On the Impossibility of Probabilistic Proofs in Relativized Worlds

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Abstract

We initiate the systematic study of probabilistic proofs in relativized worlds, where the goal is to understand, for a given oracle, the possibility of "non-trivial" proof systems for deterministic or nondeterministic computations that make queries to the oracle.

This question is intimately related to a recent line of work that seeks to improve the efficiency of probabilistic proofs for computations that use functionalities such as cryptographic hash functions and digital signatures, by instantiating them via constructions that are "friendly" to known constructions of probabilistic proofs. Informally, negative results about probabilistic proofs in relativized worlds provide evidence that this line of work is inherent and, conversely, positive results provide a way to bypass it.

We prove several impossibility results for probabilistic proofs relative to natural oracles. Our results provide strong evidence that tailoring certain natural functionalities to known probabilistic proofs is inherent.

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1 Introduction

The study of relativized complexity classes originally aspired to shed light on the structural relationships between unrelativized complexity classes. However, it was soon realized that many interesting complexity classes have contradictory relativization results. For instance, Baker et al. [9] showed that there exist oracles A and B such that $P^A = NP^A$ and $P^B \neq NP^B$.

Subsequent works sought to circumvent this difficulty by considering relativized worlds where the oracle is sampled from a "natural" distribution, and thereby avoid specially-crafted oracles that can force an equality/inequality on the complexity classes being compared. For instance, Bennett and Gill [20] proved that, with probability 1 over a random oracle R, it holds that $P^R \neq NP^R \neq \text{co-NP}^R$ and $P^R = BPP^R$. Since these relativization results agreed with what people believed to be true in the unrelativized case, Bennett and Gill proposed the Random Oracle Hypothesis, which states that structural relationships between complexity classes that hold with probability 1 over a random oracle also hold in the unrelativized case. However, this hypothesis was later disproved by Chang et al. [22], who showed that, with probability 1 over a random oracle R, $IP^R \neq PSPACE^R$. (We know that, without oracles, IP = PSPACE [34, 41].)

These works indicate that, in general, relativization results are not helpful for understanding the relationships between unrelativized complexity classes. At best they provide us with relativization barriers, which nowadays are not considered so strong since we know of non-relativizing techniques.

1.1 New motivation: the efficiency of probabilistic proofs

We revisit relativization with a new motivation: the efficiency of probabilistic proofs. Superficially, relativization and probabilistic proofs seem unrelated. Yet they are deeply connected, as we explain.

Probabilistic proofs such as interactive proofs [28] and probabilistically checkable proofs [8] have played important roles in the study of hardness of approximation since the seminal work of [25]. In recent years, they became the subject of intense study due to their application to constructing highly-efficient cryptographic proofs (such as succinct arguments), and a major research goal today is to improve the efficiency of probabilistic proofs. We now illustrate, via an example, how relativization results tell us important facts about the efficiency of probabilistic proofs.

▶ **Example 1.** Let $\mathcal{H} = \{H_s \colon \{0,1\}^{|s|} \to \{0,1\}^{|s|}\}_{s \in \{0,1\}^*}$ be a family of "hash functions" (the precise security property in this discussion is unimportant), and consider the following NP language:

$$L_s = \{(n,y) \in \mathbb{N} \times \{0,1\}^{|s|} \mid \exists x \in \{0,1\}^{|s|} \text{ s.t. } H_s^n(x) = y\}$$
.

The efficiency measures (proof length, randomness complexity, query complexity, and others) of a PCP for the language L_s typically depend on the size of an arithmetic circuit that iteratively applies H_s , for n times, to a candidate witness x and checks if the result is y. The size of such a circuit is $\Omega(n|H_s|)$, i.e., it depends on the size of a circuit for expressing the computation of H_s . Since there are many NP languages of interest to practitioners that involve cryptographic computations such as hash functions, researchers have been designing specialized families of hash functions that can be represented via small arithmetic circuits [6, 2, 29, 4, 3, 30].

We ask: is optimizing the arithmetic circuit complexity of hash functions necessary?

We now explain why the answer to this question is connected to relativization statements about probabilistic proofs. Informally, suppose that for any family of hash functions \mathcal{H} it holds that $NP^{\mathcal{H}} \subseteq PCP^{\mathcal{H}}$. In other words, every language that can be decided by a nondeterministic polynomial-time machine that makes oracle calls to a hash function has a PCP verifier that may make oracle calls to the same hash function. Now the "oracle language" $\mathcal{L} = \{L_s\}_{s \in \{0,1\}^*}$, which is in the relativized complexity class $NP^{\mathcal{H}}$, can be decided via a computation that involves n calls to the hash function but does not depend on the complexity of the hash function itself (as this computation happens inside the oracle). Hence, since we assumed that $NP^{\mathcal{H}} \subseteq PCP^{\mathcal{H}}$, we can obtain a probabilistic proof for \mathcal{L} whose efficiency does not depend on the complexity of the hash function (which is wonderful).

In sum, probabilistic proofs that "relativize with respect to hash functions" obviate the need to design hash functions with small complexity and, conversely, negative results about such relativizations provide strong evidence that efforts to design "PCP-friendly" hash functions are inherent.

The above example illustrates a general connection. On the one hand, constructing probabilistic proofs in relativized worlds could provide drastic efficiency improvements to probabilistic proofs. On the other hand, ruling out probabilistic proofs in relativized worlds

would provide a complexity-theoretic justification for why practitioners may be "stuck" with the task of designing "PCP-friendly" realizations of various functionalities (hash functions, signatures, encryption, and so on).

1.2 Our question: are there PCPs for computations in relativized worlds?

We initiate the systematic study of probabilistic proofs for relativized computations.

In this work an *oracle* is a collection $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ where each \mathcal{A}_n is a distribution over functions on *n*-bit inputs. A *sample* from \mathcal{A} is a function $A \colon \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ obtained by sampling a function f_n from each \mathcal{A}_n and then setting A to equal f_n for *n*-bit inputs. (See Section 2.1 for definitions.)

We wish to understand for what oracles \mathcal{A} there are probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) in a relativized world where all machines have oracle access to a sample from \mathcal{A} . Below we make this question more precise, distinguishing between the case of PCPs for relativized nondeterministic computations ("do PCPs provide any savings in witness length?") and the case of PCPs for relativized deterministic computations ("do PCPs provide any savings in computation length?").

The complexity classes that we study are the natural relativized extensions of DTIME, NTIME, and PCP. Note that complexity classes relative to an oracle \mathcal{A} are sets of *oracle languages* (see Definition 11) rather than sets of languages, because the sample from \mathcal{A} affects whether a particular instance is in the language or not. The informal definitions below are made precise in Section 2.4.

$DTIME(t(n))^{\mathcal{A}}$	oracle languages that are decidable by a deterministic machine that runs in time $O(t(n))$ and has oracle access to a sample from A
$\text{NTIME}(t(n))^{\mathcal{A}}$	oracle languages that are decidable by a nondeterministic machine that runs in time $O(t(n))$ and has oracle access to a sample from $\mathcal A$
$PCP(t(n), q(n))^{A}$	oracle languages that are decidable by a <i>PCP verifier</i> that runs in time $O(t(n))$, makes $O(q(n))$ queries to a proof string, and has oracle access to a sample from \mathcal{A}

We introduce two incomparable questions, which concern the (im)possibility of "non-trivial" PCPs for relativized nondeterministic computations and for relativized deterministic computations.

1. PCPs for NTIME. For every oracle \mathcal{A} it holds that NTIME $(t(n))^{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq PCP(t(n), t(n))^{\mathcal{A}}$ because a PCP verifier can read in full a witness provided in the PCP proof, and then run the nondeterministic decider on the witness. We ask: for what oracles \mathcal{A} can we have any non-trivial improvement on this trivial inclusion? Namely, we consider PCP verifiers that may make o(t(n)) queries to the PCP proof, which in general prevents the PCP verifier from reading a witness from the PCP proof. We additionally allow the PCP verifier to incur a polynomial blow-up in running time: it may run in time poly(t(n)), and in particular can make poly(t(n)) queries to the sample from \mathcal{A} . (The queries to the PCP proof are still o(t(n)).) This amounts to asking:

Given an oracle \mathcal{A} , is it the case that $\text{NTIME}(t(n))^{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq \text{PCP}(\text{poly}(t(n)), o(t(n)))^{\mathcal{A}}$? We will say that an oracle \mathcal{A} separates NTIME and PCP if the answer to this question is negative.

2. **PCPs for DTIME.** For every oracle \mathcal{A} it holds that $\text{DTIME}(t(n))^{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq \text{PCP}(t(n), 0)^{\mathcal{A}}$ because a PCP verifier can simply run the deterministic decider. We similarly ask: for what oracles \mathcal{A} can we have *any* non-trivial improvement on this trivial inclusion? Namely,

we consider PCP verifiers that run in time o(t(n)), which in general prevents a PCP verifier from simply running the deterministic decider. We additionally allow the PCP verifier to ask any number of queries to the proof or to the sample from \mathcal{A} (as bounded by its running time). This amounts to asking:

Given an oracle \mathcal{A} , is it the case that $\mathrm{DTIME}(t(n))^{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq \mathrm{PCP}(o(t(n)), o(t(n)))^{\mathcal{A}}$? We will say that an oracle \mathcal{A} separates DTIME and PCP if the answer to this question is negative.

What is known? Recall that, for unrelativized complexity classes, we have excellent PCPs. All nondeterministic computations have a constant-query PCP verifier that runs in polylogarithmic time: $\text{NTIME}(t(n)) \subseteq \text{PCP}(\text{poly}(n, \log t(n)), O(1))$ [24, 19, 37]. In particular, PCPs simultaneously provide exponential savings in witness length and in computation length.

However, for relativized complexity classes, known relativization results tell us very little. The main relevant prior work is by Hartmanis et al. [31], who claim that, with probability 1 over a random function $R: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}$, $NP^R \not\subseteq PCP(\text{poly}(n), \log n)^R$. This provides a negative result for the special case where \mathcal{A} is a "random oracle", t(n) is polynomially bounded, and the PCP verifier makes $O(\log n)$ queries to the PCP proof. (In Section 1.4 we discuss other related work.)

However, even for the case of a random oracle, our goal is to rule out *any* non-trivial PCP for *any* nondeterministic computation (ruling out any savings in witness length), and also for any *deterministic* computation (ruling out any savings in computation length, even if there is no witness).

More generally, we are interested to answer these questions for oracles beyond random oracles.

Some intuition. If the PCP verifier could "learn" the oracle in a small number of queries, then we may be able to rely on known techniques to construct PCPs for *un*relativized computations because each oracle call could be replaced by a subroutine that simulates the learned oracle. Conversely, if the oracle is "hard" to learn, then known techniques do not seem to apply because it is not clear how they could deal with oracle calls, and so we may expect that non-trivial PCPs in this case are impossible. Our goal will be to show that, for hard-enough oracles, non-trivial PCPs are indeed impossible (regardless of the techniques that could be used to construct the PCPs).

Beyond PCPs. There are several models of probabilistic proofs beyond PCPs, such as interactive proofs (IPs) [28], interactive PCPs (IPCPs) [33], and interactive oracle proofs (IOPs) [18, 39]. One may ask: why do we focus only on PCPs in our presentation? The answer is that, for the goals of this paper, the PCP model is equivalent to the IOP model (see Remark 6), and the IOP model subsumes the other models as special cases. So, for the goals of this paper, it suffices to study PCPs. All results in Section 1.3 directly translate to IPs, IPCPs, and IOPs.

1.3 Our results

We prove that, for several oracles of cryptographic interest, non-trivial PCPs for relativized computations do not exist – this holds both for deterministic computations (DTIME) and for nondeterministic computations (NTIME). Moreover, we establish several structural results about "hard oracles" for PCPs. These initial results provide us with valuable insights into the efficiency limitations of PCPs, and provide a useful starting point for further investigations into this new direction.

We now summarize our results in more detail.

(1) Random functions. We begin with the oracle that intuition suggests is the "hardest" oracle for PCPs because it is "maximally unlearnable", the random oracle. Namely, we consider the oracle $\mathcal{R} = \{\mathcal{R}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ where each \mathcal{R}_n is the uniform distribution over all functions $R_n : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$. Our first result shows that the intuition is correct, i.e., we prove that the oracle \mathcal{R} separates DTIME and PCP and also separates NTIME and PCP.

▶ **Theorem 2** (informal). Let \mathcal{R} be the random oracle. For any $t : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$,

$$\mathrm{DTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{R}} \not\subseteq \mathrm{PCP}(o(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{R}} \quad and \quad \mathrm{NTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{R}} \not\subseteq \mathrm{PCP}(\mathrm{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{R}} \ .$$

The above theorem tells us that we cannot, in general, expect to construct PCPs for cryptographic computations that involve random oracles, such as Fiat–Shamir signatures [26]. The natural alternative would be to somehow instantiate the random oracle, and incur, within the PCP, the cost of the hash function used in place of the random oracle. This is indeed what Valiant [43] did in his construction of incrementally verifiable computation (IVC): Valiant needed to construct a PCP for the computation of a SNARK verifier that uses random oracles and, lacking suitable PCPs for this relativized computation, considered instead the SNARK verifier obtained by instantiating the random oracle. Our Theorem 2 rules out PCPs for computations that use random oracles, and in particular gives strong evidence that Valiant's approach was in some sense justified.

One may argue that, while they give us useful insights, random oracles do not tell us much about other oracles because they are too special in that they have no structure. We now consider two oracles with structure: one with group structure and another with low-degree structure.

- (2) Random generic groups. Many group-based cryptographic primitives are stated (and sometimes also analyzed) with respect to a generic group. This means that the primitive relies only on the fact that a certain prime-order group is available but does not rely on whether the group is instantiated, say, with a multiplicative subgroup of a finite field or an elliptic curve group. This motivates the question of whether there are PCPs with respect to a random (generic) group oracle, which is the oracle $\mathcal{O} = \{\mathcal{O}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ where each \mathcal{O}_n is a random presentation of a group of order n. We prove that the answer is negative, i.e., that the oracle \mathcal{O} separates NTIME and PCP.
- **Theorem 3** (informal). Let \mathcal{O} be the random group oracle. For any $t: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$,

$$\text{NTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{O}} \not\subseteq \text{PCP}(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{O}}$$
.

The above theorem tells us that, in general, the representation of a group matters to a PCP. For example, if we return to the iterative hash computation of Example 1 and set the hash function to be the Pedersen hash function (a function that is collision resistant over any group where extracting discrete logarithms is hard), we should pick a group tailored to the PCP at hand. This is consistent with the fact that applied cryptographers working with probabilistic proofs have had to carefully design group instantiations for such computations.

¹ More generally, we consider the uniform distribution over functions $R_n: \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$ for some $\ell(n)$.

E.g., Jubjub [44] is an elliptic curve in the Zcash cryptocurrency that is used to instantiate a Pedersen hash function in a way that is "friendly" to probabilistic proofs. Our theorem provides strong evidence that these efforts are necessary.

(3) Random low-degree functions. Probabilistic proofs are typically achieved by relying on low-degree functions that encode information associated to the computation being checked. This fact extends to relativized complexity classes in the sense that results such as IP = PSPACE algebrize with respect to every oracle [1]. In the language of this paper, this means that for every oracle \mathcal{A} , it holds that PSPACE^{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq IP^{$\hat{\mathcal{A}}$} where $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ is the low-degree extension of \mathcal{A} (each sample in \mathcal{A} is replaced with some low-degree extension of it).

However in this paper we are interested to understand relativization results, not algebrization results, and the above discussion raises the question of what happens when we compare DTIME/NTIME and PCP in a relativized world where the oracle is a random low-degree function. Namely, we consider the oracle $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ where \mathcal{P}_n is the uniform distribution over all low-degree polynomials on n variables (for given field and degree parameters). Note that \mathcal{P} can be viewed as a low-degree extension of the random oracle \mathcal{R} .

We prove that \mathcal{P} separates NTIME and PCP.

▶ **Theorem 4** (informal). Let \mathcal{P} be the random low-degree oracle. For any $t \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$,

$$\text{NTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{P}} \not\subseteq \text{PCP}(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{P}}$$
.

Interlude on separation types. We have so far considered relativized complexity classes in which a single machine is granted oracle access to a sample $A: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ from the oracle \mathcal{A} , and is required to "work" for the language defined by A with probability 1 over the choice of A. For example, $\mathrm{DTIME}(t)^A$ is the class of all oracle languages $\mathcal{L} = \{L_A\}_{A \in \mathcal{A}}$ for which there exists a deterministic machine M, which runs in time O(t(n)), such that

$$\Pr_{A \leftarrow \mathcal{A}} \left[M^A \text{ decides the language } L_A \right] = 1 .$$

We use analogous definitions for NTIME and PCP, as discussed in Section 2.4. We consider these definitions to be the natural ones to use for the goals of this paper. We sometimes refer to separations between these complexity classes as *uniform separations*, to distinguish them from those below.

We could alternatively study separations where all machines are allowed to non-uniformly depend on A, thereby granting all machines more power. In this direction, there are two natural definitions.

- Somewhere separation. We say that \mathcal{A} provides a somewhere separation for DTIME and PCP if there exists $A \in \mathcal{A}$ such that DTIME $(t)^A \not\subseteq PCP(o(t), o(t))^A$. And similarly for NTIME.
- Almost-everywhere separation. We say that \mathcal{A} provides an almost-everywhere separation for DTIME and PCP if DTIME $(t)^A \subseteq \text{PCP}(o(t), o(t))^A$ holds with probability 1 over a random choice of sample $A \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$. (Note that this leaves open the possibility that there is no separation for a set of functions of measure 0 in \mathcal{A} .) And similarly for NTIME.

An almost-everywhere separation is, in general, strictly stronger than an a somewhere separation. However, the relation between these and uniform separations is not a priori clear.

We provide clarity on this comparison: in the full version we prove that uniform separations are equivalent to somewhere separations, at least when comparing DTIME/NTIME and PCP. Namely, we prove that, for any oracle \mathcal{A} , DTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{A}} \not\subseteq \text{PCP}(o(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{A}}$ if and only if there exists a function A in \mathcal{A} such that DTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{A}} \not\subseteq \text{PCP}(o(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{A}}$. And similarly for NTIME.

Almost-everywhere separation for random functions. For the random oracle \mathcal{R} , we strengthen the separations in Theorem 2 to almost-everywhere separations (via a different, longer proof). We learn that the random oracle \mathcal{R} is particularly "hard" for PCPs.

▶ **Theorem 5** (informal). Let \mathcal{R} be the random oracle. For any $t : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$,

$$\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\ \mathrm{DTIME}(t)^R \not\subseteq \mathrm{PCP}(o(t), o(t))^R \ \right] = 1$$
 and
$$\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\ \mathrm{NTIME}(t)^R \not\subseteq \mathrm{PCP}(\mathrm{poly}(t), o(t))^R \ \right] = 1 \ .$$

The above theorem also directly improves on the classical work of Hartmanis et al. [31], who showed that $\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}}[\operatorname{NP}^R \not\subseteq \operatorname{PCP}(\operatorname{poly}(n), \log n)^R] = 1$. The improvement is that our result rules out any non-trivial PCP for any nondeterministic computation, and also rules out any non-trivial PCP for any deterministic computation.

We prove Theorem 5 by building on techniques of Chang et al. [22] that were used to prove that $\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}}[\operatorname{IP}^R \neq \operatorname{PSPACE}^R] = 1$. These techniques rely on the fact that every function R in \mathcal{R} has many other functions in \mathcal{R} that are close to it in all but finitely many points.

We do not know how to extend these techniques to oracles such as the random group oracle \mathcal{O} or the random low-degree oracle \mathcal{P} , because in these cases any two samples are far from one another. In this light, we view the techniques that we use to prove Theorems 2 to 4 as more flexible. Moreover, we consider the separations proved in these theorems as sufficient for our motivations.

Structural results: beyond \mathcal{R} , \mathcal{O} , \mathcal{P} . Our results thus far concern separations for specific oracles of interest. There are other oracles of interest that demand understanding (e.g., pseudorandom functions) and, more generally, the study of separations could benefit from general statements. In Section 3 we prove several useful structural results about oracles that are "hard" for PCPs.

- 1. Robustness. We prove that the separating property is "robust" with respect to small perturbations. In more detail, we prove that for every oracle \mathcal{A} that separates DTIME/NTIME and PCP there exists a distance function ϵ such that any other oracle that is ϵ -close to \mathcal{A} also separates DTIME/NTIME and PCP. This statement can also be viewed as telling us that the set of separating oracles is open with respect to statistical distance (see Definition 8).
 - We can apply the above result to any of the separations that we have proved. For example, if apply it to Theorem 2 then we learn that all oracles that are "almost" uniformly random (close enough to the random oracle \mathcal{R}) separate DTIME/NTIME and PCP. In fact, in the full version, we use additional techniques to quantify (a bound on) this distance threshold, proving that all oracles that are $\frac{1}{3e}$ -close to uniformly random separate NTIME and PCP.
- 2. Monotonicity. We prove that the separating property is "monotone" in that, for every oracle \mathcal{A} that separates DTIME/NTIME and PCP, if another oracle \mathcal{B} contains \mathcal{A} as a marginal distribution then \mathcal{B} also separates DTIME/NTIME and PCP. I.e., \mathcal{B} inherits the hardness of \mathcal{A} .

We rely on monotonicity in the proof of Theorem 4, where we reduce the problem of showing separation for random *low-degree* polynomials to the problem of showing separation for random *multilinear* polynomials (which we then solve).

- 3. Conditioning. We prove that the separating property is preserved by (finite) conditioning. Namely, given an oracle \mathcal{A} and a function $\mathfrak{f}\colon D\to \{0,1\}^*$ over a finite domain D, we denote by $\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{f}}$ the oracle where samples are conditioned to equal \mathfrak{f} on D. We prove that if \mathcal{A} separates DTIME/NTIME and PCP then $\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{f}}$ also separates DTIME/NTIME and PCP.
- ▶ Remark 6 (beyond PCPs). Research in the last few years has shown that using known PCPs is not the best choice for constructing efficient succinct arguments. Instead, it is better to construct succinct arguments from IOPs [18, 39], which are a multi-round generalization of PCPs that enables significant improvements in asymptotic and concrete efficiency [15, 14, 13, 10, 12, 11, 17, 16, 40]. So the reader may rightfully ask: why did we prove all of our results for PCPs instead of IOPs, if these latter are more powerful?

The answer is that all of our results extend, in a generic way, to IOPs as well. This is because our results about PCPs only consider the PCP verifier's time complexity and query complexity, and IOPs do not provide any benefits over PCPs when only considering these complexity measures. Indeed, any IOP can be "unrolled" into a PCP, possibly of exponentially larger size, while preserving the verifier's time complexity and query complexity, regardless of oracle. In particular, for every oracle \mathcal{A} , the complexity class IOP $(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$ (oracle languages for \mathcal{A} decidable by an IOP verifier with time complexity T and query complexity T and query complexity T and query complexity T and query complexity T.

Finally, we additionally obtain analogous impossibility results for interactive proofs (IPs) [28] and interactive PCPs (IPCPs) [33], as both are special cases of IOPs.

1.4 Related work

NP vs. PCP in relativized worlds. Fortnow [27] uses diagonalization to obtain a function $R: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}$ such that, for every $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $\operatorname{NP}^R \not\subseteq \operatorname{PCP}(\operatorname{poly}(n), n^k)^R$. Hartmanis et al. [31] report a stronger result: with probability 1 over a random function $R: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}$, $\operatorname{NP}^R \not\subseteq \operatorname{PCP}(\operatorname{poly}(n), \log n)^R$. We do not know of a version of [31] that contains a proof of this result, so we cannot comment on the techniques used to prove it. As already discussed, our Theorem 5 strengthens this latter result to hold for any non-trivial PCP.

Barriers for relativization and others. PCP constructions involve the use of non-relativizing techniques. A line of works [27, 5, 1, 32, 7] has developed frameworks that seek to capture the class of such techniques, along with other non-relativizing ones, within formal models, in order to prove barriers for these techniques (e.g., to show that they do not suffice to resolve the P vs. NP question or other difficult questions in complexity theory).

The emphasis and techniques in this work are complementary to the foregoing line of works. Our emphasis is on establishing impossibility results for PCPs regardless of techniques used, as opposed to proving barriers for the PCP techniques that are known today.

Moreover, the axiomatic approaches employed in some of the works cited above cannot be used to even formulate questions that involve PCP verifiers with specific running times or query complexities. E.g., they rely on Cobham's axiomatization of the notion of polynomial time [23], so cannot express exact running times. This means that we would not be able to phrase questions about non-trivial PCPs (as we do in Section 1.2).

1.5 Open problems

The separations that we prove in this paper are for "information-theoretic" oracles \mathcal{A} . What can be said about hard "cryptographic" oracles \mathcal{A} ? E.g., if \mathcal{A} is a pseudo-random function, then must it be the case that \mathcal{A} separates DTIME/NTIME and PCP? What about if \mathcal{A} is a decryption oracle?

More generally, the holy grail in this research direction would be to distill a crisp, and operationally useful, criterion that gives sufficient and necessary condition for an oracle \mathcal{A} that separates DTIME/NTIME and PCP.

2 Definitions

2.1 Oracles

An oracle is a collection of distributions over functions, with one distribution per input length.

▶ **Definition 7.** An **oracle** with output length $\ell \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ (with $\ell(n) > 0$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$) is a collection $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ where each \mathcal{A}_n is a distribution over functions $f \colon \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$.

We can obtain a sample $A: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ from \mathcal{A} by sampling a function f_n from each \mathcal{A}_n and then setting A to equal f_n for inputs of size n. We write " $A \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$ " to denote that A is a sample that follows this distribution, and " $A \in \mathcal{A}$ " to denote that A is in the support of this distribution. We denote by $\operatorname{supp}(\mathcal{A})$ the support of \mathcal{A} .

An oracle \mathcal{A} induces a corresponding probability measure $\mu_{\mathcal{A}}$ over the space of functions from binary strings to binary strings: given a subset $S \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ and a set X of functions from S to $\{0,1\}^*$, $\mu_{\mathcal{A}}(X)$ is the probability that the restriction to S of a sample A from \mathcal{A} belongs to X.

▶ **Definition 8.** Two oracles $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\mathcal{B} = \{\mathcal{B}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ have (statistical) distance $\epsilon \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ if, for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, the statistical distance between the distributions \mathcal{A}_n and \mathcal{B}_n is at most $\epsilon(n)$.

We write " $g \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\leq n}$ " to denote that g is a function on $\{0,1\}^{\leq n}$ that is sampled from the distribution $\mathcal{A}_{\leq n} := \mathcal{A}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathcal{A}_n$. We write " $g \in \mathcal{A}_{\leq n}$ " to denote that g is in the support of this distribution, and denote by $\sup(\mathcal{A}_{\leq n})$ the support of $\mathcal{A}_{\leq n}$.

▶ **Definition 9.** An oracle \mathcal{B} **contains** an oracle \mathcal{A} if for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ it holds that $\mu_{\mathcal{B}}(\operatorname{supp}(\mathcal{A}_{\leq n})) > 0$ and, for every $\mathfrak{f} \in \operatorname{supp}(\mathcal{A}_{\leq n})$, $\mu_{\mathcal{B}}(\mathfrak{f}) = \mu_{\mathcal{B}}(\operatorname{supp}(\mathcal{A}_{\leq n})) \cdot \mu_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathfrak{f})$.

The definition below provides an operation to *condition* an oracle to take known values.

- ▶ **Definition 10.** Fix a subset $D \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ and function $\mathfrak{f}: D \to \{0,1\}^*$.
- Given a function $A: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$, we define $A^{D,\mathfrak{f}}: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ to be the function obtained by setting the values of A on D to \mathfrak{f} :

$$A^{D,\mathfrak{f}} = \begin{cases} \mathfrak{f}(x) & \text{if } x \in D \\ A(x) & \text{if } x \not\in D \end{cases}.$$

Given an oracle $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ (such that there exists some $A \in \text{supp}(\mathcal{A})$ agreeing with \mathfrak{f} on D), we define $\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{f}} = \{\mathcal{A}_n^{D,\mathfrak{f}}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ to be the oracle where samples are conditioned to equal \mathfrak{f} on D. In more detail, each distribution $\mathcal{A}_n^{D,\mathfrak{f}}$ equals the distribution \mathcal{A}_n conditioned on the event that the sampled function agrees with \mathfrak{f} on $D \cap \{0,1\}^n$.

2.2 Languages and oracle languages

A language L is a subset of $\{0,1\}^*$. We denote by L(x) the bit that specifies whether a string $x \in \{0,1\}^*$ is in L(L(x) = 1) or not (L(x) = 0).

We also consider oracle languages because we study relativized complexity classes.

▶ **Definition 11.** Let $\mathcal{U} := \{F : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*\}$ be the set of all functions on binary strings. An **oracle language** \mathcal{L} is a collection of languages indexed by functions $F \in \mathcal{U}$, namely, $\mathcal{L} = \{L_F\}_{F \in \mathcal{U}}$ where each L_F is a subset of $\{0,1\}^*$.

A language L can be viewed as a special case of an oracle language $\{L_F\}_{F\in\mathcal{U}}$ where each $L_F=L$.

▶ Definition 12. Let $\ell : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ be a computable function. An oracle language $\mathcal{L} = \{L_F\}_{F \in \mathcal{U}}$ is ℓ -bounded if, for all functions $F \in \mathcal{U}$ and inputs $\mathbb{X} \in \{0,1\}^*$, whether $\mathbb{X} \in L_F$ only depends on F's values at locations of size at most $\ell(|\mathbb{X}|)$. Namely, $L_F(\mathbb{X}) = L_{F'}(\mathbb{X})$ for every F' that agrees with F on the set $\bigcup_{1 \le i \le \ell(|\mathbb{X}|)} \{0,1\}^i$.

2.3 Machines that query oracles

We consider several notions of (Turing) machines that query oracles, as defined below. Informally, an *oracle machine* is given black-box access to a function $A: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$, which the machine can query, any number of times, at any input of its choice. Each query costs the machine a single computational step, regardless of the function A. In more detail, we consider the following definition.

▶ Definition 13. An oracle machine M is a machine that has two special tapes called oracle query tape and oracle answer tape, and two special states called QUERY and ANSWER. The special tapes are in addition to the machine's regular read/write tapes (of which there can be one or multiple) and the special states are in addition to the machine's regular start, accept, reject, and other states. We denote by $M^A(x)$ the output of M on input $x \in \{0,1\}^*$ and with access to oracle $A: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$, which is computed as follows. The input x is written in a designated read/write tape, and execution proceeds as normal except if the machine enters the QUERY state. Let $y \in \{0,1\}^*$ be the contents of the oracle query tape when this happens. In the following step, the contents of the oracle answer tape are replaced with $A(y) \in \{0,1\}^*$, and the machine enters the Answer state.

Definition 13 considers *deterministic* oracle machines. In Section 2.4 we use these machines to extend the notion of languages decidable in deterministic bounded time to work with oracles.

We also use *nondeterministic* oracle machines, which are defined similarly as above except that they can, in any computational step, choose to make a nondeterministic choice as in the standard definition of a nondeterministic machine. In Section 2.4 we use these machines to extend the notion of languages decidable in nondeterministic bounded time to work with oracles.

We also use probabilistic oracle machines that use randomness and can make queries to a proof string $\pi \in \{0,1\}^*$ (in addition to the oracle A). These machines are defined similarly as above except that they can, in any computational step, receive a bit of randomness, or query a location of the proof string π via two dedicated tapes (a $proof\ query\ tape$ and a $proof\ answer\ tape$). In Section 2.4 we use these machines to extend the notion of probabilistic proofs to work with oracles.

Throughout this paper we call oracle machines simply "machines", as it will be clear from context when we are referring to an oracle machine (of one of the foregoing types).

▶ Remark 14. Oracle machines are often defined with *one* special tape, instead of *two* as in Definition 13. The machine writes its query to the oracle in this one tape, and in the following step the tape's contents are *replaced* with the oracle's answer. Note that, with one oracle tape, the machine has to write each query "from scratch" because the prior query was deleted. This difference is not significant, because writing each query from scratch is at most quadratically slower than not having to do that (due to having two oracle tapes). However, this difference matters when studying questions that are sensitive to such costs. Thus in this paper we use machines with two oracle tapes.

2.4 Complexity classes with oracles

We define, for a given oracle A, the complexity classes $DTIME(t)^A$, $NTIME(t)^A$, and $PCP(t,q)^A$.

Deterministic time. A deterministic machine M is a D-decider for a language L if for every $x \in \{0,1\}^*$ it holds that M(x) = L(x). The complexity class DTIME(t) consists of all languages L for which there exists a deterministic machine M that runs in time O(t(n)) and is a D-decider for L. We now provide a definition that considers the more general case of oracle languages that are decidable by deterministic machines with access to an oracle.

▶ **Definition 15.** Let $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be an oracle and let $t : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ be a function. DTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{A}}$ is the class of all oracle languages $\mathcal{L} = \{L_A\}_{A \in \mathcal{A}}$ for which there exists a deterministic machine M, which runs in time O(t(n)), such that

$$\Pr_{A \leftarrow \mathcal{A}} \left[M^A \text{ is a D-decider for } L_A \right] = 1 .$$

Nondeterministic time. A nondeterministic machine M is a ND-decider for a language L if for every $x \in \{0,1\}^*$ it holds that M(x) = L(x). The complexity class NTIME(t) consists of all languages L for which there exists a nondeterministic machine M that runs in time O(t(n)) and is a ND-decider for L. We now provide a definition that considers the more general case of oracle languages that are decidable by nondeterministic machines with access to an oracle.

▶ **Definition 16.** Let $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be an oracle and let $t : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ be a function. NTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{A}}$ is the class of all oracle languages $\mathcal{L} = \{L_A\}_{A \in \mathcal{A}}$ for which there exists a nondeterministic machine M, which runs in time O(t(n)), such that

$$\Pr_{A \leftarrow \mathcal{A}} \left[M^A \text{ is a ND-decider for } L_A \right] = 1$$
.

Probabilistic proofs. A probabilistic machine M is a PCP-verifier for a language L if: for every $x \in L$ there exists $\pi \in \{0,1\}^*$ such that $\Pr[M^{\pi}(x) = 1] \geq 2/3$; for every $x \notin L$ and $\pi \in \{0,1\}^*$ it holds that $\Pr[M^{\pi}(x) = 0] \geq 2/3$. The complexity class PCP(t,q) consists of all languages L for which there exists a probabilistic machine M that runs in time O(t(n)), makes O(q(n)) queries to the proof string, and is a PCP-verifier for L. Below we consider the more general case of oracle languages that are decidable by probabilistic machines with access to an oracle.

▶ Definition 17. Let $A = \{A_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be an oracle and let $t, q : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ be functions. $PCP(t,q)^A$ is the class of all oracle languages $\mathcal{L} = \{L_A\}_{A \in \mathcal{A}}$ for which the there exists a probabilistic machine M, which runs in time O(t(n)) and makes O(q(n)) queries to the proof string, such that

$$\Pr_{A \leftarrow A} \left[M^A \text{ is a PCP-verifier for } L_A \right] = 1.$$

▶ Definition 18. Let $\mathcal{L} = \{L_A\}_{A \in \mathcal{A}}$ be an oracle language. An oracle machine M fails on an input $x \in \{0,1\}^*$ and function $A \in \mathcal{A}$ for \mathcal{L} if the following holds: if $x \in L_A$ then $\Pr_r[M^{A,\pi}(x;r)=1] < \frac{2}{3}$ for every proof π ; else if $x \notin L_A$ then $\Pr_r[M^{A,\pi}(x;r)=1] > \frac{1}{3}$ for some proof π .

We conclude this section with several technical remarks.

- ▶ Remark 19 (bounded oracle languages). For every oracle \mathcal{A} and oracle language \mathcal{L} in the complexity class DTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{A}}$, NTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{A}}$, or PCP $(t,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$, there exists a O(t)-bounded oracle language \mathcal{L}^* such that for every oracle $A \in \mathcal{A}$ it holds that $L_A = L_A^*$. The language \mathcal{L}^* is naturally defined by \mathcal{L} 's DTIME $^{\mathcal{A}}$ decider, NTIME $^{\mathcal{A}}$ decider, or PCP $^{\mathcal{A}}$ verifier. In particular, we can assume without loss of generality that oracle languages in these complexity classes are O(t)-bounded.
- ▶ Remark 20 (index over \mathcal{A} instead of \mathcal{U}). We sometimes define an oracle language \mathcal{L} in DTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{A}}$ or in NTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{A}}$ only for functions in (the support of) an oracle \mathcal{A} . In this case it is understood that L_F is defined by the DTIME $^{\mathcal{A}}$ or NTIME $^{\mathcal{A}}$ decider of $\{L_A\}_{A\in\mathcal{A}}$ for all functions $F \in \mathcal{U} \setminus \mathcal{A}$.
- ▶ Remark 21 (relativized classes for a single function). Definitions 15 to 17 capture, as a special case, relativized classes where the oracle is a single function $A: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ rather than a distribution over functions (let \mathcal{A} be the oracle that puts all the probability mass on A). In this case the relativized classes can be "collapsed" to sets of languages rather than sets of oracle languages.

3 Structural properties of separation

We prove structural properties about the non-containments $DTIME(t)^{\mathcal{A}} \not\subseteq PCP(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$ (Theorem 22) and $NTIME(t)^{\mathcal{A}} \not\subseteq PCP(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$ (Theorem 23). We use these in later sections.

- ▶ **Theorem 22** (DTIME & PCP). Let $t, T: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ be time bound functions and $q: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ a query bound function. Let A be an oracle such that DTIME $(t)^A \not\subseteq PCP(T,q)^A$. Then the following holds.
- 1. Robustness: there exists a positive function $\epsilon \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$ ($\epsilon(n) > 0$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$) such that, for every oracle \mathcal{B} that is ϵ -close to \mathcal{A} , it also holds that $\mathrm{DTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{B}} \not\subseteq \mathrm{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{B}}$.
- **2.** Monotonicity: for every oracle \mathcal{B} that contains \mathcal{A} , it also holds that $DTIME(t)^{\mathcal{B}} \not\subseteq PCP(T,q)^{\mathcal{B}}$.
- **3.** Conditioning: for every function $\mathfrak{f}: D \to \{0,1\}^*$, it also holds that $\mathrm{DTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{f}}} \not\subseteq \mathrm{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{f}}}$.
- ▶ **Theorem 23** (NTIME & PCP). Theorem 22 also holds with NTIME(t) in place of DTIME(t).

The above theorems are direct corollaries of general properties that we prove, as we now explain.

For the rest of this section we fix: (a) an oracle language \mathcal{L} that is ℓ -bounded for some $\ell \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$; (b) a time bound function $T \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$; (c) a query bound function $q \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$; (d) an oracle \mathcal{A} .

We shall provide an equivalent formulation for the condition " $\mathcal{L} \notin PCP(T, q)^{\mathcal{A}}$ " (Claim 26), and then use it to derive several general properties about this condition: robustness (Lemma 27), monotonicity (Lemma 28), and conditioning (Lemma 29).

By taking \mathcal{L} to be an oracle language in either DTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{A}}$ or NTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{A}}$ (which implies that the oracle language is O(t)-bounded), we can then derive the corresponding property in Theorem 22 or Theorem 23 respectively. We are left to state and prove the claim and lemmas mentioned above.

- ▶ **Definition 24.** We denote by $\mathbf{M}_{T,q}$ the set of probabilistic oracle machines that, on inputs of length n, read O(q(n)) proof bits and run in O(T(n)) time.
- ▶ **Definition 25.** For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $s(n) := \max\{\ell(n), 2^{T(n)}\}\ and\ S_n := \bigcup_{1 \le i \le s(n)} \{0, 1\}^i$.
- ▷ Claim 26. The following two conditions are equivalent:
- 1. $\mathcal{L} \notin PCP(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$.
- 2. For every machine $M \in \mathbf{M}_{T,q}$ there exist an input $\mathbb{x} \in \{0,1\}^*$ and function $\mathfrak{f} \colon S_{|\mathbb{x}|} \to \{0,1\}^*$ with $\mu_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathfrak{f}) > 0$ such that, for every function $F \colon \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ that agrees with \mathfrak{f} on $S_{|\mathbb{x}|}$, M fails on input \mathbb{x} and function F for \mathcal{L} . (The function F need not be in $\mathrm{supp}(\mathcal{A})$.)

Proof. We separately consider the two directions.

- $(1) \Rightarrow (2)$. If $\mathcal{L} \notin \operatorname{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$, then for every $M \in \mathbf{M}_{T,q}$ there exists a function $F \in \operatorname{supp}(\mathcal{A})$ such that M^F fails to verify L_F on some input \mathbb{X} . Consider the function $\mathfrak{f} \colon S_{|\mathbb{X}|} \to \{0,1\}^*$ obtained by restricting F to $S_{|\mathbb{X}|}$. Since the running time of M^F on input \mathbb{X} is at most $O(T(|\mathbb{X}|))$, it cannot distinguish between having access to the function F and access to any other function F' that agrees with \mathfrak{f} . Moreover, since \mathcal{L} is ℓ -bounded, $L_F(\mathbb{X}) = L_{F'}(\mathbb{X})$ for every F' that agrees with \mathfrak{f} . Therefore, $M^{F'}(\mathbb{X})$ fails for every F' that agrees with \mathfrak{f} . The set of all such oracles has positive measure in \mathcal{A} (i.e., $\mu_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathfrak{f}) > 0$), because any finite prefix of any function in \mathcal{A} has positive measure.
- $(2) \Rightarrow (1)$. The condition directly implies that, for every $M \in \mathbf{M}_{T,q}$, M^A is not a PCP-verifier for L_A for a set of functions A with positive measure in A. Therefore $\mathcal{L} \notin \text{PCP}(T,q)^A$.
- ▶ **Lemma 27** (robustness). If $\mathcal{L} \not\in \operatorname{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$, then there exists a positive function $\epsilon \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$ $(\epsilon(n) > 0 \text{ for every } n \in \mathbb{N}) \text{ such that, for every oracle } \mathcal{B} \text{ that is } \epsilon\text{-close to } \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{L} \not\in \operatorname{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{B}}$.
- **Proof.** For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, define $X_n := \{\mathfrak{f} : S_n \to \{0,1\}^* \mid \mu_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathfrak{f}) > 0\}$ to be the set of all functions over S_n that have positive measure in \mathcal{A} . We define the distance function as $\epsilon(n) := \min_{\mathfrak{f} \in X_n} \mu_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathfrak{f})$.

By Claim 26, from $\mathcal{L} \notin \operatorname{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$ we deduce that for any $M \in \mathbf{M}_{T,q}$ there exist an input \mathbb{X} and function $\mathfrak{f} \colon S_{|\mathbb{X}|} \to \{0,1\}^*$ with $\mu_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathfrak{f}) > 0$ such that, for every function $F \colon \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ that agrees with \mathfrak{f} on $S_{|\mathbb{X}|}$, M fails on input \mathbb{X} and function F for \mathcal{L} . Since the oracle \mathcal{B} is ϵ -close to \mathcal{A} we deduce, from the definition of ϵ , that $\mu_{\mathcal{B}}(\mathfrak{f}) > 0$ as well. Since the above holds for every $M \in \mathbf{M}_{T,q}$, by Claim 26 we conclude that $\mathcal{L} \notin \operatorname{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{B}}$.

▶ **Lemma 28** (monotonicity). If $\mathcal{L} \notin PCP(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$, then, for every oracle \mathcal{B} that contains \mathcal{A} , it holds that $\mathcal{L} \notin PCP(T,q)^{\mathcal{B}}$.

Proof. From Claim 26, since $\mathcal{L} \not\in \operatorname{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$, we know that for every $M \in \mathbf{M}_{T,q}$ there exist an input \mathbb{X} and function $\mathfrak{f} \colon S_{|\mathbb{X}|} \to \{0,1\}^*$ with $\mu_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathfrak{f}) > 0$ such that, for every function $F \colon \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ that agrees with \mathfrak{f} on $S_{|\mathbb{X}|}$, M fails on input \mathbb{X} and function F for \mathcal{L} . Due to containment (Definition 9), since $\mathfrak{f} \in \operatorname{supp}(\mathcal{A}_{< s(|\mathbb{X}|)})$, we deduce that

$$\mu_{\mathcal{B}}(\mathfrak{f}) = \mu_{\mathcal{B}}\left(\operatorname{supp}(\mathcal{A}_{\leq s(|\mathfrak{x}|)})\right) \cdot \mu_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathfrak{f}) > 0$$
.

Since the above holds for every $M \in \mathbf{M}_{T,q}$, by Claim 26 we conclude that $\mathcal{L} \not\in \mathrm{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{B}}$.

▶ Lemma 29 (conditioning). Let $I \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ be finite, and set $D := \bigcup_{i \in I} \{0,1\}^i$. If $\mathcal{L} \not\in PCP(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$, then there exists a function $\mathfrak{g} : D \to \{0,1\}^*$ such that, letting $\mathcal{L}^{\mathfrak{g}} := \{L_F^{\mathfrak{g}}\}_{F \in \mathcal{U}}$ where each $L_F^{\mathfrak{g}} := L_{F^{D,\mathfrak{g}}}$, for every $\mathfrak{f} : D \to \{0,1\}^*$ in the support of \mathcal{A} it holds that $\mathcal{L}^{\mathfrak{g}} \not\in PCP(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{f}}}$.

Proof. Consider the following set of functions over D:

$$G_{D,\mathcal{A}} := \{ \mathfrak{g} \colon D \to \{0,1\}^* \mid \exists A \in \operatorname{supp}(\mathcal{A}) \text{ that agrees with } \mathfrak{g} \text{ on } D \}$$
.

First, we argue that, since $\mathcal{L} \notin \operatorname{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$, there exists $\mathfrak{g} \in G_{D,\mathcal{A}}$ such that $\mathcal{L} \notin \operatorname{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{g}}}$. Suppose by way of contradiction that $\mathcal{L} \in \operatorname{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{g}}}$ for every $\mathfrak{g} \in G_{D,\mathcal{A}}$. Then every oracle $\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{g}}$ has a PCP-verifier $M_{\mathfrak{g}} \in \mathbf{M}_{T,q}$ for \mathcal{L} . We use the PCP-verifiers $\{M_{\mathfrak{g}}\}_{\mathfrak{g} \in G_{D,\mathcal{A}}}$ to construct a PCP-verifier M that shows that $\mathcal{L} \in \operatorname{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}}$ (a contradiction): $M^{A,\pi}(\mathbb{x})$ first queries all locations in D to identify which $\mathfrak{g} \in G_{D,\mathcal{A}}$ is consistent with A; then it rules according to $M_{\mathfrak{g}}^{A,\pi}(\mathbb{x})$. By construction, the machine M is in $\mathbf{M}_{T,q}$ because querying all locations in D takes a constant amount of time and involves a constant number of queries. (The size of D is a finite constant.)

Next, we use $\mathcal{L} \notin \mathrm{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{g}}}$ to argue that $\mathcal{L}^{\mathfrak{g}} \notin \mathrm{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{f}}}$. By definition of $\mathcal{L}^{\mathfrak{g}}$, for every $F \in \mathrm{supp}(\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{g}})$ we have $L_F = L^{\mathfrak{g}}_{F^{D,\mathfrak{f}}}$. Moreover, since D is the union of binary strings of certain lengths, there is a bijection between functions $F \in \mathrm{supp}(\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{g}})$ and functions $F^{D,\mathfrak{f}} \in \mathrm{supp}(\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{f}})$, and $\mu_{\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{g}}}(F) = \mu_{\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{f}}}(F^{D,\mathfrak{f}})$. This means that if the oracle $\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{f}}$ has a PCP-verifier $M_{\mathfrak{f}} \in \mathbf{M}_{T,q}$ for $\mathcal{L}^{\mathfrak{g}}$, then we can construct a machine $M_{\mathfrak{g}}$ that, relative to the oracle $\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{g}}$, is a PCP-verifier for \mathcal{L} : $M^{A,\pi}_{\mathfrak{g}}(\mathfrak{x})$ runs $M_{\mathfrak{f}}(\mathfrak{x})$ except that $M_{\mathfrak{g}}$ answers any query $y \in D$ from $M_{\mathfrak{f}}$ with $\mathfrak{f}(y)$ instead of A(y). One can verify that $M_{\mathfrak{g}} \in \mathbf{M}_{T,q}$, which means that $\mathcal{L} \in \mathrm{PCP}(T,q)^{\mathcal{A}^{D,\mathfrak{g}}}$, a contradiction.

4 Separations for random functions

We define the notion of a random oracle and then state our separation results for it.

▶ **Definition 30.** A random oracle with output length $\ell \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ is the oracle $\mathcal{R} = \{\mathcal{R}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ where each \mathcal{R}_n is the uniform distribution over functions $f \colon \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$.

The probability measure of \mathcal{R} is uniform, in the sense that, for any choice of distinct binary strings x_1, \ldots, x_m of lengths n_1, \ldots, n_m and choice of binary strings b_1, \ldots, b_m of lengths $\ell(n_1), \ldots, \ell(n_m)$, the set $S := \{A \mid A(x_1) = b_1, \ldots, A(x_m) = b_m\}$ has measure $\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S) = 1/(\prod_{i=1}^m 2^{\ell(n_i)})$.

- ▶ Theorem 31. Let \mathcal{R} be the random oracle with output length $\ell \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$.
- **1.** For any function $t: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ with $t(n) \in \Omega(n)$,

$$\text{NTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{R}} \not\subseteq \text{PCP}(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{R}}$$
.

2. For any function $t: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ with $t(n) \in \Omega(n) \cap o(2^n)$,

$$\mathrm{DTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{R}} \not\subseteq \mathrm{PCP}(o(t),o(t))^{\mathcal{R}} \ .$$

▶ Remark 32. In Section 7 we prove a stronger (almost-everywhere) separation result. We provide a standalone proof of Theorem 31 because the techniques used to prove it can be modified to apply to other oracles. We do not know how to prove stronger separations for other oracles.

4.1 Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 31

We exhibit an oracle language \mathcal{L} that is in NTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{R}}$ but not in PCP $(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{R}}$.

Oracle language. Let $e_{k,i}$ denote the $\lceil \log k \rceil$ -bit string that represents the index $i \in [k]$. The oracle language $\mathcal{L} = \{L_R\}_{R \in \mathcal{R}}$ is defined as follows:

$$L_R := \left\{ 0^n \middle| \begin{array}{c} R(w || e_{t(n),1})_1 = 0 \\ R(w || e_{t(n),2})_1 = 0 \\ \vdots \\ R(w || e_{t(n),t(n)})_1 = 0 \end{array} \right\} .$$

Note that L_R does not contain any string that is not all-zeros. Strings of the form 0^n may or may not be in L_R , depending on the answers from R.

In NTIME. We argue that \mathcal{L} is in NTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{R}}$. Consider the nondeterministic machine that, for inputs of the form 0^n , expects as nondeterministic witness a string $w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ and checks, via t(n) calls to R, if R returns a string whose first bit is zero on input $w||e_{t(n),i}$ for every $i \in \{1,\ldots,t(n)\}$. The machine rejects any input not of the form 0^n . This machine, for any given R, decides the language L_R on every input. The machine's running time is O(t(n)): writing the first query costs O(t(n)) steps and updating the query tape with each new subsequent query costs O(1) steps.

Not in PCP. We argue that \mathcal{L} is not in $\operatorname{PCP}(\operatorname{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{R}}$. Suppose by way of contradiction that \mathcal{L} has a PCP-verifier $M \in \mathbf{M}_{\operatorname{poly}(t), o(t)}$, and denote by T(n) the running time of M on input of size n. For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, define the domain $S_n := \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq T(n)} \{0, 1\}^i$ and the following set X_n of functions over S_n :

$$X_n = \left\{ f \colon S_n \to \{0,1\}^* \, \middle| \begin{array}{l} \exists \,! \, w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)} \text{ such that both conditions below hold} \\ \bullet \, \forall i \in [t], \, f(x \| e_{t,i}) = 01^{\ell(t + \lceil \log t \rceil) - 1} \\ \bullet \, \forall y \not \in \{w \| e_{t,j}\}_{j \in [t]}, f(y) = 1^{\ell(|y|)} \end{array} \right\} \ .$$

Note that, for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, every function $f \in X_n$ has measure $\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(\{f\}) > 0$. We also use 1 to denote the all-one function that on an input $z \in \{0,1\}^*$ returns $1^{\ell(|z|)}$.

- We derive a contradiction from the following two (contradicting) statements.

 Lemma 33: For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and function R agreeing with some $f \in X_n$ there exists a proof π such that $M^{1,\pi}(0^n)$ queries 1 at some "witness location" $w||e_{t(n),i}|$ of R with
- probability at least $\frac{1}{3}$.

 Lemma 34: For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ there exists a function R agreeing with some $f \in X_n$ such that for any proof π it holds that $M^{1,\pi}(0^n)$ queries 1 at some "witness location" $w||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_{t(n),i}||e_$

We are left to prove the lemmas. We abbreviate t(n) with t as the choice of n is clear from context.

of R with probability only o(1).

▶ **Lemma 33.** If $M \in \mathbf{M}_{poly(t),o(t)}$ is a PCP-verifier for \mathcal{L} , then for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and function R agreeing with some $f \in X_n$ there exists a proof π s.t.

$$\Pr_{r}\left[M^{1,\pi}(0^{n};r) \text{ queries } \mathbf{1} \text{ at some } w||e_{t,i} \text{ s.t. } R(w||e_{t,i})_{1} = 0\right] > \frac{1}{3}.$$

Proof. By definition of X_n , $0^n \in L_R$ for any R agreeing with some $f \in X_n$. Therefore, for every such R, there exists a proof π such that $M^{R,\pi}(0^n)$ accepts with probability at least $\frac{2}{3}$. We also note that since $M^{R,\pi}(0^n)$ has running time T(n), it cannot make oracle queries outside the set S_n .

We now argue that for every R agreeing with some $f \in X_n$ there exists a proof π such that

$$\Pr_{r} \left[M^{R,\pi}(0^{n}; r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at some } w || e_{t,i} \text{ s.t. } R(w || e_{t,i}) = 0 \right] > \frac{1}{3} . \tag{1}$$

Suppose Equation (1) does not hold. Then more than $\frac{2}{3}$ of the time $M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r)$ does not query the witness bits. If we change R slightly by flipping the first bit of $R(w||e_{t,i})$ from 0 to 1, and denote the new oracle by R_i , then $0^n \notin L_{R_i}$. However, the machine $M^{R_i,\pi}(0^n;r)$ cannot detect the change in more than $\frac{2}{3}$ of the time. So $M^{R_i,\pi}(0^n;r)$ accepts with probability at least $\frac{1}{3}$. Moreover, $M^{R'_i,\pi}(0^n;r)$ makes the same mistake for any function R'_i that agrees with R_i on S_n . This conclusion contradicts the fact that M verifies $L_{R'_i}$ on 0^n for all such functions R'_i . So Equation (1) holds.

Furthermore, if $w||e_{t,i}$ is the first query made by $M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r)$ such that $R(w||e_{t,i}) = 01^{\ell(t+\lceil \log t \rceil)-1}$, then $M^{1,\pi}(0^n;r)$ would also make the query $w||e_{t,i}$. This is because M has the same view in the two cases at the time it makes the query $w||e_{t,i}$. The lemma follows.

▶ Lemma 34. If $M \in \mathbf{M}_{\text{poly}(t),o(t)}$ is a PCP-verifier for \mathcal{L} , then for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ there exists R agreeing with some $f \in X_n$ such that for every proof $\pi \in \{0,1\}^*$,

$$\Pr[M^{1,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } 1 \text{ at some } w || e_{t,i} \text{ s.t. } R(w || e_{t,i})_1 = 0] \in o(1) \text{ .}$$

Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose there exists some $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for every R agreeing with some $f \in X_n$ there exists a proof π for which the above probability is $\Omega(1)$. Then, by averaging, there exists some randomness r^* such that, for a $\Omega(1)$ -fraction of the functions R agreeing with some $f \in X_n$, there exists a proof π such that $M^{1,\pi}(0^n; r^*)$ queries some $w||e_{t,i}|$ s.t. $R(w||e_{t,i})_1 = 0$. So across all possible proofs, $M^{1,\cdot}(0^n; r^*)$ need to make at least $\Omega(|X_n|) = \Omega(2^t)$ distinct queries.

However, since the randomness is fixed and M is in $\mathbf{M}_{\text{poly}(t),o(t)}$, $M^{1,\cdot}(0^n;r^*)$ can only make at most $2^{o(t)} \cdot \text{poly}(t)$ distinct queries, which leads to a contradiction because $\Omega(2^t) \gg 2^{o(t)} \cdot \text{poly}(t)$.

4.2 Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 31

We exhibit an oracle language \mathcal{L} that is in DTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{R}}$ but not in PCP $(o(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{R}}$.

Oracle language. Let $u_{n,i}$ denote the *n*-bit string whose *i*-th bit is 1 and all other bits are zero. The oracle language $\mathcal{L} = \{L_R\}_{R \in \mathcal{R}}$ is defined as follows:

$$L_R := \left\{ (x, y) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \,\middle|\, F_R^{\frac{t(n)}{n}}(x) = y \right\} ,$$

where $F_R(x) := R(x \oplus u_{n,1})_1 || R(x \oplus u_{n,2})_1 || \dots || R(x \oplus u_{n,n})_1.$

In DTIME. We argue that \mathcal{L} is in DTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{R}}$. Consider the deterministic machine that on input (x,y): (a) copies $x_0 := x$ to the query tape; (b) for $j \in \{1,\ldots,t(n)/n\}$, calls R on inputs $\{x_{j-1} \oplus u_{n,i}\}_{i \in [n]}$ to get $x_j := F_R(x_{j-1})$, and copies x_j to the query tape; (c) accepts if $y = x_{t(n)/n}$. Each of the t(n)/n iterations takes time O(n), so the running time of the machine is O(t(n)).

Not in PCP. We argue that \mathcal{L} is not in $PCP(o(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{R}}$. We begin with a combinatorial claim and some notation.

- Recall that the entropy function $H: [0,1] \to [0,1]$ is $H(z) := -z \log_2(z) (1-z) \log_2(1-z)$. For every $\epsilon \in (0,\frac{1}{2})$ and $n \in \mathbb{N}$, there exist a list $C_{\epsilon,n} = \{a_0,a_1,\ldots,a_k\}$ of $\Omega\left(\sqrt{n}2^{(1-H(\epsilon))n}\right)$ distinct n-bit binary strings such that the relative hamming distance between any two distinct strings in $C_{\epsilon,n}$ is at least ϵn . These binary strings are the codewords obtained by the greedy approach of constructing a code in $\{0,1\}^n$ with minimum distance ϵn .
- Choose $\epsilon^* \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$ such that for all large enough $n \in \mathbb{N}$ it holds that $|C_{\epsilon^*,n}| > \frac{t(n)}{n}$. Define the domain $S_n := \bigcup_{1 \le i \le t(n)} \{0,1\}^i$ and a set of functions X_n on S_n :

$$X_n := \{g \colon S_n \to \{0,1\}^* \mid \forall \, a_i \in C_{\epsilon^*,n}, \, a_{i+1} = g(a_i \oplus u_{n,1})_1 \| \cdots \| g(a_i \oplus u_{n,n})_1 \} .$$

Therefore for every $g \in X_n$ and $a_i \in C_{\epsilon^*,n}$ it holds that $F_g(a_i) = a_{i+1}$, and $F_g^{\frac{t(n)}{n}}(a_0) = a_{t(n)/n}$.

For every $i \in [k]$ and $g \in X_n$, define the function $g^{(i)}: S_n \to \{0,1\}^*$ to be

$$g^{(i)}(z) := \begin{cases} (a_0)_j \|0^{\ell(|z|)-1} & \text{if } z = a_i \oplus u_{n,j} \text{ for some } j \in [n] \\ g(z) & \text{if } z \neq a_i \oplus u_{n,j} \text{ for every } j \in [n] \end{cases}$$

Therefore for every $i' \neq i$ and $a_{i'} \in C_{\epsilon^*,n}$, $F_{g^{(i)}}(a_{i'}) = a_{i'+1}$, and $F_{g^{(i)}}(a_i) = a_0$. We argue that any PCP-verifier M for \mathcal{L} must have running time $\Omega(t(n))$.

- Since M is a PCP-verifier for \mathcal{L} , for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and every $g \in X_n$ there exists a proof π such that $M^{g,\pi}(a_0, a_{t(n)/n})$ accepts with probability at least $\frac{2}{3}$. Then, via Lemma 35 below, we deduce that for every n large enough there exists a randomness r such that $M^{g,\pi}(a_0, a_{t(n)/n}; r)$ makes at least $\frac{t(n)}{3n}$ queries of the form $F_g^i(a_0)$ for some $i \in [\frac{t(n)}{n}]$.
- Since the relative hamming distance between each pair of queries $F_g^i(a_0)$ and $F_g^j(a_0)$ is at least ϵn , the running time of $M^{g,\pi}(a_0, a_{t(n)/n}; r)$ is at least $\frac{t(n)}{3n} \cdot \epsilon n \in \Omega(t(n))$.

We have shown that any PCP-verifier for \mathcal{L} has running time in $\Omega(t(n))$, and so $\mathcal{L} \notin PCP(o(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{R}}$.

▶ Lemma 35. If M is a PCP-verifier for \mathcal{L} then, for every large enough $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and every $g \in X_{\epsilon^*,n}$, there exists a proof π and randomness r such that $M^{g,\pi}(a_0, a_{t(n)/n}; r)$ makes at least $\frac{t(n)}{3n}$ queries of the form $F_q^i(a_0)$ for some $i \in \left[\frac{t(n)}{n}\right]$.

Proof. Since M is a PCP-verifier for \mathcal{L} , for large enough n, $(a_0, a_{t(n)/n}) \in L_R$ for every R that agrees with some $g \in X_n$. So for every $g \in X_n$ there exists a proof π such that $M^{g,\pi}(a_0,a_{t(n)/n})$ accepts with probability at least $\frac{2}{3}$. If we change one assignment of g to obtain $g^{(i)}$, then $F_{g^{(i)}}^{t(n)/n}(a_0) \neq a_{t(n)/n}$. So $M^{g^{(i)},\pi}(a_0,a_{t(n)/n})$ should accept with probability at most $\frac{1}{3}$. This implies that for at least $\frac{1}{3}$ fraction of randomness r, $M^{g,\pi}(a_0,a_{t(n)/n};r)$ queries a_i . By averaging, there exists r^* such that $M^{g,\pi}(a_0,a_{t(n)/n};r^*)$ makes $\frac{t(n)}{3n}$ distinct queries of the form $F_q^i(a_0)$.

5 Separation for random low-degree functions

We define the notion of a random low-degree oracle and then state our separation result for it.

- ▶ **Definition 36.** Let q be a prime power, \mathbb{F}_q the finite field of size q, and $d \in \mathbb{N}$ a degree bound. The random oracle over \mathbb{F}_q with degree d is the oracle $\mathcal{P}[q,d] = \{\mathcal{P}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ where each \mathcal{P}_n is the uniform distribution over polynomials $f : \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q$ of degree at most d in each variable. (In particular, $\mathcal{P}[2,1]$ equals the random oracle \mathcal{R} from Definition 30.)
- ▶ **Theorem 37.** For any function $t: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ with $t(n) \in \Omega(n)$, prime power $q \in \mathbb{N}$, and degree bound $d \in \mathbb{N}$

$$\text{NTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{P}[q,d]} \not\subseteq \text{PCP}(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{P}[q,d]}$$
.

Proof. We first focus on the special case of d=1, i.e., the case of random multilinear polynomials. We show in Lemma 38 that $\mathcal{P}[q,1]$ separates NTIME and PCP. Next, we simply observe that for any field \mathbb{F}_q and degree d, the low degree random oracle $\mathcal{P}[q,d]$ contains the multilinear random oracle $\mathcal{P}[q,1]$. Therefore, by Lemma 28, $\mathcal{P}[q,d]$ also separates NTIME and PCP.

Now we prove the separation for the special case of d = 1.

▶ **Lemma 38.** For any function $t: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ with $t(n) \in \Omega(n)$, and any prime power $q \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\text{NTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{P}[q,1]} \not\subseteq \text{PCP}(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{P}[q,1]}$$
.

Proof. We exhibit \mathcal{L} that is in NTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{P}[q,1]}$ but not in PCP $(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{P}[q,1]}$.

Let $e_{k,i}$ denote the vector in \mathbb{F}_q^k that has 1 in the *i*-th coordinate and 0 everywhere else. Let $\mathcal{L} = \{L_P\}_{P \in \mathcal{P}[q,1]}$ be the oracle language where

$$L_P := \left\{ 0^n \middle| \begin{array}{l} P(x + e_{t(n),1}) = 0 \\ P(x + e_{t(n),2}) = 0 \\ \vdots \\ P(x + e_{t(n),2}) = 0 \end{array} \right\} .$$

$$P(x + e_{t(n),2}) = 0$$

$$\vdots$$

$$P(x + e_{t(n),t(n)}) = 0$$

It's clear that L_P is in NTIME $(t)^P$ for every $P \in \mathcal{P}[q,1]$. Let $q : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ be some superpolynomial function. For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we define the following set of functions over the domain $S_n = \{\mathbb{F}_q^i \mid i \leq q(t(n))\}.$

$$X_n = \left\{ f \colon S_n \to \mathbb{F}_q \mid \forall x \in \mathbb{F}_q^{t(n)}, f(x) = \prod_{i=1}^{t(n)} (b_i - x_i) \text{ where } b \in \mathbb{F}_q^{t(n)} \\ \forall x \in S_n \setminus \mathbb{F}_q^{t(n)}, f(x) = 0 \right\}.$$

Note for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, every function $f \in X_n$ has its measure $\mu_{\mathcal{P}[q,1]}(\{f\}) > 0$.

We also use $\mathbf{0}$ to denote the all zero function.

Suppose by way of contradiction that \mathcal{L} has a PCP-verifier $M \in \mathbf{M}_t$. Use T(n) to denote the running time of M on input of size n. Note that $T(n) \in \operatorname{poly}(t(n))$, so there exists a number $n^* \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\forall n \geq n^*, q(t(n)) \geq T(n)$. We derive a contradiction from the following two steps. First in Claim 39, we show that for every $n \geq n^*$ and oracle polynomial P agreeing with some $f \in X_n$ there exists some proof π such that the PCP-verifier $M^{\mathbf{0},\pi}$, which has oracle access to $\mathbf{0}$ and π , queries $\mathbf{0}$ at some x satisfying $P(x) \neq 0$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{3}$. Next, in Claim 40, we show that for every $n \geq n^*$ there exists some oracle polynomial

P agreeing with some $f \in X_n$ such that for any proof $\pi \in \{0, 1\}^*$, the PCP-verifier $M^{0, \pi}$, which has oracle access to $\mathbf{0}$ and π , queries P at some x satisfying $P(x) \neq 0$ with probability only o(1). These two statements are in contradiction. Thus \mathcal{L} does not have a PCP-verifier. Therefore $\mathcal{P}[q, 1]$ separates NTIME and PCP.

In the proofs of the two lemmas we abbreviate t(n) with t whenever the choice of n is clear from the context.

 \triangleright Claim 39. If $M \in \mathbf{M}_t$ is the PCP-verifier for \mathcal{L} , then for every $n \geq n^*$ and oracle polynomial P agreeing with some $f \in X_n$, there exists π s.t.

$$\Pr_r[M^{\mathbf{0},\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } \mathbf{0} \text{ at some } y \in \mathbb{F}_q^{t(n)} \text{ s.t. } P(y) \neq 0] > \frac{1}{3} \ .$$

Proof. We first observe that for every function $f(x) = \prod_{i=1}^{t(n)} (b_i - x_i)$ in X_n , the element $y = (b_1 - 1) \| \dots \| (b_{t(n)} - 1) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{t(n)}$ satisfies f(y) = 1 and $f(y + e_{t(n),i}) = 0$ for every $i \in [t(n)]$. Therefore for every P agreeing with f over $\mathbb{F}_q^{t(n)}$, $0^n \in L_P$. As a result, for every such P, there exists some proof $\pi \in \{0,1\}^*$ such that $M^{P,\pi}(0^n)$ accepts with probability at least $\frac{2}{3}$. We also note that since $M^{P,\pi}(0^n)$ has running time $T(n) \leq q(t(n))$, M cannot make oracle queries outside the set S_n .

For every P agreeing with some $f \in X_n$, use π_P to denote the accepting proof for P. We additionally note that for every oracle P' agreeing with $\mathbf{0}$ over S_n , it holds that $0^n \notin L_{P'}$. So for any π_P , $M^{P',\pi_P}(0^n)$ accepts with probability at most $\frac{1}{3}$.

This implies that

$$\Pr_{r}[M^{P,\pi_{P}}(0^{n};r) \text{ queries } P \text{ at } x \text{ s.t. } P(x) \neq \mathbf{0}(x) = 0] \ge \frac{1}{3} . \tag{2}$$

Let y be the first oracle query made by $M^{P,\pi_P}(0^n;r)$ such that $P(y) \neq \mathbf{0}(y) = 0$. If we replace P with $\mathbf{0}$, $M^{\mathbf{0},\pi_P}(0^n;r)$ would still make the oracle query y. We deduce that

$$\Pr_r[M^{0,\pi_P}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } P_0 \text{ at } x \text{ s.t. } P(x) \neq \mathbf{0}(x) = 0] \geq \frac{1}{3}.$$

 \triangleright Claim 40. If $M \in \mathbf{M}_t$ is the PCP-verifier for \mathcal{L} , there exists P agreeing with some $f \in X_n$ s.t. for all $\pi \in \{0,1\}^*$,

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{x}}[M^{\mathbf{0},\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } \mathbf{0} \text{ at } x \text{ s.t. } P(x) \neq 0] \in o(1) \ \ .$$

Proof. Suppose for every P agreeing with some $f \in X_n$ there exists a proof π that the aforementioned probability is $\Omega(1)$. Then, by an averaging argument, there exists some randomness r^* such that for $\Omega(1)$ fraction of oracles P agreeing with some $f \in X_n$, there exists π s.t. $M^{0,\pi}(0^n; r^*)$ queries some x s.t. $P(x) \neq 0$. Additionally, for any $x \in \mathbb{F}_q^{t(n)}$, there are exactly $(q-1)^{t(n)}$ multilinear functions $f \in X_n$ such that $f(x) \neq 0$. So across all possible proofs, $M^{0,\cdot}(0^n; r^*)$ need to make at least $\Omega(|X_n|/(q-1)^t \operatorname{poly}(t)) = \Omega((q/(q-1))^t) \in \Omega(\exp(t))$ distinct queries.

However, since the randomness is fixed and M is in \mathbf{M}_t , $M^{\mathbf{0},\cdot}(0^n;r^*)$ can make at most $2^{o((t)} \cdot \operatorname{poly}(t)$ distinct queries. However, $\Omega(\exp(t)) \gg 2^{o(t)} \cdot \operatorname{poly}(t)$, so we derive a contradiction.

6 Separation for random generic groups

We present the definition of the generic group model (GGM) [38, 42, 21, 35, 36].

- ▶ **Definition 41** (groups and their representations). An abelian group of order p is a pair $\mathbb{G} = (S, +)$ where S is a set of size p and $+: S \times S \to S$ is a function that satisfies the axioms of a group operation. We denote by $\mathbf{0}$ the identity of \mathbb{G} . A representation of \mathbb{G} is an injective function $\sigma: S \to \{0,1\}^{\lceil \log_2 p \rceil}$, and its inverse $\sigma^{-1}: \{0,1\}^{\lceil \log_2 p \rceil} \to S$ maps each image $\sigma(g) \in \{0,1\}^{\lceil \log_2 p \rceil}$ to its pre-image $g \in S$ and each string $s \in \{0,1\}^{\lceil \log_2 p \rceil} \setminus \sigma(S)$ to the identity $\mathbf{0} \in S$.
- ▶ **Definition 42** (group oracles). Let \mathbb{G} be a group of order p, and σ a representation of \mathbb{G} . The group oracle corresponding to (\mathbb{G}, σ) is the function $O: \{0,1\}^{4\lceil \log_2 p \rceil} \to \{0,1\}^{\lceil \log_2 p \rceil}$ such that $O(c_a, c_b, a, b) = \sigma(c_a \times \sigma^{-1}(a) + c_b \times \sigma^{-1}(b))$. To obtain the identity element of the group simply query $O(0^{\lceil \log_2 p \rceil}, 0^{\lceil \log_2 p \rceil}, a, b) = \sigma(\mathbf{0})$.
- ▶ Definition 43. The random group oracle is the oracle $\mathcal{O} = \{\mathcal{O}_p\}_{p \in \mathbb{N}}$ where each \mathcal{O}_p is the uniform distribution over all group oracles for groups of size p. Namely, a sample from \mathcal{O}_p is obtained as follows: sample a random group \mathbb{G} of order p, sample a random representation σ of \mathbb{G} , and output the group oracle $O: \{0,1\}^{4\lceil \log_2 p \rceil} \to \{0,1\}^{\lceil \log_2 p \rceil}$ corresponding to (\mathbb{G},σ) .
- ▶ **Theorem 44.** In the generic group model, $t: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ with $t(n) \in \Omega(n)$,

$$\text{NTIME}(t)^{\mathcal{O}} \not\subseteq \text{PCP}(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{O}}$$
.

Proof. We exhibit an oracle language \mathcal{L} that is in NTIME $(t)^{\mathcal{O}}$ but not in PCP $(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{O}}$. Oracle language.

Define p(n) to be the largest prime number no larger than $2^{t(n)}$, so we know that $p(n) \in (2^{t(n)-1}, 2^{t(n)}]$. Let $\mathcal{L} = \{L_O\}_{O \in \mathcal{O}}$ be the oracle language where

$$L_O := \left\{ 0^n \mid \exists \, x \in \{0, 1\}^{t(n)}, x < p(n) - 1, \text{ s.t. } \sigma^{-1}(x) + \sigma^{-1}(x^{\oplus t(n)}) = \mathbf{0} \right\} \ ,$$

where $x^{\oplus t(n)}$ is the string identical to x everywhere except for the t(n)-th bit.

In NTIME. We note that numbers in [p(n)] can be represented by binary strings of length $\Theta(t(n))$. So it's clear that L_O is in NTIME $(t)^O$ for every $O \in \mathcal{O}$.

- **Not in PCP.** We argue that \mathcal{L} is not in $\operatorname{PCP}(\operatorname{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{O}}$. Consider an oracle O s.t. $0^n \notin L_O$. We show that for any PCP-verifier $M \in \mathbf{M}_t$, if M^O is correct on 0^n then we can construct another oracle O' for which $M^{O'}$ is not correct on 0^n (Lemma 45). Therefore there exists some O^* for which M^{O^*} is not correct on 0^n . Additionally, the language \mathcal{L} is by definition 4t-bounded and the running time of M is bounded by $2^{t(n)}$. Since M^{O^*} fails on 0^n , for every function F that agrees with O^* on $\bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq 2^{t(n)}} \{0,1\}^i$, M^F also fails on 0^n . So by Claim 26, we conclude that $\mathcal{L} \notin \operatorname{PCP}(\operatorname{poly}(t), o(t))^{\mathcal{O}}$.
- ▶ **Lemma 45.** For any PCP-verifier $M \in \mathbf{M}_t$ and any oracle $O \in \mathcal{O}$ such that $0^n \notin L_O$, if M^O is correct on 0^n then there exists O' for which $M^{O'}$ is not correct on 0^n .

Proof. Use σ to denote O's representation of the order p(n) group. Define the set of pairs of strings

$$I(O) := \{(u, v) \in (\{0, 1\}^{t(n)})^2 \mid u, v < p(n) - 1, \sigma^{-1}(u) + \sigma^{-1}(v^{\oplus t(n)}) = \mathbf{0}\}$$
.

Note that if we use $O^{(u,v)}$ to denote the oracle identical to O except for its permutation function for the group of order p(n), which is defined as

$$\sigma^{(u,v)}(g) := \begin{cases} u & \text{if } \sigma(g) = v \\ v & \text{if } \sigma(g) = u \\ \sigma(g) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Note that for any $(u, v) \in I(O)$, we have $(\sigma^{(u,v)})^{-1}(v) + (\sigma^{(u,v)})^{-1}(v^{\oplus t(n)}) = \mathbf{0}$. So $0^n \in L_{O(u,v)}$.

Consider the pairs of strings $(u, v) \in I(O)$ for which M^O queries all of (u, v) with "low" probability:

$$X_{\star}(O) := \left\{ (u, v) \in I(O) \;\middle|\; \text{for } i = u, v, \sum_{\pi \in \{0, 1\}^*} \Pr_r \left[\begin{array}{c} M^{O, \pi}(0^n; r) \text{ queries } O \text{ at } i \\ \text{or gets back } i \text{ from } O \end{array} \right] < \frac{1}{6} \right\} \;.$$

We argue that $|X_{\star}(O)| > 0$, and for every $(u, v) \in X_{\star}(O)$ it holds that $M^{O^{(u,v)}}$ is not correct on 0^n .

Consider the set of strings $u \in \{0,1\}^{\lceil \log_2 p(n) \rceil}$, u < p(n) - 1 that M^O queries with "high" probability:

$$X_c(O) := \left\{ u \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)} \; \middle| \; u < p(n) - 1 \,, \, \sum_{\pi \in \{0,1\}^*} \Pr_r \left[\begin{array}{c} M^{O,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } O \text{ at } u \\ \text{or gets back } u \text{ from } O \end{array} \right] \geq \frac{1}{6} \right\} \;.$$

Observe that

$$|X_c(O)| \le \left(c \cdot t(n)\right) \cdot \left(2^{o(t(n))} \cdot \text{poly}(t(n))\right) = 2^{o(t(n))} . \tag{3}$$

This is because, in any given execution, M can make at most poly(t(n)) queries to O (also can get at most poly(t(n)) symbols from O) and o(t(n)) queries to the given proof string, which means that

$$\sum_{u \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}, \, u < p(n)-1} \sum_{\pi \in \{0,1\}^*} \Pr_r \left[\begin{array}{c} M^{O,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } O \text{ at } u \\ \text{or gets back } u \text{ from } O \end{array} \right] \leq 2^{o(t(n))} \mathrm{poly}(t(n)) \enspace .$$

We deduce that $|X_{\star}(O)|$ is large:

$$|X_{\star}(O)| \ge (p(n) - 3) - 2 \cdot 2|X_c(O)| = 2^{t(n)} - 2^{o(t(n))}$$
.

Next, for every $(u, v) \in X_{\star}(O)$ it holds that

$$\forall \, \pi \in \{0,1\}^*, \, \text{for} \, \, i = u,v, \, \Pr_r \left[\begin{array}{c} M^{O,\pi}(0^n;r) \, \, \text{queries} \, O \, \, \text{at} \, \, i \\ \text{or} \, \, \text{gets back} \, i \, \, \text{from} \, \, O \end{array} \right] < \frac{1}{6} \, \, .$$

Therefore,

$$\forall \pi \in \{0,1\}^*, \quad \Pr_r[M^{O,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } O \text{ at } u \text{ or } v]$$

$$\leq \sum_{i=u,v} \Pr_r \left[\begin{array}{c} M^{O,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } O \text{ at } i \\ \text{or gets back } i \text{ from } O \end{array} \right]$$

$$< 2 \cdot \frac{1}{6} = \frac{1}{3} .$$

This means that for every $(u, v) \in X_{\star}(O)$ it holds that M cannot distinguish between O and $O^{u,v}$ with probability greater than or equal to $\frac{1}{3}$.

We know that M^O is correct on 0^n , namely, for every proof string π it holds that $M^{O,\pi}(0^n)$ accepts with probability no more than 1/3. We also know that for every $(u,v) \in I(O)$ it holds that 0^n is in $L_{O^{(u,v)}}$. But the foregoing argument tells us that for every $(u,v) \in X_{\star}(O)$ it holds that for every proof string π we have that $M^{O^{(u,v)},\pi}(0^n)$ accepts with probability less than 1/3 + 1/3 = 2/3. We deduce that, for every $(u,v) \in X_{\star}(O)$, $M^{O^{(u,v)}}$ is not correct on 0^n .

7 Almost-everywhere separation for random functions

We strengthen the separation for random functions in Theorem 31. The difference is that now the choice of machine M, which is the candidate PCP-verifier for L_R , depends on the sample R.

- ▶ **Theorem 46.** Let \mathcal{R} be a random oracle with output length $\ell \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$.
- **1.** For any function $t: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ with $t(n) \in \Omega(n)$,

$$\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\text{NTIME}(t)^R \not\subseteq \text{PCP}(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^R \right] = 1 \ .$$

2. For any function $t: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ with $t(n) \in \Omega(n) \cap o(2^n)$,

$$\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\mathrm{DTIME}(t)^R \not\subseteq \mathrm{PCP}(o(t), o(t))^R \right] = 1 \enspace .$$

7.1 Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 46

We prove the statement by arguing that, for every oracle R in a certain set of measure 1 (derived below), there exists a language L_R that is in NTIME $(t)^R$ but not in PCP $(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^R$.

We first define the language $L_R \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ for any $R \in \mathcal{R}$. The language is defined as follows:

$$L_R = \left\{ 0^n \middle| \begin{array}{c} R(w || e_{t(n),1})_1 = 0 \\ R(w || e_{t(n),2})_1 = 0 \\ \vdots \\ R(w || e_{t(n),2})_1 = 0 \end{array} \right\} .$$

$$R(w || e_{t(n),2})_1 = 0$$

The language L_R is in NTIME $(t)^R$ for every $R \in \mathcal{R}$ (via the same argument as in Section 4.1). We are left to argue that L_R is not in PCP $(\text{poly}(t), o(t))^R$ for R in a certain set of measure 1. For this, we state a lemma (which we prove later on below), and then conclude the proof of the theorem.

▶ Lemma 47. For every
$$M \in \mathbf{M}_{\text{poly}(t),o(t)}$$
, $\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} [M^R \text{ is a PCP-verifier for } L_R] = 0$.

Let S_M be the set of oracles $R \in \mathcal{R}$ for which M^R is a PCP-verifier for L_R . Lemma 47 tells us that S_M has measure zero, that is, $\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_M) = 0$. Since the set $\mathbf{M}_{\text{poly}(t),o(t)}$ is countable (it is a subset of the countable set of all machines) and measures are countably sub-additive, we deduce that

$$\mu_{\mathcal{R}}\left(\bigcup_{M \in \mathbf{M}_{\mathrm{poly}(t),o(t)}} S_M\right) \leq \sum_{M \in \mathbf{M}_{\mathrm{poly}(t),o(t)}} \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_M) = 0.$$

We conclude that

$$\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\exists M \in \mathbf{M}_{\text{poly}(t), o(t)} \text{ s.t. } M^R \text{ is a PCP-verifier for } L_R \right] = 0 ,$$

which shows that L_R is not in PCP(poly(t), o(t))^R for all R in a set of measure 1.

This completes the proof, and so we are only left with proving Lemma 47.

Before proving Lemma 47, we define two disjoint sets of oracles, $S_{n,0}$ and $S_{n,1}$, and then prove certain properties about them (see Lemmas 50 to 52 below).

▶ **Definition 48.** For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, function $R \in \mathcal{R}_n$, and string $w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$, we define the function $\mathbf{F}[R,w]: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ to be

$$\mathbf{F}[R,w](z)_j := \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } j = 1 \text{ and } z = w \| e_{t(n),i} \text{ for some } i \in [t(n)] \\ R(z)_j & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Moreover, given $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}_n$, we define $\mathbf{F}[S, \{0,1\}^{t(n)}]$ to be the set $\{\mathbf{F}[R, w] | R \in S, w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}\}$.

- ▶ **Definition 49.** For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $S_{n,0}$ is the set of functions $R \in \mathcal{R}_n$ for which $0^n \notin L_R$, that is, for which for every $w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ there exists an index $i \in [t(n)]$ such that $R(w||e_{t(n),i})_1 \neq 0$. Also, $S_{n,1}$ equals the set $\mathbf{F}[S_{n,0},\{0,1\}^{t(n)}]$, which is disjoint from $S_{n,0}$ (since $0^n \in L_R$ for every $R \in S_{n,1}$).
- ▶ **Lemma 50.** For every subset $S \subseteq S_{n,0}$, we have $\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S) \le \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(\mathbf{F}[S, \{0, 1\}^{t(n)}])$.

Proof. Each $R \in S$ yields $2^{t(n)}$ distinct functions $\mathbf{F}[R, w]$ as w ranges over $\{0, 1\}^{t(n)}$. On the other hand, each $R' \in \mathbf{F}[S, \{0, 1\}^{t(n)}]$ has at most $2^{t(n)} - 1$ "pre-images" in S: there exists precisely one w such that $R(w||e_{t(n),i})_1 = 0$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, t(n)\}$. So if $R' = \mathbf{F}[R, w]$, R and R' can only be different in the first bit at locations of the form $w||e_{t(n),i}$ for $i \in \{1, \ldots, t(n)\}$. There are $2^{t(n)} - 1$ different assignments to the first bits at $w||e_{t(n),i}$ each of which gives rise to a preimage of R' in S (we exclude the all-zero assignment). We deduce that $2^{t(n)}\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S) \leq (2^{t(n)} - 1)\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(\mathbf{F}[S, \{0, 1\}^{t(n)}])$, and so $\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S) \leq \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(\mathbf{F}[S, \{0, 1\}^{t(n)}])$.

▶ Lemma 51. $\lim_{n\to\infty} \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) = 1/e$.

Proof. For any $n \in \mathbb{N}$ the measure of $S_{n,0}$ in \mathcal{R} is $\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) = (1 - \frac{1}{2^{t(n)}})^{2^{t(n)}}$. Therefore:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) = \lim_{N \to \infty} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right)^N = \lim_{N \to \infty} e^{N\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right)} = \lim_{N \to \infty} e^{\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right)'/\left(\frac{1}{N}\right)'} = 1/e \ .$$

▶ Lemma 52. For every function $R \in S_{n,0}$, if M^R is correct on 0^n then there are at least $2^{t(n)} - 2^{o(t(n))}$ strings $w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ for which $M^{\mathbf{F}[R,w]}$ is not correct on 0^n . (Note that $\mathbf{F}[R,w] \in S_{n,1}$.)

Proof. Fix a constant c > 0 to be determined later. Consider the set of strings $w \in \{0, 1\}^{t(n)}$ for which M^R queries all of $\{w \oplus e_{t(n),1}, \dots, w \oplus e_{t(n),t(n)}\}$ with "low" probability:

$$X_{\star}(R) := \left\{ w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)} \mid \forall i \in [t(n)], \sum_{\pi \in \{0,1\}^*} \Pr_r[M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at } w \oplus e_{t(n),i}] < \frac{1}{c \cdot t(n)} \right\} .$$

We argue that $|X_{\star}(R)|$ is large, and for every $w \in X_{\star}(R)$ it holds that $M^{\mathbf{F}[R,w]}$ is not correct on 0^n .

Consider the set of strings $w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ that M^R queries with "high" probability:

$$X_c(R) := \left\{ w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)} \; \middle| \; \sum_{\pi \in \{0,1\}^*} \Pr_r[M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at } w \;] \geq \frac{1}{c \cdot t(n)} \right\} \; .$$

Observe that

$$|X_c(R)| \le \left(c \cdot t(n)\right) \cdot \left(2^{o(t(n))} \cdot \operatorname{poly}(t(n))\right) = 2^{o(t(n))} . \tag{4}$$

This is because, in any given execution, M can make at most poly(t(n)) queries to R and o(t(n)) queries to the given proof string, which means that

$$\sum_{w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}} \sum_{\pi \in \{0,1\}^*} \Pr_r[M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at } w] \leq 2^{o(t(n))} \operatorname{poly}(t(n)) \ .$$

We deduce, via Equation (4), that $|X_{\star}(R)|$ is large:

$$|X_{\star}(R)| \ge 2^{t(n)} - t(n)|X_c(R)| = 2^{t(n)} - 2^{o(t(n))}$$

Next, for every $w \in X_{\star}(R)$ it holds that

$$\forall \pi \in \{0,1\}^*, \forall i \in [t(n)], \Pr_r[M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at } w \oplus e_{t(n),i}] < \frac{1}{c \cdot t(n)}$$
.

Therefore.

$$\forall \pi \in \{0,1\}^*, \quad \Pr_r[M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at any } w \oplus e_{t(n),i}]$$

$$\leq \sum_{i \in [t(n)]} \Pr_r[M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at } w \oplus e_{t(n),i}]$$

$$< t(n) \cdot \frac{1}{c \cdot t(n)} = \frac{1}{c} .$$

This means that for every $w \in X_{\star}(R)$ it holds that M cannot distinguish between R and $R' := \mathbf{F}[R, w]$ with probability greater than $\frac{1}{c}$ (the probability is over M's randomness r).

We know that M^R is correct on 0^n , namely, for every proof string π it holds that $M^{R,\pi}(0^n)$ accepts with probability less than 1/3. We also know that for every $w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ it holds that 0^n is in $L_{\mathbf{F}[R,w]}$. But the foregoing argument tells us that for every $w \in X_{\star}(R)$ it holds that for every proof string π we have that $M^{\mathbf{F}[R,w],\pi}(0^n)$ accepts with probability less than 1/3 + 1/c.

Choosing $c \geq 3$, we deduce that, for every $w \in X_{\star}(R)$, $M^{\mathbf{F}[R,w]}$ is not correct on 0^n .

Proof of Lemma 47. Fix $M \in \mathbf{M}_{\text{poly}(t),o(t)}$. It suffices to show that, for some $\epsilon \in [0,1)$ and every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, M^R is correct on input 0^n for at most an ϵ -fraction of oracles R. Indeed, this fact would imply that:

$$\begin{split} &\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[M^R \text{ is a PCP-verifier for } L_R \right] \\ &\leq \Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \right] \\ &= \prod_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^i \text{ for all } i < n \, \right] \\ &= \prod_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } 0^n \, \middle| \,$$

as claimed. Above "correct" on input 0^n means that if $0^n \in L_R$ then there exists a proof string π such that $M^{R,\pi}(0^n)$ accepts with probability at least 2/3, and if $0^n \notin L_R$ then for every proof string π it holds that $M^{R,\pi}(0^n)$ rejects with probability at least 2/3.

We are left to argue that M^R is correct on input 0^n for at most an ϵ -fraction of oracles R. Consider the following sets of oracles:

$$\begin{split} U_{n,\mathsf{all}} &:= \left\{ R \in \mathcal{R} \,|\, M^R \text{ is incorrect on } 0^n \,\right\} \;, \\ U_{n,0} &:= \left\{ R \in S_{n,0} \,|\, M^R \text{ is incorrect on } 0^n \,\right\} \;, \\ U_{n,1} &:= \left\{ R' \in S_{n,1} \,|\, M^{R'} \text{ is incorrect on } 0^n \,\right\} \;. \end{split}$$

Note that $U_{n,0} \cup U_{n,1} \subseteq U_{n,\text{all}}$. Also, $U_{n,0}$ and $U_{n,1}$ are disjoint, because $S_{n,0}$ and $S_{n,1}$ are disjoint.

We want to prove that $\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(U_{n,\mathsf{all}}) > 1 - \epsilon$. We do so as follows:

$$\begin{split} \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(U_{n,\mathsf{all}}) &\geq \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(U_{n,0}) + \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(U_{n,1}) \\ &\geq \left(\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) - \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0} \setminus U_{n,0})\right) + \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(U_{n,1}) \\ &\geq_{[a]} \left(\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) - \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0} \setminus U_{n,0})\right) + \frac{2^{t(n)} - 2^{o(t(n))}}{2^{t(n)}} \cdot \mu_{\mathcal{R}} \left(\mathbf{F}[S_{n,0} \setminus U_{n,0}, \{0,1\}^{t(n)}]\right) \\ &\geq_{[b]} \left(\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) - \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0} \setminus U_{n,0})\right) + \frac{2^{t(n)} - 2^{o(t(n))}}{2^{t(n)}} \cdot \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0} \setminus U_{n,0}) \\ &= \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) - \frac{2^{o(t(n))}}{2^{t(n)}} \cdot \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0} \setminus U_{n,0}) \\ &\geq \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) - \frac{2^{o(t(n))}}{2^{t(n)}} \cdot \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{2^{o(t(n))}}{2^{t(n)}}\right) \cdot \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) \; . \end{split}$$

Above, the third inequality (labeled [a]) follows from Lemma 52; the fourth inequality (labeled [b]) follows from Lemma 50 applied to the set $S_{n,0} \setminus U_{n,0}$.

Finally, by Lemma 51 we know that $\lim_{n\to\infty} \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,0}) = 1/e > 1/3$, so if we set $\epsilon := 2/3$ then the above expression is greater than $1-\epsilon$ for large enough n.

7.2 Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 46

We prove the statement by arguing that, for every oracle R in a certain set of measure 1 (derived below), there exists a language L_R that is in DTIME $(t)^R$ but not in PCP $(o(t), o(t))^R$.

We first define the language $L_R \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ for any $R \in \mathcal{R}$. The language is defined as follows:

$$L_R := \{(x,y) \in \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \mid F_{R,n}(x) = y\} ,$$
 where $F_{R,n}(x)_i := \bigoplus_{j \in \{(i-1)\frac{t(n)}{n} + 1, \dots, i\frac{t(n)}{n}\}} R(x \| e_{t(n),j})_1$ for $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$.

We argue that the language L_R is in DTIME $(t)^R$ for every $R \in \mathcal{R}$. Consider the deterministic machine that on input (x,y): (a) copies $x \| e_{t(n),1}$ to the query tape; (b) for $i \in \{1,\ldots,n\}$, calls R on inputs $\{x \| e_{t(n),j}\}_{j \in \{(i-1)\frac{t(n)}{n}+1,\ldots,i\frac{t(n)}{n}\}}$ to get $z_i := F_{R,n}(x)_i$; (c) accepts if y = z. Writing down x takes time n, querying all bits of the form $x \| e_{t(n),j}$ takes O(t(n)) time, computing z and comparing it with y takes O(t(n)) time. So the running time of the machine is O(t(n)). We are left to argue that L_R is not in $PCP(o(t), o(t))^R$ for R in a certain set of measure 1. For this, we state a lemma (which we prove later on below), and then conclude the proof of the theorem.

▶ Lemma 53. For every $M \in \mathbf{M}_{o(t),o(t)}$, $\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} [M^R \text{ is a PCP-verifier for } L_R] = 0$.

Using the same arguement as in the proof of Theorem 46, we conclude that

$$\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\exists M \in \mathbf{M}_{o(t), o(t)} \text{ s.t. } M^R \text{ is a PCP-verifier for } L_R \right] = 0 \ ,$$

which shows that L_R is not in $PCP(o(t), o(t))^R$ for all R in a set of measure 1.

This completes the proof, and so we are only left with proving Lemma 53.

Before proving Lemma 53, we define for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ 2ⁿ disjoint sets of oracles, $S_{n,y}$ where $y \in \{0,1\}^n$, and then prove certain properties about them (see Remark 56 and Lemma 57 below).

- ▶ **Definition 54.** For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $y \in \{0,1\}^n$, $S_{n,y}$ is the set of functions $R \in \mathcal{R}_n$ for which $(0^n, y) \in L_R$, that is, for which $F_{R,n}(0^n) = y$. We note that by definition the sets are disjoint.
- ▶ **Definition 55.** For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, function $R \in \mathcal{R}_n$, index $i \in [n]$ and coordinate index $j \in \left[\frac{t(n)}{n}\right]$, we define the function $\mathbf{F}[R, i, j] : \{0, 1\}^* \to \{0, 1\}^*$ to be

$$\mathbf{F}[R, i, j](z)_k := \begin{cases} 1 - R(z)_k & \text{if } k = 1 \text{ and } z = 0^n || e_{t(n), (i-1)\frac{t(n)}{n} + j} \\ R(z)_k & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Moreover, given $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}_n$, we define $\mathbf{F}[S, i, j]$ to be the set $\{\mathbf{F}[R, i, j] \mid R \in S\}$.

From the definitions of the set $S_{n,y}$ and the map $\mathbf{F}[\ ,\ ,\]$, we immediately obtain the following claim.

- ▶ Remark 56. We note that for any $R \in S_{n,y}$, $i \in [n]$ and $j \in [t(n)/n]$, (a) $\mathbf{F}[R,i,j] \notin S_{n,y}$, since flipping the first bit at $0^n \| e_{t(n),(i-1)t(n)/n+j}$ results in $F_{R,n}(0^n)_i \neq F_{\mathbf{F}[R,i,j],n}(0^n)_i$; (b) the number of preimages of R under the maps $\{\mathbf{F}[\ ,i,j]\}_{i\in[n],j\in[t(n)/n]}$ is exactly t(n).
- ▶ **Lemma 57.** For every function $R \in S_{n,y}$, if M^R is correct on $(0^n, y)$ then there are at least t(n) o(t(n)) pairs $(i, j)_{i \in [n], j \in [t(n)/n]}$ for which $M^{\mathbf{F}[R,i,j]}$ is not correct on $(0^n, y)$.

Proof. Fix a constant c > 0. Let π be the proof such that $\Pr_r[M^{R,\pi}(0^n, y; r)] \ge \frac{2}{3}$. Consider the set of t(n) queries

$$X(R) := \left\{ 0^n \| e_{t(n),(i-1)t(n)/n+j} \mid i \in [n], \ j \in [t(n)/n] \right\}.$$

Define the subset of X(R) which $M^{R,\pi}$ queries with "low" probability:

$$X_{\star}(R) := \left\{ w \in X(R) \;\middle|\; \Pr_{r}[M^{R,\pi}(0^{n};r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at } w] < \frac{1}{c} \right\} \; .$$

We argue that $|X_{\star}(R)|$ is large, and for every $w \in X_{\star}(R)$, $w = 0^n ||e_{t(n),(i-1)t(n)/n+j}|$ it holds that $M^{\mathbf{F}[R,i,j],\pi}$ is not correct on $(0^n,y)$.

Consider the set of strings $w \in X(R)$ that M^R queries with "high" probability:

$$X_c(R) := \left\{ w \in X(R) \; \middle| \; \Pr_r[M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at } w \;] \geq \frac{1}{c} \right\} \; .$$

Observe that

$$|X_c(R)| \le c \cdot o(t(n)) \in o(t(n)) . \tag{5}$$

This is because, in any given execution, M can make at most o(t(n)) queries to R which means that

$$\sum_{w \in X(R)} \Pr_r[M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at } w] \leq o(t(n)) \ .$$

We deduce, via Equation (5), that $|X_{\star}(R)|$ is large:

$$|X_{\star}(R)| \ge t(n) - |X_c(R)| = t(n) - o(t(n))$$
.

Next, for every $w \in X_{\star}(R)$ it holds that

$$\Pr_r[M^{R,\pi}(0^n;r) \text{ queries } R \text{ at } w] < \frac{1}{c}$$
.

This means that for every $w \in X_{\star}(R)$, $w = 0^n \|e_{t(n),(i-1)t(n)/n+j}$, it holds that M cannot distinguish between R and $R' := \mathbf{F}[R,i,j]$ with probability greater than $\frac{1}{c}$ (the probability is over M's randomness r).

We know that $M^{R,\pi}$ is correct on $(0^n,y)$, namely, $M^{R,\pi}(0^n)$ accepts with probability at least 1/3. We also know that for every $(i,j) \in [n] \times [t(n)/n]$ it holds that $(0^n,y) \notin L_{\mathbf{F}[R,i,j]}$ (part (a) of Remark 56). But the foregoing argument tells us that for every $0^n \|e_{t(n),(i-1)t(n)/n+j} \in X_{\star}(R)$ it holds that $M^{\mathbf{F}[R,i,j],\pi}(0^n)$ accepts with probability greater than 1/3 + 1/c.

Choosing $c \geq 3$, we deduce that, for every $0^n \|e_{t(n),(i-1)t(n)/n+j} \in X_{\star}(R)$, $M^{\mathbf{F}[R,i,j]}$ is not correct on $(0^n, y)$.

Proof of Lemma 53. Fix $M \in \mathbf{M}_{o(t),o(t)}$. It suffices to show that, for some $\epsilon \in [0,1)$ and every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, M^R is correct on inputs $(0^n, y)_{y \in \{0,1\}^n}$ for at most an ϵ -fraction of oracles R. Indeed, this fact would imply that:

$$\begin{split} &\Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\, M^R \text{ is a PCP-verifier for } L_R \, \right] \\ &\leq \Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\, \forall n \in \mathbb{N}, \, M^R \text{ is correct on } (0^n, y)_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} \, \right] \\ &= \prod_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\, M^R \text{ is correct on } (0^n, y)_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} \, \middle| \, M^R \text{ is correct on } (0^i, y)_{y \in \{0,1\}^i} \text{ for all } i < n \, \right] \\ &= \prod_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \Pr_{R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} \left[\, M^R \text{ is correct on } (0^n, y)_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} \, \right] \\ &\leq \lim_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \epsilon^n = 0 \, \, , \end{split}$$

as claimed. Above "correct" on input $(0^n, y)$ means that if $(0^n, y) \in L_R$ then there exists a proof string π such that $M^{R,\pi}(0^n, y)$ accepts with probability at least 2/3, and if $(0^n, y) \notin L_R$ then for every proof string π it holds that $M^{R,\pi}(0^n, y)$ rejects with probability at least 2/3.

We are left to argue that M^R is correct on inputs $(0^n, y)_{y \in \{0,1\}^n}$ for at most an ϵ -fraction of oracles R. Consider the following sets of oracles:

$$\begin{split} &U_{n,\mathsf{all}} := \left\{ R \in \mathcal{R} \,|\, M^R \text{ is incorrect on } (0^n,y) \text{ for some } y \in \{0,1\}^n \,\, \right\} \,\,, \\ &U_{y,\mathsf{all}} := \left\{ R \in S_{n,y} \,|\, M^R \text{ is incorrect on } (0^n,y') \text{ for some } y' \in \{0,1\}^n \,\, \right\} \,\,, \\ &U_{y,y} := \left\{ R \in S_{n,y} \,|\, M^R \text{ is incorrect on } (0^n,y) \,\, \right\} \,\,. \end{split}$$

We want to prove that $\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(U_{n,\mathsf{all}}) > 1 - \epsilon = 1/3$. We do so as follows:

$$\begin{split} \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(U_{n,\text{all}}) &= \sum_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(U_{y,\text{all}}) \\ &\geq_{[a]} \frac{1}{t(n)} \cdot \sum_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,y} \setminus U_{y,y}) \cdot (t(n) - o(t(n))) \\ &\geq \sum_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,y} \setminus U_{y,\text{all}}) \cdot \frac{t(n) - o(t(n))}{t(n)} \\ &= (1 - \mu_{\mathcal{R}}(U_{n,\text{all}})) \cdot \frac{t(n) - o(t(n))}{t(n)} \\ &\geq \frac{t(n) - o(t(n))}{2t(n)} > \frac{1}{3} \end{split}$$

In the inequality labeled [a], the $\frac{1}{t(n)}$ term comes from part (b) of Remark 56 that each $R \in \mathcal{R}_n$ has t(n) preimages under the maps $\{\mathbf{F}[\ ,i,j]\}_{i\in[n],j\in[t(n)/n]}$; the term $\mu_{\mathcal{R}}(S_{n,y}\setminus U_{y,y})\cdot(t(n)-o(t(n)))$ is the measure of all $R'\in\cup_{i,j}\mathbf{F}[S_{n,y},i,j]$ for which $M^{R',\pi}(0^n,y)$ fails (Lemma 57).

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