A Security Analysis of Restricted Syndrome Decoding Problems
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Abstract
Restricted syndrome decoding problems (R-SDP and R-SDP($G$)) provide an interesting basis for post-quantum cryptography. Indeed, they feature in CROSS, a submission in the ongoing process for standardizing post-quantum signatures.
This work improves our understanding of the security of both problems. Firstly, we propose and implement a novel collision attack on R-SDP($G$) that provides the best attack under realistic restrictions on memory. Secondly, we derive precise complexity estimates for algebraic attacks on R-SDP that are shown to be accurate by our experiments. We note that neither of these improvements threatens the updated parameters of CROSS.
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How to cite
Ward Beullens, Pierre Briaud, and Morten Øygarden, A Security Analysis of Restricted Syndrome Decoding Problems. IACR Communications in Cryptology, vol. 1, no. 3, Oct 07, 2024, doi: 10.62056/a06cy7qiu.
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.