REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on information accompanying transfers of funds

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1) Flows of dirty money through transfers of funds can damage the stability and reputation of the financial sector and threaten the internal market. Terrorism shakes the very foundations of our society. The soundness, integrity and stability of the system of transfers of funds and confidence in the financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardised by the efforts of criminals and their associates either to disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to transfer funds for terrorist purposes.

(1) Flows of illicit money damage the structure, stability and reputation of the financial sector and threaten the internal market as well as international development, and directly or indirectly undermine the confidence of citizens in the rule of law. The funding of terrorism and organised crime remains a significant problem which should be addressed at Union level. Terrorism and organised crime damage the democratic institutions and shake the very foundations of our society. Crucial facilitators of illicit money flows are secretive corporate structures operating in and through secrecy jurisdiction, often also referred to as tax havens. The soundness, integrity and stability of the system of transfers of funds and confidence in the financial system as a whole is being seriously jeopardised by the efforts of criminals and their associates either to disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to transfer funds for criminal activities or terrorist purposes.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2) In order to facilitate their criminal activities, money launderers and terrorist financers could try to take advantage of the freedom of capital movements entailed by the integrated financial area, unless certain coordinating measures are adopted at Union level. By its scale, Union action should ensure that Recommendation 16 on wire transfers of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), adopted in February 2012 is transposed uniformly throughout the Union, and, in particular, that there is no discrimination between national payments within a Member State and cross border payments between Member States. Uncoordinated action by Member States alone in the field of cross border transfers of funds could have a significant impact on the smooth functioning of payment systems at Union level and therefore damage the internal market in the field of financial services.

(2) In order to facilitate their criminal activities, money launderers and terrorist financers are taking advantage of the freedom of capital movements entailed by the integrated financial area, unless certain coordinating measures are adopted at Union and international level. International cooperation within the framework of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the global implementation of its recommendations aim to prevent regulatory arbitrage and the distortion of competition. By its scale, Union action should ensure that FATF Recommendation 16 on wire transfers adopted in February 2012 is transposed uniformly throughout the Union, and, in particular, that there is no discrimination or discrepancy between national payments within a Member State and cross border payments between Member States. Uncoordinated action by Member States alone in the field of cross border transfers of funds could have a significant impact on the smooth functioning of payment systems at Union level and therefore damage the internal market in the field of financial services.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2a) The implementation and enforcement of this Regulation, including FATF Recommendation 16, should not result in unjustified or disproportionate costs for payment service providers and citizens who use their services, and the free movement of egal capital should be fully guaranteed throughout the Union.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) In order to foster a coherent approach in the international context in the field of combating money laundering and terrorist financing, further Union action should take account of developments at that level, namely the International Standards on combating money-laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation adopted in 2012 by the FATF, and in particular Recommendation 16 and the revised interpretative note for its implementation.

(5) In order to foster a coherent approach in the international context and make the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing more efficient, further Union action should take account of developments at that level, namely the International Standards on combating money-laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation adopted in 2012 by the FATF, and in particular Recommendation 16 and the revised interpretative note for its implementation.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5a) Particular attention should be paid to the Union obligations set out in Article 208 TFEU in order to stem the increasing trend of money laundering activities being moved from developed countries with stringent anti-money laundering rules to developing countries where rules may be less stringent.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6) The full traceability of transfers of funds can be a particularly important and valuable tool in the prevention, investigation and detection of money laundering or terrorist financing. It is therefore appropriate, in order to ensure the transmission of information throughout the payment chain, to provide for a system imposing the obligation on payment service providers to have transfers of funds accompanied by information on the payer and the payee.

(6) The full traceability of transfers of funds can be a particularly important and valuable tool in the prevention, investigation and detection of money laundering or terrorist financing. It is therefore appropriate, in order to ensure the transmission of information throughout the payment chain, to provide for a system imposing the obligation on payment service providers to have transfers of funds accompanied by information on the payer and the payee, which should be accurate and updated. In that regard, it is essential for financial institutions to report adequate, accurate and up-to-date information with respect to transfers of funds carried out for their clients to enable the competent authorities to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing more effectively.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7) The provisions of this Regulation apply without prejudice to national legislation implementing Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data¹⁹ . For example, personal data collected for the purpose of complying with this Regulation should not be further processed in a way inconsistent e with Directive 95/46/EC. In particular, further processing for commercial purposes should be strictly prohibited. The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is recognised as an important public interest ground by all Member States. Hence, in the application of this Regulation, the transfer of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection in the meaning of Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC should be permitted according to Article 26 (d) of the same Directive.

(7) The provisions of this Regulation apply without prejudice to national legislation implementing Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council¹⁹. For example, personal data collected for the purpose of complying with this Regulation should not be further processed in a way inconsistent e with Directive 95/46/EC. In particular, further processing for commercial purposes should be strictly prohibited. The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is recognised as an important public interest ground by all Member States. Hence, in the application of this Regulation, the transfer of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection in the meaning of Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC should be permitted according to Article 26 (d) of the same Directive. It is important that payment service providers operating in multiple jurisdictions with branches or subsidiaries located outside the Union are not unreasonably prevented from sharing information about suspicious transactions within the same organisation. This is without prejudice to international agreements between the Union and third countries which aim to combating money laundering including appropriate safeguards for citizens ensuring an equivalent or adequate level of protection.

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¹⁹ OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.

¹⁹ Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31).

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9) It is appropriate to exclude from the scope of this Regulation transfers of funds that represent a low risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Such exclusions should cover credit or debit cards, mobile telephones or other digital or information technology (IT) devices, Automated Teller Machine (ATM) withdrawals, payments of taxes, fines or other levies, and transfers of funds where both the payer and the payee are payment service providers acting on their own behalf. In addition, in order to reflect the special characteristics of national payment systems, Member States may exempt electronic giro payments, provided that it is always possible to trace the transfer of funds back to the payer. However, there must be no exemption when a debit or credit card, a mobile telephone or other digital or IT prepaid or postpaid device is used in order to effect a person-to-person transfer.

(9) It is appropriate to exclude from the scope of this Regulation transfers of funds that represent a low risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Such exclusions should cover credit or debit cards, mobile telephones or other digital or information technology (IT) devices, Automated Teller Machine (ATM) withdrawals, payments of taxes, fines or other levies, and transfers of funds where both the payer and the payee are payment service providers acting on their own behalf. In addition, in order to reflect the special characteristics of national payment systems, Member States may exempt electronic giro payments, provided that it is always possible to trace the transfer of funds back to the payer, as well as transfers of funds carried out through cheque image exchanges or bills of exchange. However, there must be no exemption when a debit or credit card, a mobile telephone or other digital or IT prepaid or postpaid device is used in order to effect a person-to-person transfer. Taking into account the dynamically evolving technological progress, consideration should be given to extend the scope of the Regulation to cover e-money and other new payment methods.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) In order not to impair the efficiency of payment systems, the verification requirements for transfers of funds made from an account should be separate from those for transfers of funds not made from an account. In order to balance the risk of driving transactions underground by imposing overly strict identification requirements against the potential terrorist threat posed by small transfers of funds, the obligation to check whether the information on the payer is accurate should, in the case of transfers of funds not made from an account, be imposed only in respect of individual transfers of funds that exceed EUR 1 000,. For transfers of funds made from an account, payment service providers should not be required to verify information on the payer accompanying each transfer of funds, where the obligations under Directive [xxxx/yyyy] have been met.

(10) Payment service providers should ensure that the information on the payer and the payee is not missing or incomplete. In order not to impair the efficiency of payment systems, the verification requirements for transfers of funds made from an account should be separate from those for transfers of funds not made from an account. In order to balance the risk of driving transactions underground by imposing overly strict identification requirements against the potential terrorist threat posed by small transfers of funds, the obligation to check whether the information on the payer is accurate should, in the case of transfers of funds not made from an account, be restricted only to the name of the payer for individual transfers of funds of up to EUR 1 000. For transfers of funds made from an account, payment service providers should not be required to verify information on the payer accompanying each transfer of funds, where the obligations under Directive [xxxx/yyyy] have been met.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(12a) The authorities responsible for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, and relevant judicial and law enforcement agencies in the Member States, should intensify cooperation with each other and with the relevant third-country authorities, including developing countries, in order further to strengthen transparency, the sharing of information and best practices. The Union should support capacity-building programmes in developing countries to facilitate that cooperation. Systems for collecting evidence and making available data and information relevant to the investigation of offences should be improved, without in any way infringing the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, or fundamental rights, in the Union.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(12b) The payment service providers of the payer, the payee and the intermediary service providers should have in place appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect personal data against accidental loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure or access.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14) In order to check whether the required information on the payer and the payee accompanies transfers of funds, and to help to identify suspicious transactions, the payment service provider of the payee and the intermediary payment service provider should have effective procedures in place in order to detect whether information on the payer and the payee is missing.

(14) In order to check whether the required information on the payer and the payee accompanies transfers of funds, and to help to identify suspicious transactions, the payment service provider of the payee and the intermediary payment service provider should have effective procedures in place in order to detect whether information on the payer and the payee is missing or incomplete, in particular if numerous payment services are involved to improve the traceability of transfers of funds. Effective checks that the information is available and is complete, in particular where several payment service providers are involved, can help make investigation procedures less time consuming and more effective, which, in turn, improves the traceability of transfers of funds. Competent authorities in the Member States should thus ensure that payment service providers include the required transaction information with the wire transfer or related message throughout the payment chain.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(15) Owing to the potential terrorist financing threat posed by anonymous transfers, it is appropriate to require payment service providers to request information on the payer and the payee. In line with the risk based approach developed by FATF, it is appropriate to identify areas of higher and lower risk with a view to better targeting money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Accordingly, the payment service provider of the payee and the intermediary service provider should establish effective risk-based procedures for cases where a transfer of funds lacks the required payer and payee information, in order to decide whether to execute, reject or suspend that transfer and what appropriate follow-up action to take. Where the payment service provider of the payer is established outside the territory of the Union, enhanced customer due diligence should be applied, in accordance with Directive [xxxx/yyyy], in respect of cross-border correspondent banking relationships with that payment service provider.

(15) Owing to the potential terrorist financing threat posed by anonymous transfers, it is appropriate to require payment service providers to request information on the payer and the payee. In line with the risk based approach developed by FATF, it is appropriate to identify areas of higher and lower risk with a view to better targeting money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Accordingly, the payment service provider of the payee and the intermediary service provider should establish effective risk-based procedures and assess and weigh risks so that resources can be explicitly steered towards high-risk areas of money laundering. Such effective risk-based procedures for cases where a transfer of funds lacks the required payer and payee information will help payment service providers to decide more effectively whether to execute, reject or suspend that transfer and what appropriate follow-up action to take. Where the payment service provider of the payer is established outside the territory of the Union, enhanced customer due diligence should be applied, in accordance with Directive [xxxx/yyyy], in respect of cross-border correspondent banking relationships with that payment service provider.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17) The provisions on transfers of funds where information on the payer or the payee is missing or incomplete apply without prejudice to any obligations on payment service providers and the intermediary payment service providers to suspend and/or reject transfers of funds which violate provisions of civil, administrative or criminal law.

(17) The provisions on transfers of funds where information on the payer or the payee is missing or incomplete apply without prejudice to any obligations on payment service providers and the intermediary payment service providers to suspend and/or reject transfers of funds which violate provisions of civil, administrative or criminal law. The need for identity information on payer or the payee of individuals, legal persons, trusts, foundations, mutual societies, holdings and other similar existing or future legal arrangements is a key factor in tracing criminals who might otherwise hide their identity behind corporate structure.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(18) Until technical limitations that may prevent intermediary payment service providers from satisfying the obligation to transmit all the information they receive on the payer are removed, those intermediary payment service providers should keep records of that information. Such technical limitations should be removed as soon as payment systems are upgraded.

(18) Until technical limitations that may prevent intermediary payment service providers from satisfying the obligation to transmit all the information they receive on the payer are removed, those intermediary payment service providers should keep records of that information. Such technical limitations should be removed as soon as payment systems are upgraded. In order to overcome technical limitations, the use of the SEPA credit transfer scheme could be encouraged in interbank transfers between Member States and third countries.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19) Since in criminal investigations it may not be possible to identify the data required or the individuals involved until many months, or even years, after the original transfer of funds and in order to be able to have access to essential evidence in the context of investigations, it is appropriate to require payment service providers to keep records of information on the payer and the payee for the purposes of preventing, investigating and detecting money laundering or terrorist financing. This period should be limited.

(19) Since in criminal investigations it may not be possible to identify the data required or the individuals involved until many months, or even years, after the original transfer of funds and in order to be able to have access to essential evidence in the context of investigations, it is appropriate to require payment service providers to keep records of information on the payer and the payee for the purposes of preventing, investigating and detecting money laundering or terrorist financing. This period should be limited to five years, after which all personal data should be deleted, unless national law provide otherwise. Such further retention should be permitted only if necessary for the prevention, detection or investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing and should not exceed ten years. Payment service providers should ensure that data retained under this Regulation is used only for the purposes described herein.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of Articles XXX of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers²⁴ .

(23) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of Chapter V of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council²⁴.

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²⁴ OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13.

²⁴ Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3) ‘payer’ means a natural or legal person who either carries out a transfer of funds from his or her own account or who places an order for a transfer of funds;

(3) 'payer' means a payer as defined in Article 4(7) of Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council^1a;

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^1a Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC (OJ L 187, 18.7.2009, p. 5).

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(4) ‘payee’ means a natural or legal person who is the intended recipient of transferred funds;

(4) 'payee' means a payee as defined in Article 4(8) of Directive 2007/64/EC;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) ‘payment service provider’ means a natural or legal person who provides the service of transferring funds in his or her professional capacity;

(5) 'payment service provider' means a payment service provider as defined in Article 4(9) of Directive 2007/64/EC;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7) ‘transfer of funds’ means any transaction carried out by electronic means on behalf of a payer through a payment service provider, with a view to making funds available to a payee through a payment service provider, irrespective of whether the payer and the payee are the same person;

(7) ‘transfer of funds’ means any transaction carried out by electronic means on behalf of a payer through a payment service provider, with a view to making funds available to a payee through a payment service provider, in particular ‘money remittance services’ and ‘direct debit’ within the meaning of Directive 2007/64/EC, irrespective of whether the payer and the payee are the same person;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) ‘a person-to-person’ transfer of funds means a transaction between two natural persons.

(10) 'a person-to-person' transfer of funds means a transaction between two natural persons, who, as consumers, act for purposes other than their trade, business or profession.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. This Regulation shall not apply to transfers of funds carried out using a credit or debit card, or a mobile telephone or any other digital or information technology (IT) device, where the following conditions are fulfilled:

2. This Regulation shall not apply to transfers of funds carried out using a credit, debit or prepaid card or voucher, or a mobile telephone, e-money, or any other digital or information technology (IT) device defined in Directive 2014/.../EU [PSD], where the following conditions are fulfilled:

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) the card or device is used to pay goods and services;

(a) the card or device is used to pay goods and services to a company within professional trade or business;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

However, this Regulation shall apply when a credit or debit card, or a mobile telephone, or any other digital or IT device is used in order to effect a person-to-person transfer of funds.

However, this Regulation shall apply when a credit, debit or prepaid card or voucher, or a mobile telephone, e-money or any other digital or information technology (IT) device is used in order to effecta person-to-person transfer of funds.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

This Regulation shall not apply to natural or legal persons who have no activity other than to convert paper documents into electronic data and who act under a contract with a payment service provider as well as any natural or legal persons who have no activity other than to provide payment service providers with messaging or other support systems for transmitting funds or with clearing and settlement systems.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) the payer's address, or national identity number, or customer identification number, or date and place of birth.

(c) the payer's address, or customer identification number, or date and place of birth.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. Before transferring the funds, the payment service provider of the payer shall verify the accuracy of the information referred in paragraph 1 on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source.

3. Before transferring the funds, the payment service provider of the payer shall apply customer due diligence measures in accordance with Directive (xxxx/yyyy) and shall verify the accuracy and completeness of the information referred in paragraph 1 on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. However, by way of derogation from paragraph 3, in the case of transfers of funds not made from an account, the payment service provider of the payer shall not verify the information referred to in paragraph 1 if the amount does not exceed EUR 1 000 and it does not appear to be linked to other transfers of funds which, together with the transfer in question, exceed EUR 1 000.

5. However, by way of derogation from paragraph 3, in the case of transfers of funds not made from an account, the payment service provider of the payer is required to verify at least the name of the payer for transfers of funds of up to EUR 1 000, but shall verify the complete information relating to the payer and the payee referred to in paragraph 1 where the transaction is carried out in several operations that appear to be linked or where they exceed EUR 1 000.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. By way of derogation from Article 4(1) and (2), where the payment service provider(s) of both the payer and the payee are established in the Union, only the account number of the payer or his unique transaction identifier shall be provided at the time of the transfer of funds.

1. By way of derogation from Article 4(1) and (2), where the payment service provider(s) of both the payer and the payee are established in the Union, only the full name and the account number of the payer and the payee or the unique transaction identifier shall be required to be provided at the time of the transfer of funds, without prejudice to the information requirements laid down in Article 5(2)(b) and (3)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the payment service provider of the payer shall, upon request from the payment service provider of the payee or the intermediary payment service provider, make available the information on the payer or the payee in accordance with Article 4, within three working days of receiving that request.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the payment service provider of the payer shall, in the case of an identified higher risk as referred to in the Article 16(2) or (3) of, or in Annex III to, Directive [xxxx/yyyy], require the complete information relating to the payer and to the payee or, upon request from the payment service provider of the payee or the intermediary payment service provider, make available the information on the payer or the payee in accordance with Article 4, within three working days of receiving that request.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

By way of derogation from Article 4(1) and (2), where the payment service provider of the payee is established outside the Union, transfers of funds amounting to EUR 1 000 or less shall be accompanied only by:

By way of derogation from Article 4(1) and (2), where the payment service provider of the payee is established outside the Union, transfers of funds amounting to EUR 1 000 or less shall be accompanied by:

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The payment service provider of the payee shall detect whether the fields relating to the information on the payer and the payee in the messaging system or the payment and settlement system used to effect the transfer of funds, have been filled in using the characters or inputs admissible within the conventions of that system.

1. The payment service provider of the payee shall detect whether the fields relating to the information on the payer and the payee in the messaging system or the payment and settlement system used to effect the transfer of funds, have been filled in using the characters or inputs admissible to the internal risk-based established anti-abuse procedures within the conventions of that messaging or payment and settlement system.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. For transfers amounting to EUR 1 000 or less, where the payment service provider of the payer is established outside the Union, the payment service provider of the payee need not verify the information pertaining to the payee, unless there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing.

4. For transfers amounting to EUR 1 000 or less, where the payment service provider of the payer is established outside the Union, the payment service provider of the payee need not verify the information pertaining to the payee, unless there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing.

Member States may reduce or waive the threshold where the national risk assessment has advised that checks of transfers of funds not made from an account be intensified. Member States making use of this derogation shall inform the Commission thereof.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4a. Where the payment service provider of the payer is established in a third country which presents an increased level of risk, enhanced customer due diligence shall be applied, in accordance with Directive [xxxx/yyyy], in respect of cross-border correspondent banking relationships with that payment service provider.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The payment service provider of the payee shall establish effective risk-based procedures for determining when to execute, reject or suspend a transfer of funds lacking the required payer and payee information and the appropriate follow up action.

1. The payment service provider of the payee shall establish effective risk-based procedures, based on the identified risks in Article 16(2) of, and Annex III to, Directive [xxxx/yyyy], for determining when to execute, reject or suspend a transfer of funds lacking the required complete payer and payee information and the appropriate follow up action.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. In any event, the payment service provider of the payer and the payment service provider of the payee shall comply with any applicable law or administrative provisions relating to money laundering and terrorist financing, in particular Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 and Directive [xxx/yyy].

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

If the payment service provider of the payee becomes aware, when receiving transfers of funds, that information on the payer and the payee required under Articles 4(1) and (2), 5(1) and 6 is missing or incomplete, it shall either reject the transfer or ask for complete information on the payer and the payee.

If the payment service provider becomes aware, when receiving transfers of funds, that information on the payer and the payee required under Articles 4(1) and (2), 5(1) and 6 is missing or incomplete or has not been completed using the characters or inputs admissible within the conventions of the messaging or payment and settlement system, it shall either reject the transfer or suspend it and ask for complete information on the payer and the payee before executing the payment transaction.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where a payment service provider regularly fails to supply the required information on the payer, the payment service provider of the payee shall take steps, which may initially include the issuing of warnings and setting of deadlines, before either rejecting any future transfers of funds from that payment service provider or deciding whether or not to restrict or terminate its business relationship with that payment service provider.

2. Where a payment service provider regularly fails to supply the required complete information on the payer, the payment service provider of the payee shall take steps, which may initially include the issuing of warnings and setting of deadlines, before either rejecting any future transfers of funds from that payment service provider or deciding whether or not to restrict or terminate its business relationship with that payment service provider.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The payment service provider of the payee shall consider missing or incomplete information on the payer and the payee as a factor in assessing whether the transfer of funds, or any related transaction, is suspicious, and whether it must be reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit.

The payment service provider of the payee shall in accordance with the payment service providers risk-based procedures consider missing or incomplete information on the payer and the payee as one of the factors in assessing whether the transfer of funds, or any related transaction, is suspicious, and whether it must be reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit. The payment service provider shall, in its effective risk-based procedures, also focus on, and take appropriate measures regarding, other risk factors as identified in Article 16(3) of, and Annex III, to Directive [xxxx/yyyy].

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The intermediary payment service provider shall have effective procedures in place in order to detect whether the following information on the payer and the payee is missing:

2. The intermediary payment service provider shall have effective procedures in place in order to detect whether the following information on the payer and the payee is missing or incomplete:

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The intermediary payment service provider shall establish effective risk-based procedures for determining when to execute, reject or suspend a transfer of funds lacking the required payer and payee information and the appropriate follow up action.

1. The intermediary payment service provider shall establish effective risk-based procedures for determining whether the received information on the payer and the payee is missing or incomplete and shall undertake appropriate follow up action.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

If the intermediary payment service provider becomes aware, when receiving transfers of funds, that information on the payer and the payee required under Articles 4(1) and (2), 5(1) and 6 is missing or incomplete, it shall either reject the transfer or ask for complete information on the payer and the payee.

If the intermediary payment service provider becomes aware, when receiving transfers of funds, that information on the payer and the payee required under Articles 4(1) and (2), 5(1) and 6 is missing or incomplete or has not been completed using the characters or inputs admissible in accordance with the conventions of the messaging or payment and settlement system, it shall either reject the transfer or suspend it and ask for complete information on the payer and the payee before executing the payment transaction.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Cooperation obligations

Cooperation obligations and equivalence

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Payment service providers shall respond fully and without delay, in accordance with the procedural requirements established in the national law of the Member State in which they are established, to enquiries from the authorities responsible for combating money laundering or terrorist financing of that Member State concerning the information required under this Regulation.

1. Payment service providers and intermediary payment service providers shall respond fully and without delay, in accordance with the procedural requirements established in the national law of the Member State in which they are established, to enquiries exclusively from the authorities responsible for combating money laundering or terrorist financing of that Member State concerning the information required under this Regulation. Specific safeguards shall be put in place in order to ensure that such exchanges of information comply with data protection requirements. No other external authorities or parties shall have access to the data stored by the payment service providers.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Because a great proportion of illicit financial flows ends up in tax havens, the Union should increase its pressure on those countries to cooperate in order to combat such illicit financial flows and improve transparency.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. Payment service providers established in the Union shall apply this Regulation with regard to their subsidiaries and branches operating in third countries that are not deemed equivalent.

The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 22a concerning the recognition of the legal and supervisory framework of jurisdictions outside the Union as equivalent to the requirements of this Regulation.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 15a

Data Protection

1. With regard to the processing of personal data within the framework of this Regulation, payment service providers shall carry out their tasks for the purposes of this Regulation in accordance with national law transposing Directive 95/46/EC.

2. Payment service providers shall ensure that data retained under this Regulation is used only for the purposes described herein and that it is in no case used for commercial purposes.

3. Data protection authorities shall have powers, including the indirect access powers, to investigate, either ex officio or based on a complaint, any claims as regards problems with personal data processing. This should include particularly access to the data file at the payment service provider and competent national authorities.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 15b

Transfer of personal data to third countries or international organisations

The transfer of personal data to a third country, or to an international organisation, which does not ensure an adequate level of protection within the meaning of Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC, may take place only if:

(a) appropriate data protection measures and safeguards are put in place; and

(b) the supervisory authority has, after assessing those measure and safeguards, given prior authorisation for the transfer.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The payment service provider of the payer and the payment service provider of the payee shall keep records of the information referred to in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 for five years. In the cases referred to in Article 14(2) and (3), the intermediary payment service provider must keep records of all information received for five years. Upon expiry of this period, personal data must be deleted, unless otherwise provided for by national law, which shall determine under which circumstances payment service providers may or shall further retain data. Member States may allow or require further retention only if necessary for the prevention, detection or investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing. The maximum retention period following carrying-out of the transfer of funds shall not exceed ten years.

Information on the payer and the payee shall not be kept any longer than strictly necessary. The payment service provider of the payer and the payment service provider of the payee shall keep records of the information referred to in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 for a maximum period of five years. In the cases referred to in Article 14(2) and (3), the intermediary payment service provider must keep records of all information received for five years. Upon expiry of this period, personal data must be deleted. Member States may allow or require retention for a further period only in exceptional situations, where justified where reasons have been given, and only if necessary for the prevention, detection or investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing. The maximum retention period following carrying-out of the transfer of funds shall not exceed ten years and the storage of personal data shall comply with national law transposing Directive 95/46/EC.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The payment service providers of the payer, the payee and the intermediary service providers, shall have in place appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure or access.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The information collected on the payer or the payee by the payment service providers of the payer, the payee and the intermediary payment service providers shall be deleted following expiry of the retention period.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 16a

Access to information and confidentiality

1. Payment service providers shall ensure that the information collected for the purposes of this Regulation is accessible only to designated persons or limited to persons strictly necessary for the completion of the undertaken risk.

2. Payment service providers shall ensure that the confidentiality of the data processed is respected.

3. Individuals who have access to and who are dealing with personal data of the payer or the payee, shall respect the confidentiality of the data processes as well as the data protection requirements.

4. Competent authorities shall ensure that specific data protection training is provided to persons who regularly collect or process personal data.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) repeated non-inclusion of required information on the payer and payee, in breach of Articles 4, 5 and 6;

(a) repeated non-inclusion of required information on the payer and payee by a payment service provider, in breach of Articles 4, 5 and 6;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ca) serious failure by intermediary payment service providers to comply with Articles 11 and 12.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Administrative sanctions and measures imposed in the cases referred to in Articles 17 and 18(1) shall be published without undue delay including information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of persons responsible for it, unless such publication would seriously jeopardise the stability of financial markets.

The competent authorities shall publish administrative sanctions and measures imposed in the cases referred to in Articles 17 and 18(1) without undue delay including information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of persons responsible for it if necessary and proportionate after a case-by-case evaluation.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2a. Where the competent authority of a Member State imposes or applies an administrative penalty or other measure in accordance with Articles 17 and 18, it shall notify EBA of that penalty or measure and of the circumstances under which it was imposed or applied. EBA shall include such notification in the central database of administrative penalties established in accordance with Article 69 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council^1a and shall apply to it the same procedures as for all other published penalties.

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^1a Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Member States shall establish effective mechanisms to encourage reporting of breaches of the provisions of this Regulation to competent authorities.

1. Member States shall establish effective mechanisms to encourage reporting of breaches of the provisions of this Regulation to competent authorities. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be implemented to protect data against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss, alteration, or unlawful disclosure.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) appropriate protection for persons who report potential or actual breaches;

(b) appropriate protection for whistleblowers and persons who report potential or actual breaches;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The payment service providers shall establish appropriate procedures for their employees to report breaches internally through a specific channel.

3. The payment service providers in cooperation with the competent authorities shall establish internal appropriate procedures for their employees to report breaches internally through a secure, independent and anonymous channel.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Member States shall require competent authorities to effectively monitor, and take necessary measures with a view to ensuring, compliance with the requirements of this Regulation.

Member States shall require competent authorities to effectively monitor, and take necessary measures with a view to ensuring, compliance with the requirements of this Regulation. EBA may issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, on the processes for implementing this Regulation, taking into account the best practices of Member States .

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. The Commission shall coordinate and carefully monitor the application of this Regulation with regard to payment service providers outside the Union and shall strengthen cooperation, where appropriate, with third-country authorities responsible for investigating and penalising breaches under Article 18.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1b. By 1 January 2017, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the application of Chapter IV, with particular regard to cross-border cases, third-country payment service providers and their national competent authorities’ execution of investigatory and penalising powers. Should there be a risk of a breach relating to the storage of data, the Commission shall take appropriate and effective action, including submitting a proposal to amend this Regulation.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 22a

Exercise of the delegation

1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.

2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 15(1a) shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from the date referred to in Article 26.

3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 15(1a) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of that decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.

4. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.

5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 15(1a) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply, provided that implementing provisions adopted under the procedure set out therein do not alter the basic provisions of this Regulation.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Agreements with territories or countries mentioned in Article 355 of the Treaty

Agreements with territories or countries not mentioned in Article 355 of the Treaty

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission may authorise any Member State to conclude agreements with a country or territory which does not form part of the territory of the Union mentioned in Article 355 of the Treaty, which contain derogations from this Regulation, in order to allow for transfers of funds between that country or territory and the Member State concerned to be treated as transfers of funds within that Member State.

Without prejudice to Article 15(1a), the Commission may, in cases in which equivalence has been substantiated, authorise any Member State to conclude agreements with a country or territory which does not form part of the territory of the Union mentioned in Article 355 of the Treaty, which contain derogations from this Regulation, in order to allow for transfers of funds between that country or territory and the Member State concerned to be treated as transfers of funds within that Member State.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3a. For authorised decisions relating to dependent or associated territories already in place, uninterrupted continuation shall be ensured, namely Commission Implementing Decision 2012/43/EU^1a, Commission Decision 2010/259/EC^1b, and Commission Decision 2008/982/EC^1c.

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^1a Commission Implementing Decision 2012/43/EU of 25 January 2012 authorising the Kingdom of Denmark to conclude agreements with Greenland and the Faeroe Islands for transfers of funds between Denmark and each of these territories to be treated as transfers of funds within Denmark, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 24, 27.1.2012, p. 12).

^1b Commission Decision 2010/259/EC of 4 May 2010 authorising the French Republic to conclude an agreement with the Principality of Monaco for transfers of funds between the French Republic and the Principality of Monaco to be treated as transfers of funds within the French Republic, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 112, 5.5.2010, p. 23).

^1c Commission Decision 2008/982/EC of 8 December 2008 authorising the United Kingdom to conclude an agreement with the Bailwick of Jersey, the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Isle of Man for transfers of funds between the United Kingdom, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 352, 31.12.2008, p. 34).

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1) Flows of dirty money through transfers of funds can damage the stability and reputation of the financial sector and threaten the internal market. Terrorism shakes the very foundations of our society. The soundness, integrity and stability of the system of transfers of funds and confidence in the financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardised by the efforts of criminals and their associates either to disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to transfer funds for terrorist purposes.

(1) Massive flows of illicit money damage the stability and reputation of the financial sector and threaten the single market as well as international development, and terrorism shakes the very foundations of our society. Crucial facilitators of illicit money flows are secretive corporate structures operating in and through secrecy jurisdictions, often also referred to as tax havens. The soundness, integrity and stability of the system of transfers of funds and confidence in the financial system as a whole is being seriously jeopardised by the efforts of criminals and their associates either to disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to transfer funds for terrorist purposes.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1a) Money laundering is the processing of "dirty money" or criminal proceeds by disguising their illegal origin(s), changing their form(s), or moving the 'legitimised' funds back to the real economy, and whereas natural and legal persons and entire jurisdictions that actively or passively participate in money laundering activities enable the development and profitability of organised crime, which consequently undermines legal business activity, threatens the sustainability of the Union's market economy and social welfare models.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2) In order to facilitate their criminal activities, money launderers and terrorist financers could try to take advantage of the freedom of capital movements entailed by the integrated financial area, unless certain coordinating measures are adopted at Union level. By its scale, Union action should ensure that Recommendation 16 on wire transfers of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), adopted in February 2012 is transposed uniformly throughout the Union, and, in particular, that there is no discrimination between national payments within a Member State and cross border payments between Member States. Uncoordinated action by Member States alone in the field of cross border transfers of funds could have a significant impact on the smooth functioning of payment systems at Union level and therefore damage the internal market in the field of financial services.

(2) In order to facilitate their criminal activities, money launderers and terrorist financers are taking advantage of the freedom of capital movements entailed by the integrated financial area, unless certain coordinating measures are adopted at Union level. By its scale, Union action should ensure that Recommendation 16 on wire transfers of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), adopted in February 2012 is transposed uniformly throughout the Union, and, in particular, that there is no discrimination and discrepancies between national payments within a Member State and cross border payments between Member States. Uncoordinated action by Member States alone in the field of cross border transfers of funds could have a significant impact on the smooth functioning of payment systems at the Union level and therefore damage the internal market in the field of financial services.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2a) The implementation and enforcement of this Regulation, including FATF recommendation 16 on wire transfers adopted in February 2012, should not result in unjustified or disproportionate costs for payment service providers and citizens who use their services, and whereas the freedom of legal capital movement is to be fully guaranteed throughout the Union.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5 a) Special attention must be paid to the EU obligations set out in the Treaty of Lisbon in Article 208 on Policy Coherence for Development in order to stem the increasing trend of money laundering activities being moved from developed countries with stringent legislation into developing countries.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6) The full traceability of transfers of funds can be a particularly important and valuable tool in the prevention, investigation and detection of money laundering or terrorist financing. It is therefore appropriate, in order to ensure the transmission of information throughout the payment chain, to provide for a system imposing the obligation on payment service providers to have transfers of funds accompanied by information on the payer and the payee.

(6) The full traceability of transfers of funds can be a particularly important and valuable tool in the prevention, investigation and detection of money laundering or terrorist financing. It is therefore appropriate, in order to ensure the transmission of information throughout the payment chain, to provide for a system imposing the obligation on payment service providers to have transfers of funds accompanied by information on the payer and the payee. This system should also ensure the inclusion of payment service providers situated in developing countries whose financial systems are often abused for these illegal purposes.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) In order not to impair the efficiency of payment systems, the verification requirements for transfers of funds made from an account should be separate from those for transfers of funds not made from an account. In order to balance the risk of driving transactions underground by imposing overly strict identification requirements against the potential terrorist threat posed by small transfers of funds, the obligation to check whether the information on the payer is accurate should, in the case of transfers of funds not made from an account, be imposed only in respect of individual transfers of funds that exceed EUR 1 000. For transfers of funds made from an account, payment service providers should not be required to verify information on the payer accompanying each transfer of funds, where the obligations under Directive [xxxx/yyyy] have been met.

(10) In order neither to impair the efficiency of payment systems nor to impose disproportionate burden on payment service providers and citizens who use their services, the verification requirements for transfers of funds made from an account should be separate from those for transfers of funds not made from an account. In order to balance the risk of driving transactions underground by imposing overly strict identification requirements against the potential terrorist threat posed by small transfers of funds, while ensuring proper traceability of the payment transaction, the obligation to check whether the information on the payer is accurate should, in the case of transfers of funds not made from an account, always also include the name of the payee and be supplemented by any additional data deemed appropriate in respect of individual transfers of funds that exceed EUR 1 000 or individual transfers of funds lower than EUR 1000 made between the same payer and payee in the course of one calendar month that in total exceed the amount of EUR 1000. For transfers of funds made from an account, payment service providers should not be required to verify information on the payer accompanying each transfer of funds, where the obligations under Directive [xxxx/yyyy] have been met.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11a) Money laundering, corruption and organised crime continue to seriously affect developing countries and represent a critical obstacle to their development, limiting their growth potential and reducing their fiscal resource, due to the fact that instead of being placed in productive channels for further investment, laundered funds are often placed into "sterile" investments to preserve their value or make them easily transferable.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11b) As much EUR 800 billion is lost each year from developing countries to tax havens and illicit financial flows; notes that greater transparency and traceability of financial transfers is essential for poverty alleviation and wealth creation in developing countries.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(12 a) The authorities responsible for combating money laundering or terrorist financing, and relevant judicial and law enforcement agencies in the Member States, should intensify cooperation with each other and with the relevant authorities of non-Member States, including developing countries, in order to further strengthen transparency, the sharing of information and best practices. The EU should support capacity-building programmes in developing countries to facilitate this cooperation. Systems for collecting evidence and making available data and information relevant to the investigation of offences should be improved, without in any way infringing the subsidiarity and proportionality principles or fundamental rights in the Union.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

However, this Regulation shall apply when a credit or debit card, or a mobile telephone, or any other digital or IT device is used in order to effect a person-to-person transfer of funds.

However, this Regulation shall apply when a credit or debit card, or a mobile telephone, or any other digital or IT prepaid or postpaid device is used in order to affect a person-to-person transfer of funds.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Cooperation obligations

Cooperation obligations and Equivalence

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1) Because a great proportion of illicit financial flows ends up in tax havens, the EU should increase its pressure on these countries to cooperate in order to combat such illicit financial flows and improve transparency.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. Payment service providers established in the Union shall apply this regulation with regard to their subsidiaries and branches operating in jurisdictions outside the Union that are not deemed equivalent.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1) Flows of dirty money through transfers of funds can damage the stability and reputation of the financial sector and threaten the internal market. Terrorism shakes the very foundations of our society. The soundness, integrity and stability of the system of transfers of funds and confidence in the financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardised by the efforts of criminals and their associates either to disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to transfer funds for terrorist purposes.

(1) Massive flows of illicit money damage the structure, stability and reputation of the financial sector and threaten the single market as well as international development, and terrorism shakes the very foundations of our society. Crucial facilitators of illicit money flows are complex corporate structures operating in and through secrecy jurisdiction, often also referred to as tax havens. The soundness, integrity and stability of the system of transfers of funds and confidence in the financial system as a whole is being seriously jeopardised by the efforts of criminals and their associates either to disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to transfer funds for terrorist purposes.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9) It is appropriate to exclude from the scope of this Regulation transfers of funds that represent a low risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Such exclusions should cover credit or debit cards, mobile telephones or other digital or information technology (IT) devices, Automated Teller Machine (ATM) withdrawals, payments of taxes, fines or other levies, and transfers of funds where both the payer and the payee are payment service providers acting on their own behalf. In addition, in order to reflect the special characteristics of national payment systems, Member States may exempt electronic giro payments, provided that it is always possible to trace the transfer of funds back to the payer. However, there must be no exemption when a debit or credit card, a mobile telephone or other digital or IT prepaid or postpaid device is used in order to effect a person-to-person transfer.

(9) It is appropriate to exclude from the scope of this Regulation transfers of funds that represent a low risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Such exclusions should cover credit or debit cards, mobile telephones or other digital or information technology (IT) devices, Automated Teller Machine (ATM) withdrawals, payments of taxes, fines or other levies, and transfers of funds where both the payer and the payee are payment service providers acting on their own behalf. In addition, in order to reflect the special characteristics of national payment systems, Member States may exempt electronic giro payments, provided that it is always possible to trace the transfer of funds back to the payer. However, there must be no exemption when a debit or credit card, a mobile telephone or other digital or IT prepaid or postpaid device is used in order to effect a person-to-person transfer. Taking into account the dynamically evolving technological progress, consideration should be given to extend the scope of the Regulation to cover e-money and other new payment methods.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) In order not to impair the efficiency of payment systems, the verification requirements for transfers of funds made from an account should be separate from those for transfers of funds not made from an account. In order to balance the risk of driving transactions underground by imposing overly strict identification requirements against the potential terrorist threat posed by small transfers of funds, the obligation to check whether the information on the payer is accurate should, in the case of transfers of funds not made from an account, be imposed only in respect of individual transfers of funds that exceed EUR 1 000. For transfers of funds made from an account, payment service providers should not be required to verify information on the payer accompanying each transfer of funds, where the obligations under Directive [xxxx/yyyy] have been met.

(10) In order to balance the risk of driving transactions underground by imposing overly strict identification requirements against the potential terrorist threat posed by small transfers of funds, the obligation to check whether the information on the payer is accurate should, in the case of transfers of funds not made from an account, be imposed only in respect of individual transfers of funds that exceed EUR 1 000, without affecting the possibility of Member States to reduce or remove that threshold according to the results of the national risk assessment.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(13) For transfers of funds from a single payer to several payees to be sent in an inexpensive way in batch files containing individual transfers from the Union to outside the Union, provision should be made for such individual transfers to carry only the account number of the payer or his unique transaction identifier provided that complete information on the payer and the payee is contained in the batch file.

(13) For transfers of funds from a single payer to several payees to be sent in an inexpensive way in batch files containing individual transfers from the Union to outside the Union, provision should be made for such individual transfers to carry only the account number of the payer or his unique identifier provided that complete information on the payer and the payee is contained in the batch file.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14) In order to check whether the required information on the payer and the payee accompanies transfers of funds, and to help to identify suspicious transactions, the payment service provider of the payee and the intermediary payment service provider should have effective procedures in place in order to detect whether information on the payer and the payee is missing.

(14) In order to check whether the required information on the payer and the payee accompanies transfers of funds, and to help to identify suspicious transactions, the payment service provider of the payee and the intermediary payment service provider should have effective procedures in place in order to detect whether information on the payer and the payee is missing or incomplete. This in particular if numeral payment services are involved to improve the traceability of transfers of funds

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17) The provisions on transfers of funds where information on the payer or the payee is missing or incomplete apply without prejudice to any obligations on payment service providers and the intermediary payment service providers to suspend and/or reject transfers of funds which violate provisions of civil, administrative or criminal law.

(17) The provisions on transfers of funds where information on the payer or the payee is missing or incomplete apply without prejudice to any obligations on payment service providers and the intermediary payment service providers to suspend and/or reject transfers of funds which violate provisions of civil, administrative or criminal law. The need for identity information on payer or the payee of individualsor future legal arrangements is a key factor in tracing criminals who might otherwise hide their identity behind corporate structure.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(18) Until technical limitations that may prevent intermediary payment service providers from satisfying the obligation to transmit all the information they receive on the payer are removed, those intermediary payment service providers should keep records of that information. Such technical limitations should be removed as soon as payment systems are upgraded.

(18) Until technical limitations that may prevent intermediary payment service providers from satisfying the obligation to transmit all the information they receive on the payer are removed, those intermediary payment service providers should keep records of that information. Such technical limitations should be removed as soon as payment systems are upgraded. In order to overcome technical limitations, the use of the SEPA credit transfer scheme could be encouraged in interbank transfers between EU Member States and third countries.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3) payer’ means a natural or legal person who either carries out a transfer of funds from his or her own account or who places an order for a transfer of funds;

(3) ‘payer’ means a payer as defined in Article 4(7) of Directive 2007/64/EC

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(4) ‘payee’ means a natural or legal person who is the intended recipient of transferred funds;

(4) ‘payee’ means a payee as defined in Article 4(8) of Directive 2007/64/EC;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) ‘payment service provider’ means a natural or legal person who provides the service of transferring funds in his or her professional capacity;

(5) ‘payment service provider’ means a payment service provider as defined in Article 4(9) of Directive 2007/64/EC;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9) ‘unique transaction identifier’ means a combination of letters or symbols determined by the payment service provider, in accordance with the protocols of the payment and settlement systems or messaging systems used for the fund transfer, which permits traceability of the transaction back to the payer and the payee;

(9) ‘unique identifier’ means a unique identifier as defined in Article 4(21) of Directive 2007/64/EC;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) ‘a person-to-person’ transfer of funds means a transaction between two natural persons.

(10) ‘a person-to-person’ transfer of funds means a transaction between two natural persons, who, as consumers, act for purposes other than their trade, business or profession.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) the payer's account number, where such an account is used to process the transfer of funds, or a unique transaction identifier where no such account is used for that purpose;

(b) the payer's account number, where such an account is used to process the transfer of funds, or a unique identifier where no such account is used for that purpose;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. Before transferring the funds, the payment service provider of the payer shall verify the accuracy of the information referred in paragraph 1 on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source.

3. Before transferring the funds, the payment service provider of the payer shall verify the accuracy of the complete information referred in paragraph 1 on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. However, by way of derogation from paragraph 3, in the case of transfers of funds not made from an account, the payment service provider of the payer shall not verify the information referred to in paragraph 1 if the amount does not exceed EUR 1 000 and it does not appear to be linked to other transfers of funds which, together with the transfer in question, exceed EUR 1 000.

5. However, by way of derogation from paragraph 3, in the case of transfers of funds not made from an account, the payment service provider of the payer shall not verify the information referred to in paragraph 1 if the amount does not exceed EUR 1 000 and it does not appear to be linked to other transfers of funds which, together with the transfer in question, exceed EUR 1 000.

Member States can reduce or remove the threshold when the national risk assessment advises to intensify the control over the transfers of funds not made from an account. Member States making use of this derogation shall inform the Commission thereof.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. By way of derogation from Article 4(1) and (2), where the payment service provider(s) of both the payer and the payee are established in the Union, only the account number of the payer or his unique transaction identifier shall be provided at the time of the transfer of funds.

1. By way of derogation from Article 4(1) and (2), where the payment service provider(s) of both the payer and the payee are established in the Union, only the full name of the principal and the account number of the payer or his unique identifier shall be provided at the time of the transfer of funds.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

This information need not be verified for accuracy, unless there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing.

This information shall be verify according to the rules established under article 4(4) and 4 (5)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. For transfers amounting to EUR 1 000 or less, where the payment service provider of the payer is established outside the Union, the payment service provider of the payee need not verify the information pertaining to the payee, unless there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing.

4. For transfers amounting to EUR 1 000 or less, where the payment service provider of the payer is established outside the Union, the payment service provider of the payee need not verify the information pertaining to the payee, unless there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing.

Member States can reduce or remove the threshold when the national risk assessment advises to intensify the control over the transfers of funds not made from an account. Member States making use of this derogation shall inform the Commission thereof.

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The intermediary payment service provider shall have effective procedures in place in order to detect whether the following information on the payer and the payee is missing:

2. The intermediary payment service provider shall have effective procedures in place in order to detect whether the following information on the payer and the payee is missing or incomplete:

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The payment service provider of the payer and the payment service provider of the payee shall keep records of the information referred to in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 for five years. In the cases referred to in Article 14(2) and (3), the intermediary payment service provider must keep records of all information received for five years. Upon expiry of this period, personal data must be deleted, unless otherwise provided for by national law, which shall determine under which circumstances payment service providers may or shall further retain data. Member States may allow or require further retention only if necessary for the prevention, detection or investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing. The maximum retention period following carrying-out of the transfer of funds shall not exceed ten years.

The payment service provider of the payer and the payment service provider of the payee shall keep records of the information referred to in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 for five years. In the cases referred to in Article 14(2) and (3), the intermediary payment service provider must keep records of all information received for five years. Upon expiry of this period, personal data must be deleted, unless otherwise provided for by national law, which shall determine under which circumstances payment service providers may or shall further retain data. Member States may allow or require further retention only if necessary for the prevention, detection or investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing. The maximum retention period following carrying-out of the transfer of funds shall not exceed ten years, and the storage of personal data shall comply with the General Data Protection Regulation [yyyy/xxxx].

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) appropriate protection for persons who report potential or actual breaches;

(b) appropriate protection for whistle-blowers and persons who report potential or actual breaches;

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Member States shall require competent authorities to effectively monitor, and take necessary measures with a view to ensuring, compliance with the requirements of this Regulation.

Member States shall require competent authorities to effectively monitor, and take necessary measures with a view to ensuring, compliance with the requirements of this Regulation. The European Banking Authority (EBA) could provide more specific guidance on the implementation process, including guidelines on the definition of certain terms and practices. In order to produce such guidelines, the best practice examples of countries that have satisfactorily implemented the regulation should be published.