on what kind of lines and borders are produced by the cage, how insiders and outsiders are constituted and in which way the structure, economy, practices and self-definition of a society is interconnected with its architecture and its relation to animals.

In the stream on **animal experimentation** *Andrew Knight (Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, UK)* presented results of a review-based survey he conducted to assess the clinical, toxicological and educational utility of animal experimentation. According to the European Directive 2010/63 EU, the authorization of animal experimentation requires the scientific and educational validity as well as a significant utility for human medical treatments. Leaving aside ethical issues and concentrating on the substantiality of promises of human health benefits reached by such animal experiments, Knight found out that less than 10% of these experiments could keep their word. Most of the results gained by animal experimentation could not be translated into human health benefits or failed to reliably predict human toxicities, carcinogenicities or teratogenicities. Arguing that animal experimentation cannot keep its promises and thus violate the European Directive 2010/63 EU, Knight advocated basic policy reforms in medical research. *Jessica Groling (University of Exeter, UK)*

examined how Albert Bandura's theory of moral disengagement can be fruitfully applied to the context of university-based animal experimentation in the UK. Assuming that most animal experimenters are not entering their profession with a desire to inflict harm on sentient beings, Bandura's model can explain how they become socialized into this institutionalized practice and disengage moral self-sanctions from their harm-inducing conduct. Groling showed how the conditions for mechanisms of moral disengagement are built into the infrastructure, regulatory practices and cultural tools of the industry and thus attempted to give clues for successful interventions against animal experimentation. *Jasmijn de Boo (Animal Consultants International, UK)* conducted a study on the implementation of the "3Rs" methodologies which aim at the *Reduction and Replacement* of animal use and *Refinement* of procedures in scientific animal research and improvement of animal husbandry. By analyzing more than 190 papers on toxicology and related disciplines in 2006-2007, she identified only poor compliance rates of the "3Rs". Best results could be found in articles from multiple authors, reviewers and editors so it seemed that joint responsibility might be a way to increase compliance and to significantly decrease the number of the currently more than 127 million animals yearly harmed by experiments.

The seventh and last session was dedicated to a further discussion of theoretical concepts in Human-Animal Studies, of the human/animal binary and to the role of animals in literature. In the stream on **theory** *Brianne Donaldson and Rebekah Sinclair (Claremont Lincoln University, USA)* analyzed the theories of ethical irreducibility of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler and Gilles Deleuze. Although criticizing these specific approaches for theoretical shortcomings regarding the application to human-animal relationships, Donaldson and Sinclair kept with the core principle of an ethics of irreducibility: Arguing that ethical thinking is based on the act of seeking an irreducible other that transcends any sort of binary relationship, ethical thought means to care so much about the other that you refuse to reduce her to your own frameworks of recognition and knowledge. Under these circumstances, binaries are rendered nonsensical and focussing on them even for deconstruction diverts us from the irreducible other which is the impetus for deconstruction in the first place. Thus Donaldson and Sinclair argued for the abandoning of deconstructive tasks and for irreducibility as a habit of thought to be implemented into Critical Human-Animal Studies. *Julia Gutjahr and Marcel Sebastian (Group for Society and Animals Studies, University of Hamburg, Germany)* turned the attention of the audience to the importance of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, mainly by elaborating on the work of Max Horkheimer and



Theodor W. Adorno. Animals play a central role in this theory by appearing as victims of socially mediated violence in being both a projection for the unreconciled parts of nature in humans and mediums for utopian motives. The criticism of the human urge to dominate nature offers a critical-theoretical analysis of the history of human civilization in terms of the underlying relationship between humans and their inner and outer nature and thus between human and nonhuman animals. Drawing on Critical Theory concepts as “domination of nature” and “instrumental reason”, Gutjahr and Sebastian shed light on the origins of the human domination of animals as well as on forms of intrahuman domination as a continuation of the domination of nature. Subsequently, *Kari Driscoll (Columbia University, USA)* explored the problem of honesty and deceit as it relates to the interaction between humans and animals in literary and philosophical discourse around 1900. Based on Friedrich Nietzsche’s account of a difference between human and animal honesty according to which human honesty is more valuable than an animal’s honesty, Driscoll analyzed Rainer Maria Rilke’s text “An Encounter”. The text is about a man and a dog and their somehow contractual relationship according to which the dog promises to be silent as long as the man promises to be the master. Because of their different forms of honesty this contract is an asymmetrical one. However, Rilke interpreted this asymmetry not as the man’s superiority but as his deficiency which shows referring to Driscoll the link between the anxiety about the human-animal relationship and the pervasive crisis of language in Europe at this time.

Turning to further reflections of the **human/animal binary**, *Sonja Buschka (Group for Society and Animals Studies, University of Hamburg, Germany)* confronted the idea of a fundamental cognitive human-animal difference with results of recent biological and behavioural studies on animals. She found out that according to these studies there are no fundamental but at most gradual differences in the cognitive capacities of humans and animals and that thus the construction of a fundamental cognitive human-animal difference is obsolete. Since the idea of such a fundamental cognitive difference is usually connected to the assumption of human superiority over animals, Buschka furthermore demonstrated in which ways these findings challenge the human claim to power over animals and what kind of changes in the human intercourse with animals would be necessary in law, food and agriculture, medical research, “pet”-keeping and the handling of natural living spaces – given that these results would be taken seriously. Deepening these points, *Judith Benz-Schwarzburg (University of Tübingen, Germany)* presented further insights into the similarities of human and animal behavioural and cognitive characteristics such as culture, language and theory of mind as well as into their moral implications. One basic implication is that the psychological

needs of captive animals have to be taken care of. However, for species such as great apes and dolphins with whom we share major characteristics of personhood, welfare requirements alone maybe insufficient and basic moral rights might be indicated as it is demanded by the Great Ape Project. Although the great similarities between humans and some animal species make the latter candidates for the same basic moral rights, Benz-Schwarzburg nevertheless rightly questioned the idea of similarity to humans as a standard according to which other species are morally judged. In conclusion she pled for the consideration of the incremental progression of cognitive, social and psychological capacities in animals – or our imperfect knowledge about it – in debates on animal rights. Picking up the question of the justification of animal rights, *Yoav Kenny (Tel Aviv University, Israel)* argued that although the human/animal distinction has been widely contested today, political philosophy still accepts it as a fundamental presupposition. This can be seen in a lot of discussions on animal rights and welfare which apply rationalistic human concepts to non-human animals and thus perpetuate an anthropocentric and binary perception of the human-animal relation. Kenny located the underlying reasons for this in philosophical roots going back to Aristotle's concept of the "zoon politikon" ("political animal") as being exclusively human which he claimed to be a phenomenal misreading. He suggested that a closer reading of Aristotle reveals that his concept of "zoon politikon" is not restricted to human beings but may serve as a basis for a new conceptualization of animals which is both political and non-anthropocentric, avoids violently flattening ontology that ignores otherness and differences between animals species as well as between individuals and takes into account material, environmental and political apparatuses, especially factory farming.

In the stream on **literature** *Robert McKay (University of Sheffield, UK)* discussed the significance of animal ethics in the work of the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century American writer James Agee, particularly in his short story "A Mother's Tale" from 1952. McKay argued that the literary effects of the story's portrayal of a slaughterhouse and a "beef-steer's" experience of slaughter already at this time opened up a wide range of important questions in animal ethics and human-centred social and philosophical dilemmas of the American post-war period. Questions of the former concerned the ethical value of life itself and of animal agency and in turn the morality of animal killing while questions of the latter concerned the threats of totalitarianism, total war and developing a mass society while retaining individual moral responsibility. From this and other stories of Agee, McKay extracted a specific version of humanism which undermined the binary oppositions of human and animals usually implied by that term and posed a challenge to the political discussion of slaughter practices in 1950s

America. Since animal representations in social media, newspapers and fiction influence the public and the reader's motivation to take action for animals, *Anne Pusch (Heidelberg University, Germany)* addressed in her presentation the political implications of representations of animals in fiction referring to Diane Jessup's novel "The dog who spoke with Gods" (2001). Although Jessup dedicates her novel to the mistreatment of canines in laboratory research, she takes position against organizations that try to abolish these mistreatments. In her story, animal activists almost kill the canine protagonist during their rescue operation because he fights back due to a loyalty to his human master/torturer which is stronger than the desire for freedom. In analyzing how Jessup weaves a message of "harmful" and "criminal" animal activists into a story of good versus evil, nature versus culture and right versus wrong, Pusch highlighted the misuse of rhetoric surrounding animal liberation with a focus on literary works. The closure of this stream was given by the Danish writer *Charlotte Inuk Hoff Hansen (Independent Writer, Denmark)* who presented a chapter from her fictional novel "Large Animals" (2008). By telling a story on a young idealist veterinary student's existential crisis on the schizophrenian attitudes when it comes to "pets" versus "farm animals" she marked important points in the Danish "animal liberation" versus "animal welfare" debate and analyzed reasons for the – in comparison to other European countries – only slowly developing Danish movement.

## **Summary**

This conference offered a great opportunity for productive scientific exchange and insights in current works and concepts in the field of Human-Animal Studies. With its compact schedule it covered an immense spectrum of research topics from which the (de)construction of the human/animal binary, the development or application of theoretical approaches, animal experimentation, animals in art and visual culture and animal ethics were dominant. Although many speakers referred to the social and economical entrenchment of the diverse human-animal relationships, the used concept of "society" and "economy" or "capitalism" was often a broad one. It would be an interesting research perspective to distinguish between different kinds of societies, economies or capitalisms in order to explain potential differences in the social shaping of human-animal relationships. Important insights may be gained by theoretical and empirical comparisons of industrial and post-industrial societies as for example between traditional industrial or emerging market societies and post-industrial

knowledge/service societies. Furthermore, the comprehensibility of some presentations for non-native English speakers/hearers might have been enhanced by using more visual support. Nevertheless, the quality of the conference contributions was on an extremely high level considering the newness of Human-Animal Studies as an academic discipline. Additional to this interesting and widespread schedule there were lot of opportunities for discussions and networking both on the national and the international level so that assumedly everybody left with a feeling of gratitude to the conference organizers and with an increased motivation for the continuation of the own scientific work.

## **Conference Proceedings Report: Anarchy and Animal Liberation Workshop<sup>1</sup>**

**Reviewed by Kim Socha<sup>2</sup>**

### **Abstract**

This report documents a workshop on the topic of animal liberation and anarchism that took place at the 2011 Twin Cities Anarchist Book Fair in September 2011. Topics include the facilitator's radicalization via the animal liberation movement, justification for including nonhuman animals in anarchist theory and praxis, capitalist appropriation and commodification of veganism and animal rights, past and present direct action and strategies for politicizing animal liberation as an anarchist principle. Key words: anarchism, animal liberation, veganism.

On September 18, 2011, I presented a workshop with Sarahjane Blum, a longtime activist and participant in the 2002 open rescue on Hudson Valley foie gras farm in California. The workshop, entitled "Anarchy and Animal Liberation," took place at the Second Annual Twin Cities Anarchist Book Fair. The workshop's purpose was to facilitate a discussion encouraging attendees to consider how nonhuman animals would fare within our visions of an anarchist society.

I began the workshop by exploring my own radicalization toward anarchism by way of the animal liberation movement. Three books directly allowed me to consider animal rights as a serious political issue that can challenge domination more holistically: *Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals* (edited by Anthony J. Nocella, II [also a workshop attendee] and Steven Best; Lantern 2004), Bob Torres's *Making a Killing: The Political Economy of Animal Rights* (AK Press 2007) and *Contemporary Anarchist Studies* (edited by Randall Amster, Luis Fernandez, II, Anthony Nocella, II, Abraham DeLeon, and Deric Shannon; Routledge 2009). Current animal rights/liberation scholarship encourages social justice activists to consider how nonhuman animal oppression buttresses human oppression. However, these books had the opposite effect on me, for they forced me

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to consider that challenges to animal oppression must include a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of domination, politics, economy and (popular) culture, all of which are human constructs. Oppression should not be compartmentalized based upon species.

After this brief personal introduction, the ten workshop attendees explained how they integrate animal concerns into their particular conceptualizations of anarchism. While responses were unique, a recurring theme was that a society founded upon autonomy and freedom from subjugation must include consideration of *all* sentient (and non-sentient) life. In sum, attendees were sympathetic to nonhuman animals and eager to consider anarchism as an aspect of and foundation for animal liberation.

Next, I posed a dilemma in animal activism/veganism through which animal liberation is being appropriated by a capitalist system that manufactures vegan “cheese,” t-shirts with radical messages and faux leather, but that is inherently incapable of fostering liberation because the system is based upon the master/slave relationship. Therefore, I am ambivalent to the popularity of veganism, especially in celebrity culture. On one hand, celebrity vegans can influence and inspire their fans to reflect upon the plight of nonhuman animals; on the other, mirroring the lifestyles of the rich and famous is entrenched in classism and celebrity worship, which are problematic and can lead the movement astray from political issues and into lifestyle ones (more on that below). For example, I argued that animal advocates misplace their energies when they use online forums to decry actress Natalie Portman’s “fall from grace” because she admitted to eating eggs during her pregnancy. However, I believe that this is the fate of veganism—calling out others on their missteps, especially public figures—when it is peddled as a lifestyle consisting of a list of food, clothing and other prohibitions, all of which lead to some nebulous concept of ethical perfection.

Inspired by Torres’s similar use of Murray Bookchin’s theory of social ecology, I supplemented this discussion with a brief passage from Bookchin’s “Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm” to consider the dangers of veganism’s growing popularity. Bookchin writes

of a phenomenon in Euro-American anarchism that cannot be ignored: the spread of individualist anarchism. In a time when even respectable forms of socialism are in pell-mell retreat from principles that might in any way be construed as radical, issues of lifestyle are once again supplanting social action and revolutionary politics in anarchism. In the traditionally individualist-liberal

United States and Britain, the 1990s are awash in self-styled anarchists who—their flamboyant radical rhetoric aside—are cultivating a latter-day anarcho-individualism that I will call lifestyle anarchism [...] [that] arrogantly derides structure, organization, and public involvement; and [is] a playground for juvenile antics. (Bookchin, 1995)

To interpolate veganism into Bookchin's comments, I fear that animal liberation and veganism are in "retreat from principles that might in any way be construed as radical," with "issues of lifestyle [...] supplanting social action and revolutionary politics in [veganism]." Bookchin's concerns are echoed by Brian A. Dominick in his pamphlet "Animal Liberation and Social Revolution: A Vegan Perspective on Anarchism, or An Anarchist Perspective on Veganism." In an addendum, Dominick argues that even if millions of individuals change their lifestyles (i.e. go vegan), that will not change the world if the "social structures [...] handcrafted by elites" are not destroyed, concluding that lifestyles such as veganism "really don't constitute any kind of concrete activism. There is much more to being an activist than just taking a stand, especially a quiet one." (Dominick, 1997: 21)

Once again, attendees were in agreement. One woman discussed the ways in which she wavers between animal liberation/veganism as a lifestyle and as a political ideology. She noted Earth Balance as an example of this quandary. While this margarine spread has long been popular amongst vegans, the company has been scrutinized for its use of palm oil, a product whose acquisition results in human, animal and environmental rights violations. However, she still uses it, thus feeling guilty for allowing her lifestyle to supplant "social action and revolutionary politics," to use Bookchin's terms. This example is more than just a relatable anecdote. Rather, it demonstrates the ways in which animal advocates can become so used to convenient (and delicious) vegan commodities that they ignore the ethical concerns of those products. Further, vegan activists are often myopic in their cultural criticism, focusing only on nonhumans while ignoring the intersectional nature of oppression. In the case of Earth Balance, this means disregarding environmental and human labor issues. As a group, we established that as enticing as it is to consume mainstream vegan products and center only on animal issues, to do so is to ignore the challenge to authoritarianism that forms the core of anarchist principles. To promote these principles, our actions and activism must be more holistic in both word and deed.

Direct action was the final workshop topic, for it is the premier anarchist act. I readily admitted that my background in anarchist scholarship was fixed in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America, despite my best intentions of branching out ideologically. Although I have certainly read the seminal works of continental anarchists Max Stirner,

Michael Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, along with material from contemporary anthologies, Alexander Berkman, Emma Goldman and Voltairine de Cleyre have penned the philosophies that I find most conducive to direct action. At this point, I introduced my co-facilitator Sarahjane Blum, who had agreed to talk about her direct action on the Hudson Valley foie gras farm.

In 2002, Sarahjane and her activist cohort videotaped the conditions at Hudson Valley, finding blinded birds riddled with infected sores being violently force-fed and thrown about their pens in assembly-line fashion by farm workers. The film that she and the other investigators produced, *Delicacy of Despair*, further documents garbage cans filled with birds who had died covered in their own vomit, with some seeming to have exploded during the feeding process. Eventually, Sarahjane and her cohort were able to rescue and rehabilitate fifteen ducks.

Rather than talk about direct action in theory, it was important to have Sarahjane there to answer the pressing question: “Why direct action over lawful methods?” Interestingly, her reasoning echoed (at least to me) the logic that drove Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman to plan the assassination of industrialist Henry Frick in 1892. In *Living My Life*, Goldman’s autobiography, she explains the moment that drove her to action: seeing a newspaper headline that read “Latest Developments in Homestead—Families of Strikers Evicted from the Company Houses—Woman in Confinement Carried Out into Street By Sheriffs.” The article continued by noting “Frick’s dictum to the workers: he would rather see them dead than concede to their demands [...] The brutal bluntness of the account, the inhumanity of Frick towards the evicted mother, inflamed [Goldman’s] mind. Indignation swept [her] whole being.” (Goldman, 1931: 84-85) Goldman saw no legal recourse to the rampant violence against the victims of a capitalist who valued profit over dignity and compassion.

Similarly, Sarahjane explained that the Hudson Valley incident and her other experiences with direct action were fueled by the acceptance that “there was nothing else to do” but act against the law when the law is created and sustained by the oppressor. Both Sarahjane and Emma were compelled to action only after careful contemplation of more mainstream activist methods such as protests and dialoguing with the oppressor. And ultimately, both were motivated by empathy for their fellow beings, not by the anti-social tendencies that one might readily associate with such flagrant challenges to authority.

I closed the workshop by asking attendees to consider why American anarchists were no longer engaged in direct action to the extent that they were in the early twentieth-century.



I also asked them to consider why they think that strategy has migrated to radical environmental and animal rights activists. Of the interesting responses, one resonated with me most loudly as a gentleman explained that when the unions were no longer subjugated, but rather begrudgingly embraced by corporations, the need for radical activism was no longer necessary for it had been absorbed into the very system against which it had once struggled. Therein, the unions themselves became corrupted.

This was a significant lesson on which to end the workshop, for it speaks to the danger of animal rights/liberation issues being absorbed into the very systems against which radical activists rebel. These systems are courts of law, corporations and research institutions with which welfare activists, albeit well meaning, strike deals. The recent negotiation between the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) and United Egg Producers (UEP) is a prime example of the limits of working with the oppressor. A familiar cry of animal liberationists is that we want empty cages, not bigger ones. HSUS and UEP have seen to it that hens will have marginally bigger cages, but those cages will remain full, perhaps even more so if consumers buy more eggs after being deceived into thinking there could ever be an ethically produced egg. Other abuses such as de-beaking and killing male chicks will be business as usual on the factory farm.

The compromise between HSUS and UEP begins to answer the question of why direct action has migrated from the early anarchists to radical environmental and animal activists—when permissible methods of revolt do not lead to justice, the compassionate individual has no recourse but to explore the prohibited. With unions a part of the corporate industrial complex, too few individuals are left to declare that the scraps of liberty our masters throw our way are not enough to sustain us. Today, with animals the manipulable bodies upon which our damaged culture stands, there are still enough individuals in the animal rights/liberation movement to refuse the master's scraps and who are willing to “explore the prohibited” as they seek justice.

As often occurs during informal workshops, other ideas and questions were offered that we did not have time to fully consider. I share these queries to continue the conversation begun amongst this small group of anarchist animal advocates in the Twin Cities: How do we get animal rights activists to be concerned about human-based social justice issues? How do we get anarchists to be less humanist and concerned about speciesism? What is the demographic of most animal rights activists, and what can that information tell us about the movement's benefits and liabilities? What is the difference between animal rights and animal liberation? Why do some animal liberationists support the killing of humans who kill

nonhuman animals? Why are some animal rights activists anti-human, sexist, homophobic, racist, and classist?

Although there are no easy answers to these questions, I do not ask them rhetorically. Rather, they are prompts to further contemplation and to action. In “Direct Action,” de Cleyre proclaims that “[e]vents, not tongues, must make [the radical’s] position clear.” (de Cleyre, 1912) Therein, as in other ways explored in this workshop, the tenets of anarchy continue to complement the goals of radical animal activists, and I hope that these collusions continue to be explored in more widespread, holistic and active ways.

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## FILM REVIEWS

### **Reconsidering Representations: Animals in children's films and possibilities for animal advocacy**

**Brian M. Lowe<sup>1</sup>**

Werner Herzog's *Cave of Forgotten Dreams* (2010), about the cave paintings of nonhuman animals in the Chauvet cave in southern France, is a recent reminder that humans have been creating representations of nonhuman animals – visual and more recently literary – for at least 30,000 years. Unsurprisingly, this trend continued with the advent of film; Mitman (1999) notes that “nature” films were amongst the original genres to appear during the silent film era, becoming wildly popular with audiences and even receiving some (ambivalent) support as “educational”(although the tension between academic and entertainment values of films concerning nonhuman animals and their environments continues). Such cinematic displays were continuations of the motif of displaying taxidermed animals, often in dioramas, which became centerpieces of natural history museums; Jay Kirk, in *Kingdom Under Glass* (2010), documents how Carl Akeley hunted, killed, prepared, and ultimately displayed the bodies of hundreds of animals for the Chicago Field Museum, the Museum of Natural History in New York City, and the Smithsonian Institution. Despite the ethos of the time – that killing animals for the purposes of displaying and preserving their images for audiences – Akeley developed an early film camera for the purpose of documenting animals in life to assist the simulacra of their taxidermed forms and encouraged King Leopold of Belgium to create a preserve in the Belgium Congo, which would later become the site of Dian Fossey's encounters with mountain gorillas, made known to western audiences in the film *Gorillas in the Mist* (Apted, 1988). Akeley's intellectual journey – that nonhuman animals move from objects to be created, to representations that encourage preservation and protection as a whole – is a useful vehicle for understanding transformations within films concerning animals. Both the displays of taxidermed animals in museums and subsequent cinematic representations of nonhuman animals and their environments were considered to be wholesome and appropriate for families to consume together, raising the question about what audiences (especially children) were supposed to derive from these

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experiences? As Burt (2002) notes, animal imagery of both the fictitious and “real” animal can be a point of departure for ethical scrutiny and evaluation.

The interest in cinematic representations of nonhuman animals clearly transcended the silent film era, moving into color theatrical releases, classroom films, and early television broadcasts in the United States. One of the significant progenitors of this trend, Disney films, benefitted from both the apparently inexhaustible interest for “animals in film” and the widespread availability of film projectors for classroom use (which had been created and used during World War II for a variety of instructional films for enlisted personnel, an economic niche which benefitted Disney and left it in an enviable position to create children’s films in the post-war era). The presence of these projectors encouraged representations of animals-in-nature as educational tools, as well as the use of films as socially instructive and normative pedagogical materials as discussed by Ken Smith in *Mental Hygiene* (1999). Arguably, both genres of films were attempting to impress upon young people normative dimensions of social life; both how to interact with and understand their peers and elders, and how to understand the natural world. The period of the 1950s through the 1980s witnessed films and television which tended to reinforce understandings of nature (and by extension, animals) of being in an inevitable subordinate position to humans, with the possibly unintentionally subversive exception of animation. While many animated films (especially those created by Disney) may be justly accused of anthropomorphism and animals as accepting of their conditions (like farm animals accepting their lot), such films may also (inadvertently) encourage children to view animals as subjects worthy of sympathy and empathy. While these efforts may not have been as intentional as the work of Theodor Geisel (Dr. Seuss), who Michael Kazin (2011) recently reminded us utilized his popular children’s books to promote both socialist and environmental messages, representations of animals as worthy of consideration and concerns should not be dismissed as unimportant fluff. The same period also witnessed the use of animals in entertainment, often with deleterious consequences concealed from audiences. The use of dolphins in the television program *Flipper* exemplifies this paradox: live dolphins were trained, and held in captivity, spawning a global interest in seeing live dolphins at aquariums and other facilities, which in turn became the targets of animal activists whose sympathy for marine mammals challenges these facilities as unethical and destructive. For example, Richard O’Barry, in the 2009 Louie Psihoyos documentary *The Cove*, disavows his past as the primary trainer for the dolphins viewed in *Flipper* and subsequently devotes his life to ending the trade in dolphins for live entertainment.

The 1980s and 1990s saw the expansion (especially through cable television) of representations of animals through television networks Discovery and “spin-offs” like *Animal Planet* which offered a multi-vocalic perspective on animals, ranging from the familiar animals as wild creatures to animals as moral subjects in programs like *Animal Cops*, in which animals are in need of rescue because of cruelty experienced at the hands of humans. Unlike previous representations, these genres are not clearly intended for children. Likewise, the early twenty-first century witnessed popular documentaries like the *March of the Penguins* (seized upon by American social conservatives for being emblematic of “family values”, despite contrarian zoological evidence) and *The Cove* (revealing the annual dolphin slaughter in Taiji, Japan to both Japanese and Western audiences). These more recent forms of representations are more ambiguous and complex, both in terms of ideological underpinnings, and questions of intended audiences. These and other films are indicative of the complexities increasingly apparent in representations of animals – even those largely intended for children or families. Some children’s films, like *Hoot* (2006) are more explicit about an agenda supportive of animals (in which children attempt to sabotage a construction development which threatens the habitat of endangered burrowing owls). Films including the *Madagascar* series and *Happy Feet* (which feature computer-generated anthropomorphic animals voiced by celebrities) have complex narratives including allusions to other films (often intended for media-savvy adults) and subtexts of contemporary themes (such as global warming). This trend is not limited to films with animals as dominant characters; Pixar’s *Wall-E*(2008), in which the entertaining critiques of the adventures of an apparently obsolete robot belies an extensive societal and environmental critique of the dangers of consumerism. These and similar “family” films are indicative of a milieu in which films are multi-vocalic, offering audiences entertainment and more nuanced societal critiques of human practices towards animals.

The boundary between “family” and other film genres regarding animals becomes even more porous when considering films like Rupert Wyatt’s *Rise of the Planet of the Apes* (2011), released in the United States as a PG-13 film (thereby effectively allowing older children to attend theatrical screenings alongside teenagers and adults). As a prequel to the dynamics and mythology of the 1968 *Planet of the Apes*, *Rise* focuses on the unintended consequences of animal research, undertaken for ambivalent reasons: scientist Will Rodman (played by James Franco) pursues a neurologically regenerative drug as “the cure for Alzheimer’s” and is initially supported by his business executive superior Steven Jacobs (played by David Oyelowo) who views this drug as a potentially highly lucrative commodity.

This relationship becomes strained following a disastrous meeting with the corporate board members, in which a female chimpanzee who has been experimented upon (and whose initial capture forms the opening sequence for the film) leaps into the board room and is shot to death in front of the board members. Subsequently, Rodman discovers that the adult was protecting her newborn (whose birth was hidden from Rodman's team), and not reacting violently to the experimental drug. Rodman covertly takes the infant home to prevent his destruction after the drug trials are suspended, initially to find a preserve for him (after all other chimps in the study have been euthanized), but quickly becomes attached to him. The baby chimp is named "Caesar" by Rodman's father Charles (played by John Lithgow), who is the source of Rodman's enthusiasm for this drug trial as a man deep in the grips of Alzheimer's. Caesar (played by a heavily CGI-modified Andy Serkis) becomes the dominant character of the film, whose intelligence has clearly been boosted due to his exposure to the drug as a developing fetus. Through Caesar, the audience is exposed to the ambivalent motivations for animal research, including seeking cures for human illnesses and pursuing profit. Caesar also personifies the problematic position of primates in contemporary developed societies: after protecting Charles from an altercation, Caesar is sent to a primate sanctuary filled with apes abandoned from other human uses, including a self-described "circus Orangutan". Caesar also embodies the potential for unintended consequences of animal experimentation: the next generation of the drug utilized in the drug trials as an aerosol boosts the intelligence of the apes exposed to it while spreading as a disease apparently fatal to humans). The final sequence of the film depicts Caesar leading a group of primates across the Golden Gate Bridge, while defeating the police dispatched to kill them, to relative sanctuary of the Redwoods of Muir Woods National Park. Beyond the focus on artificial Chimpanzee character of Caesar, animal advocates should note that this extended consideration of the realities and possible consequences of animal research grossed over an estimated \$480 million dollars U.S. – suggesting that many film going audiences are quite receptive to such narratives.

What do these and related trends imply for animal advocates? As of this writing, North American filmgoers may choose from the computer-animated *Adventures of Tin Tin* (featuring Snowy the dog) and *War Horse* (based on the Michael Morpurgo novel), suggesting that the trend towards family-oriented films with animals as central characters is not declining. Not only have these films been commercially successful, but have also been favorably critically reviewed (*War Horse* being nominated for both a Golden Globe for Best Picture and an American Film Institute Award as Film of the Year). In the coming months

*Big Miracle* (Kwapis, 2012) (a Universal Pictures dramatization of the 1988 efforts to free three Grey whales trapped in Alaskan ice) and *Chimpanzee* [Fothergill and Linfield, 2012] (a documentary created by DisneyNature and the Jane Goodall Institute to be released on Earth Day 2012) will be released, suggesting that large film studios are anticipating that audience enthusiasm for animal-centered films has not subsided, and are therefore willing to invest significant resources in producing and promoting such films. This trend suggests that a mediated environment which may be increasingly receptive to narratives and imagery which challenge an anthropocentric vision of nature and animals will continue within theatres that children and their families are likely to become exposed to.

Animal advocates may wish to heed these findings. The aforementioned films suggest a strategic opportunity; that media may not simply behave as the “third factor” in Nibert’s (2002) theory of animal oppression (whereby ideology reinforces the economic and political structures that are founded upon the exploitation of animals and humans), but may in fact be a contested terrain in which conflicting images and narratives are disseminated and circulated which both challenge and reinforce existing societal trends. Duncombe (2007) has argued that *spectacle* has become the lingua franca of our time; “Spectacle is our way of making sense of the world. Truth and power belong to those who tell the better story” (Duncombe, 2007: 8). Duncombe chastises the political Left for largely eschewing the potential of spectacle for engaging both its opponents and the uncommitted as to the veracity of its claims; current trends in family-oriented films may be receptive to such efforts. Kazin (2011) argues that the American political Left was more successful in disseminating its claims through popular culture (including popular cultural representations intended for children, as in the work of Dr. Seuss) than it was with more traditional political organizing. Alexander (2011) contends that, within complex societies, performances are increasingly important in both wielding power and subverting it; by extension implying that films depicting animals as subjects of concern and identification may work against the interests of those who benefit from the exploitation and destruction of animals.

Secondly, trends in visual representations – including documentaries which make ethical claims on behalf of animals, fictional and factual television programs that feature animals as objects and subjects of concern, and an apparently unquenched audience thirst for such representations – imply a strategic opportunity for animal advocates. At a time when journalistic discussions of human treatment of animals may be increasingly constrained in the United States by “agricultural-gag” laws and domestic terrorism statutes typifying non-violent acts of economic sabotage as crimes requiring the full force of the state to suppress,

engaging popular cultural representations of animals may be amongst the most attractive avenues for animal advocacy. Virilio (1989) observed that nation-states utilized cinematic representations to augment war efforts since the First World War, as the visual appealed to audiences in ways printed matter failed to. As actor Leslie Howard noted after leaving a successful film career in the United States in order to serve in the British war effort: “The first film that I want to make is a documentary of the British White Paper on the outbreak of war...You see, nobody abroad wants to read official documents now. They won’t buy your White Paper. But they will crowd into the cinemas to see an official documentary” (in Virilio, 1989:78-79). Without stretching the analogy too thinly, if audiences are crowding to see representations of animals in cinemas, animal advocates should seize this popular cultural opening.

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## **Rio**

Blue Sky Studios, Twentieth Century Fox, 96 min

### **Reviewed by Carol L. Glasser<sup>1</sup>**

*Rio*, a CGI animated film directed by Carlos Saldanha, highlights many issues of animal exploitation from a critical perspective. Domestication of wild animals, the politics of rescue and adoption versus pet-keeping, the illegal bird trade, and even meat-eating are dealt with critically in the movie. Overall, *Rio* presents positive examples of how humans should interact with and respect the autonomy of birds, though some problematic representations of the human-animal relationship do seep into the movie.

This movie centers around the journey of a bird named Blu. As a baby bird, bird dealers capture Blu in the jungle. En route to his final destination, where he presumably will be sold, he falls out of the truck. Linda, an adolescent human girl in Minnesota, finds him and raises him. As adults they happily live together in the bookstore Linda owns. One day an orniculturist, Tulio from Rio de Janeiro, shows up at the door and notifies them that Blu is one of only two living blue macaws in the world and that he must travel to Rio mate with the other living blue macaw, a female named Jewel.

Once Linda and Blu are in Rio, both Blu and Jewel are captured by a bird dealer. The remainder of the movie is about their adventure to escape, the main hurdle being that they are chained together at the leg and Blu cannot fly. As they and the other birds they meet along the way try to break their chain, they continue to be pursued by the bird dealers. Simultaneously, Linda is relentless in her search to find Blu.

The movie's basic plot line is clearly pro-animal and pro-bird. Bird dealers and the animals enlisted to help them are the villains. It was refreshing that this plot point received no explanation or justification, thereby normalizing the idea that birds are not ours to own, even though the capturing and selling of birds is a regular occurrence. Our human heroes are bird lovers. Linda rescued Blu and provided him a happy home in which he was given freedom of movement, and Tulio runs a bird rescue, rehabilitating injured birds.

Much of the conflict in the story deals with the issue of domestication and pet ownership. That the ethics of domestication and human-animal companionship are difficult and

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contentious and the lines between right and wrong are not always clear is reflected in this film. Linda rescues Blu as a baby bird. Their union is not one of ownership but of companionship, as Linda's is shown to have developed her lifestyle with Blu and his preferences in mind. Throughout the movie, when the two become separated they both remain dedicated and diligent about being reunited. Though the human character plays a maternal role to the non-human character, there is not a sense of ownership, providing a model of respectful human-animal bonds within a home.

At the same time that a positive companionship relationship is developed, a critique of domestication and the problems it can entail also comes through. Blu is crippled by his inability to fly. While his wings were not clipped—which is something humans often do to “pet” birds to prevent them from flying and, thereby, leaving—being raised by a human meant no one ever taught him to fly. His lack of ability to fly places him in danger when outside of the care of Linda. The other birds in the story confront and even ridicule Blu for his domestication. In the opening scenes two geese taunt him from outside his window for being an indoor bird. And when two well-meaning birds try to set Blu free from his cage while he is traveling with Linda he responds, “No guys, really I’m fine. The cage is great. Love the cage.” Multiple times Jewel calls Blu “pet” as a pejorative, to which his only defense is that he is not a “pet,” he is a “companion.” The difficulty negotiating the positive and negative aspects of the bond between human and companion animal are well played and highlighted from the perspective of humans and birds.

There are also many aspects of the movie that instill human supremacy over other species as unproblematic alongside more liberationist visions of birds. The fact that these two conflicting points of view exist harmoniously and do not disrupt the flow of the movie reflects our culture's inconsistent and nonsensical attitudes toward other animals. We are expected to hate the bird dealer but love the ornithologist, Tulio, even though both have trapped and caged Jewel. Further, the impetus for the original trip to Rio by Blu and Linda is to breed the blue macaws. The rights and freedoms of the individual birds, particularly those of Jewel who is captured and caged and resists the breeding, are not important. Linda and Tulio value the species over the individuals, a way of thinking that currently justifies myriad human atrocities against animals, including killing for “population control,” zoos, and aquariums to name a few.

The inconsistent ways that animals are treated is highlighted most brilliantly in a dinner scene. Tulio and Linda are out at dinner, talking about birds. As they discuss their favorite species of birds the waiters come out with food—all meat, all from birds. As Tulio discusses

his love for owls and Linda discusses macaws they gnaw on chicken, only to be interrupted by Tulio's phone ringing. He loves birds so much that his ring tone is a rooster.

The movie highlights that the chicken people eat is a bird in other ways as well. There is one bird, Nigel, who works with the smuggler. His villain status is solidified when we see him eating chicken. The human smugglers fear him and are disgusted by his "cannibalism." Nigel even makes a threat to another bird that he will "roisserie" him/her.

The most problematic aspect of the film comes at the end when both female characters are portrayed as finding their true happiness through the act of submission. Linda and Jewel begin the film as independent, competent, self-sufficient women. Linda owns her own bookstore and supports herself and Blu and throughout the film she navigates and directs much of the search for him. Jewel is consistently the one who figures out how to free herself and Blu when they get into various types of binds and remains focused on their freedom throughout. However, by the end, each submits to the male figure(s) in her life. Linda stays in Rio and works at the bird sanctuary and it is suggested that she also adopts the homeless child who originally bird-napped Blu and Jewel. Photographs displayed during the credits insinuate that she does reopen a bookstore, however it is in Portuguese, a language it is not clear she knows.

Jewel not only submits to Blu by offering to sacrifice her own life to be with him as he is certain to die in a plane crash because he cannot fly (they do get out of this jam, but the intention was there), she ends up coupling with Blu and also accepting the human as protector, a relationship she had fervently rejected throughout the movie. Toward the end of the film Jewel breaks her wing trying to save Blu's life. Just before the closing scene, the brave, fierce Jewel makes a scared, whimpering face and, when given the cue from Blu allows herself to go limp and be picked up by Tulio so he can care for her.

The ultimate happiness for these female characters comes in the form of a heterosexual union. For Linda it is not just through partnering, it is also through motherhood that she is completed. Her "big brave boy," Blu, grows up and learns to fly. In the closing scene she sets him free to fly with Jewel. Though it is assumed the relationship between Linda and Blu is not over since they both now live in Rio, she has clearly accepted his independence. She simultaneously gains a son—a final image of the movie is a still photograph of Linda, Tulio, and Fernando riding a bicycle built for three (with Tulio in the lead seat, of course). While heteromonogamy and motherhood are not problematic concepts in and of themselves, that this is the only way the movie found a happy ending for these women is problematic.

In all, however, the movie is wonderful for any age group and is highly recommended. Proactive viewers watching with children can use this movie as a fun segue into a number of important topics of humane education, particularly about pet ownership and the domestication of wildlife.

## **Kung Fu Panda 2 (2011)**

Dreamworks, 93 minutes

### **Reviewed by Steve Romanin<sup>1</sup>**

Although “Kung Fu Panda” reinforces some harmful attitudes about fatphobia, static and essentialized gender roles, cultural homogenization and species stigmatization, it does so while simultaneously offering challenges to these and other dominant ideologies. Entertaining and family-friendly, “Kung Fu Panda 2” is a good film and worth watching, although radical or critically-minded parents would do well to debrief with their children about some of the more negative representations offered.

Kung Fu Panda 2, the sequel to 2008’s computer-animated martial arts comedy, sees the majority of the cast reprising their roles as a band of kung fu protectors in the Valley of Peace in ancient China. Po, the titular panda, voiced by Jack Black, is an unlikely hero. Chosen as the celebrated “Dragon Warrior” by mistake in the first film, Po is now just as capable a fighter as the other protectors. Following some brief exposition, the band embarks on a quest to rid Gongmen City of the genocidal Lord Shen, a sinister peacock who has constructed a powerful weapon that he uses to threaten both the city and the future of kung fu. Kung Fu Panda 2 is a witty, funny, breathtaking movie that has some positive messages for both children and adults. At the same time, there are some areas of the movie that need to be addressed for a more complete picture of how the film both reinforces and challenges the status quo.

One of the running jokes of both the first and second films centers on the size and fitness of the protagonist. In a medium saturated with fatphobic images and story lines, Kung Fu Panda 2 still reproduces some of these attitudes. Po’s size, laziness and appetite is repeatedly used as a joke. He remarks frequently about his desires for food, and is often seen eating - sometimes shirking his training duties to do so. Indeed, one of the earliest scenes in the movie has Po breaking his own record for stuffing honey balls into his mouth during a training session. In addition, despite being as good a fighter as the other kung fu animals, Po is often represented as being out-of-shape. He struggles to keep up during the journey to Gongmen City, regards exercise as unpleasant and always tries to find the easiest way to accomplish his

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goals. Po uses his size and weight to fight - using his belly to ricochet blows and bounce opponents around between his teammates while sound effect emphasizing his squishy, bouncy shape. Other characters - especially villains - frequently make snide remarks regarding Po's size and fitness throughout the film. On the other hand, Po remains a skilled fighter and proves himself capable of both protecting innocent creatures and more or less single-handedly vanquishing evil-doers. In this sense, he arguably challenges fatphobic attitudes as his size barely impedes his abilities, and, in terms of his fighting style, actually becomes an asset. Po breaks down *some* stereotypes about large bodies, while sadly reinforcing others.

Representations of gender performances are also somewhat ambivalent in *Kung Fu Panda 2*. For the most part, characters fall into dominant gender performances of men or women with few, but notable exceptions. Many characters are stylistically animated to conform to their voice-actors' genders, given exaggerated eyelashes or make-up in the case of women and muscles and hard brows in the case of men. One notable exception is Tigress. Although voiced by Angelina Jolie, Tigress is physically androgynous, with no explicitly feminine facial features or dress. In addition, she is the most stoic and serious of all the kung fu animals. Wise, practiced, a leader and mentor to Po, Tigress is a strong female character and one of the strongest characters in the entire movie. Without being explicitly feminist, the character of Tigress offers viewers a strong female lead in a film otherwise bereft of one and in a medium saturated with overtly passive female characters. Likewise, Po's adoptive father, a goose named Mr. Ping, embodies an alternative to dominant performances of masculinity; he is a restaurateur who focuses on pleasing his customers and perfecting his food, he is sensitive and expressive and shows his vulnerability in times of despair. One of the highlights of the movie (and a considerable aspect of the storyline) is the relationship between Po and his adoptive father. A single father, Mr. Ping openly expresses his loving feelings for his son. He is gentle, understanding and takes every opportunity to tell his son how proud of him he is. While, for the most part, *Kung Fu Panda 2* reinforces hegemonic gender performances, the few exceptions to the rule truly stand out.

Being that this is a mainstream children's film set in ancient China, one might expect that a fairly homogenous and static representation of Chinese culture would be offered - and while that is the case for the majority of the settings, imagery, architecture and music, very few of the characters themselves embody cultural stereotypes. On the contrary, the mostly-Caucasian cast (made up of a Hollywood elite) play a cacophony of animal species, modeled on various kung fu styles (Tiger, Crane, Monkey, Mantis, Viper) that appear as enigmatic stand-ins for

different ethnic or racial categories. In contrast to the prevalence of animalized representations of non-White race categories, these species categorizations can not be directly mapped onto any existing race categories in the real world (there is no explicitly “Black” character anymore than an explicitly “Asian” character). Instead, the ambiguity of the animals’ (and hence the actors’) racial identities and the interplay, cooperation and communication between these vastly differing animal species promotes a message of multicultural understanding and unity. The multi-species band of heroes and their visually-impressive teamwork - one of the hallmarks of the film - showcases the importance of maintaining strong communities across racial and ethnic lines in the pursuit of social justice.

Relatedly, and in contrast to the myriad of different animal species that make up the heroes, the villains (or at least the villains’ goons) are almost all wolves. The animators draw on harmful ideas about wolves to make them appear especially villainous – they are seen snarling, snapping at each other and their enemies, and regarding all other animals – especially innocent and vulnerable townsfolk – as potential food. Their callousness seems to be driven by some innate desire to inflict harm and/or violence and attain pleasure thereby, not by any larger, more ambitious goals like those of the antagonist. They are pictured, therefore, as bloodthirsty killing machines, bent on destruction. This only serves to further an already deeply entrenched stigma about wolves, which are crucial keystone predators and vitally important ecological guardians. Instead of stressing this, however, *Kung Fu Panda 2* reinforces the dominant attitudes about wolves – an attitude that enables hunters and trappers to continue their “work”, unabated by the voices of conservationists or animal advocates.

*Kung Fu Panda 2* is a visually stunning, fast-paced and fun movie that has many laughs for both children and adults; it is a refreshingly satisfying children’s film, entertainingly suitable for all age groups. For animal advocates, the film is at its best when it is offering lessons about friendship, teamwork and alternative gender expressions and at its worst when it is stereotyping an entire species of already-misunderstood animals as murderous villains. Still, there is very little in the way of speciesist language or imagery throughout the movie - indeed, based on the dialog alone, Po’s father, Mr. Ping, appears to be running a vegan noodle shop, since the only food items he mentions in the film are vegetables and tofu. *Kung Fu Panda 2* does reinforce some dominant attitudes about gender performances, body shapes, cultural homogenization and species stigmatization - however, it does so while offering incisive challenges to these same ideologies and it is by no means the worst-offender in this medium nor even in this genre.



## **Puss in Boots (2011)**

DreamWorks Animation, 90 min

### **Reviewed by Matthew Cole<sup>1</sup> and Kate Stewart<sup>2</sup>**

*Puss in Boots*, a spin-off from the commercially successful series of *Shrek* films, ostensibly offers a celebratory affirmation of the positive regard that many humans hold for “domestic” cats in contemporary Western culture. For instance, it affectionately nods towards some of the ‘quirks’ of cat’s behaviour that no doubt delight many of the films’ audience, and presents a nonhuman character as a moral agent, capable of saving himself and others through the redemptive power of community, filial and fraternal loyalty. However, anything beyond a superficial interpretation of *Puss in Boots* suggests that it acts as a repository of some of the most important hegemonic themes in human-nonhuman animal relations in contemporary Western culture, themes which resolutely instrumentalize other animals and legitimate their exploitation. In this review, after summarizing the plot of *Puss in Boots*, we present an analysis of these hegemonic themes. These all constellate around the meta-theme of the distribution of characteristics of subjectivity and objectification among the film’s characters and thereby draw on familiar tropes in children’s films featuring nonhuman characters. *Puss in Boots* therefore contributes to the socialization of conformity to the norms of nonhuman animal exploitation.

The film opens with adult Puss fleeing a sexual conquest, pickpocketing as he leaves. He arrives at a bar otherwise full of humans, where we learn he has a bounty on his head, but is a ‘good’ criminal refusing to steal from either the church or orphans. He is enticed by information about magic beans, in the possession of villainous grotesques, Jack and Jill. In Puss’ attempts to steal the beans he encounters a masked cat, with whom he flees after the theft fails. In the bar they run to, they face off in contests of dancing and fencing, before the masked cat is revealed to be, in Puss’ words, “a woman”: another biped cat called Kitty Softpaws. We learn that Kitty is an associate of Puss’ old childhood friend Humpty Dumpty, and through flashback learn that Puss and Humpty grew up together at the same orphanage –

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the only non-humans, but both described there as ‘boys’. We see a young Humpty (a small egg who ‘ages’ into a large egg, but never hatches) obsessed with finding the magic beans, and with inventing flying machines. They embark on youthful delinquency, which matures into more serious criminality on Humpty’s part and results in the escapade in which Puss is wrongly accused and outcast from the village. Reunited in the present, the three main characters embark on a search for the beans, stealing them from Jack and Jill and successfully growing the magic beanstalk. With romance brewing between the cats, they and a jealous Humpty (now disguised as a golden egg, in a leather costume) climb the beanstalk and locate the Golden Goose and her golden eggs. Chased by what they assume to be the creature of lore protecting the castle, they flee with the goose and their bounty of eggs, apparently to return with them as heroes to their village. On the way, we see Puss knocked out and captured, and he wakes to discover he has been betrayed by a vengeful Humpty who intends also to destroy the village by enticing the goose’s gigantic mother (the previously unseen ‘creature’) with the eggs and Golden Goose as quarry, blaming the escapade on a now imprisoned Puss. With Kitty’s help, Puss escapes and foils the orchestrated attack. He reunites Mother Goose and her daughter, redeeming himself in the process. Humpty is also redeemed by sacrificing himself in order to save the geese. We see his broken body transformed into a solid gold egg, ascending into the clouds with the reunited geese. The epilogue shows Humpty, back in his familiar form, ‘living’ in the clouds with the giant goose. Exonerated and forgiven, Puss bids farewell to Kitty and the village, before being reunited with her at the end of the credits, when they finally kiss.

*Puss in Boots* then, tells a familiar story of the eponymous wronged ‘outsider’, betrayed by someone close to him, finding moral and material reward and redemption through rejection of juvenile delinquency, in favour of acquiescence to the values of adult society.<sup>3</sup> As he undertakes his moral journey, Puss’s redemption is paralleled by the damnation of his nemeses in the film, the “mean, greedy and ugly” (Paramount Pictures, 2011) human characters of Jack and Jill, and the fall and ultimate rise of his childhood friend, Humpty Dumpty. The simple theodicy message of the film is therefore that good people prosper and bad people suffer. A key component of that suffering is the extent to which characters remain ‘people’ or are relegated to ‘animal’ status.

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<sup>3</sup> We discuss these and other common themes in children’s stories in our paper on how childhood literary and film traditions contribute to a socialization process whereby children learn a conceptual distance from and between nonhuman animals (Stewart and Cole, 2009).

‘Bad’ humans who are punished are zoomorphized in *Puss in Boots*, while ‘good’ nonhuman animals are anthropomorphized. The way in which the good and the bad prosper and suffer is therefore determined by the respective characters’ shifting fortunes in a hierarchy of subjectification/objectification. That is, *Puss in Boots* hierarchically distributes the capacity to constitute the self-as-subject, to confer degrees of subjectivity on others, and relatedly, the capacity to objectify (instrumentalize) others. This fictive economy maps onto the real economy of subjectification/objectification that operates outside the cinema, and which determines and legitimates the fate of exploited nonhuman others.

The hierarchical economy in *Puss in Boots* has the moral code of society itself at its pinnacle, embodied in the norms of the village where Puss lives his early life. Those norms centre on the objectification of exploited others (nonhuman animals used for food and labour), village, familial and friendship loyalties and obedience to the law, especially laws of property: Puss’s juvenile delinquencies, in cahoots with his friend Humpty Dumpty, centre on acts of theft.<sup>4</sup> The village distributes its powers of subjectification/objectification to Puss when he expresses those same norms in his behaviour. This is symbolized in the film by a flashback sequence of a young Puss heroically saving the life of the mother of the village Comandante from a rampaging, escaped bull: community, familial and species hierarchies are preserved by Puss literally putting a nonhuman other in his place: as a subjugated prisoner. Typical of the position of subjugated nonhumans in children’s films,<sup>5</sup> the bull conspires in his own domination when he admiringly joins in a chorus of approval<sup>6</sup> for Puss, while lying, defeated, on his back.

Puss’s reward for this heroic act conflates the moral with the material: he is presented by his adoptive human mother, Imelda, with accoutrements that symbolize, and result from, the domination of others: a sword, a hat with a conspicuous feather and his boots, which are made of “the finest Corinthian leather.” Triumph over the bull is therefore celebrated by the presentation of boots made from bovine skin: injury to insult. This paraphernalia simultaneously anthropomorphizes Puss, partly clothes him in the body parts of exploited nonhuman others, and invests him with the capacity to constitute himself as a subject, in that his ‘character’ is distinguished by his use of these objects throughout the film. Puss, as the

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<sup>4</sup> Property law extends to other animals as property: Beanstalk Jack, a human character who Puss encounters when he’s wrongly imprisoned by the village guards, laments. “always know which cow is yours”, when recounting his crime of selling a cow that belonged to someone else in return for magic beans.

<sup>5</sup> For instance the ‘prey’ animals who bow down to *The Lion King* (see Stewart and Cole 2009:467).

<sup>6</sup> The bulls’ ‘animal’ voice is subtitled in the film, contrasting with Puss’s proficiency in human speech.

most 'human' character in the film (more so than the dehumanized humans Jack and Jill, of whom more below), wields the greatest power to grant subjectivity to other, lesser, characters and to objectify those who are instrumentalized. This is manifested in two main themes: Puss as a proxy human with the associated capacity to both grant subjectivity and to use nonhuman others and Puss as a cipher for heteronormative masculine sexuality. These two themes are staked out at the start of the film, when Puss recounts his various names, including "the Ginger-haired *Man*" and "Frisky Two Times".<sup>7</sup>

As the Ginger-haired Man, Puss's capacity to both grant and withhold subjectivity is evident throughout the film, for instance in his ability to instrumentalize other animals (such as when he rides a horse), or his capacity to interpellate others as subjects. A striking instance of the latter occurs when Puss returns the Golden Goose to her mother with the words "*she's* ok" at the end of the film. At this moment, the emphasis on Puss as protector of others is expressed through his gendering, and thereby recognition of the subjecthood of, the Golden Goose. This contrasts with the moment when the Golden Goose is taken from her home at the top of the beanstalk (which Puss does nothing to prevent). At that point, she is thoroughly instrumentalized as (stealable) property: "*it's* a gold pooper, we're taking *it*". This distinction subtly communicates to the audience the importance of denying subjecthood to facilitate the instrumentalization of others. But the Ginger-haired Man's powers of subjectification are most fully explored through his relationship with Humpty Dumpty. Humpty's ontological status is ambivalent throughout the film, summed up in this plaintive declaration: "I'm not a person, I'm not a bird; I'm not even a food. I don't know what I am". Puss replies, "You are my brother", thereby conferring subjectivity on Humpty purely through his relationship to Puss. At other points in the film, Puss's power to objectify Humpty is expressed through asserting that he *is* 'a food': "I smell... something breakfasty"; "I should scramble you with onions", or his threat to turn Humpty into an "egg salad sandwich".

Humpty's narrative in the story, and his desire for revenge on Puss, centres on his lack of belonging, his inability to find a position within the economy of subjectification/objectification. Humpty is portrayed as a keen inventor of flying machines in the film, implying a frustrated wish to 'hatch' into a bird. This aspect of the plot perhaps unwittingly opens up the possibility of critique of the film's general tendency to present eggs as abstractions from the reproductive process, but the latter abstraction is dominant

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<sup>7</sup> As well as "Puss in Boots", Puss also refers to himself as "Diablo Gato", enhancing his 'cool' 'outsider' status.

throughout *Puss in Boots*. Humpty first appears in the orphanage as a smaller egg, but only ‘grows up’ to be a bigger egg. Post-mortem, Humpty is transmogrified into a golden egg.<sup>8</sup> The Golden Goose’s eggs never hatch, aren’t incubated,<sup>9</sup> and when Puss returns the Golden Goose to her mother, her golden eggs aren’t returned as well – the ‘gold’ (objects) apparently remain the ‘property’ of the villagers. In these ways, the biological functions of eggs are obscured in the film and they are more easily objectified as ‘a food’ for the audience. Frequent references to Humpty as food work because the ‘subjectivity’ of Humpty as an egg, abstracted from the reproductive process, effaces the objectification of real (exploited) chickens.

As “Frisky Two Times”, and a self-described “lover of beautiful women”, Puss epitomizes cultural stereotypes of promiscuous, virile heteronormative masculinity. This is established in the implied one-night stand with a female cat at the start of the film, and reinforced throughout when Puss is depicted as both attracted, and irresistible to, *human* women. In all his flirtatious encounters, Puss is ‘in control’, but women ‘can’t help’ but be attracted to him. Interestingly, this transgression of the human/nonhuman sexual boundary is strictly gendered. Puss declares to Kitty: “you are a *woman*” (implying her sexual attractiveness), but Kitty is not depicted as attractive, or attracted, to human men (despite the anthropomorphic emphasis on her ‘sexy’ hip-swaying and exaggeratedly long eyelashes once she has been unmasked). Taken together, this implies a sexist/speciesist characterisation of human female sexuality as more ‘animalistic’ in contrast to the controlled masculine sexuality of Puss. It is through Puss’s relationship with Kitty that heteronormativity and sexualized gender identities are most consistently reinforced: In contrast to Puss’s promiscuity, Kitty remains ‘faithful’ and monogamous, only flirting with Puss. “Frisky Two Times” asserts his virile credentials to Kitty through familiar speciesist/sexist posturing, inviting her to think of him as “beefcake, stallion, tiger”. The traditional gender roles in *Puss in Boots* extend to Puss heroically saving Kitty’s life as they tumble from the beanstalk. Puss finally ‘claims’ Kitty as his sexual partner in the film’s epilogue, providing a ‘satisfying’ culmination of their flirtation throughout the film. Just as Humpty’s subjectivity depended on

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<sup>8</sup> Humpty’s epilogue appearance in an ‘egg heaven’ afterlife, together with the Golden Goose and her mother, dissolves even the potentially unsettling ‘death’ of ‘a food’ in a happily-ever-after fate.

<sup>9</sup> The Golden Goose, whose infantilized appearance as a gosling, in contrast to her obviously adult mother, suppresses potentially troubling associations of eggs with reproduction. She does sit on Humpty, but his perpetual fate as an egg that will never hatch keeps this behaviour comic, rather than tragic.

Puss's gift ("you are my brother"), so Kitty's sexual fulfilment only lies in relation to Puss's pursuit of her.

While Frisky Two Times is the heteronormative centre of *Puss in Boots*, some other instances are worth mention. The most notable is Humpty's 'joke' about rape when contemplating his potential imprisonment: "...you got any idea what they do to eggs in prison? Let me tell you this, it ain't over easy". Homophobia also runs through *Puss in Boots*, expressed in the way the film jokes around the theme of viewing male genitalia: Puss displays revulsion at the prospect of a human showing him the 'golden eggs' implicitly tattooed on his genitals; Puss and Kitty express comic distaste when Humpty undresses in front of them. Puss reacts with disgust to Beanstalk Jack, who is depicted as enjoying watching Puss lick himself. In this last example, a stereotypical 'dirty old man' has the distinction of being the only character to express non-heteronormative sexual desire in the film.<sup>10</sup> Finally, heteronormativity asserts itself through the hierarchy of attractiveness of its characters. Puss and Kitty are the beautiful people, while Humpty, the tattooed tavern customer, and the 'dirty old man' are grotesques.

The distinction of the beautiful and the grotesque also intersects with the class politics of *Puss in Boots*. Puss and Kitty are established as eloquent and refined through their physical attractiveness, 'well-spoken' accents and the stereotypical cleanliness of cats, alluded to in their 'well-groomed' appearance in the film. Puss's 'refinement' is specifically reinforced through his clothing – the 'dandy' feathered hat, and especially, his boots of "finest Corinthian leather". For the adult audience, in North America at least, this reference to "finest Corinthian leather" recalls the famous marketing slogan for Chrysler Cordoba cars used in the 1970s, voiced by Mexican actor Ricardo Montalbán. This reference, combined with the voicing of Puss by Antonio Banderas, most famous for his role as Zorro, articulates 'positive' stereotypes of both 'Latin' and feline temperaments: laid back, vain, promiscuously virile. In contrast Jack and Jill's status as 'bad' people is equated with physical unattractiveness, non-normative body shapes (conceptually linked to their description as "greedy", in contrast to Puss's moderate lapping of milk), non-middle class accents and their 'animalistic' association with pigs. The latter has a dual aspect: their literal harnessing of the 'demonic' (labour) power of the red-eyed boars who pull their wagon, and their implied affective relationship with their captive piglets. Cultural associations of pigs with 'dirt' therefore taint Jack and Jill

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<sup>10</sup> That is, setting aside the peculiar transgression of the sexual species boundary of Puss's flirtation with human women.

as ‘dirty’ characters, and their ‘animalism’ is compounded by Jill grunting/growling at Puss when gagged after her capture. Beanstalk Jack’s inept handling of the magic beans is similarly linked to an ageist and ableist characterisation of a sleepy, feeble and senile old man, whose forgetfulness is contrasted with Puss’s youthful and vigorous impatience to act on the basis of the story that Jack recounts.

The final, and arguably most important theme of *Puss in Boots*, is the cultural reproduction of instrumentalized nonhumans as exploitable objects. The superabundance of Puss’s names, noted above, stands in marked contrast to the namelessness of most of the nonhumans in the film (naming and the withholding of names is elemental to the economy of subjectification/objectification). Resonating again with *The Lion King*, nonhumans who are objectified to different degrees outside the cinema, do not have names, can’t use human language, and aren’t clothed – all key markers of Puss’s subjectivity. Examples include the rampaging bull mentioned earlier; the team of boars (depicted with demonic red eyes) who pull Jack and Jill’s wagon; a group of piglets captive inside the same wagon; a group of chickens who scatter in fear and confusion during the climactic action sequence of the film; horses, used to pull the heroes’ cart and ridden by Puss in the final shot of the film; a lamb (as in “Mary had a little...”) who appears in flashbacks to the orphanage where Puss grows up;<sup>11</sup> the Golden Goose and her mother; a cow appearing in the (G)litter Club<sup>12</sup> who has her bell rung by a musician in the cat band which accompanies Puss and Kitty’s ‘dance fight’. These examples refuse subjectivity to animals who are functional, that is who are instrumentalized, in *Puss in Boots*. Even those animals who are not explicitly (e.g. horses, boars, bull and cow) or implicitly (e.g. chickens, piglets) exploited in the film perform symbolic functions for the viewing audience, for instance the permanently infant lamb acting as a ‘cute’ repository for the self-congratulatory capacity to ‘care’ for lesser (because dependent) nonhumans. The latter discourse of humans ‘protecting’ vulnerable nonhuman others echoes justifications for nonhuman exploitation that are deployed as justifications for factory farms as much as they are in the “happy meat” phenomenon.

While a more positive message of humans giving sanctuary to abandoned nonhumans can be found in the depiction of Imelda’s ‘orphanage’ in *Puss in Boots*, the film reinscribes nonhuman dependence on humans, even in the case of its more ‘independent’

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<sup>11</sup> The lamb is permanently infantilised in the film, appearing again being comforted by Imelda at the end of the film.

<sup>12</sup> This cow is also objectified as the cats’ milk equivalent of a beer tap in the (G)litter Club.

characters: When Puss recounts his early life to Kitty, he describes being blown into the village in a basket and being “a kitten with no milk, no mama” before being saved by Imelda. His wish to make his human ‘mother’ proud is a central motivation for Puss’s moral direction. In a rare critical (of ‘real’ human-nonhuman animal relations) moment in the film, Kitty recalls that “a nice couple took me in”, but when explaining why she was de-clawed (hence the ‘Softpaws’ element of her name), she speculates that this was a result of “playing too rough with the hamster” or damaging the ‘nice couple’s’ curtains.<sup>13</sup> Kitty wistfully reflects, “cat people are crazy”.<sup>14</sup> Puss and Kitty then are contrasted by their respective experiences with ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ ‘pet owners’, but the fundamental status of cats as ‘pets’ is stabilized in these shared experiences. In this context, it is also important to note a hierarchy of subjectivity among the cats in *Puss in Boots*. Apart from Puss and Kitty, cats also appear as unvoiced and unclothed, are quadrupedal, and drink milk from bowls, contrasted with Puss drinking from a glass. But, they are granted a *partial* subjectivity through their performances as musicians and dancers in the film, or as sexual beings in the case of Puss’s partner in a one-night stand. That partial subjectivity mirrors the status of cats as ‘pets’, protected from the worst effects of instrumentalization but still subject to extensive human control, for instance of their movements, diet and reproductive process, and still instrumentalized for their capacity to amuse and entertain. Puss himself, when stripped of clothing after his imprisonment, reverts to cat-like behaviour (e.g. licking himself) and uses feline wiles to attempt escape (fixing the gaoler with wide, big-pupilled eyes to attempt to persuade him to let him go), and is shown as easily distracted (and thereby has his ‘human’ subjectivity temporarily suspended) by a moving light, shone by Kitty after the dance fight.<sup>15</sup> Puss and Kitty playfully provoke each other in the dance fight by using desubjectifying ‘catlike’ moves. These break the anthropomorphic spell, exemplified by their bipedal gait, human speech, and clothing, that they depend on for their status as ‘subjects’ in the film.

*Puss in Boots* then, grants different levels of subjectivity to its characters corresponding to their symbolic and material uses of humans outside the cinema (i.e. as ‘cared for’, but entertaining, animal companions, or as ‘food’). At the same time, it invisibilizes the violent reality of the material exploitation of nonhumans (with the exception

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<sup>13</sup> Kitty’s ‘Softpaws’ status also provides a heteronormatively gendered counterpoint to Puss’s wielding of his razor sharp claws, which he *brandishes*, but never *uses*, except to comically un-trouser hapless human characters.

<sup>14</sup> This phrase casually articulates an ‘excessive’ fondness for cats with a pejorative stereotype of mental illness.

<sup>15</sup> This scene is recalled at the end of the film, when the massed cats of the (G)Litter Club ‘dance’ in unison to the distraction of moving lights.



of Kitty's de-clawing story, which is only permitted because cats are *not* exploited for human food). As the characters that the audience are invited to identify with, Puss and Kitty's carnivory is suppressed in the film. The human audience therefore never have to confront the violent truth of their own complicity with the objectification of 'food' animals. These cats never kill, and subsist only on milk. That milk is implicitly cow's milk (which, *of course*, is not problematized in relation to the separation of cows and calves, the killing of infant male calves, the 'veal' industry, etc.), indicated by the presence of the cow with a bell in the (G)litter club (we are presumably to infer that the cats milk 'their' cow!), Puss's ordering of a 'leche' in the tavern at the start of the film, and his virile declaration that he only drinks "whole milk" at the film's climax.<sup>16</sup> There are only two, weak, allusions to cats as killers/carnivores. The first is in the form of a fish's skeleton used as a musical instrument in the (G)litter Club (which could be imagined as having been scavenged from human refuse). The second is a bird brought as a 'gift' by Puss to his 'mama' Imelda at the end of the film. But, crucially, the bird is only playing dead - she/he opens her/his eyes to camera to reassure the audience that Puss doesn't really kill.

While Puss (and the other cats) normalize other-species' milk drinking for the human audience, another incident reinforces the 'food' status of the voiceless piglets: When discovered attempting to steal the magic beans from Jack and Jill's wagon, Kitty distracts their human antagonists by throwing a piglet at them and shouting "sausage bomb!" This joke only works because the piglets are already objectified, and never granted subjectivity, in *Puss in Boots*. By way of contrast, Babe, a human voiced pig *subject* in the film of the same name, is taunted by Duchess the cat with the 'food' status of pigs: "Pork, they call it - or bacon. They only call them pigs when they're alive [...] Believe me, sooner or later, every pig gets eaten. That's the way the world works. Oh, I haven't upset you, have I?" This disturbs the audience's positioning of pigs as 'food' as it invites empathy with Babe's fear of this violent potential fate, but only because Babe has been constructed as a subject in the film.<sup>17</sup>

Like many children's films featuring nonhuman animal characters, *Puss in Boots* has been promoted through a tie-in with McDonalds. The accompanying television advertisement is telling. It opens with children in a village square, recalling that of the film, being invited by Puss to follow him up the beanstalk that emerges from a 'happy meal' (*sic*) box. At the top of

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<sup>16</sup> Here *Puss in Boots* also recalls *The Lion King*, in which the central lion characters are never shown killing, or consuming, other animals. For more on this, see Stewart and Cole (2009).

<sup>17</sup> The subversion, albeit limited, of *Babe* in relation to norms of nonhuman animal exploitation is also explored in Stewart and Cole, 2009.

the beanstalk, Puss and the children find themselves in a McDonalds restaurant, where the 'happy meal' box is shown to contain a 'milk jug', 'chicken nuggets' and 'apple dippers'. This particular construction of a meal of course resonates with *Puss in Boots* and the film has provided nothing to trouble the child's consumption of these specific products of exploitation: The emphasis on cow's milk drinking invites peer recognition between the child targets of the advertisement and Puss himself ('apple dippers' are accompanied with a 'caramel' dip that contains, alongside the ubiquitous corn syrup and sundry additives, 'sweetened condensed milk' and 'cream'), while, as noted above, chickens only appear in the film as startled (and implicitly unintelligent) non-characters. The focus of the child consumer's affective sentiment for nonhuman animals is drawn towards Puss and the other characters from the film, represented in the meal as plastic toys, and therefore away from the real nonhumans objectified to 'provide' the 'happy meal' (*sic*). It is worth noting that for some of the 3-D screenings of *Puss in Boots*, children are provided with glasses shaped like cats eyes, lest there be any confusion about who they are intended to identify with in the film.

From a vegan perspective, the advertisement and film are a tragically missed opportunity to promote plant-based food - we might imagine a vegan restaurant at the top of the beanstalk, naturally selling bean burgers, not least as a 'tie-in' with the orphanages' residents having been depicted as largely subsisting on beans in the film (though beans are thereby stigmatized by association with material deprivation, a familiar trope that devalues plant foods). Furthermore, we might indulge ourselves with an image of Ronald McDonald as the terrible giant of the Jack and the beanstalk story, and McDonalds restaurants, with their egregious, obfuscatory, ideology of human-nonhuman animal relationships, as the epitome of castles that float in the sky. More seriously, *Puss in Boots* exemplifies the cultural reproduction of speciesist norms that legitimate the exploitation of nonhuman others, intersected with heteronormative, sexist and classist stereotypes. Challenging the socialisation of children into those norms through 'innocent' vehicles like *Puss in Boots* therefore remains an urgent task for critical animal studies.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> The urgency, but difficulty, of this task is evidenced from the commercial success of films like *Puss in Boots*, which reportedly has taken \$331,169,740 at the box office worldwide, as at 20 December 2011 (Box Office Mojo, 2011).

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## **Rango (2011)**

Nickelodeon, Blink Wink, GK Films, 107 minutes

## **Reviewed by Ralph Acampora<sup>1</sup>**

### **Reptile on the Range: The Western as Absurdist Animation**

*Rango* (2011, G. Verbinski dir.) is one of those children's movies that can keep grown-ups amused and stimulated. Ostensibly about a wayward lizard who must rediscover himself in the proverbial wild West upon accidental separation from his pet-life of cozy domesticity, the film is also framed within a larger narrative that turns out to be an environmental(ist) parable about the ravages of Vegas-style development on the biotic communities of desert regions. The eco-lesson doesn't over-reach into pedantry and indeed there is enough action to keep eight- or nine-year-olds happy, but because there is so much (and at times relatively sophisticated) dialogue the optimal target audience I would estimate is the 'tween-crowd (ages, say, ten to twelve). This is definitely not a flick for toddlers or wee ones, and pubescent teenagers would probably prefer something like the *Twilight* series.

In terms of animal content, the cast of characters is wide and deep. Aside from the aforementioned lizard anti-hero, there is an armadillo seer or vision-guide: we first see him as resurrected roadkill, and perhaps his role reflects the unfortunate instinct of actual armadillos to pop upwards upon panic—which results in being mowed down by traffic (just as the trances of a shaman's extraordinary epiphanies may expose him to being run down or over by the oblivious swoosh of common sense and customary routines). Another species is represented by guitar-playing owls in a continual chorus-role, which comments upon critical moments of plot-development. In the main town-setting of the movie, there cohabitates a mixed community of birds, rodents, cats, etc. Stereotyped by dumb, brute strength, the local smithy is played by a boar. The two-faced, conniving mayor is cast as a tortoise who seems slow and plodding at first but shapes up to be a clever survivor and sharp, ultimately sinister figure. The last specimens I will cite are the gophers and their mole-leader: together they appear as prospectors who tunnel their way to the thieving of treasures more valuable than

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money itself (i.e. the scarce commodity of water, kept instead of cash at the town's bank in the highest-security vault available).

The formal portrayal of animals in *Rango* may be likened to an animated version of Jean Grandville's nineteenth-century drawings of personified creatures and zoomorphed humans. Just as interpretations of Grandville have differed as to whether the artist was producing metaphorical caricatures or rather showcasing a literal continuity of human and other animals, so it is possible semiotically to watch this movie as populated by allegorical similes (e.g. the wise owls in the chorus) or by hybrid figures (e.g. the armadillo cast as spiritual guide). On the former and anthropocentric register, the animals are "good to think with" precisely by seeing *through* them to their depiction and implicit critique of human folly; with the latter and post-humanist hermeneutic operative, they can be seen rather to act as cross-species exemplars of transformative ontology and interrogators of morality. Trying out both these approaches, I found that the second made for a more engaging experience of the story and its characters.

Because of the setting (desert landscape), because of the actor doing the protagonist's voice (Johnny Depp), and because of the story's vibe of anomie, the movie looks, sounds, and feels somewhat like the gonzo narrative and film associated with Hunter Thompson's *Fear and Loathing*. Though your children will likely settle into a wisecracking action-type 'toon and miss most of the adult-oriented verbal/aural and cinematic allusions (my favorite: an attack of airborne gophers set to Wagner's *Die Valkyre*, reminiscent of a Vietnam battle scene from *Apocalypse Now*, itself an ironic echo of the bathetic use of Wagner's music in the Looney Tunes parody of opera featuring Bugs Bunny and Elmer Fudd), you will appreciate the many satiric subtexts (not unlike *The Simpsons* series in this respect) and the general feel of *Bildungsroman* gone western and multi-species (think young Werther and Clint Eastwood meet Ed Abbey to reinvent heroism and animality). Moreover, the cinematography is excellent and should be nominated for awards this year. Thus—from the several angles of animal studies, juvenile entertainment, and stimulation of elders—*Rango* is well worth the time and money required to screen it yourself (now available on DVD, if you missed theatrical releases).

## **Bold Native (2010)**

Open Road Films, 104min

### **Reviewed by Adam Weitzenfeld<sup>1</sup>**

*Bold Native* is a 2010 release by Open Road Films about a fictional group of animal liberationists and much more. Writer and director Denis Henry Hannelly ambitiously creates not only a moving story about an eccentric team of radical animal rights activists, but also the diverse human beings who make up the animal rights movement and the difficult moral dialogue they engage in with their adversaries, allies, and even themselves. Hannelly has created arguably the most engaging introduction to the animal rights movement thus far. *Bold Native*'s bold and pioneering storytelling makes it unlike any other animal rights film due to its character-driven narrative that blends fiction with real activists and investigative footage. In addition, it is comprehensive and systemic in focus: *Bold Native* includes a critique of the commodification of animals as property, coverage of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act [AETA], and the alignment of animal rights with anti-oppression movements, all without ever becoming dry and overbearing. In the end, the film presents a strong, yet inviting normative critique of contemporary human-nonhuman animal relations that draws its audience closer to a critical animal studies perspective than most previously released animal advocacy films.

The plot begins when Charlie (Joaquin Pastor) joins an ALF raid on a laboratory instead of going to a job interview arranged by his father Richard Cranehill (Randolph Mantooth), a corporate executive of a fast food chain. Three years later, when two FBI agents inform Richard that his son is a suspected arsonist and terrorist, Richard makes the decision to find Charlie and protect him by bringing to an end his unlawful animal rights ways. Meanwhile, Charlie and his best friend Sonja (Sheila Vand) are coordinating the first mass-organized animal liberation event around the country to capture the national media's attention. In addition to the two focal tensions—the troubled aspirations of Charlie and Richard—, there is another: the threat of force when dialogue fails. The worse the exploitation of animals becomes and the more futile welfare reform seems to be at addressing animals' needs, the more frustrated and impatient some members of *Bold Native* become. Charlie must confront

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Riley (Kristine Louise), his former lover, who now is taking justice into her own hands through the spirit of revenge and violence under the alias Riley calls Feral Child,

Hennelley brings together diverse genres and moods which sustain the audience's interest in the characters and plot as well as the subject matter by preventing the film from becoming too difficult to bear without ever making light of other animals' suffering. The narrative in *Bold Native* moves from engaging and informative dialogues on AETA and animal welfare reform to a fun montage of the protagonists journeying across the country to assemble their team. Not soon after, the plot turns dark in a chilling flashback to the past. Fast-forward, and the film's heroes arrive at an Edenic intentional community that is disrupted by a heart-tugging turn of events. The film's final scene is an unexpected dialogue, yet it is fitting, and after watching it several times, it's difficult to imagine *Bold Native* ending any better way. When the credits begin to roll, one is left *not* with a feeling of futility and despair, but of empowerment and personal agency.

In spite of the excellent performances by the leading actors, the storytelling of the film can be disorienting if its viewers are not attentive and intelligent. Throughout the film are flashback sequences to previous events in Charlie's life interjected between scenes of Richard's pursuit after his son. The immediate cuts from the past of one character to the present of another may require conscious effort on the audience's part to seam together the patches. Another, more troublesome fault in the film is the occasional shaky plausibility of characters' motivations and actions. For instance, in one scene, Karl (Matt Shea), a character that profited handsomely from his advertising campaign for a fast food company, decides to join Charlie on his quest to liberate animals after Charlie had just broken into his home and blackmailed him. In another scene, Charlie and company run into an unexpected someone who might threaten their years of organizing, yet they react juvenily for people who have so much at stake in the next 24 hours. Fortunately, the disorientation and implausibility can be overcome fairly easily in order to enjoy the film and all its strengths.

One such strength of the film, and also something that makes it unique, is its use of and affirmation of dialogue. The abundance of dialogue between characters in *Bold Native*, in contrast to the monopoly of the monologue in many documentaries, more easily exposes the absurdity of speciesist reasoning and rhetoric in support of animal exploitation. In one instance, Riley justifies violence against the owners of the means of production of slaughter and exploitation, reversing the master's logic ("it's just a dumb animal. I guess he could be feeling emotions like ours or it could just be instinctual reactions. Take away language and all we can do is guess"). Likewise, she excuses her own actions through appropriating the

rhetoric of the American government (“It’s not torture, it’s an enhanced interrogation technique”). In another scene, a character calls out Richard’s hypocrisy (“You’ve got no problem buying animals bodies from people who claim to own them, don’t tell me you’re too weak to kill one yourself”), tests his logical consistency (“What’s one little dog’s life compared to the safety of your own son”), and mocks cliché justifications for killing animals (“If it makes you feel better, you can eat the dog after you kill it!”).

As different as both scenes are, they are similar in their juvenile replication of irresponsible thinking that seeks to achieve social change less through conversation than through coercion and force. This moral is echoed throughout *Bold Native*’s 104 minute duration by several of the characters. Charlie, in response to the claim that “violence is not going to get you anywhere”, says he agrees—although, he considers the destruction of property a non-violent act. Nicole (Ursula Whittaker), a previous member of Bold Native, instructs Richard that “[y]ou’re not going to get what you want by force,” and also Charlie that “the only real way of winning this thing” is “to talk to the other side.” Sonja, in response to the sadistic actions of Feral Child, most beautifully articulates how Bold Native as an ethics is different: “They build the cages, we crack them open. If we start building the cages, our hearts will die.”

It is then perhaps surprising how *Bold Native* presents a quasi-ambivalent picture of animal welfare reform through its character Jane (Jessica Hagan), an abolitionist in theory and pragmatist in action. Despite being mocked by Jack Sanders—an allusion to Colonel Sanders of KFC—, during an executive board meeting, the corporation surprisingly accepts her proposal. At a dinner celebration in honor of her success, however, she is accused of having accomplished nothing but appeasing consumers’ guilt and is commanded *to do* something. “We have to talk about it now,” replies Jane: “There is a majority of people who feel it is their right to eat meat and we *have to* talk to them.” Her skeptic responds, “I think the only moral choice is to take the choice away.” This reasoning is juxtaposed in the following scene to the violent actions of Feral Child, those that Riley justifies as “forcing empathy upon someone who refuses to experience it.” Forcing compassion is, as Jane explains, not possible. What is required is the transformation of material conditions between living beings. Yet the question remains whether policy change has primacy over or equal efficacy as consciousness raising and illegal direct action. Are people at some point “going to start asking why [animal liberationists] are willing to risk everything for these animals,” as Charlie claims?



One position comes to precedence after someone confronts Jane about her moral integrity: “How is it that you can sit there with your politeness and your grace and basically ask people for nothing? How do you do it? How do you beg for little scraps of humanity?... I don’t know if any of what you do makes sense.” Jane is left speechless until firmly asked to authentically express her ultimate desire. While the film portrays animal welfare reform as “succeeding,” albeit slowly and modestly, it also portrays it as disingenuous and accomplishing “nothing.” It is easy to imagine many people walking away from the film feeling pessimistic about reform and thinking that anything less than direct animal liberation is morally insufficient to authentically hold an animal rights position. Indeed, the ethos that Hennessey gives to *Bold Native* at the conclusion of the film teeters on romanticization. Still, the audience is left with an open question after completing the film, and this may be seen as either the film’s strength or weakness depending upon one’s perspective. On the one hand, audiences may feel frustrated or off-the-hook by not being told what to do and think. On the other hand, they may feel responsible and empowered to choose and think for themselves, to be encouraged to speak with their own voice.

Another unique strength of *Bold Native* is that it is a character-driven and fictional film about animal liberation. This is the difference that makes a difference. *Bold Native*’s pathos is drawn not exclusively from the mass suffering of nameless animals, but the connection the audience makes with the characters in the film. Characters like Karl, Sonja, and the loveable I Rock (Tonya Kay) keep the film energized and fun—two adjectives that don’t accompany many animal rights films—but also make the film “human” in the sense that its audiences can relate to the people who may remind them of themselves, their friends and family. It’s these relationships amongst characters in the film and the characters and the audience that provide inspiration for transformation beyond the logos of the bare facts and violence of the animal industrial complex.

At the same time the familiarity draws people closer to the ideals in the film, the fictional and fantastical distance of *Bold Native* may provide the audience greater comfort associating with the illegal and sometimes destructive actions of the characters in the film. With the exception of a couple scenes, including the one of Feral Child, the angst and anger that is present among many animal liberationists, as is amongst many people in general, is subdued. Hennessey seems to have made a concerted effort to represent the members of *Bold Native* as “free” spirits, another kind of “feral children” who have been freed from the domination of hegemonic cultural norms, but who do so not through revenge, but love. The answer to Charlie’s question at the beginning of the film—“If you deny freedom to the quiet

ones, those that have no voice, can you be free yourself, or are you caged by your own lack of compassion?”—is a resounding NO! “Our hearts will die” if we begin to cage people institutionally, culturally, and socially. There seems to also be a conscious effort to pay some tribute to the diversity—racial, geographic, spiritual, cultural, etc.—of those involved in animal activism. The film even occasionally brings attention to other social movements, albeit merely through association, such as women’s suffrage, LGBT marriage equality, and anti-capitalism. The suggestion, one that could have been cultivated much more substantially, is that no one is free until all are free.

Unfortunately, the representation of gender in the film is traditional. The plot is driven by the father-son relationship of affluent white males, and female characters play important but secondary roles as supporting the males, whether it be I Rock driving Richard or Sonja’s companionship with Charlie. Further, Richard, Karl, and Charlie undergo significant transformation and are given at least some background stories, while Sonja, Nicole, and I Rock are neither given much history nor become different people by the end of the film. Riley and Jane do undergo transformation, but have comparatively smaller back-stories and presences than the male leads. While watching the film with others, some expressed doubt over the necessity of female (and male) nudity and concern about the sexualization of Riley. At one point, Riley seduces Charlie into a lovemaking session, and the former couple is positioned for several frames like Adam and Eve—Riley, who like Eve, introduces the (second) temptation to transgress the code of *Bold Native*’s commitment to non-violence. While these are not issues a mainstream audience may be concerned with, they may alienate more radical viewers.

Finally, the charming strength of blending of fiction and reality in *Bold Native* is as much a potential danger. Hannelley throws audiences familiar with the animal protection movements some treats, such as cameos by animal rights lawyers like Shannon Keith, animal liberationist Peter Young, Chris DeRose of Last Chance for Animals, John Feldman of Goldfinger, and even what might be a reference to Derrida’s cat in *The Animal that Therefore I Am* when Richard is caught by the cat’s gaze while showering. Popular animal rights literature and films (e.g. *Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?*, *Diet for a New America*, *Earthlings*, *Slaughterhouse*, *Making a Killing*) also make it into a couple scenes as a tribute, plot point, and advocacy for the viewers to inform themselves about the world they participate in. The frenetic camera further adds a documentary feel to the film that makes what happens seem all the more real. This is even truer when it is occasionally complemented by actual investigative footage of animal farms and laboratories. However, it is exactly this

“feeling” that might facilitate audience members to confuse representation with reality. Audiences may leave *Bold Native* thinking that something like Feral Child actually exists in the United States—even though it does not—and, on the contrary to the intention of the filmmakers, walk away less sympathetic and trusting of animal liberationists. On the other hand, some viewers may naively use the film as a pedagogical text on becoming an animal liberationist, incognizant of the long, laborious planning and scouting involved before an action.

Fortunately, for those who are new to the concepts of animal liberation, sanctuaries, factory farms, and veganism, all the DVD’s extras serve as valuable appendices to what was not addressed directly or at length in the film. The *Bold Native* DVD comes with filmmaker’s commentary, deleted and extended scenes, Mercy for Animal’s *Farm to Fridge* farmed animal documentary, a feature on a couple rescued animals who appear in the film, and interviews with vegan celebrities. Noticeably absent are subtitles—an unfortunate omission for the hearing-impaired and non-native English speakers. Potential viewers, however, should not be deterred by the film’s shortcomings. *Bold Native* is an excellent film for viewing and discussions. It will be unsurprising if, in a decade from now, it will have become a cult classic among the more radical members of the animal rights movements. Indeed, it has already won the ICAS’s Critical Animal Studies Media of the Year award in 2011.

## BOOK REVIEW ESSAY

### **Accounting for the Women of the Animal Rights Movement/**

**Emily Gaarder (2011) *Women and the Animal Rights Movement*. Rutgers University Press: London.**

### **Reviewed by Jessica Gröling<sup>1</sup>**

Emily Gaarder's activism began with feminism, and although it didn't take her long to make the conceptual connections between the oppression of women and of animals, she recalls spending a while feeling unable to push beyond her comfort zone and make the necessary changes to her diet and lifestyle. Gaarder describes four events that occurred in the run-up to her making these changes: she visited a zoo, reread interviews she had conducted with incarcerated girls, finished Carol Adams' *The Sexual Politics of Meat* (1990), and stood at the kitchen sink and decided to stop eating animals. My own activism began with animal rights, but during the time I was reading *Women and the Animal Rights Movement* a series of events occurred that reinforced for me just how important it is to acknowledge the intersectionality between the oppression of women and animals, as well as the ways in which projects for women and animal liberation can and must be linked.

First, I heard about *Casa Diablo's Gentleman's Club* in Portland, Oregon, the world's first vegan strip club that, according to its owner Johnny Diablo, "put[s] the meat on the pole, not the plate" (Simcha, 2008). Then PETA upped the ante on their existing campaigns that use sex and nudity to sell the animal rights message by announcing that a vegan porn site, *peta.xxx*, would be launched in late 2011 (Vergakis, 2011). That same day I recall being moved to tears by a picture of a sow incarcerated in a gestation crate: the stripping of a mother's very essence as we take control of her reproductive capacity. This led me to wonder about the humans involved in the factory-farming industry and research showing correlations between animal cruelty and domestic violence. News that came the next day of a local

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hunter appearing in court accused of raping a woman seemed to follow the pattern (Mid Devon Gazette, 2011). Sadly, it has to be said that the animal rights movement itself does not appear to be immune to sexual violence, but such incidents are sometimes covered up, by women as well as men, in the supposed interests of the movement. At the most recent UK Animal Rights Gathering tensions mounted over the unwillingness of many to address issues such as racism and sexism in and through their animal rights activism because these issues were seen as distractions from the animal cause. These and other issues are interesting to analyze, as Gaarder does in this book, in light of the fact that, while women are in the majority in the animal rights movement, men disproportionately hold leadership positions and animal rights rhetoric and tactics frequently downplay the feminine or emotional in favor of the universalistic and the rational.

Gaarder sets out to examine the relationship between gender and animal rights activism and show how women in the movement use or reject cultural ideas about sex and gender through accounts of their own involvement and of women's majority status in the movement. In a series of biographical snapshots of women animal rights activists, Gaarder traces their specific paths into the movement and gives voice to their beliefs and experiences. Twenty-seven interviews were conducted between 2002 and 2004 with women of varying ages who self-described as animal rights activists, most of whom were white but not all of whom were vegan or even vegetarian. Gaarder examines how the politics of gender affects tactics and the division of labor in the movement as well as perceptions of activists and the movement as a whole, inevitably touching upon some of PETA's controversial campaigns. Through this, her analysis builds on and adds to other detailed examinations of the gender dynamics of the movement.

While focusing on women's 'accounts' Gaarder warns that the retrospective narratives they offer for why they became activists, and their macro-level explanations for why women make up the majority of the rank-and-file activists in the movement, do not provide a 'tidy truth' for either. Rather, they demonstrate women's use of popular biological and social discourses concerning sex and gender to make sense of their agency and the absence of men in the movement. In other words, in formulating these accounts, and prompted by Gaarder to think specifically about the relevance of gender, the women she interviewed were involved in a form of theory-making that exposes the power not just of personal experience but also of cultural discourse in shaping interpretations.

## **The gendered division of labor and disavowal of emotion within the animal rights movement**

The majority of Gaarder's interviewees report a gendered division of labor and leadership in the animal rights movement. Women's preponderance among animal rights advocates has already been repeatedly noted by others (Galvin and Herzog, 1998; Jamison and Lunch, 1992; Jasper and Poulsen, 1995; Plous, 1991, 1998; Richards and Krannich, 1991), with some estimating that women constitute 68–80% of the movement's members (Jasper and Poulsen, 1995; Lowe and Ginsberg, 2002). Many of Gaarder's interviewees felt that men predominantly hold leadership positions and are seen as adding legitimacy to the movement, especially in national or institutionalized organizations or advocacy groups. Men also constitute an overwhelming majority of the movement's noted philosophers and intellectuals. The result, as several women in this study noted, is that 'feminized' welfare and animal care work is often devalued, whereas there is a tendency "to endorse the more heroic attitudes toward animal advocacy, and the acts of daring" ('Marti' in Gaarder 2011:97). This, as Carol Adams (2011) argues, may lead to a portrayal of animal liberation as a war, a struggle that sanctions any means necessary in pursuit of its goals. The emphasis placed on objective, rational and scientific frameworks of rights and justice called for by many within the movement, including Peter Singer and Tom Regan, who are often described as the 'fathers of animal rights', is accompanied by a patriarchal disavowal of emotion and sentimentality. Animal advocates must, according to Singer and Regan, make an effort not to give the impression that they are in favor of animal rights or animal liberation because they 'love' animals. This plea, Gaarder notes, precludes appeals to what actually led many activists to the cause in the first place: an emotional attachment to animals or an empathic response to their suffering. Gaarder demonstrates that the bifurcation of the human into either rational or emotional and the preference for a justice-based over a care-based approach are reflected in the gender politics of the movement, no doubt influenced to a great extent by societal expectations and the frequent stereotyping of animal advocates as emotional or irrational.

Gaarder takes this opportunity to very briefly explore an alternative relational ethic of care that recognizes the importance of personal and emotional experience in moral decision-making and acknowledges that caring, rather than rationalism, abstract principles, and rules, is often a major motivator. An ethic of care, several ecofeminists argue, has the potential to

validate the real motivations of many activists and draw attention to the gendered nature of caring. It would have been nice at this point to have seen Gaarder address some of the main objections to the idea of emotion as a source of moral knowledge in ethical decision-making, for instance those that argue that a care-based approach founded on partiality and personal relationships can sanction certain forms of prejudice (see for example Cochrane 2010).

### **Accounting for women's majority status in the movement**

Although it has been well-documented that women are more likely than men to express concern about the mistreatment of animals (Driscoll, 1992; Gallup and Beckstead, 1988; Herzog, Betchart and Pittman, 1991; Galvin and Herzog, 1992) and that there are gender differences in human-animal interactions, with men being more likely than women to go hunting, for example (Herzog 2007), the focus for Gaarder is less on how women become interested in animals issues and more on their pathway into the animal rights *movement*. Elsewhere, some have suggested that because women have more free time than men, they are more likely than men to become animal rights activists (Jasper and Nelkin, 1992). Others claim the exact opposite: women today enjoy far less free time than men because of their dual responsibilities as caretakers and providers for the family (Frasier, 1994). In response to these suggestions about the effects of gendered economic structures, Gaarder asks an important question: if availability of time is so important to women's activism, why are they not in the majority in all other social movements as well? Perhaps, as Kruse (1999) suggests, women are more likely to be the primary caretakers of companion animals, partly an effect of social learning and societal expectations, and hence may be more frequently exposed to promotional material prompting them to become active for animals, for instance at veterinary surgeries.

In Gaarder's study, the most prominent explanations given by women activists for their majority status in the movement fell within the categories of gendered social learning, social expectations, biological natures, and empathy based on shared inequity. Those who drew attention to gender variations in socialization argued that women learned to care and were encouraged to develop their nurturing tendencies. Affirming many of the points made by Luke (2007) about gender-role socialization and social expectations, some activists suggested that it was acceptable for women to show compassion, whereas for men it would be seen as a sign of weakness, thus making men less likely to become active in the animal movement.

Although there were women who drew on hormonal or evolutionary explanations to account for women's empathic connection with animals and their increased likelihood to become activists for animals, Gaarder notes that these women were mostly above the age of thirty and thus perhaps less likely to have been exposed to critiques of biological determinism. The most interesting of the themes noted by Gaarder is what she refers to as 'empathy based on shared inequities'. Some women explained their empathic connection to animals as connected to their own experiences of abuse, objectification and subordination. Similar reference to the common roots and methods of oppression was made early on by nineteenth century female anti-vivisectionists. 'Jacqueline', one of Gaarder's interviewees, had worked with low-income battered women and had started to use her legal skills to help abused animals when she read about the correlations between animal abuse and domestic violence. Peek, Bell, and Dunham's (1996) earlier research found a relationship between an egalitarian gender ideology and animal advocacy, although they focused on attitudes toward animal rights rather than participation in the movement, and egalitarian gender ideology was only able to distinguish women who support animal rights from those who do not, and could not account for women's greater animal rights advocacy in a combined sample of men and women.

Other themes raised by women's accounts of their own activism included the perceived need to be a voice for the voiceless, which connected some of the women's own struggles with voice and power to that of animals, the importance of early attitudes of caring and childhood relationships with animals, and the significance of changing one's diet and lifestyle for opening oneself up to becoming more visibly active for animals. Some women also spoke of other causes they had previously been involved in. Those who were younger recalled the impact of teenage rebelliousness on their choice to become active while older interviewees emphasized the importance of midlife turning points. Other family members' treatment of animals was also a common thread in women's accounts. Some talked about family members who cared for stray animals, others witnessed animal abuse in their family, and a few drew parallels between the abuse of animals and their own experiences of being raped or abused in the home. A willingness to investigate one's emotions through further reading and learning about animal rights was another important factor.



### **Coping strategies, sacrifices, and personal reward**

Another central focus of this book is an examination of the ways in which animal rights activism impacts upon women's personal relationships, their careers, and overall well-being. Especially striking was the story of 'Frances' (pp. 69–70), who spoke about the emotional toll her involvement in animal activism had had on her family relationships. As a result of her dedication to activism her two dogs had been deliberately poisoned and she became divorced from her husband of twenty-two years. Her relationship with her children also suffered. Other women spoke of similar emotional fallout and the ostracism they faced from unsympathetic friends and family members. Six of the women chose to give up established careers to devote themselves fully to the animal cause while others reported losing their positions in prestigious jobs as a result of their advocacy work. Some were able to create emotional thresholds to prevent trauma and burnout. Gaarder suggests that for others their advocacy work may even have acted as a distraction from their own experiences of victimization and may have helped to empower victims of abuse.

Animal activism could be rewarding as well as emotionally exhausting. Some positive changes noted by Gaarder's interviewees included a new perspective and setting of new priorities, a sense of freedom, empowerment, pride, and meaning in their lives, and a marked change of consciousness regarding the world and our place in it. Finally, Gaarder also touches on the dangers of responding to rejection from others by isolating oneself or choosing to only associate with fellow animal rights advocates.

### **Intersecting oppressions and controversial tactics**

“[J]ust because people are animal rights activists, it doesn't mean they know anything about feminism.” ('Amie' in Gaarder 2011:132)

Gaarder joins Adams (1990) and other ecofeminists in arguing that the oppressions of women and of animals are fundamentally linked and mutually reinforcing. They contend that species inequality is gendered where those who are identified as closer to nature in the culture/nature binary, i.e. women, are devalued and dominated. Domesticated animals are also victims of sexual inequality as females are exploited for their reproductive capacities and male animals

are linked to the females by being stripped of any rational (male) human characteristics. According to Adams (1990), those attitudes associated with ‘maleness’, such as the idea that ends justify (violent) means and that objectification of others is an inherent part of life, also give meaning to meat as food. What we have witnessed recently, says Gaarder, is an escalation of sexualized media tactics in the name of animal rights. The PETA campaigns that use nudity and sexualized images of women of a certain body type are frequently criticized for reinforcing the very system of sexual objectification that consigns women and animals to continued domination. As Adams (2011) argues, the PETA adverts substitute one absent referent for another by layering one oppressive system on top of another. Not only is the trading in of one form of objectification for another problematic for feminist reasons that women have enunciated, but if animals are burdened by gendered associations, it might be wrong to assume they can be liberated through campaigns that depict women in a demeaning way. Feminized animals and animalized women remain caught within this oppressive nexus. The main objections to these campaigns raised by women in this study related to a concern that they were disrespectful towards women activists, inconsistent with fighting objectification and oppression, ineffective and even damaging to the movement. Some women indeed commented that the campaigns were missing a vital point of intersection between the oppression of women and that of animals and feared that women were more likely to feel offended than be drawn to the cause as a result.

However, as Gaarder demonstrates in this book, the rejection by women of these controversial tactics is by no means unanimous. On the contrary, several of the women in her study assumed either that gender and sexuality have no bearing on speciesism or that, as the ‘liberal feminist’ position holds, gender oppression can be divorced from sex. A woman’s decision to display herself in a certain way, as long as she really is free to choose, may be empowering, so perhaps, they argue, we should embrace these tactics. In total, 44% of Gaarder’s interviewees opposed these campaigns, 30% supported them, and 26% harbored mixed feelings about them. Those in support held the opinion that in a male-dominated society where ‘sex sells’ these campaigns could bring much-needed publicity. Where women had freely chosen to participate, they were clearly not oppressed, they contend. And animals, who face the *ultimate* oppression must in any case be put before the interests of some women.

“[A]s long as humans can consent and animals cannot, I say use every weapon in your arsenal to get attention.” (‘Frances’ in Gaarder 2011:125)

“[L]eave your feminism at home and do what’s best for the animals.” (‘Lola’ *ibid.* 124)

For some “[e]xpressing ‘human’ concerns about gender, race, or class is considered divisive to the movement, and even selfish. Focusing on one’s own concern for liberation, voice, or equality is unacceptable when animals suffer the greatest oppression of all.” (*ibid.* 153)

Concerns about movement unity, ‘in-fighting’, and a loss of focus on the animals if “discrimination and racism and all this other stuff” (‘Bonnie’ *ibid.* 136) are allowed to become topics for discussion were expressed by a number of women. This emphasis on the urgency of addressing animal suffering and the need to relegate ‘human’ concerns to the back burner, would seem to lend support to the idea that “traumatic knowledge” (Adams 2003) of animal suffering can lead to a ‘single-issue’ approach and a lack of focus on the need to form coalitions with other progressive social movements. Other women reported feeling torn between “competing loyalties” (‘Anika’ in Gaarder 2011:125). Interestingly, Gaarder finds evidence that age may again be a factor contributing to the likelihood that women activists might embrace an intersectional framework, with younger women being more likely to object to campaigns that portray sexualized women. The pressure to prioritize animal issues over other social causes then comes not only from inside the movement culture, but also from larger cultural forces that socialize women to put others’ needs before their own.

Some of her interviewees, for example ‘Jacqueline’ (*ibid.* 139), argued for the need to “[speak] to” the links between oppressions through animal rights activism.

“[I]gnoring racist or sexist remarks and behaviors misses an opportunity to educate and expand the animal rights movement. A movement culture that excessively and uncritically embraces ‘movement unity’ fails to challenge overt or unconscious acts of male dominance and white privilege.” (Gaarder 2011:115)

Gaarder (*ibid.* 153) concludes that “[t]he gender inequalities described in this book cannot be resolved unless the animal rights movement challenges the sexist devaluation of emotion and the sexual objectification of women that saturates our culture.”

## **Conclusion**

Emily Gaarder's *Women and the Animal Rights Movement* represents an important contribution to the growing literature on women's roles in the animal rights movement and the intersectionality of oppression. While many of the links and observations she makes may come as no surprise to those already involved in struggles at the intersection of feminism and animal rights, and indeed some of her critiques of PETA's tactics, for example, have been made elsewhere, her study is unique in that it relies on women's own accounts of their animal rights activism. She concludes that "[g]ender is far more than a demographic characteristic of social movement activists. Just as social movements can influence ideas about gender in society, so too can societal ideas about gender shape social movements. Although this movement is focused on animals, its activists are influenced by gendered expectations and experiences. Activists operate within a sexist society, and their tactical choices and goals either accept or contest those constraints." (Gaarder 2011:152). In this book she invites us to reflect on animal rights activism through the lens of gender and the eyes of women in the movement to "[open] our minds to the complex and sometimes contradictory conclusions people can draw in the wake of suffering, the depths to which pain can compromise our ethical structures, our relationships to others, and our own well-being. The implications of such understanding can, [she hopes], provoke us to take meaningful action without hurting ourselves or others in the process." (*ibid.* 156).

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## BOOK REVIEWS

**Richard Twine (2010) *Animals as Biotechnology: Ethics, Sustainability and Critical Animal Studies*, Earthscan: London**

**Reviewed by Chris Washington<sup>1</sup>**

Richard Twine's *Animals as Biotechnology*, situated at the nexus of a vast array of academic discourses and practices—biology, genomics, genetics, environmental studies, agriculture, medicine, animals studies, bioethics, and global law—seeks to install a reflexive posthumanism into the field of sociology, thus extending the range of the discipline's focus beyond human life (Twine himself is a sociologist). That, at least, is a fair enough overview of Twine's amazingly complex and comprehensive book. To accomplish this, Twine focuses on biotechnology (put broadly, the genetic manipulation of life) and its applications in animal agriculture. He contends that humanist discourses pressure the ethical issues involved in scientific disciplines but nevertheless have little policy influence outside of the confines of whatever specialized academic field to which they happen to belong. Scientific biotechnological endeavors, on the other hand, tend to have a great deal of political influence without attending to the ethical implications of the work. For Twine, this means the humanities, while doing valuable work, need to actively engage in hard scientific debates. His solution is that we need to develop the maturing field of critical animal studies (Twine uses "reflexive posthumanism" and "critical animal studies" interchangeably) as a critique of global biotechnological advancements. Twine's book, in other words, not only intervenes in the busy academic intersections of the humanities and the sciences but also undertakes no less

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than to install a supple ethical awareness within scientific disciplines that have tangible biopolitical effects on the world of humans and animals.

Twine divides his book into three parts and he gives over much of the first part to a historical survey of the ethical and scientific discourses that relate to the human manipulation of animals in new biotechnological scientific practices. One of the problems with addressing the ethics of biotechnological pursuits, as Twine sees it, is not simply that scientists often shield themselves from ethical questions, but that the humanities relegate ethics to a “narrow philosophical discourse” (19). Part of Twine’s approach in addressing biotechnological fields, then, concerns devising a reflexive (“reflexive” is maybe the key word throughout Twine’s book) bioethics that includes all forms of life and is recognized as more than a subfield of philosophy: “Critical bioethics aims to foreground interdisciplinarity, sociopolitical dimensions and reflexivity to what becomes bioethical subject matter” (49). Nor is this, as Twine puts it, a narrow “parochial ethical debate” but rather one that has “ramifications for pressing interconnected contemporary debates over climate change and food security” (21). As Twines sees it, as long as ethics remains as docile as its current permutations entail, it will continue to contribute to an unsustainable future because climate change is in large part attributable to the mass-scale farming of animals (which is not to say that Twine is being anthropocentric here; ethics must account, too, for human violence to animals because animals are sentient creatures).

Creating this new bioethics requires undoing fundamental anthropocentric tenets that have long dominated all manner of Western thinking on human-animal relations. Twine concurs with well-known scholars like Carol Adams and Cary Wolfe that ethics centers on the presupposition of an ontological dualism that posits humans as naturally sovereign over animal life. Whether in the humanities or the sciences, Twine argues that ethics fails to critique the “liberal humanist subject” that “emerged” from the Enlightenment “as a dominant model” of the human as “rational, autonomous and disembodied” (29). Subjectivity,



grounded on this model, works by excluding any perceived non-human other—“the feminine, animality, emotionality, madness, the racialized other, abject and classed bodies” (30). With such an unquestioned model at its heart, Twine, again following earlier thinkers, suggests that the animal ethics of folks like Tom Regan and Peter Singer are doomed to reinforce the dominant human-animal dualism that fuels human violence towards animals. In contradistinction, a reflexive posthumanism seeks to dislodge this human-animal ontological dualism (what Twine calls “anthropocentric ontology”) and reorient ethics toward an idea of subjectivity as historically and biologically numinous and fluid (indeed, Twine cites research about the indeterminism of species distinctions at the biological level). If the human subject remains not yet fully formed, then its current assumption of a fully-realized dominance must be reevaluated.

Because this anthropocentric ontology remains tenaciously inscribed within any discussion of ethical relations between humans and animals, it is no surprise that Twine finds it stubbornly pervading all aspects of medical and agricultural experimentation on animals. He notes a growing porosity between medicine and agriculture concerning the uses of biotechnology to reengineer animals for human consumption as not just food, but food specifically instrumentalized for nutritional value. As Twine shows, in nutrigenomics there is an increasing interest in capitalizing on animals as livestock who yield money but also serve as “functional food products” (58), that is, as food bioengineered for optimal human nutrition. This section of the book, entitled “Capitalizing on Animals,” examines how “the biotechnological capitalization of animals requires a favourable [sic] regulatory environment, a reductive view of the animal as genetic knowledge and an association with a broader persuasive economic vision around the promise of molecular science” (61). This vision of the future of animal biotechnology constitutes what Twine calls the master narratives multinational corporations intend to use to foster growth in the animal agricultural industry. In the U.S. these master narratives have been largely accepted as evidenced by the fact that

the commercialization of genetically modified and cloned animals continues, whereas the UK has created “genetics knowledge parks” that aid in the replication of these master narratives by funding research on the ethical and social issues of genetics in addition to the typical scientific experiments on animals (66). As Twine notes, this master narrative explicitly ties animal genomics to commercial agriculture and its capitalist aims. Regardless of the “clouding” of medicine and agriculture in the development of how to classify animal genomics that has occurred, the overall point of the capitalist forces promoting these narratives, as Twine reads them, is to eschew ethical questions about genetic modification from regulatory procedures (78). And despite that U.S. and UK animal welfare laws contain exceptions for experimentation on certain animals in laboratories, the fact that such laws contain none for farmed animals seems like culpable evidence that animal genomics and other biotechnological procedures will be considered agricultural in U.S. and UK regulatory schemes and, ironically, thereby escape regulation.

What makes these master narratives, and genetic modification technology in general, different than previous historical narratives and methods of animal production is that it grants to humans “a novel authorial power over other animals” (70). It would be impossible to do justice to the varied scientific practices and discourses Twine interrogates under the broad banner of animal agricultural biotechnology but his primary focus is on molecular breeding which includes “cloning, genetic modification, genomic selection and marker-assisted selection” (107). Each of these phenomena is fairly recent; however, the novelty consists in more than the techniques’ contemporaneity: they accomplish human control of animals at the molecular level and thus enact a new form of what Michel Foucault calls “biopower,” the ability of powerful institutional forces (the State, corporations) to create, arrange, and transform life at the bodily level.

The final third of the book, “Capturing Sustainability in the Genome,” and for my money the most immediate for animal life, demonstrates how global corporations seek to

leverage biopower through genetic modification technologies. Biotechnology is being positioned as “ethical biocapital,” which is to say that scientists and savvy agribusinesses are responding to public concerns about the nutritional value of eating animals, the sustainability of large-scale controlled animal feeding operations (CAFO’s), and animal welfare concerns, by using genomics to create animal bodies in ways that appear to nullify these concerns. As Twine puts it, external critiques of animal agriculture are being “internalized into the very materiality of the animal body.” In other words, by tweaking their methods, geneticists seek to produce animals who eradicate charges that eating meat is unhealthy or that the mass production of animals contributes overwhelmingly to global climate change. By implementing biotechnologies, corporations want to make global meat consumption appear sustainable. The use of biotechnology therefore extends beyond the parameters of simply contributing to the mass slaughter of animals in global agribusiness; it actually allows for a complete physical refashioning of individual animals at a biological level as crucial instruments in fashioning hegemonic illusions of sustainable consumption practices.

What with America’s food guru, Michael Pollan, legitimating continued meat eating as somehow sustainable in the face of all contrary evidence, and a nascent retrenchment on the left regarding veganism in ethical feel-good books and animal holocaust apologies, Twine’s *Animals as Biotechnology* offers a much-needed interdisciplinary intervention on all of these issues.<sup>2</sup> Impressively erudite and impeccably researched, the book marks a major contribution to debates on animal biotechnology, climate change, and critical animal studies. The book triumphantly addresses the critique of the humanities as irrelevant and isolated from practical matters by attending to the hard scientific issues so many scholars in the humanities lack the training to properly engage. Its success is double, then, because more

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<sup>2</sup> Outside of the work of Pollen himself, the work of Keith and Rudy is in this mold. Lierre Keith, *The Vegetarian Myth: Food, Justice, and Sustainability* (Oakland: PM Press, 2009). Kathy Rudy, *Loving Animals: Toward a New Animal Advocacy* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2011).

than offering a critique of scientific practices from a posthumanist perspective, for scientists in these fields the book lucidly presents the full scope of the ethical issues that surround their work—and, perhaps more importantly, offers an ethical framework for the future. “Biotechnology,” Twine writes, “is figured by its advocates potentially as the creative capitalist answer to previously assumed limits to growth, a new frontier of capitalization” (100). The response, as Twine persuasively argues, is to switch to an actually sustainable vegan agricultural system that couples itself to a reflexive critical bioethics and refuses to endorse capitalist profit-enhancement as an intuitively natural goal of the human condition.

**Lisa Kemmerer (Ed.) (2011) *Sister Species: Women, Animals, and Social Justice*. University of Illinois Press.**

**Reviewed by Lindsey McCarthy<sup>1</sup>**

*Sister Species: Women, Animals, and Social Justice* takes us on a unique journey of thought and self-discovery. This is the case from the outset, perhaps since Carol J. Adams (2011: xi) poses the questions, "...what is my own story of awareness and engagement?" and "What does this awareness ask of me?" *Sister Species* is an anthology of women's voices and experiences from the animal advocacy movement, which provides rich accounts and diverse personal narratives to further develop and pull together the fields of critical animal studies and critical feminist studies. Being both nuanced and multifaceted is indeed the point; in line with feminist problematizing of the term 'woman' and the deconstruction of dichotomous modes of thought (from the beginning, the notion of the male/female dichotomy is rejected), this book, while wholly structured around *women's* involvement in the animal advocacy movement, does not fail to assert the diversity of tactics, philosophies, and voices within this group. The authors represented work within a variety of advocacy movements, ranging from the co-founder of a rooster rehabilitation sanctuary, to a farmed animal cruelty investigator, to a playwright. At the same time, what unites these voices is their belief that "...human exceptionalism is the major problem of the Twenty-First Century" (2011: xi), as well as their utmost passionate efforts to confront this problem head-on. The personal accounts span over fourteen chapters to engage the reader with the author's relationship to nonhuman animals and how this awareness came about. The anthology offers a refreshing break from abstract intellectual theory, which can only be appreciated by the select few. The essays are simultaneously inspiring and crushingly sad; providing honest and disturbing first-hand accounts of abuse – which makes the book at once understandably a difficult but wholeheartedly compelling read; vital for anyone involved or interested in the burgeoning field of critical animal studies or animal advocacy.

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The title of the book is eye-catching and noteworthy. While this is not made explicit, 'sister species' may be a reference to Linda Vance's (1993) critique of the male environmentalist description of nature as 'mother', provider, and nurturer as being based primarily in male desire. 'Sister' replaces 'mother' as a feminist reconceptualization of nature, based on the shared oppression of women and the nonhuman world. The book begins with a foreword by Carol J. Adams, the pioneer of feminist-vegetarian critical theory. This piece sets the scene by locating the book within a context of intersectionality between forms of oppression, of which nonhumans form an integral part. To those who may ask "why animals?", Adams (2011) replies that feminism led us here, or rather more than 35 years of feminist activism and writing led us here, as well as women playing a major role in animal advocacy. Adams is right in suggesting that this anthology makes us feel less alone – that the stories weave together the personal and the political – and almost reach out to the reader and ask us to listen, force us to (re)consider our own stories of awareness and engagement with other animals, in a way which is comprehensible and accessible. An introduction by Lisa Kemmerer sets out the basics, providing an overview of feminism from the sixties and seventies, to an explanation of patriarchy, and links between ecofeminism and speciesism. The readers are introduced to the core feminist principles to aid understanding of how they are played out in the subsequent narrative essays. Specifically, Kemmerer outlines her overall goal as "...first and foremost, [this book is] about learning by listening to the understanding of others" (2011: 32). To achieve this, Kemmerer aims to: -

- Expose critical connections between social justice movements, focusing on sexism, racism, homophobia, classism, and speciesism;
- Establish speciesism as a key concern for all social justice activists;
- Outline why all social justice activists ought to adopt a vegan lifestyle and;
- Encourage animal advocates to network with other social justice advocates to expose and dismantle all forms of oppression.

Following discussion will present a critical review of just what we can learn by listening to these voices and the exciting implications for contemporary critical animal studies and critical feminist theory.

## **Empathy, Silence, Trauma and Voice**

Kemmerer highlights a number of key themes that run through the collection of essays, namely: empathy, silence, trauma and voice.

The concept of *empathy* has been a topic of philosophical debate for almost a century, and as a relative, subjective term, may mean different things for different people. Empathy and an ethics of care have long been articulated as components of feminist theories and epistemologies. Rather than assuming that all knowledge should be value-free, feminists have argued that all knowledge is intrinsically value-laden and actually, the presence of emotion validates an argument (Collins, 1990: 263). Sadly, for the most part, past scholarship has tended to adopt a largely anthropocentric conceptualisation of empathy to the exclusion of nonhuman animals.

Several scholars from critical animal studies have challenged this assumption, some in terms of attitudes to nonhumans and correlations to empathy. For instance, Taylor and Signal (2005) found a positive relationship between empathy and attitudes towards non-humans and a correlation between human-directed empathy and animal-directed empathy. More generally, this process is known as "compassion based upon empathy" (Phelps, 2008: 4) and can be applied to other animals because "our participation in the shared life of the animal kingdom allows us to be confident that the suffering of our fellow animals is as distasteful to them as ours is to us" (Phelps, 2008: 4). In these essays, the concept of empathy is extended towards the nonhuman, placing the nonhuman or "the absent referent" (Adams, 2000) back into the mental equation; only then can we begin to bring about much-needed change and maintain moral effectiveness. Empathy entails that we see our connection with other animals. This point runs through several of the accounts, although the ways and means are different: for Patrice Jones, it took Alice Walker's essay *Am I Blue?* to "...interrupt her pleasure" (2011: 49); for Twyla François it was growing to see that each of the cows on her parents' farm had their own personality; and for Miyun Park, it was realising that segregating "food" animals as "other" would be on a par with her oppressors telling her to "go back to China...".

Another theme that Kemmerer identifies is *silence*: "violence tends to force silence on those who would otherwise speak" (2011: 25). This concept follows Audre Lorde's writing on fear "that rules lives and requires silence" (Lorde in Kemmerer, 2011: 25). The narratives in this anthology draw attention to the ways in which silence has played an oppressive part in

past lives. A. Breeze Harper recalls feeling "uncomfortable" about being the only black child (with her twin) in an all-white working-class school system. Yet, silence is integrally bound up with the third theme, that of finding a *voice*. A. Breeze Harper draws on her traumatic past experiences of racism, whiteness, and speciesism to shape her motivations as an animal rights activist, namely to "push the envelope, to implore social justice activists to see the interconnections of violence and abuse" (2011: 75). The authors offer scope, then, to find empowerment and voice even within conditions that may severely limit one's ability to act. Perhaps even more so, feeling discouraged, angry, or upset due to oppression can lead to activism and engagement. For instance, in a similar vein to Donna Haraway's (1991) conceptualizations on the feminization of work, Ingrid E. Newkirk recognises how women still control the majority of the world's kitchens. Rather than being rendered passive or submissive, marginal voices can perform local resistances, which in turn, can lead to ripples of change throughout the system. Thus, there is a liberatory potential for women to exploit their labour in kitchens ("fonts of power"), in terms of laying plans for "dietary domination", or promotion of a vegan diet (2011: 70). Ultimately, while the key ideas of empathy, silence, trauma, and voice emerge from each author's personal experiences of struggle and violence, in a world often ethically-blind to cruelty and suffering, out of this struggle develops passion, consciousness, and wisdom.

On a more emotive level, the book provides readers with honest accounts, detailing the realities of animal suffering and abuse ("these writers give us the opportunity to learn more about what is happening to animals", Adams, 2011: x). This helps to further argue Kemmerer's goal to "outline why all social justice activists ought to adopt a vegan lifestyle". Often, the accounts are difficult to stomach, but as Adams (2011) stresses, this knowledge and these feelings are vital to provoke activism on behalf of nonhuman animals.

For me, this is also a book about *interconnections* between oppressions and social justice movements. This book adds to the momentum of work within critical animal studies which argues that to seek justice for one group and not another is to unwittingly forward an ineffective egalitarian project. It is no longer acceptable for feminism to resist or ignore the inclusion of nonhuman animals in their ethic of care, or to challenge only cultural traditions of male dominance over human women at the expense of nonhuman females. Rather, species difference is a social construction similar to race, gender, and other identity markers historically understood as biological. Harking back to Sojourner Truth's ground-breaking speech at the Women's Rights Convention in Ohio in 1851, this book speaks on behalf of the oppressed female nonhumans in asking, "*Ain't I a woman, too?*" And of course, to a certain



extent, this question has already been asked: women's role in the animal advocacy movement has been and continues to be colossal. But this is a question that needs to be asked and asked again, and the astonishing honesty of each of these accounts demonstrates with great clarity "why every woman should be an animal activist and why every animal activist should be a feminist" (Kemmerer, 2011).

On reflection, I found myself wondering if there was not further opportunity to elaborate on the deconstruction of dichotomies in *Sister Species*. Kemmerer (2011: 9) makes a specific critique of talking about 'women' as women and challenging the male/female dichotomy in the introduction. While the deconstruction of the term 'woman' crops up again in Newkirk's essay, '*Are you waving at me?*' there perhaps remains scope to articulate this idea of specificity further throughout the ensuing chapters. However, this is only a minor pondering, and may be a question better addressed in future editions.

Overall, this theoretical innovation offers a constructive way forward not only for feminism and critical animal studies but also for every group struggling for liberation. If people are willing to listen, the book has the capacity to change one's thinking; it begins to bring each liberation campaign out of isolation, by considering race, gender, class and species as part of a broader structure of power. Although these connections have already been made within the field of critical animal studies (Adams, 2000), what makes this book exceptional is its interplay between oppression and resistance. And where there is resistance there is hope for social change. These resistances may only seem small, local, but it is about doing what we can. In Twyla François' essay, '*From Rural Roots to Angel's Wing*', her assertion to "hold onto your preteen person and never lose your sense of wonder and compassion" (2011: 63) reassures us that these resistances, in the long run, will make a difference.

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**Paul Waldau (2011) *Animal Rights: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford University Press: Oxford.**

**Reviewed by Carlo Salzani<sup>1</sup>**

It is an undeniable fact today that *animal protection* – however one defines it – is a worldwide social movement, one that comprises a myriad of different positions and oppositions, and strongly polarizes a number of heated debates in philosophical, legal, social and political circles. And this is why one can safely state, with Paul Waldau and Oxford UP, that “everyone” needs to know something about it. The feeling of “necessity” is confirmed by the number of new works pouring out from small and big publishers alike (try the search-word “animal rights” on Amazon and see what it’s being published in 2011 alone!), which certainly provide an array of complex and comprehensive views on the topic, but also create a “need” for clarity and synthesis. This is what Waldau’s book provides, and this is its greatest merit.

The book belongs to the “what everyone needs to know” series at Oxford UP and presents thus a predefined scope and a standardized structure: it proposes an introduction to the topic which attempts to survey the movement and cover all major areas, and is therefore classically organized around a series of probing questions. The approach is multidisciplinary and the language attempts – and manages – to be non-ideological and matter-of-fact, which is no small achievement within this extremely litigious field. It is not that Waldau denies or hides his own commitment – which in fact is presented in the preface as the rationale of the book: a commitment not only to the animal cause, but even more to understanding the reasons and forces which created and sustain such a powerful movement. Rather, this very commitment to understanding is what brackets, for the space of the book, a more passionate approach and suspends judgment in order to foster awareness. This is an extremely useful exercise also for those who, like myself, have been surveying the scientific literature for some years and thus take perhaps too many things for granted.

Quite correctly, Waldau believes that “what everyone needs to know” is first of all the meaning of the syntagm “animal rights,” and begins therefore with some definitions. The

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most controversial part of the syntagm is certainly the second, the question of “rights,” but in order to get to it Waldau needs to spend some time on the first part, the meaning of “animal.” He calls our attention to an important linguistic singularity, which translates into an ideological distinction of immense consequence: every dictionary provides at least two meanings for the word “animal,” one of which includes humans, whereas the other excludes them. I was a bit surprised at this point by reading that the *Oxford English Dictionary*, according to Waldau, provides for the first case the definition “all living beings” (5). I checked its online version and other dictionaries as well, and all emphasize instead the divide between the animal kingdom on one hand, and the vegetal and mineral ones on the other: animals are not “all living beings,” but all beings belonging to the kingdom *Animalia*, as distinguished from the living beings belonging to the kingdom *Vegetalia* and the nonliving beings belonging to the kingdom *Mineralia*. Waldau’s point here is however to underline the fact that, from a scientific point of view, humans belong to this category, but in the common usage they *intentionally* exclude themselves from this commonality: animals become thus “all living being *other than* humans.” Any legal system adopts the second definition, and Waldau importantly notes that “favoring *either* choice reveals an agenda” (6): the complexity of the debate is already revealed by the questionability of the terminology.

This questionability needs to be further explored, since it involves important separations and exclusions also within the category “all living being other than humans.” Humans do not only create ideological groupings which involve enormous differences in consideration and treatment (“companion animals,” “wild animals,” “food animals,” “research animals,” “entertainment animals,” “work animals”), but also reserve their concern, when they do have one, to those animals we can *see*, that is, the *macro animals*, which certainly constitute a sheer minority within the animal kingdom. Claims about the respect and protection for “all animals” or “all life” need to be contextualized and understood in their inevitable and necessary simplification: how far do we go in this respect and protection? Up to condemning “killing germs” or “antibiotics” (literally, “against life”)? Waldau’s point here is certainly not to undermine the cause for the protection of animals, but rather to point out its necessary limits. What we know about animals and the way we can relate to (only a few of) them inevitably condition our commitment to their protection; our ultimate and inescapable anthropocentrism is revealed in our inevitable privileging those characteristics (intelligence, emotions, etc.) we also share and can thus understand and relate to. At this point Waldau cannot dive into the depths of more philosophical arguments, but the sole mention of this

issue and of the inconsistencies involved in any form of animal protection distinguishes his attempt from the majority of the literature which simply decides not to envision the problem.

In this area Waldau can provide some qualitative and quantitative determinations which are extremely useful in order to get an “objective” picture of a number of human-animal relations, from pets to animals used in scientific research, with a stronger emphasis – perforce – on food animals and factory farming. And these first two chapters are a useful and necessary “introduction,” but we have to wait until the third chapter, the one about “philosophical arguments,” to find a problematization of the term “rights.” On this issue, “what everyone needs to know” is not complex and abstruse philosophical meditations about the meaning of “rights,” both “human” and “animal,” which is a fundamental topic of immense philosophical and practical relevance, but which also exceeds the scope of an introductory survey. Clarity, Waldau correctly argues, is “very desirable in this area” (56), and his matter-of-fact approach appears particularly effective. In the first chapter, answering the question “why do we need to know what is meant by ‘animal rights’?,” he had already provided a first response: “many people in a variety of contexts today easily resort to the word ‘rights’ to signal that something very important is at issue” (2). In the common use, “rights” inevitably and strongly denotes importance and interest. The recourse to the “common use” should not be disregarded, since, on the one hand, the debate on this topic is extremely opaque and, on the other, the term has entered the common language and is widely used. In fact Waldau never provides a clear definition of “rights,” but rather approaches, with a series of progressive clarifications, the issues and problems revolving around it in order to get at what is at stake.

The first distinction to be made is that between “moral rights” and “legal rights”: “moral rights are anchored in a system of morality, while each and every legal right is anchored in a specific legal system” (58). One could counter that the very term “right” derives from, and has no meaning without, the notion of “legal system.” But the discussion about whether natural rights exist at all goes here not only beyond the scope of the book, but is also beside the point, since we *do* already talk about “animal rights,” and this is what Waldau is trying to explain. There is of course a connection between morality and law, but the two fields are and must be kept separate. The point Waldau wants to make is that “however one answers the deep questions that drive debates about whether natural rights exist at all [...] it is clearly the case that humans can recognize the relevance of talk about ‘rights’ to both human and nonhuman living beings” (63). Here it is where, I believe, Waldau really hits the heart of the matter: “it is possible for all to recognize that even if there is

disagreement on the source of rights, humans may nonetheless agree that respecting moral rights, however they are explained, is an important human responsibility to all kinds of living beings” (63). Thus, although the term “rights” continues to be used in a variety of ways and contexts, “the term is now *in play* regarding nonhuman animals” (63, emphasis added). This is by now a *fact*, regardless of ideological stands and bias, and is therefore “what everyone needs to know”; this terminological and conceptual clarity is the necessary basis to enter any discussion and to pursue social and “political” action.

After a brief survey of the major philosophical positions about animal rights, Waldau approaches the field of law and thus of “legal rights.” He is right to put emphasis on this field because this is the area of major and more “practical” impact: legal rights are the highest form of legal protection and only the law can *impose* this protection (whether *imposition* is desirable is another matter). However, the law is also an extremely conservative institution, which resists change. Traditionally, law has treated animals as *mere property* of humans and has promoted a general tendency to broad generalizations about humans’ “natural” superior status. When animals are mentioned in this area, the focus is on property issues involving human interests; the interests of the nonhuman animals themselves are almost always invisible. As far as the letter of the law is concerned, things haven’t improved much, but Waldau argues that profound changes are taking place in this area. And he argues for the central role of legal struggles because “even if it is not always clear what problems the granting of legal rights will involve, this remains an altogether powerful and popular tool” (94). Whether anticruelty legislation is an effective tool is debatable, and Waldau mentions the *querelle* between animal rights advocates and animal welfare supporters; he seems to believe though that the field presents great possibilities for the future.

He proceeds then to survey other areas, such as political realities, social realities, education, the arts, natural and social sciences. This survey is perforce cursory and limited to superficial aspects, but it importantly provides a general overview of the impact of the movement on society as a whole and on its main parts. To “what everyone needs to know” also belong a chapter on the major figures and organizations in the animal rights movement, and, as appendixes, a very succinct chronology of important events, an indispensable – though far too short – glossary, and suggestions for further reading which follow the chapters division. A note should be made on the emphasis Waldau correctly puts on the exceptionality of today’s situation in respect to the history of animal protection: this emphasis obliquely traverses the book and in particular informs a brief chapter on the history of the movement. Industrial societies have produced a qualitative and quantitative caesura in the human-animal

relations, which is essentially exemplified by what is currently known as “factory farming.” This has impacted also on the millenary history of compassion and care towards animals, which today is, as well, qualitatively and quantitatively *sui generis*: “in a very real sense,” Waldau writes, “today’s animal rights movement has features that are direct responses to the fact that in modern societies the important heritage of anticruelty has been challenged as never before” (78).

Although the outlook today is objectively bleak, this challenge has certainly produced, in our societies, more awareness and powerful responses, and Waldau chooses to embrace hope in the final chapter on “The future of animal rights.” The conclusion of the book in fact connects to the rationale proposed in the preface: “everybody” needs to know something about animal rights because the way we treat other creatures tells us much about who we are and the societies we choose to build. Because the phrase “animal rights,” Waldau writes in the preface, “works for so many *not as a repudiation of humans*, but as an affirmation of humans’ special abilities to care about others, whether those ‘others’ be human or other-than-human, the phrase opens doors to the rich, more-than-human world that is our beyond our species” (xiv, emphasis in the original). The last sentence of the final chapter echoes this concept and restates that the choice for animal rights “is also about human animals as we attempt to find healthy ways for individuals in local places, and our species as a whole, to coexist with the citizens of the more-than-human world within which we and our children will always live” (199).

## **Marti Kheel: A Reflection**

**Richard Twine/ The Editorial Collective**

I first discovered the work of Marti Kheel as a student in 1994 via the web-site of the group that she helped found, Feminists for Animal Rights (FAR), itself part of my own first fruitful encounter with ecofeminism. For me Marti was a major figure in putting the wide range of issues related to animal liberation on the feminist agenda; of course something that is still resisted by many. Marti was also keenly concerned to strengthen the links between animal and environmental ethics, a long standing interest which culminated in her 2008 book, *Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective*. At the time Marti contacted me and I was able to help spread the word about her book via the web-site [www.ecofem.org](http://www.ecofem.org) . The book remains the major work of ecofeminism from recent years and deserves to be read widely. In July 2009 at the inaugural Minding Animals conference in Newcastle, Australia I had the pleasure of finally meeting Marti. I remember her playing a very active role in that conference and it is hard to believe now a little over two years later that she is no longer with us. I think the best tribute that the Critical Animal Studies community can pay Marti is to take the time to engage with her ideas and arguments. This is part of the vital broader task facing any relatively new and potentially precarious field: remembering, literally learning by heart, with due care, our roots and thus fending off intellectual amnesia.

More information about Marti and her excellent publications can be found at her official web-site.

<http://martikheel.com/publications.html>



## JCAS: AUTHOR GUIDELINES

### Editorial Objectives

The *Journal for Critical Animal Studies* is open to all scholars and activists. The journal was established for the purpose of fostering academic study of critical animal issues in contemporary society. While animal studies are increasingly becoming a field of importance in the academy, much work being done under this moniker take a reformist or depoliticized approach that fails to mount more serious critique of underlying issues of political economy and speciesist philosophy.

JCAS is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on animal liberation philosophy and policy issues. This journal was designed to build up the common activist's knowledge of animal liberation while at the same time appealing to academic specialists to address the important topic of animal liberation. We encourage and actively pursue a diversity of viewpoints of contributors from the frontlines of activism to academics. We have created the journal for the purpose of facilitating communication between the many diverse perspectives of the animal rights movement. Thus, we especially encourage submissions that seek to create new syntheses between differing disputing parties and to explore paradigms not currently examined.

### Suggested Topics

Papers are welcomed on any area of animal liberation philosophy from any discipline, and presenters are encouraged to share theses or dissertation chapters. Because a major goal of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies is to foster philosophical, critical, and analytic thinking about animal liberation, papers that contribute to this project will be given priority (especially papers that address critical theory, political philosophy, social movement analysis, tactical analysis, feminist, activism and academia, Continental philosophy or post-colonial perspectives). We especially encourage contributions that engage animal liberation in disciplines and debates that have received little previous attention. The following are a few topic suggestions:

### The reviewing process

Each paper submitted is initially reviewed for general suitability for publication. All submissions will be read by at least two members of the journal's editorial board.

### Manuscript requirements

The manuscript should be in MS WORD format, in 1.5 line spacing and 12 point Times New Roman. Good electronic copies of all figures and tables should also be provided. All manuscripts should be run through an American English spell check prior to submission.

As a guide, we ask that regular essays and reviews be between 2000-8000 words, and have limited endnotes. In exceptional circumstances JCAS will consider publishing extended essays (up to 15,000 words). Authors should supply a brief **abstract** of the paper (of no more than 250 words).

A brief **autobiographical** note should be supplied which includes full names, affiliation, e-mail address, and full contact details.

**References** to other publications must be in Harvard style and carefully checked for completeness, accuracy and consistency.

You should cite publications in the text: (Best, 2006) using the first named author's name or (Best and Nocella, 2006) citing

both names of two, or (Best et al., 2006), when there are three or more authors. At the end of the paper a reference list in alphabetical order should be supplied:

*For books:* Surname, Initials (year), Title of Book, Publisher, Place of publication. e.g. Gray, J. (2002), *Straw Dogs*, Granta Books: London

*For book chapters:* Surname, Initials (year), "Chapter title", Editor's Surname, Initials (Ed.), Title of Book, Publisher, Place of publication, pages. E.g. Greenbrier, T. (2006) "Against Civilization, For Reconnection to Life!", in Best, S. and Nocella, A.J. (Eds) *Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth*, AK Press, Oakland, pp. 198-203.

*For journals:* Surname, Initials (year), "Title of article", Journal Name, volume, number, pages. e.g. Cudworth, E. (2008), "'Most Farmers Prefer Blondes': The dynamics of anthroparchy in Animas' becoming meat", *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, pp. 32-45.

*For published conference proceedings:* Surname, Initials (year of publication), "Title of paper", in Surname, Initials (Ed.), Title of published proceeding which may include place and date(s) held, Publisher, Place of publication, Page numbers.

*For unpublished conference proceedings:* Surname, Initials (year), "Title of paper", paper presented at Name of Conference, date of conference, place of conference, available at: URL if freely available on the internet (accessed date).

*For working papers:* Surname, Initials (year), "Title of article", working paper [number if available], Institution or organization, Place of organization, date.

*For encyclopedia entries* (with no author or editor): Title of Encyclopedia (year) "Title of entry", volume, edition, Title of Encyclopedia, Publisher, Place of publication, pages.

*For newspaper articles* (authored): Surname, Initials (year), "Article title", Newspaper, date, pages.

*For newspaper articles* (non-authored): Newspaper (year), "Article title", date, pages.

*For electronic sources:* if available online the full URL should be supplied at the end of the reference, as well as a date that the resource was accessed.

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Articles submitted to JCAS should be original contributions, and should not be under consideration for any other publication at the same time. For ease of dissemination and to ensure proper policing use, papers and contributions become the legal copyright of the publisher unless otherwise agreed.

### Website

Additional guidance and instructions for authors can be found at the Journal's website:

<http://journal.hamline.edu/index.php/jcas/index>