

Differentially Private Combinatorial Optimization

Anupam Gupta Katrina Ligett Frank McSherry Aaron Roth
Kunal Talwar

November 10, 2009

Abstract

Consider the following problem: given a metric space, some of whose points are “clients,” select a set of at most k facility locations to minimize the average distance from the clients to their nearest facility. This is just the well-studied k -median problem, for which many approximation algorithms and hardness results are known. Note that the objective function encourages opening facilities in areas where there are many clients, and given a solution, it is often possible to get a good idea of where the clients are located. This raises the following quandary: what if the locations of the clients are sensitive information that we would like to keep private? *Is it even possible to design good algorithms for this problem that preserve the privacy of the clients?*

In this paper, we initiate a systematic study of algorithms for discrete optimization problems in the framework of differential privacy (which formalizes the idea of protecting the privacy of individual input elements). We show that many such problems indeed have good approximation algorithms that preserve differential privacy; this is even in cases where it is impossible to preserve cryptographic definitions of privacy while computing any non-trivial approximation to even the *value* of an optimal solution, let alone the entire solution.

Apart from the k -median problem, we consider the problems of vertex and set cover, min-cut, k -median, facility location, and Steiner tree, and give approximation algorithms and lower bounds for these problems. We also consider the recently introduced submodular maximization problem, “Combinatorial Public Projects” (CPP), shown by Papadimitriou et al. [PSS08] to be inapproximable to subpolynomial multiplicative factors by any efficient and *truthful* algorithm. We give a differentially private (and hence approximately truthful) algorithm that achieves a logarithmic additive approximation.

1 Introduction

Consider the following problems:

- Assign people using a social network to one of two servers so that most pairs of friends are assigned to the same server.
- Open some number of HIV treatment centers so that the average commute time for patients is small.
- Open a small number of drop-off centers for undercover agents so that each agent is able to visit some site convenient to her (each providing a list of acceptable sites).

The above problems can be modeled as instances of well-known combinatorial optimization problems: respectively the minimum cut problem, the k -median problem, and the set cover problem. Good heuristics have been designed for these problems, and hence they may be considered well-studied and solved. However, in the above scenarios and in many others, the input data (friendship relations, medical history, agents' locations) represent sensitive information about individuals. Data privacy is a crucial design goal, and it may be vastly preferable to use a private algorithm that gives somewhat suboptimal solutions to a non-private optimal algorithm. This leads us to the following central questions: *Given that the most benign of actions possibly leaks sensitive information, how should we design algorithms for the above problems? What are the fundamental trade-offs between the utility of these algorithms and the privacy guarantees they give us?*

The notion of privacy we consider in this paper is that of *differential privacy*. Informally, differential privacy guarantees that the distribution of outcomes of the computation does not change significantly when one individual changes her input data. This is a very strong privacy guarantee: anything significant about any individual that an adversary could learn from the algorithm's output, he could also learn were the individual not participating in the database at all—and this holds true no matter what auxiliary information the adversary may have. This definition guarantees privacy of an individual's sensitive data, while allowing the computation to respond when a large number of individuals change their data, as any useful computation must do.

1.1 Our Results

In this paper we initiate a systematic study of designing algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems under the constraint of differential privacy. Here is a short summary of some of the main contributions of our work.

- While the exponential mechanism of [MT07] is an easy way to obtain *computationally inefficient* private approximation algorithms for some problems, the approximation guarantees given by a direct application of this can be far from optimal (e.g., see our results on min-cut and weighted set cover). In these cases, we have to use different techniques—often more sophisticated applications of the exponential mechanism—to get good (albeit computationally expensive) solutions.
- However, we want our algorithms to be *computationally efficient* and *private* at the same time: here we cannot use the exponential mechanism directly, and hence we develop new algorithmic ideas. We give private algorithms for a wide variety of *search* problems, where we must not only approximate the *value* of the solution, but also produce a solution that optimizes this value. See Table 1 for our results.
- For some problems, unfortunately, just outputting an explicit solution might leak private information. For example, if we output a vertex cover of some graph explicitly, any pair of vertices not output reveals that they do not share an edge—so any private explicit vertex cover algorithm must output $n - 1$ vertices. To overcome this hurdle, we instead privately output an implicit representation of a small vertex cover—we view vertex cover as a location problem, and output an orientation of the edges. Each edge can cover itself using the end point that it points to. The orientation is output privately, and the resulting vertex cover approximates the optimal vertex cover well. We deal with similar representational issues for other problems like set cover as well.
- We also show lower bounds on the approximation guarantees regardless of computational considerations. For example, for vertex cover, we show that any ϵ -differentially private algorithm must have

	Non-private	Efficient Algorithms	Information Theoretic
Vertex Cover	$2 \times \text{OPT}$ [Pit85]	$(2 + 16/\epsilon) \times \text{OPT}$	$\Theta(1/\epsilon) \times \text{OPT}$
Wtd. Vertex Cover	$2 \times \text{OPT}$ [Hoc82]	$(16 + 16/\epsilon) \times \text{OPT}$	$\Theta(1/\epsilon) \times \text{OPT}$
Set Cover	$\ln n \times \text{OPT}$ [Joh74]	$O(\ln n + \ln m/\epsilon) \times \text{OPT}$ †	$\Theta(\ln m/\epsilon) \times \text{OPT}$
Wtd. Set Cover	$\ln n \times \text{OPT}$ [Chv79]	$O(\ln n(\ln m + \ln \ln n)/\epsilon) \times \text{OPT}$ †	$\Theta(\ln m/\epsilon) \times \text{OPT}$
Min Cut	OPT [FF56]	$\text{OPT} + O(\ln n/\epsilon)$ †	$\text{OPT} + \Theta(\ln n/\epsilon)$
CPPP	$(1 - 1/e) \times \text{OPT}$ [NWF78]	$(1 - 1/e) \times \text{OPT} - O(k \ln m/\epsilon)$ †	$\text{OPT} - \Theta(k \ln(m/k)/\epsilon)$
k -Median	$(3 + \gamma) \times \text{OPT}$ [AGK ⁺ 04]	$6 \times \text{OPT} + O(k^2 \ln^2 n/\epsilon)$	$\text{OPT} + \Theta(k \ln(n/k)/\epsilon)^a$

Table 1: Summary of Results. Results in the second and third columns are from this paper.

^a[FFKN09] independently prove a similar lower bound.

an approximation guarantee of $\Omega(1/\epsilon)$. We show that each of our lower bounds are tight: we give (computationally inefficient) algorithms with matching approximation guarantees.

- Our results have implications beyond privacy as well: Papadimitriou et al. [PSS08] introduce the *Combinatorial Public Project* problem, a special case of submodular maximization, and show that the problem can be well approximated by either a truthful mechanism or an efficient algorithm, but not by both simultaneously. In contrast to this negative result, we show that under differential privacy (which can be interpreted as an approximate but robust alternative to truthfulness) we can achieve the same approximation factor as the best non-truthful algorithm, plus an additive logarithmic loss.
- Finally, we develop a private amplification lemma: we show how to take private algorithms that gives bounds in expectation and efficiently convert them (privately) into bounds with high probability. This answers an open question in the paper of Feldman et al. [FFKN09].

Table 1 summarizes the bounds we prove in this paper. For each problem, it reports (in the first column) the best known non-private approximation guarantees, (in the second column) our best efficient ϵ -differentially private algorithms, and in each (in the third column) case matching upper and lower bounds for inefficient ϵ -differentially private algorithms. For a few of the efficient algorithms (marked with a †) the guarantees are only for an approximate form of differential privacy, incorporating a failure probability δ , and scaling the effective value of ϵ up by $\ln(1/\delta)$.

1.2 Related Work

Differential privacy is a relatively recent privacy definition (e.g., see [DMNS06, Dwo06, NRS07, BLR08, KLN⁺08, FFKN09, DNR⁺09], and see [Dwo08] for an excellent survey), that tries to capture the intuition of individual privacy. Many algorithms in this framework have focused on measurement, statistics, and learning tasks applied to statistical data sets, rather than on processing and producing combinatorial objects. One exception to this is the Exponential Mechanism of [MT07] which allows the selection from a set of discrete alternatives.

Independently, Feldman et al. [FFKN09] also consider the problem of privately approximating k -medians for points in \mathbb{R}^d . Their model differs slightly from ours, which makes the results largely incomparable: while our results for general metrics translated to \mathbb{R}^d give smaller additive errors than theirs, we only output a k -median approximation whereas they output coresets for the problem. Their lower bound argument for private coresets is similar to ours.

Prior work on Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) tells us that in fact the minimum cut in a graph can be computed in a distributed fashion in such a way that computations *reveals nothing that cannot be learnt from the output of the computation*. While this is a strong form of a privacy guarantee, it may be unsatisfying to an individual whose private data can be inferred from the privately computed output. Indeed, it is not hard to come up with instances where an attacker with some limited auxiliary information can infer the presence or absence of specific edges from local information about the minimum cut in the graph. By relaxing the whole input privacy requirement of SFE, differential privacy is able to provide unconditional per element privacy, which SFE need not provide if the output itself discloses properties of input.

Feigenbaum et al. [FIM⁺06] extend the notion of SFE to NP hard problems for which efficient algorithms must output an approximation to the optimum, unless P=NP. They defined as *functional privacy* the constraint that two inputs with the same output value (e.g. the size of an optimal vertex cover) must produce the same value under the approximation algorithm. Under this constraint, Halevi et al. [HKKN01] show that approximating the value of vertex cover to within $n^{1-\xi}$ is as hard as computing the value itself, for any constant ξ . These hardness results were extended to *search* problems by Beimel et al. [BCNW06], where the constraint is relaxed to only equate those inputs whose sets of optimal solutions are identical. These results were extended and strengthened by Beimel et al. [BHN07, BMNW07].

Nonetheless, Feigenbaum et al. [FIM⁺06] and others show a number of positive approximation results under versions of the functional privacy model. Halevi et al. [HKKN01] provide positive results in the function privacy setting when the algorithm is permitted to leak few bits (each equivalence class of input need not produce identical output, but must be one of at most 2^b possible outcomes). Indyk and Woodruff also give some positive results for the approximation of ℓ_2 distance and a nearest neighbor problem [IW06]. However, as functional privacy extends SFE, it does not protect sensitive data that can be inferred from the output.

Nevertheless, SFE provides an implementation of any function in a distributed setting such that nothing other than the output of the function is revealed. One can therefore run a differentially private algorithm in a distributed manner using SFE (see e.g. [DKM⁺06, BNO08]), in the absence of a trusted curator.

2 Definitions

Differential privacy is a privacy definition for computations run against sensitive input data sets. Its requirement, informally, is that the computation behaves nearly identically on two input data sets that are nearly identical; the probability of any outcome must not increase by more than a small constant factor when the input set is altered by a single element. Formally,

Definition 1 ([DMNS06]). *We say a randomized computation M has ϵ -differential privacy if for any two input sets A and B with symmetric difference one, and for any set of outcomes $S \subseteq \text{Range}(M)$,*

$$\Pr[M(A) \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \times \Pr[M(B) \in S]. \quad (2.1)$$

The definition has several appealing properties from a privacy perspective. One that is most important for us is that arbitrary sequences of differentially private computations are also differentially private, with an ϵ parameter equal to the sum of those comprising the sequence. This is true even when subsequent computations can depend on and incorporate the results of prior differentially private computations [DKM⁺06], allowing repetition of differentially private steps to improve solutions.

2.1 Approximate Differential Privacy

One relaxation of differential privacy [DKM⁺06] allows a small additive term in the bound:

Definition 2. *We say a randomized computation M has δ -approximate ϵ -differential privacy if for any two input sets A and B with symmetric difference one, and for any set of outcomes $S \subseteq \text{Range}(M)$,*

$$\Pr[M(A) \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \times \Pr[M(B) \in S] + \delta. \quad (2.2)$$

The flavor of guarantee is that although not all events have their probabilities preserved, the alteration is only for very low probability events, and is very unlikely to happen. The δ is best thought of as $1/\text{poly}(n)$ for a data set containing some subset of n candidate records. We note that there are stronger notions of approximate differential privacy (c.f. [MKA⁺08]), but in our settings, they are equivalent upto $\text{poly}(n)$ changes in δ . We therefore restrict ourselves to this definition here.

2.2 The Exponential Mechanism

One particularly general tool that we will often use is the exponential mechanism of [MT07]. This construction allows differentially private computation over arbitrary domains and ranges, parametrized by a query function $q(A, r)$ mapping a pair of input data set A (a multiset over some domain) and candidate result r to a real valued “score”. With q and a target privacy value ϵ , the mechanism selects an output with exponential bias in favor of high scoring outputs:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{E}_q^\epsilon(A) = r] \propto \exp(\epsilon q(A, r)). \quad (2.3)$$

If the query function q has the property that any two adjacent data sets have score within Δ of each other, for all possible outputs r , the mechanism provides $2\epsilon\Delta$ -differential privacy. Typically, we would normalize q so that $\Delta = 1$. We will be using this mechanism almost exclusively over discrete ranges, where we can derive the following simple analogue of a theorem of [MT07], that the probability of a highly suboptimal output is exponentially low:

Theorem 2.1. *The exponential mechanism, when used to select an output $r \in R$ gives $2\epsilon\Delta$ -differential privacy, letting R_{OPT} be the subset of R achieving $q(A, r) = \max_r q(A, r)$, ensures that*

$$\Pr[q(A, \mathcal{E}_q^\epsilon(A)) < \max_r q(A, r) - \ln(|R|/|R_{\text{OPT}}|)/\epsilon - t/\epsilon] \leq \exp(-t). \quad (2.4)$$

The proof of the theorem is almost immediate: any outcome with score less than $\max_r q(A, r) - \ln(|R|/|R_{\text{OPT}}|)/\epsilon - t/\epsilon$ will have normalized probability at most $\exp(-t)/|R|$; each has weight at most $\exp(\text{OPT} - t)|R_{\text{OPT}}|/|R|$, but is normalized by at least $|R_{\text{OPT}}|\exp(\text{OPT})$ from the optimal outputs. As there are at most $|R|$ such outputs their cumulative probability is at most $\exp(-t)$.

3 Private Min-Cut

Given a graph $G = (V, E)$ the minimum cut problem is to find a cut (S, S^c) so as to minimize $E(S, S^c)$. In absence of privacy constraints, this problem is efficiently solvable exactly. However, outputting an exact solution violates privacy, as we show in Section 3.1. Thus, we give an algorithm to output a cut within additive $O(\log n/\epsilon)$ edges of optimal.

The algorithm has two stages: First, given a graph G , we add edges to the graph to raise the cost of the min cut to at least $4 \ln n/\epsilon$, in a differentially private manner. Second, we deploy the exponential mechanism over all cuts in the graph, using a theorem of Karger to show that for graphs with min cut at least $4 \ln n/\epsilon$ the number of cuts within additive t of OPT increases no faster than exponentially with t . Although the exponential mechanism takes time exponential in n , we can construct a polynomial time version by considering only the polynomially many cuts within $O(\ln n/\epsilon)$ of OPT. Below, let $\text{Cost}(H, (S, S^c))$ denote the size $E_H(S, S^c)$ of the cut (S, S^c) in a graph H .

Algorithm 1 The Min-Cut Algorithm

- 1: **Input:** $G = (V, E), \epsilon$.
 - 2: **Let** $H_0 \subset H_1, \dots, \subset H_{\binom{n}{2}}$ be arbitrary strictly increasing sets of edges on V .
 - 3: **Choose** index $i \in [0, \binom{n}{2}]$ with probability proportional to $\exp(-\epsilon|\text{OPT}(G \cup H_i) - 8 \ln n/\epsilon|)$.
 - 4: **Choose** a subset $S \in 2^V \setminus \{\emptyset, V\}$ with probability proportional to $\exp(-\epsilon \text{Cost}(G \cup H_i, (S, S^c)))$.
 - 5: **Output** the cut $C = (S, S^c)$.
-

Our result relies on a result of Karger about the number of near-minimum cuts in a graph [Kar93]

Lemma 3.1 ([Kar93]). *For any graph G with min cut C , there are at most $n^{2\alpha}$ cuts of size at most αC .*

By enlarging the size of the min cut in $G \cup H_i$ to at least $4 \ln n/\epsilon$, we ensure that the number of cuts of value $\text{OPT}(G \cup H_i) + t$ is bounded by $n^2 \exp(\epsilon t/2)$. The downweighting of the exponential mechanism will be able to counteract this growth in number and ensure that we select a good cut.

Theorem 3.2. *For any graph G , the expected cost of ALG is at most $\text{OPT} + O(\ln n/\epsilon)$.*

Proof. First, we argue that the selected index i satisfies $4 \ln n/\epsilon < \text{OPT}(G \cup H_i) < \text{OPT}(G) + 12 \ln n/\epsilon$ with probability at least $1 - 1/n^2$. For $\text{OPT} > 8 \ln n/\epsilon$, Equation 2.4 ensures that the probability of exceeding the optimal choice (H_0) by $4 \ln n/\epsilon$ is at most $1 - 1/n^2$. Likewise, for $\text{OPT} < 8 \ln n/\epsilon$, there is some optimal H_i achieving min cut size $8 \ln n/\epsilon$, and the probability we end up farther away than $4 \ln n/\epsilon$ is at most $1 - 1/n^2$.

Assuming now that $\text{OPT}(G \cup H_i) > 4 \ln n/\epsilon$, Karger's lemma argues that the number c_t of cuts in $G \cup H_i$ of cost at most $\text{OPT}(G \cup H_i) + t$ is at most $n^2 \exp(\epsilon t/2)$. As we are assured a cut of size $\text{OPT}(G \cup H_i)$ exists,

each cut of size $\text{OPT}(G \cup H_i) + t$ will receive probability at most $\exp(-\epsilon t)$. Put together, the probability of a cut exceeding $\text{OPT}(G \cup H_i) + b$ is at most

$$\Pr[\text{Cost}(G \cup H_i, C) > \text{OPT}(G \cup H_i) + b] \leq \sum_{t>b} \exp(-\epsilon t)(c_t - c_{t-1}) \quad (3.5)$$

$$\leq (\exp(\epsilon) - 1) \sum_{t>b} \exp(-\epsilon t) c_t \quad (3.6)$$

$$\leq (\exp(\epsilon) - 1) \sum_{t>b} \exp(-\epsilon t/2) n^2 \quad (3.7)$$

The sum telescopes to $\exp(-\epsilon b/2)n^2/(\exp(\epsilon/2) - 1)$, and the denominator is within a constant factor of the leading factor of $(\exp(\epsilon) - 1)$, for $\epsilon < 1$. For $b = 8 \ln n/\epsilon$, this probability becomes at most $1/n^2$. \square

Theorem 3.3. *The algorithm above preserves 2ϵ -differential privacy.*

Note that the first instance of the exponential mechanism in our algorithm runs efficiently (since it is selecting from only $\binom{n}{2}$ objects), but the second instance does not. We now describe how to achieve (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy efficiently.

First recall that using Karger's algorithm we can efficiently (with high probability) generate all cuts of size at most $k\text{OPT}$ for any constant k . Indeed it is shown in [Kar93] that in a single run of his algorithm, any such cut is output with probability at least n^{-2k} so that n^{2k+1} runs of the algorithm will output all such cuts except with an exponentially small probability.

Our efficient algorithm works as follows: in step 4 of Algorithm 1, instead of sampling amongst all possible cuts, we restrict attention to the set of cuts generated in n^7 runs of Karger's algorithm. We claim that the output distribution of this algorithm has statistical distance $O(1/n^2)$ from that of Algorithm 1, which would imply that we get $(\epsilon, O(\frac{1}{n^2}))$ -differential privacy.

Consider a hypothetical algorithm that generates the cut (S, S^c) as in Algorithm 1 but then outputs FAIL whenever this cut is not in the set of cuts generated by n^7 runs of Karger's. We first show that the probability that this algorithm outputs FAIL is $O(\frac{1}{n^2})$. As shown above, $\text{OPT}(G \cup H_i)$ is at least $4 \ln n/\epsilon$ except with probability $\frac{1}{n^2}$. Conditioned on this, the cut chosen in Step 4 has cost at most $3\text{OPT}(G \cup H_i)$ except with probability $\frac{1}{n^2}$. Since each such cut is in the sample except with exponentially small probability, the claim follows. Finally, note that this hypothetical algorithm can be naturally coupled with both the algorithms so that the outputs agree whenever the former doesn't output FAIL. This implies the claimed bound on the statistical distance. We remark that we have not attempted to optimize the running time here; both the running time and the value of δ can be improved by choosing a larger constant (instead of 8) in Step 3, at the cost of increasing the additive error by an additional constant.

3.1 Lower Bounds

We next show that this additive error is unavoidable for any differentially private algorithm. The lower bound is information-theoretic and thus applies also to computationally inefficient algorithms.

Theorem 3.4. *Any ϵ -differentially private algorithm for min-cut must incur an expected additive $\Omega(\ln n/\epsilon)$ cost over OPT , for any $\epsilon \in (3 \ln n/n, \frac{1}{12})$.*

Proof. Consider a $\ln n/3\epsilon$ -regular graph $G = (V, E)$ on n vertices such that the minimum cuts are exactly those that isolate a single vertex, and any other cut has size at least $(\ln n/2\epsilon)$ (a simple probabilistic argument establishes the existence of such a G ; in fact a randomly chosen $\ln n/3\epsilon$ -regular graph has this property with high probability).

Let M be an ϵ -differentially private algorithm for the min-cut. Given the graph G , M outputs a partition of V . Since there are $n = |V|$ singleton cuts, there exists a vertex v such that the mechanism M run on G outputs the cut $(\{v\}, V \setminus \{v\})$ with probability at most $1/n$, i.e.

$$\Pr[M(V, E) = (\{v\}, V \setminus \{v\})] \leq \frac{1}{n}.$$

Now consider the graph $G' = (V, E')$, with the edges incident on v removed from G , i.e. $E' = E \setminus \{e : v \in e\}$. Since M satisfies ϵ -differential privacy and E and E' differ in at most $\ln n/3\epsilon$ edges,

$$\Pr[M(V, E') = (\{v\}, V \setminus \{v\})] \leq 1/n^{1/3}.$$

Thus with probability $(1 - \frac{1}{n^{1/3}})$, $M(G')$ outputs a cut other than the minimum cut $(\{v\}, V \setminus \{v\})$. But all other cuts, even with these edges removed, cost at least $(\ln n/6\epsilon)$. Since OPT is zero for G' , the claim follows. \square

4 Private k -Median

We next consider a private version of the metric k -median problem: There is a pre-specified set of points V and a metric on them, $d : V \times V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. There is a (private) set of demand points $D \subseteq V$. We wish to select a set of medians $F \subset V$ with $|F| = k$ to minimize the quantity $\text{cost}(F) = \sum_{v \in D} d(v, F)$ where $d(v, F) = \min_{f \in F} d(v, f)$. Let $\Delta = \max_{u, v \in V} d(u, v)$ be the diameter of the space.

As we show in Section 4.1, any privacy-preserving algorithm for k -median must incur an additive loss of $\Omega(\Delta \cdot k \ln(n/k)/\epsilon)$, regardless of computational constraints. We observe that running the exponential mechanism to choose one of the $\binom{n}{k}$ subsets of medians gives an (computationally inefficient) additive guarantee.

Theorem 4.1. *Using the exponential mechanism to pick a set of k facilities gives an $O(\binom{n}{k} \text{poly}(n))$ -time ϵ -differentially private algorithm that outputs a solution with expected cost $\text{OPT} + O(k\Delta \log n/\epsilon)$.*

We next give a polynomial-time algorithm that gives a slightly worse approximation guarantee. Our algorithm is based on the local search algorithm of Arya *et al.* [AGK⁺04]. We start with an arbitrary set of k medians, and use the exponential mechanism to look for a (usually) improving swap. After running this local search for a suitable number of steps, we select a good solution from amongst the ones seen during the local search. The following result shows that if the current solution is far from optimal, then one can find improving swaps.

Theorem 4.2 (Arya *et al.* [AGK⁺04]). *For any set $F \subseteq V$ with $|F| = k$, there exists a set of k swaps $(x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_k, y_k)$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^k (\text{cost}(F) - \text{cost}(F - \{x_i\} + \{y_i\})) \geq \text{cost}(F) - 5\text{OPT}$.*

Corollary 4.3. *For any set $F \subseteq V$ with $|F| = k$, there exists some swap (x, y) such that*

$$\text{cost}(F) - \text{cost}(F - \{x\} + \{y\}) \geq \frac{\text{cost}(F) - 5\text{OPT}}{k}.$$

Algorithm 2 The k -Median Algorithm

- 1: **Input:** V , Demand points $D \subseteq V$, k, ϵ .
 - 2: **let** $F_1 \subset V$ arbitrarily with $|F_1| = k$, $\epsilon' \leftarrow \epsilon/(2\Delta(T+1))$.
 - 3: **for** $i = 1$ to T **do**
 - 4: Select $(x, y) \in F_i \times (V \setminus F_i)$ with probability proportional to $\exp(-\epsilon' \times \text{cost}(F_i - \{x\} + \{y\}))$.
 - 5: **let** $F_{i+1} \leftarrow F_i - \{x\} + \{y\}$.
 - 6: **end for**
 - 7: Select j from $\{1, 2, \dots, T\}$ with probability proportional to $\exp(-\epsilon' \times \text{cost}(F_j))$.
 - 8: **output** F_j .
-

Theorem 4.4. *Setting $T = 6k \ln n$ and $\epsilon' = \epsilon/(2\Delta(T+1))$, the k -median algorithm provides ϵ -differential privacy and except with probability $O(1/\text{poly}(n))$ outputs a solution of cost at most $6\text{OPT} + O(\Delta k^2 \log^2 n/\epsilon)$.*

Proof. We first prove the privacy. Since the cost function has sensitivity Δ , Step 4 of the algorithm preserves $2\epsilon'\Delta$ differential privacy. Since Step 4 is run at most T times and privacy composes additively, outputting all of the T candidate solutions would give us $(2\epsilon'\Delta T)$ differential privacy. Picking out a good solution from the T candidates costs us another $2\epsilon'\Delta$, leading to the stated privacy guarantee.

We next show the approximation guarantee. By Corollary 4.3, so long as $\text{cost}(F_i) \geq 6\text{OPT}$, there exists a swap (x, y) that reduces the cost by at least $\text{cost}(F_i)/6k$. As there are only n^2 possible swaps, the exponential mechanism ensures through (2.4) that we are within additive $4 \ln n/\epsilon'$ with probability at least $1 - 1/n^2$. When $\text{cost}(F_i) \geq 6\text{OPT} + 24k \ln n/\epsilon'$, with probability $1 - 1/n^2$ we have $\text{cost}(F_{i+1}) \leq (1 - 1/6k) \times \text{cost}(F_i)$.

This multiplicative decrease by $(1 - 1/6k)$ applies for as long as $\text{cost}(F_i) \geq 6\text{OPT} + 24k \ln n/\epsilon'$. Since $\text{cost}(F_0) \leq n\Delta$, and $n\Delta(1 - 1/6k)^T \leq \Delta \leq 24k \ln n/\epsilon'$, there must exist an $i < T$ such that $\text{cost}(F_i) \leq 6\text{OPT} + 24k \ln n/\epsilon'$, with probability at least $(1 - T/n^2)$.

Finally, by applying the exponential mechanism again in the final stage, we select from the F_i scoring within an additive $4 \ln n/\epsilon'$ of the optimal visited F_i with probability at least $1 - 1/n^2$, again by (2.4). Plugging in the value of ϵ' , we get the desired result. Increasing the constants in the additive term can drive the probability of failure to an arbitrarily small polynomial. \square

4.1 k -Median Lower Bound

Theorem 4.5. *Any ϵ -differentially private algorithm for the k -median problem must incur cost $\text{OPT} + \Omega(\Delta \cdot k \ln(n/k)/\epsilon)$ on some inputs.*

Proof. Consider a point set $V = [n] \times [L]$ of nL points, with $L = \ln(n/k)/10\epsilon$, and a distance function $d((i, j), (i', j')) = \Delta$ whenever $i \neq i'$ and $d((i, j), (i, j')) = 0$. Let M be a differentially private algorithm that takes a subset $D \subseteq V$ and outputs a set of k locations, for some $k < \frac{n}{4}$. Given the nature of the metric space, we assume that M outputs a k -subset of $[n]$. For a set $A \subseteq [n]$, let $D_A = A \times [L]$. Let A be a size- k subset of V chosen at random.

We claim that $\mathbb{E}_{A, M}[|M(D_A) \cap A|] \leq \frac{k}{2}$ for any ϵ -differentially private algorithm M . Before we prove this claim, note that it implies the expected cost of $M(D_A)$ is $\frac{k}{2} \times \Delta L$, which proves the claim since $\text{OPT} = 0$.

Now to prove the claim: define $\phi := \frac{1}{k} \mathbb{E}_{A, M}[|A \cap M(D_A)|]$. We can rewrite

$$k \cdot \phi = \mathbb{E}_{A, M}[|A \cap M(D_A)|] = k \cdot \mathbb{E}_{i \in [n]} \mathbb{E}_{A \setminus \{i\}, M}[\mathbf{1}_{i \in M(D_A)}]$$

Now changing A to $A' := A \setminus \{i\} + \{i'\}$ for some random i' requires altering at most $2L$ elements in $D_{A'}$, which by the differential privacy guarantee should change the probability of the output by at most $e^{2\epsilon L} = (n/k)^{1/5}$. Hence

$$\mathbb{E}_{i \in [n]} \mathbb{E}_{A', M}[\mathbf{1}_{i \in M(D_{A'})}] \geq \phi \cdot (k/n)^{1/5}.$$

But the expression on the left is just k/n , since there are at most k medians. Hence $\phi \leq (k/n)^{4/5} \leq 1/2$, which proves the claim. \square

Corollary 4.6. *Any 1-differentially private algorithm for uniform facility location that outputs the set of chosen facilities must have approximation ratio $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$.*

Proof. We consider instances defined on the uniform metric on n points, with $d(u, v) = 1$ for all u, v , and facility opening cost $f = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}$. Consider a 1-differentially private mechanism M when run on a randomly chosen subset A of size $k = \sqrt{n}$. Since OPT is $kf = 1$ for these instances, any $o(\sqrt{n})$ -approximation must select at least $\frac{k}{2}$ locations from A in expectation. By an argument analogous to the above theorem, it follows that any differentially private M must output $n/20$ of the locations in expectation. This leads to a facility opening cost of $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$. \square

4.2 Euclidean Setting

Feldman *et al.* [FFKN09] study private coresets for the k -median problem when the input points are in \mathbb{R}^d . For P points in the unit ball in \mathbb{R}^d , they give coresets with $(1 + \epsilon)$ multiplicative error, and additive errors about $O(k^2 d^2 \log^2 P)$ and $O(16kd)^{2d} d^{3/2} \log P \log dk$ respectively for their inefficient and efficient algorithms. Since Euclidean k -median has a PTAS, this leads to k -median approximations with the same guarantees. We can translate our results to their setting by looking at a $(1/P)$ -net of the unit ball as the candidate set of n -points, of which some may appear. This would lead to an inefficient algorithm with

additive error $O(kd \log P)$, and an efficient algorithm with additive error $O(k^2 d^2 \log^2 P)$. The latter has a multiplicative error of 6 and hence our efficient algorithms are incomparable. Note that coresets are more general objects than just the k -median solution.

5 Vertex Cover

We now turn to the problem of (unweighted) vertex cover, where we want to pick a set S of vertices of minimal size so that every edge in the graph is incident to at least one vertex in S . In the privacy-preserving version of the problem, the private information we wish to conceal is the presence or absence of each edge.

Approximating the Vertex Cover Size. As mentioned earlier, even approximating the vertex cover size was shown to be polynomially inapproximable under the constraint of *functional* privacy [HKKN01, BCNW06]. On the other hand, it is easy to approximate the size of the optimal vertex cover under differential privacy: twice the size of a maximum matching is a 2-approximation to the optimal vertex cover, and this value only changes by at most two with the presence or absence of a single edge. Hence, this value plus Laplace($2/\epsilon$) noise provides ϵ -differential privacy [DMNS06]. (Here it is important that we use *maximum* rather than just maximal matchings, since the size of the latter is not uniquely determined by the graph, and the presence or absence of an edge may dramatically alter the size of the solution.) Interestingly enough, for *weighted* vertex cover with maximum weight w_{\max} (which we study in Section 5.2), we have to add in Lap(w_{\max}/ϵ) noise to privately estimate the weight of the optimal solution, which can be much larger than OPT itself. The mechanism in Section 5.2 avoids this barrier by outputting an implicit representation of the vertex cover, and hence gives us a $O(1/\epsilon)$ multiplicative approximation with ϵ -differential privacy.

The Vertex Cover Search Problem. If we want to find a vertex cover (and not just estimate its size), how can we do this privately? In covering problems, the (private) data imposes hard constraints on the a solution, making them quite different from, say, min-cut. Indeed, while the private data only influences the *objective function* in the min-cut problem, the data determines the *constraints* defining feasible solutions in the case of the vertex cover problem. This hard covering constraint make it impossible to actually output a small vertex cover privately: as noted in the introduction, any differentially private algorithm for vertex cover that outputs an explicit vertex cover (a subset of the n vertices) must output a cover of size at least $n - 1$ with probability 1 on any input, an essentially useless result.

In order to address this challenge, we require our algorithms to output an *implicit representation* of a cover: we privately output an orientation of the edges. Now for each edge, if we pick the endpoint that it points to, we clearly get a vertex cover. Our analysis ensures that this vertex cover has size not much larger than the size of the optimal vertex cover for the instance. Hence, such an orientation may be viewed as a privacy-preserving set of instructions that allows for the construction of a good vertex cover in a distributed manner: in the case of the undercover agents mentioned in the introduction, the complete set of active dropoff sites (nodes) is not revealed to the agents, but an orientation on the edges tells each agent which dropoff site to use, if she is indeed an active agent. Our algorithms in fact output a permutation of all the vertices of the graph. Each edge can be considered oriented towards the endpoint appearing earlier in the permutation. Our lower bounds apply to the more general setting where we are allowed to output any orientation (and hence are stronger).

5.1 The Algorithm for Unweighted Vertex Cover

Our (randomized) algorithm will output a permutation, and the vertex cover will be defined by picking, for each edge, whichever of its endpoints appears first in the permutation. We show that this vertex cover will be $(2 + O(1/\epsilon))$ -approximate and ϵ -differentially private. Our algorithm is based on a simple (non-private) 2-approximation to vertex cover [Pit85] that repeatedly selects an uncovered edge uniformly at random, and includes a random endpoint of the edge. We can view the process, equivalently, as selecting a vertex at random with probability proportional to its uncovered degree. We will take this formulation and mix in a uniform distribution over the vertices, using a weight that will grow as the number of remaining vertices decreases.

Let us start from $G_1 = G$, and let G_i be the graph with $n - i + 1$ vertices remaining. We will write $d_v(G)$ for the degree of vertex v in graph G . The algorithm *ALG* in step i chooses from the $n - i + 1$ vertices of G_i with probability proportional to $d_v(G_i) + w_i$, for an appropriate sequence $\langle w_i \rangle$. Taking

$w_i = (4/\epsilon) \times (n/(n-i+1))^{1/2}$ provides ϵ -differential privacy and a $(2 + 16/\epsilon)$ approximation factor, the proof of which will follow from the forthcoming [Theorem 5.1](#) and [Theorem 5.2](#).

As stated the algorithm outputs a sequence of vertices, one per iteration. As remarked above, this permutation defines a vertex cover by picking the earlier occurring end point of each edge.

Algorithm 3 Unweighted Vertex Cover

- 1: **let** $n \leftarrow |V|, V_1 \leftarrow V, E_1 \leftarrow E$.
 - 2: **for** $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ **do**
 - 3: **let** $w_i \leftarrow (4/\epsilon) \times \sqrt{n/(n-i+1)}$.
 - 4: **pick** a vertex $v \in V_i$ with probability proportional to $d_{E_i}(v) + w_i$.
 - 5: **output** v . **let** $V_{i+1} \leftarrow V_i \setminus \{v\}, E_{i+1} \leftarrow E_i \setminus (\{v\} \times V_i)$.
 - 6: **end for**
-

Theorem 5.1 (Privacy). *ALG satisfies ϵ -differential privacy for the settings of w_i above.*

Proof. For any two sets of edges A and B , and any permutation π , let d_i be the degree of the i^{th} vertex in the permutation π and let m_i be the remaining edges, both ignoring edges incident to the first $i-1$ vertices in π .

$$\frac{\Pr[ALG(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[ALG(B) = \pi]} = \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{(w_i + d_i(A))/((n-i+1)w_i + 2m_i(A))}{(w_i + d_i(B))/((n-i+1)w_i + 2m_i(B))}.$$

When A and B differ in exactly one edge, $d_i(A) = d_i(B)$ for all i except the first endpoint incident to the edge in the difference. Until this term $m_i(A)$ and $m_i(B)$ differ by exactly one, and after this term $m_i(A) = m_i(B)$. The number of nodes is always equal, of course. Letting j be the index in π of the first endpoint of the edge in difference, we can cancel all terms after j and rewrite

$$\frac{\Pr[ALG(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[ALG(B) = \pi]} = \frac{w_j + d_j(A)}{w_j + d_j(B)} \times \prod_{i \leq j} \frac{(n-i+1)w_i + 2m_i(B)}{(n-i+1)w_i + 2m_i(A)}.$$

An edge may have arrived in A , in which case $m_i(A) = m_i(B) + 1$ for all $i \leq j$, and each term in the product is at most one; moreover, $d_j(A) = d_j(B) + 1$, and hence the leading term is at most $1 + 1/w_j < \exp(1/w_1)$, which is bounded by $\exp(\epsilon/2)$.

Alternately, an edge may have departed from A , in which case the lead term is no more than one, but each term in the product exceeds one and their product must now be bounded. Note that $m_i(A) + 1 = m_i(B)$ for all relevant i , and that by ignoring all other edges we only make the product larger. Simplifying, and using $1 + x \leq \exp(x)$, we see

$$\prod_{i \leq j} \frac{(n-i+1)w_i + 2m_i(B)}{(n-i+1)w_i + 2m_i(A)} \leq \prod_{i \leq j} \frac{(n-i+1)w_i + 2}{(n-i+1)w_i + 0} = \prod_{i \leq j} \left(1 + \frac{2}{(n-i+1)w_i}\right) \leq \exp\left(\sum_{i \leq j} \frac{2}{(n-i+1)w_i}\right).$$

The w_i are chosen so that $\sum_i 2/(n-i+1)w_i = (\epsilon/\sqrt{n}) \sum_i 1/2\sqrt{i}$ is at most ϵ . □

Theorem 5.2 (Accuracy). *For all G , $\mathbb{E}[ALG(G)] \leq (2 + 2 \text{avg}_{i \leq n} w_i) \times |OPT(G)| \leq (2 + 16/\epsilon)|OPT(G)|$.*

Proof. Let $OPT(G)$ denote an arbitrary optimal solution to the vertex cover problem on G . The proof is inductive, on the size n of G . For G with $|OPT(G)| > n/2$, the theorem holds. For G with $|OPT(G)| \leq n/2$, the expected cost of the algorithm is the probability that the chosen vertex v is incident to an edge, plus the expected cost of $ALG(G \setminus v)$.

$$\mathbb{E}[ALG(G)] = \Pr[v \text{ incident on edge}] + \mathbb{E}_v[\mathbb{E}[ALG(G \setminus v)]].$$

We will bound the second term using the inductive hypothesis. To bound the first term, the probability that v is chosen incident to an edge is at most $(2mw_n + 2m)/(nw_n + 2m)$, as there are at most $2m$ vertices incident

to edges. On the other hand, the probability that we pick a vertex in $OPT(G)$ is at least $(|OPT(G)|w_n + m)/(nw_n + 2m)$. Since $|OPT(G)|$ is non-negative, we conclude that

$$\Pr[v \text{ incident on edge}] \leq (2 + 2w_n)(m/(nw_n + 2m)) \leq (2 + 2w_n)\Pr[v \in OPT(G)]$$

Since $\mathbf{1}[v \in OPT(G)] \leq |OPT(G)| - |OPT(G \setminus v)|$, and using the inductive hypothesis, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[ALG(G)] &\leq (2 + 2w_n) \times (|OPT(G)| - \mathbb{E}_v[|OPT(G \setminus v)|]) + (2 + 2 \operatorname{avg}_{i < n} w_i) \times \mathbb{E}_v[|OPT(G \setminus v)|] \\ &= (2 + 2w_n) \times |OPT(G)| + (2 \operatorname{avg}_{i < n} w_i - 2w_n) \times \mathbb{E}_v[|OPT(G \setminus v)|] \end{aligned}$$

The probability that v is from an optimal vertex cover is at least $(|OPT(G)|w_i + m)/(nw_i + 2m)$, as mentioned above, and (using $(a + b)/(c + d) \geq \min\{a/c, b/d\}$) is at least $\min\{|OPT(G)|/n, 1/2\} = |OPT(G)|/n$, since $|OPT(G)| < n/2$ by assumption. Thus $\mathbb{E}[|OPT(G \setminus v)|]$ is bounded above by $(1 - 1/n) \times |OPT(G)|$, giving

$$\mathbb{E}[ALG(G)] \leq (2 + 2w_n) \times |OPT(G)| + (2 \operatorname{avg}_{i < n} w_i - 2w_n) \times (1 - 1/n) \times |OPT(G)|.$$

Simplification yields the claimed results, and instantiating w_i completes the proof. \square

Hallucinated Edges. Here is a slightly different way to implement the intuition behind the above algorithm: imagine adding $O(1/\epsilon)$ “hallucinated” edges to each vertex (the other endpoints of these hallucinated edges being fresh “hallucinated” vertices), and then sampling vertices without replacement proportional to these altered degrees. However, once (say) $n/2$ vertices have been sampled, output the remaining vertices in random order. This view will be useful to keep in mind for the weighted vertex cover proof. (A formal analysis of this algorithm is in [Appendix A](#).)

5.2 Weighted Vertex Cover

In the weighted vertex cover problem, each vertex V is assigned a weight $w(v)$, and the cost of any vertex cover is the sum of the weights of the participating vertices. One can extend the unweighted 2-approximation that draws vertices at random with probability proportional to their uncovered degree to a weighted 2-approximation by drawing vertices with probability proportional to their uncovered degree divided by their weight. The differentially private analog of this algorithm essentially draws vertices with probability proportional to $1/\epsilon$ plus their degree, all divided by the weight of the vertex; the algorithm we present here is based on this idea.

Define the *score* of a vertex to be $s(v) = 1/w(v)$. Our algorithm involves hallucinating edges: to each vertex, we add in $1/\epsilon$ hallucinated edges, the other endpoints of which are imaginary vertices, whose weight is considered to be ∞ (and hence has zero score). The score of an edge $e = (u, v)$ is defined to be $s(e) = s(u) + s(v)$; hence the score of a fake edge f incident on u is $s(f) = s(u)$, since its other (imaginary) endpoint has infinite weight and zero score. We will draw edges with probability proportional to their score, and then select an endpoint to output with probability proportional to its score. In addition, once a substantial number of vertices of at least a particular weight have been output, we will output the rest of those vertices.

Assume the minimum vertex weight is 1 and the maximum is 2^J . For simplicity, we round the weight of each vertex up to a power of 2, at a potential loss of a factor of two in the approximation. Define the j^{th} weight class V_j to be the set of vertices of weight 2^j . In addition, we will assume that $|V_j| = |V_{j+1}|$ for all weight classes. In order to achieve this, we hallucinate additional fake vertices. We will never actually output a hallucinated vertex. Let N_j denote $|V_j|$.

We imagine the i^{th} iteration of the outer loop of the algorithm as happening at *time* i ; note that one vertex is output in Step 3, whereas multiple vertices might be output in Step 6. Let \tilde{n}_i be the sum of the scores of all real vertices not output before time i , and \tilde{m}_i be the sum of the scores of all real edges not covered before time i .

5.2.1 Privacy Analysis

Theorem 5.3. *The weighted vertex cover algorithm preserves $O(\epsilon)$ differential privacy.*

Algorithm 4 Weighted Vertex Cover

- 1: **while** not all vertices have been output **do**
 - 2: **pick** an uncovered (real or hallucinated) edge $e = (u, v)$ with probability proportional to $s(e)$.
 - 3: **output** endpoint $u \in e$ with probability proportional to $s(u)$.
 - 4: **while** there exists some weight class V_j such that the number of nodes of class j or higher that we've output is at least $N_j/2 = |V_j|/2$ **do**
 - 5: **pick** the smallest such value of j
 - 6: **output** (“dump”) all remaining vertices in V_j in random order.
 - 7: **end while**
 - 8: **end while**
-

Proof. Consider some potential output π of the private vertex cover algorithm, and two weighted vertex cover instances A and B that are identical except for one edge $\mathbf{e} = (p, q)$. Let p appear before q in the permutation π ; since the vertex sets are the same, if the outputs of both A and B are π , then p will be output at the same time t in both executions. Let v_t be the vertex output in Step 3 at time t in such an execution; note that either $p = v_t$, or p is output in Step 6 after v_t is output.

The probability that (conditioned on the history) a surviving vertex v is output in Step 3 of the algorithm at time i is:

$$\sum_{\text{edges } e} \Pr[\text{pick } e] \cdot \Pr[\text{output } v \mid \text{pick } e] = \sum_{e \ni v} \frac{s(e)}{\tilde{m}_i + \tilde{n}_i/\epsilon} \cdot \frac{s(v)}{s(e)} = \frac{(d(v)+1/\epsilon) \cdot s(v)}{\tilde{m}_i + \tilde{n}_i/\epsilon}.$$

Since we compare the runs of the algorithm on A and B which differ only in edge \mathbf{e} , these will be identical after time t when \mathbf{e} is covered, and hence

$$\frac{\Pr[M(A)=\pi]}{\Pr[M(B)=\pi]} = \frac{(d_A(v_t)+1/\epsilon)s(v_t)}{(d_B(v_t)+1/\epsilon)s(v_t)} \prod_{i \leq t} \left(\frac{\tilde{m}_i^B + \tilde{n}_i/\epsilon}{\tilde{m}_i^A + \tilde{n}_i/\epsilon} \right).$$

Note that if the extra edge $\mathbf{e} \in A \setminus B$ then $d_A(v_t) \leq d_B(v_t) + 1$ and $\tilde{m}_i^B \leq \tilde{m}_i^A$, so the ratio of the probabilities is at most $1 + \epsilon < \exp(\epsilon)$. Otherwise, the leading term is less than 1 and $\tilde{m}_i^B = \tilde{m}_i^A + s(\mathbf{e})$, and we get

$$\frac{\Pr[M(A)=\pi]}{\Pr[M(B)=\pi]} \leq \prod_{i \leq t} \left(1 + \frac{s(\mathbf{e})}{\tilde{n}_i/\epsilon} \right) \leq \exp \left(s(\mathbf{e}) \cdot \epsilon \cdot \sum_{i \leq t} \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_i} \right).$$

Let T_j be the time steps $i \leq t$ where vertices in V_j are output in π . Letting 2^{j^*} be the weight of the lighter endpoint of edge \mathbf{e} , we can break the sum $\sum_{i \leq t} \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_i}$ into two pieces and analyze each separately:

$$\sum_{i \leq t} \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_i} = \sum_{j \leq j^*} \sum_{i \in T_j} \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_i} + \sum_{j > j^*} \sum_{i \in T_j} \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_i},$$

For the first partial sum, for some $j \leq j^*$, let $\sum_{i \in T_j} \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_i} = \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_{i_0}} + \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_{i_1}} + \dots + \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_{i_\lambda}}$ such that $i_0 > i_1 > \dots > i_\lambda$. We claim that $\tilde{n}_{i_0} \geq 2^{-j^*} N_{j^*}/2$. Indeed, since \mathbf{e} has not yet been covered, we must have output fewer than $N_{j^*}/2$ vertices from levels j^* or higher, and hence at least $N_{j^*}/2$ remaining vertices from V_{j^*} contribute to \tilde{n}_{i_0} .

In each time step in T_j , at least one vertex of score 2^{-j} is output, so we have that $\tilde{n}_{i_\ell} \geq 2^{-j^*} N_{j^*}/2 + \ell \cdot 2^{-j}$. Hence

$$\sum_{i \in T_j} \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_i} \leq \frac{1}{2^{-j^*} N_{j^*}/2} + \frac{1}{2^{-j^*} N_{j^*}/2 + 2^{-j}} + \dots + \frac{1}{2^{-j^*} N_{j^*}/2 + N_j 2^{-j}}.$$

Defining $\theta = 2^{-j^*+j} \cdot N_{j^*}/2$, the expression above simplifies to

$$2^j \left(\frac{1}{\theta} + \frac{1}{\theta+1} + \dots + \frac{1}{\theta+N_j} \right) \leq 2^j \ln \left(\frac{\theta+N_j}{\theta} \right) = 2^j \ln \left(1 + \frac{N_j}{\theta} \right).$$

Now using the assumption on the size of the weight classes, we have $N_j \leq N_{j^*} \implies N_j/\theta \leq 2^{j^*-j+1}$, and hence $\sum_{i \in T_j} \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_i} \leq (j^* - j + 2)2^j$, for any $j \leq j^*$. Finally,

$$\sum_{j \leq j^*} \sum_{i \in T_j} \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_i} \leq \sum_{j \leq j^*} (j^* - j + 2)2^j = O(2^{j^*}).$$

We now consider the other partial sum $\sum_{j>j^*} \sum_{i \in T_j} \frac{1}{\tilde{n}_i}$. For any such value of i , we know that $\tilde{n}_i \geq 2^{-j^*} N_{j^*}/2$. Moreover, there are at most $N_{j^*}/2$ times when we output a vertex from some weight class $j \geq j^*$ before we output all of V_{j^*} ; hence there are at most $N_{j^*}/2$ terms in the sum, each of which is at most $\frac{1}{2^{-j^*} N_{j^*}/2}$, giving a bound of 2^{j^*} on the second partial sum. Putting the two together, we get that

$$\frac{\Pr[M(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[M(B) = \pi]} \leq \exp(s(\mathbf{e}) \cdot \epsilon \cdot O(2^{j^*})) = \exp(O(\epsilon)),$$

using the fact that $s(\mathbf{e}) \leq 2 \cdot 2^{-j^*}$, since the lighter endpoint of \mathbf{e} had weight 2^{j^*} . \square

5.2.2 Utility Analysis

Call a vertex v *interesting* if it is incident on a real uncovered edge when it is picked. Consider the weight class V_j : let $I_j^1 \subseteq V_j$ be the set of interesting vertices output due to Steps 3, and $I_j^2 \subseteq V_j$ be the set of interesting vertices of class j output due to Step 6. The cost incurred by the algorithm is $\sum_j 2^j (|I_j^1| + |I_j^2|)$.

Lemma 5.4. $\mathbb{E}[\sum_j 2^j |I_j^1|] \leq \frac{4(1+\epsilon)}{\epsilon} \text{OPT}$

Proof. Every interesting vertex that our algorithm picks in Steps 3 has at least one real edge incident on it, and at most $\frac{1}{\epsilon}$ hallucinated edges. Conditioned on selecting an interesting vertex v , the selection is due to a real edge with probability at least $1/(1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon})$. One can show that the (non-private) algorithm \mathcal{A} that selects only real edges is a 2-approximation [Pit85]. On the other hand each vertex in I_j^1 can be coupled to a step of \mathcal{A} with probability $\epsilon/(1 + \epsilon)$. Since we rounded up the costs by at most a factor of two, the claim follows. \square

Lemma 5.5. $\mathbb{E}[|I_j^2|] \leq 6 \mathbb{E}[\sum_{j' \geq j} |I_{j'}^1|]$

Proof. Let t_j denote the time that class j is dumped. Recall that by (5.2.1), we pick a surviving vertex v with probability $\propto (d(v) + \frac{1}{\epsilon}) \cdot s(v)$ at each step. This expression summed over all uninteresting vertices is $\cup_{j' \geq j} V_{j'}$ is at most $(1/\epsilon) \sum_{j' \geq j} 2^{-j'} N_{j'} \leq 2^{-j+1} N_j / \epsilon$. On the other hand, at each step before time t_j , all the interesting vertices in $I_{j'}^2$ are available and the same expression summed over them is at least $2^{-j} |I_{j'}^2| / \epsilon$. Thus for any $t \leq t_j$, conditioned on outputting a vertex $v_t \in \cup_{j' \geq j} V_{j'}$ in Step 3, the probability that it is interesting is at least $\frac{|I_{j'}^2| 2^{-j} / \epsilon}{(|I_{j'}^2| 2^{-j} + 2^{1-j} N_j) / \epsilon} \geq \frac{|I_{j'}^2|}{3N_j}$ (using $|I_{j'}^2| \leq N_j$). Now since we output $N_j/2$ vertices from $\cup_{j' \geq j} V_{j'}$ in Step 3 before time t_j , we conclude that $\mathbb{E}[\sum_{j' \geq j} |I_{j'}^1| \mid |I_j^2|] \geq \frac{N_j}{2} \times \frac{|I_j^2|}{3N_j} = \frac{|I_j^2|}{6}$. Taking expectations completes the proof. \square

We can now compute the total cost of all the interesting vertices dumped in Steps 6 of the algorithm.

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{cost}(\cup_j I_j^2)] = \sum_j 2^j \mathbb{E}[|I_j^2|] \leq 6 \sum_j 2^j \sum_{j' \geq j} \mathbb{E}[|I_{j'}^1|] \leq 6 \sum_{j'} \mathbb{E}[|I_{j'}^1|] 2^{j'+1} \leq 12 \cdot \mathbb{E}[\text{cost}(\cup_j I_j^1)].$$

Finally, combining this calculation with Lemma 5.4, we conclude that our algorithm gives an $O(\frac{1}{\epsilon})$ approximation to the weighted vertex cover problem.

5.3 Vertex Cover Lower Bounds

Theorem 5.6. *Any algorithm for the vertex cover problem that prescribes edge-orientations with ϵ -differential privacy must have an $\Omega(1/\epsilon)$ approximation guarantee, for any $\epsilon \in (\frac{1}{n}, 1]$.*

Proof. Let $V = \{1, 2, \dots, \lceil \frac{1}{2\epsilon} \rceil\}$, and let M be an ϵ -differentially private algorithm that takes as input a private set E of edges, and outputs an orientation $M_E : V \times V \rightarrow V$, with $M_E(u, v) \in \{u, v\}$ indicating to the edge which endpoint to use. Picking two distinct vertices $u \neq v$ uniformly at random (and equating (u, v) with (v, u)), we have by symmetry:

$$\Pr_{u,v}[M_\emptyset((u, v)) \neq u] = \frac{1}{2}.$$

Let $\star_u = (V, \{u\} \times (V \setminus \{u\}))$ be the star graph rooted at u . Since \star_u and \emptyset differ in at most $\frac{1}{2\epsilon} - 1 < \frac{1}{\epsilon}$ edges and M satisfies ϵ -differential privacy, we conclude that

$$\Pr_{u,v}[M_{\star_u}((u,v)) \neq u] \geq \frac{1}{2e}.$$

Thus the expected cost of M when input a uniformly random \star_u is at least $\frac{1}{2e} \times \lceil \frac{1}{2\epsilon} \rceil$, while $\text{OPT}(\star_u)$ is 1. We can repeat this pattern arbitrarily, picking a random star from each group of $1/\epsilon$ vertices; this results in graphs with arbitrarily large vertex covers where M incurs cost $1/\epsilon$ times the cost. \square

6 Set Cover

We now turn our attention to private approximations for the Set Cover Problem; here the set system (U, \mathcal{S}) is public, but the actual set of elements to be covered $R \subseteq U$ is the private information. As for vertex cover, we cannot explicitly output a set cover that is good and private at the same time. Hence, we again output a permutation over all the sets in the set system; this implicitly defines a set cover for R by picking, for each element R , the first set in this permutation that contains it. Our algorithms for set cover give the slightly weaker (ϵ, δ) -privacy guarantees.

6.1 Unweighted Set Cover

We are given a set system (U, \mathcal{S}) and must cover a private subset $R \subset U$. Let the cardinality of the set system be $|\mathcal{S}| = m$, and let $|U| = n$. We first observe a computationally inefficient algorithm.

Theorem 6.1. *The exponential mechanism, when used to pick a permutation of sets, runs in time $O(m! \text{poly}(n))$ and gives an $O(\log(em/\text{OPT})/\epsilon)$ -approximation.*

Proof. A random permutation, with probability at least $(\frac{m}{\text{OPT}})^{-1}$ has all the sets in OPT before any set in OPT^c . Thus the additive error is $O(\log(\frac{m}{\text{OPT}})/\epsilon)$. \square

The rest of the section gives a computationally efficient algorithm with slightly worse guarantees: this is a modified version of the greedy algorithm, using the exponential mechanism to bias towards picking large sets.

Algorithm 5 Unweighted Set Cover

- 1: **Input:** Set system (U, \mathcal{S}) , private $R \subset U$ of elements to cover, ϵ, δ .
 - 2: **let** $i \leftarrow 1$, $R_i = R$, $\mathcal{S}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{S}$. $\epsilon' \leftarrow \epsilon/2 \ln(\frac{\epsilon}{\delta})$.
 - 3: **for** $i = 1, 2, \dots, m$ **do**
 - 4: **pick** a set S from \mathcal{S}_i with probability proportional to $\exp(\epsilon'|S \cap R_i|)$.
 - 5: **output** set S .
 - 6: $R_{i+1} \leftarrow R_i \setminus S$, $\mathcal{S}_{i+1} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_i - \{S\}$.
 - 7: **end for**
-

6.1.1 Utility Analysis

At the beginning of iteration i , say there are $m_i = m - i + 1$ remaining sets and $n_i = |R_i|$ remaining elements, and define $L_i = \max_{S \in \mathcal{S}} |S \cap R_i|$, the largest number of uncovered elements covered by any set in \mathcal{S} . By a standard argument, any algorithm that always picks sets of size $L_i/2$ is an $O(\ln n)$ approximation algorithm.

Theorem 6.2. *The above algorithm achieves an expected approximation ratio of $O(\ln n + \frac{\ln m}{\epsilon'}) = O(\ln n + \frac{\ln m \ln(\epsilon/\delta)}{\epsilon})$.*

Proof. As there is at least one set containing L_i elements, our use of the exponential mechanism to select sets combined with Equation 2.4 ensures that the probability we select a set covering fewer than $L_i - 3 \ln m/\epsilon$ elements is at most $1/m^2$. While $L_i > 6 \ln m/\epsilon$, with probability at least $(1 - 1/m)$ we always select sets that cover at least $L_i/2$ elements, and can therefore use no more than $O(\text{OPT} \ln n)$ sets. Once L_i drops below this bound, we observe that the number of remaining elements $|R_i|$ is at most $\text{OPT} \cdot L_i$. Any permutation therefore costs at most an additional $O(\text{OPT} \ln m/\epsilon')$. \square

6.1.2 Privacy

Theorem 6.3. *The unweighted set cover algorithm preserves (ϵ, δ) differential privacy for any $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$, and $\delta < 1/e$.*

Proof. Let A and B be two set cover instances that differ in some element I . Say that S^I is the collection of sets containing I . Fix an output permutation π , and write $s_{i,j}(A)$ to denote the size of set S_j after the first $i - 1$ sets in π have been added to the cover.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[M(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[M(B) = \pi]} &= \prod_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,\pi_i}(A)) / (\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(A)))}{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,\pi_i}(B)) / (\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(B)))} \right) \\ &= \frac{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{t,\pi_t}(A))}{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{t,\pi_t}(B))} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^t \left(\frac{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(B))}{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(A))} \right) \end{aligned}$$

where t is such that S_{π_t} is the first set containing I to fall in the permutation π . After t , the remaining elements in A and B are identical, and all subsequent terms cancel. Moreover, except for the t^{th} term, the numerators of both the top and bottom expression cancel, since all the relevant set sizes are equal. If A contains I and B does not the first term is $\exp(\epsilon')$ and the each term in the product is at most 1.

Now suppose that B contains I and A does not. In this case, the first term is $\exp(-\epsilon') < 1$. Moreover, in instance B , every set in S^I is larger by 1 than in A , and all others remain the same size. Therefore, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[M(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[M(B) = \pi]} &\leq \prod_{i=1}^t \left(\frac{(\exp(\epsilon') - 1) \cdot \sum_{j \in S^I} \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(A)) + \sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(A))}{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(A))} \right) \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^t (1 + (\exp(\epsilon') - 1) \cdot p_i(A)) \end{aligned}$$

where $p_i(A)$ is the probability that a set containing I is chosen at step i of the algorithm running on instance A , conditioned on picking the sets $S_{\pi_1}, \dots, S_{\pi_{i-1}}$ in the previous steps.

For an instance A and an element $I \in A$, we say that an output σ is q -bad if $\sum_i p_i(A) \mathbf{1}(I \text{ uncovered at step } i)$ (strictly) exceeds q , where $p_i(A)$ is as defined above. We call a permutation q -good otherwise. We first consider the case when the output π is $(\ln \delta^{-1})$ -good. By the definition of t , we have

$$\sum_{i=1}^{t-1} p_i(A) \leq \ln \delta^{-1}.$$

Continuing the analysis from above,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[M(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[M(B) = \pi]} &\leq \prod_{i=1}^t \exp((\exp(\epsilon') - 1)p_i(A)) \leq \exp(2\epsilon' \sum_{i=1}^t p_i(A)) \\ &\leq \exp(2\epsilon' (\ln(\frac{1}{\delta}) + p_t(A))) \leq \exp(2\epsilon' (\ln(\frac{1}{\delta}) + 1)). \end{aligned}$$

Thus, for any $(\ln \delta^{-1})$ -good output π , we have $\frac{\Pr[M(A)=\pi]}{\Pr[M(B)=\pi]} \leq \exp(\epsilon)$. We can then invoke the following lemma, proved in appendix B

Lemma 6.4. *For any set system (U, \mathcal{S}) , any instance A and any $I \in A$, the probability that the output π of the algorithm above is q -bad is bounded by $\exp(-q)$.*

Thus for any set \mathcal{P} of outcomes, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[M(A) \in \mathcal{P}] &= \sum_{\pi \in \mathcal{P}} \Pr[M(A) = \pi] \\
&= \sum_{\pi \in \mathcal{P}: \pi \text{ is } (\ln \delta^{-1})\text{-good}} \Pr[M(A) = \pi] + \sum_{\pi \in \mathcal{P}: \pi \text{ is } (\ln \delta^{-1})\text{-bad}} \Pr[M(A) = \pi] \\
&\leq \sum_{\pi \in \mathcal{P}: \pi \text{ is } (\ln \delta^{-1})\text{-good}} \exp(\epsilon) \Pr[M(B) = \pi] + \delta \\
&\leq \exp(\epsilon) \Pr[M(B) \in \mathcal{P}] + \delta.
\end{aligned}$$

□

Corollary 6.5. *For $\epsilon < 1$ and $\delta = 1/\text{poly}(n)$, there is an $O(\frac{\ln n \ln m}{\epsilon})$ -approximation algorithm for the unweighted set cover problem preserving (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy.*

6.2 Weighted Set Cover

We are given a set system (U, \mathcal{S}) and a cost function $C : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. We must cover a private subset $R \subset U$. W.l.o.g., let $\min_{S \in \mathcal{S}} C(S) = 1$, and denote $\max_{S \in \mathcal{S}} C(S) = W$. Let the cardinality of the set system be $|\mathcal{S}| = m$, and let $|U| = n$.

Algorithm 6 Weighted Set Cover

- 1: **let** $i \leftarrow 1$, $R_i = R$, $\mathcal{S}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{S}$, $r_i \leftarrow n$, $\epsilon' = \frac{\epsilon}{2 \ln(e/\delta)}$, $T = \Theta(\frac{\log m + \log \log(nW)}{\epsilon'})$
 - 2: **while** $r_i \geq 1/W$ **do**
 - 3: **pick** a set S from \mathcal{S}_i with probability proportional to $\exp(\epsilon'(|S \cap R_i| - r_i \cdot C(S)))$
 or **halve** with probability proportional to $\exp(-\epsilon'T)$
 - 4: **if halve then**
 - 5: **let** $r_{i+1} \leftarrow r_i/2$, $R_{i+1} \leftarrow R_i$, $\mathcal{S}_{i+1} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_i$, $i \leftarrow i + 1$
 - 6: **else**
 - 7: **output** set S
 - 8: **let** $R_{i+1} \leftarrow R_i \setminus S$, $\mathcal{S}_{i+1} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_i - \{S\}$, $r_{i+1} \leftarrow r_i$, $i \leftarrow i + 1$
 - 9: **end if**
 - 10: **end while**
 - 11: **output** all remaining sets in \mathcal{S}_i in random order
-

Let us first analyze the utility of the algorithm. If $R = \emptyset$, the algorithm has cost zero and there is nothing to prove. So we can assume that $\text{OPT} \geq 1$. We first show that (**whp**) $r_i \gtrsim R_i/\text{OPT}$.

Lemma 6.6. *Except with probability $1/\text{poly}(m)$, we have $r_i \geq \frac{|R_i|}{2\text{OPT}}$ for all iterations i .*

Proof. Clearly $r_1 = n \geq |R_1|/2\text{OPT}$. For r_i to fall below $|R_i|/2$, it must be in $(\frac{|R_i|}{2\text{OPT}}, \frac{|R_i|}{\text{OPT}}]$ and be halved in Step 6 of some iteration i . We'll show that this is unlikely: if at some iteration i , $\frac{|R_i|}{2\text{OPT}} \leq r_i \leq \frac{|R_i|}{\text{OPT}}$, then we argue that with high probability, the algorithm will not output **halve** and thus not halve r_i . Since all remaining elements R_i can be covered at cost at most OPT , there must exist a set S such that $\frac{|S \cap R_i|}{C(S)} \geq \frac{|R_i|}{\text{OPT}}$, and hence $|S \cap R_i| \geq C(S) \cdot \frac{|R_i|}{\text{OPT}} \geq C(S) \cdot r_i$.

Hence $u_i(S) := |S \cap R_i| - r_i \cdot C(S) \geq 0$ in this case, and the algorithm will output S with probability at least proportional to 1, whereas it outputs **halve** with probability proportional to $\exp(-\epsilon'T)$. Thus, $\Pr[\text{algorithm returns halve}] < \exp(-\epsilon'T) = 1/\text{poly}(m \log nW)$. Since there are m sets in total, and r ranges from n to $1/W$, there are at most $m + O(\log nW)$ iterations, and the proof follows by a union bound. □

Let us define a *score* function $u_i(S) := |S \cap R_i| - r_i \cdot C(S)$, and $u_i(\text{halve}) := -T$: note that in Step 4 of our algorithm, we output either **halve** or a set S , with probabilities proportional to $\exp(\epsilon'u_i(\cdot))$. The

following lemma states that with high probability, none of the sets output by our algorithm have very low scores (since we are much more likely to output **halve** than a low-scoring set).

Lemma 6.7. *Except with probability at most $1/\text{poly}(m)$, Step 4 only returns sets S with $u_i(S) \geq -2T$.*

Proof. There are at most $|\mathcal{S}_i| \leq m$ sets S with score $u_i(S) \leq -2T$, and so one is output with probability at most proportional to $m \exp(-2T\epsilon)$. We will denote this bad event by \mathcal{B} . On the other hand, **halve** is output with probability proportional to $\exp(-T\epsilon)$. Hence, $\Pr[\text{halve}]/\Pr[\mathcal{B}] \geq \exp(T\epsilon)/m$, and so $\Pr[\mathcal{B}] \leq m/\exp(T\epsilon) \leq 1/\text{poly}(m \log nW)$. Again there are at most $m + O(\log nW)$ iterations, and the lemma follows by a trivial union bound. \square

We now analyze the cost incurred by the algorithm in each stage. Let us divide the algorithm's execution into *stages*: stage j consists of all iterations i where $|R_i| \in (\frac{n}{2^j}, \frac{n}{2^{j-1}}]$. Call a set S interesting if it is incident on an uncovered element when it is picked. Let \mathcal{I}_j be the set of interesting sets selected in stage j , and $C(\mathcal{I}_j)$ be the total cost incurred on these sets.

Lemma 6.8. *Consider stages $1, \dots, j$ of the algorithm. Except with probability $1/\text{poly}(m)$, we can bound the cost of the interesting sets in stage $1, \dots, j$ by:*

$$\sum_{j' \leq j} C(\mathcal{I}_{j'}) \leq 4j \text{OPT} \cdot (1 + 2T).$$

Proof. By Lemma 6.7 all the output sets have $u_i(S_i) \geq -2T$ **whp**. Rewriting, each S_i selected in a round $j' \leq j$ satisfies

$$C(S_i) \leq \frac{|S_i \cap R_i| + 2T}{r_i} \leq \frac{2^{j'+1} \text{OPT}}{n} (|S_i \cap R_i| + 2T),$$

where the second inequality is **whp**, and uses Lemma 6.6. Now summing over all rounds $j' \leq j$, we get

$$\sum_{j' \leq j} C(\mathcal{I}_{j'}) \leq \sum_{j' \leq j} \frac{2^{j'+1} \text{OPT}}{n} \left(\sum_{i \text{ s.t. } S_i \in \mathcal{I}_{j'}} (|S_i \cap R_i| + 2T) \right).$$

Consider the inner sum for any particular value of j' : let the first iteration in stage j' be iteration i_0 —naturally $R_i \subseteq R_{i_0}$ for any iteration i in this stage. Now, since $S_i \cap R_i \subseteq R_{i_0}$ and $S_i \cap R_i$ is disjoint from $S_{i'} \cap R_{i'}$, the sum over $|S_i \cap R_i|$ is at most $|R_{i_0}|$, which is at most $\frac{n}{2^{j'-1}}$ by definition of stage j' . Moreover, since we are only concerned with bounding the cost of interesting sets, each $|S_i \cap R_i| \geq 1$, and so $|S_i \cap R_i| + 2T \leq |S_i \cap R_i|(1 + 2T)$. Putting this together, (6.2) implies

$$\sum_{j' \leq j} C(\mathcal{I}_{j'}) \leq \sum_{j' \leq j} \frac{2^{j'+1} \text{OPT}}{n} \times \frac{n}{2^{j'-1}} (1 + 2T) = 4j \text{OPT} (1 + 2T),$$

which proves the lemma. \square

Theorem 6.9 (Utility). *The weighted set cover algorithm incurs a cost of $O(T \log n \text{OPT})$ except with probability $1/\text{poly}(m)$.*

Proof. Since the number of uncovered elements halves in each stage by definition, there are at most $1 + \log n$ stages, which by Lemma 6.8 incur a total cost of at most $O(\log n \text{OPT} \cdot (1 + 2T))$. The sets that remain and are output at the very end of the algorithm incur cost at most W for each remaining uncovered element; since $r_i < 1/W$ at the end, Lemma 6.6 implies that $|R_i| < 2\text{OPT}/W$ (**whp**), giving an additional cost of at most 2OPT . \square

We can adapt the above argument to bound the expected cost by $O(T \log n \text{OPT})$.

Theorem 6.10 (Privacy). *For any $\delta > 0$, the weighted set cover algorithm preserves (ϵ, δ) differential privacy.*

Proof. We imagine that the algorithm outputs a set named “HALVE” when Step 4 of the algorithm returns `halve`, and show that even this output is privacy preserving. Let A and B be two set cover instances that differ in some element I . Say that S^I is the collection of sets containing I . Fix an output π , and write $u_{i,j}(A)$ to denote the score of π_j (recall this may be `halve`) after the first $i - 1$ sets in π have been selected.

$$\frac{\Pr[M(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[M(B) = \pi]} = \prod_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{i,\pi_i}(A)) / (\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{i,j}(A)))}{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{i,\pi_i}(B)) / (\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{i,j}(B)))} \right) = \frac{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{t,\pi_t}(A))}{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{t,\pi_t}(B))} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^t \left(\frac{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{i,j}(B))}{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{i,j}(A))} \right)$$

where t is such that S_{π_t} is the first set containing I to fall in the permutation π . After t , the remaining elements in A and B are identical, and all subsequent terms cancel. Moreover, except for the t^{th} term, the numerators of both the top and bottom expression cancel, since all the relevant set sizes are equal. If A contains I and B does not the first term is $\exp(\epsilon')$ and the each term in the product is at most 1. Since $\epsilon' \leq \epsilon$, we conclude that in this case, for any set \mathcal{P} of outputs, $\Pr[M(A) \in \mathcal{P}] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \Pr[M(B) \in \mathcal{P}]$.

Now suppose that B contains I and A does not. In this case, the first term is $\exp(-\epsilon') < 1$. Moreover, in instance B , every set in S^I is larger by 1 than in A , and all others remain the same size. Therefore, we have:

$$\frac{\Pr[M(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[M(B) = \pi]} \leq \prod_{i=1}^t \left(\frac{(\exp(\epsilon') - 1) \cdot \sum_{j \in S^I} \exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{i,j}(A)) + \sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{i,j}(A))}{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot u_{i,j}(A))} \right) = \prod_{i=1}^t (1 + (e^{\epsilon'} - 1) \cdot p_i(A))$$

where $p_i(A)$ is the probability that a set containing I is chosen at step i of the algorithm running on instance A , conditioned on picking the sets $S_{\pi_1}, \dots, S_{\pi_{i-1}}$ in the previous steps.

For an instance A and an element $I \in A$, we say that an output σ is q -bad if $\sum_i p_i(A) \mathbf{1}(I \text{ uncovered at step } i)$ (strictly) exceeds q , where $p_i(A)$ is as defined above. We call a permutation q -good otherwise. We first consider the case when the output π is $(\ln \delta^{-1})$ -good. By the definition of t , we have

$$\sum_{i=1}^{t-1} p_i(A) \leq \ln \delta^{-1}.$$

Continuing the analysis from above,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[M(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[M(B) = \pi]} &\leq \prod_{i=1}^t \exp((\exp(\epsilon') - 1)p_i(A)) \leq \exp\left(2\epsilon' \sum_{i=1}^t p_i(A)\right) \\ &\leq \exp(2\epsilon' (\ln \delta^{-1} + p_t(A))) \leq \exp(2\epsilon' (\ln \delta^{-1} + 1)). \end{aligned}$$

Thus, for any $(\ln \delta^{-1})$ -good output π , we have $\frac{\Pr[M(A)=\pi]}{\Pr[M(B)=\pi]} \leq \exp(\epsilon)$.

Finally, as in the proof of Theorem 6.3, we can use lemma 6.4 to complete the proof. \square

6.3 Removing the Dependence on W

We can remove the dependence of the algorithm on W with a simple idea. For an instance $\mathcal{I} = (U, \mathcal{S})$, let $\mathcal{S}^j = \{S \in \mathcal{S} \mid C(S) \in (n^j, n^{j+1}]\}$. Let U^j be the set of elements such that the cheapest set containing them is in \mathcal{S}^j . Suppose that for each j and each $S \in \mathcal{S}^j$, we remove all elements that can be covered by a set of cost at most n^{j-1} , and hence define S' to be $S \cap (U^j \cup U^{j-1})$. This would change the cost of the optimal solution only by a factor of 2, since if we were earlier using S in the optimal solution, we can pick S' and at most n sets of cost at most n^{j-1} to cover the elements covered by $S \setminus S'$. Call this instance $\mathcal{I}' = (U, \mathcal{S}')$.

Now we partition this instance into two instances \mathcal{I}_1 and \mathcal{I}_2 , where $\mathcal{I}_1 = (\cup_{j \text{ even}} U^j, \mathcal{S}')$, and where $\mathcal{I}_2 = (\cup_{j \text{ odd}} U^j, \mathcal{S}')$. Since we have just partitioned the universe, the optimal solution on both these instances costs at most $2 \text{OPT}(\mathcal{I})$. But both these instances $\mathcal{I}_1, \mathcal{I}_2$ are themselves collections of *disjoint* instances, with each of these instances having $w_{\max}/w_{\min} \leq n^2$; this immediately allows us to remove the dependence on W . Note that this transformation is based only on the set system (U, \mathcal{S}) , and not on the private subset R .

Theorem 6.11. *For any $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$, $\delta = 1/\text{poly}(n)$, there is an $O(\log n(\log m + \log \log n)/\epsilon)$ -approximation for the weighted set cover problem that preserves (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy.*

6.4 Lower bounds

Theorem 6.12. *Any ϵ -differentially private algorithm that maps elements to sets must have approximation factor $\Omega(\log m/\epsilon)$, for a set cover instance with m sets and $((\log m)/\epsilon)^{O(1)}$ elements, for any $\epsilon \in (2 \log m/m^{\frac{1}{20}}, 1)$.*

Proof. We consider a set system with $|U| = N$ and \mathcal{S} a uniformly random selection of m size- k subsets of U . We will consider problem instances S_i consisting of one of these m subsets, so $\text{OPT}(S_i) = 1$. Let M be an ϵ -differentially private algorithm that on input $T \subseteq U$, outputs an assignment f mapping each element in U to some set in \mathcal{S} that covers it. The number of possible assignments is at most m^N . The cost on input T under an assignment f is the cardinality of the set $f(T) = \cup_{e \in T} f(e)$.

We say assignment f is good for a subset $T \subseteq U$ if its cost $|f(T)|$ is at most $l = \frac{k}{2}$. We first show that any fixed assignment $f : U \rightarrow [m]$, such that $|f^{-1}(j)| \leq k$ for all j , is unlikely to be good for a randomly picked size- k subset T of U . The number of ways to choose l sets from among those with non-empty $f^{-1}(\cdot)$ is at most $\binom{N}{l}$. Thus the probability that f is good for a random size- k subset is at most $\binom{N}{l} \left(\frac{lk}{N}\right)^k$. Setting $k = N^{1/10}$, and $l = \frac{k}{2}$, this is at most

$$\left(\frac{Ne}{l}\right)^l \left(\frac{lk}{N}\right)^k = \left(\frac{ek^3}{2N}\right)^{k/2} \leq 2^{-k \log N/4}.$$

Let $m = 2^{2\epsilon k}$. The probability that f is good for at least t of our m randomly picked sets is bounded by

$$\binom{m}{t} \left(2^{-k \log N/4}\right)^t \leq 2^{2\epsilon kt} 2^{-tk \log N/4} \leq 2^{-tk \log k/8}.$$

Thus, with probability at most $2^{-Nk \log k/8}$, a fixed assignment is good for more than N of m randomly chosen size- k sets. Taking a union bound over $m^N = 2^{2\epsilon k N}$ possible assignments, the probability that *any* feasible assignment f is good for more than N sets is at most $2^{-Nk \log k/16}$. Thus there exists a selection of size- k sets S_1, \dots, S_m such that no feasible assignment f is good for more than N of the S_i 's.

Let $p_{M(\emptyset)}(S_i)$ be the probability that an assignment drawn from the distribution defined by running M on the empty set as input is good for S_i . Since any fixed assignment is good for at most N of the m sets, the average value of $p_{M(\emptyset)}$ is at most N/m . Thus there exists a set, say S_1 such that $p_{M(\emptyset)}(S_1) \leq N/m$. Since $|S_1| = k$ and M is ϵ -differentially private, $p_{M(S_1)}(S_1) \leq \exp(\epsilon k) p_{M(\emptyset)}(S_1) < \frac{1}{2}$. Thus with probability at least half, the assignment M picks on S_1 is not good for S_1 . Since $\text{OPT}(S_1) = 1$, the expected approximation ratio of M is at least $l/2 = \frac{\log m}{4\epsilon}$.

Additionally, one can take s distinct instances of the above problem, leading to a new instance on $s \cdot N$ elements and $s \cdot m$ sets. OPT is now s , while it is easy to check that any private algorithm must cost $\Omega(s \cdot l)$ in expectation. Thus the lower bound in fact rules out additive approximations. \square

6.5 An Inefficient Algorithm for Weighted Set Cover

For completeness, we now show that the lower bound shown above is tight even in the weighted case, in the absence of computational constraints. Recall that we are given a collection \mathcal{S} of subsets of a universe U , and a private subset $R \subseteq U$ of elements to be covered. Additionally, we have weights on sets; we round up weights to powers of 2, so that sets in \mathcal{S}_j have weight exactly 2^{-j} . Without loss of generality, the largest weight is 1 and the smallest weight is $w = 2^{-L}$.

As before, we will output a permutation π on \mathcal{S} , with the understanding that the cost $\text{cost}(R, \pi)$ of a permutation π on input R is defined to be the total cost of the set cover resulting from picking the first set in the permutation containing e , for each $e \in R$.

Our algorithm constructs this permutation in a gradual manner. It maintains a permutation π_j on $\cup_{i \leq j} \mathcal{S}_i$ and a threshold T_j . In step j , given π_{j-1} and T_{j-1} , the algorithm constructs a partial permutation π_j on $\cup_{i \leq j} \mathcal{S}_i$, and a threshold T_j . In each step, we use the exponential mechanism to select an extension with an appropriate base distribution μ_j and score function q . At the end of step L , we get our permutation $\pi = \pi_L$ on \mathcal{S} .

Our permutations π_j will all have a specific structure. The weight of the i th set in the permutation, as a function of i will be a unimodal function that is non-increasing until T_j , and then non-decreasing. In other words, π_j contains sets from \mathcal{S}_j as a continuous block. The sets that appear before T_j are said to be in the *bucket*. We call a partial permutation respecting this structure *good*. We say a good permutation π *extends* a good partial permutation π_j if π_j and π agree on their ordering on $\cup_{i \leq j} \mathcal{S}_i$.

We first define the score function that is used in these choices. A natural objective function would be $cost(R, \pi_j) = \min_{\pi \text{ extends } \pi_j} cost(R, \pi)$, i.e. the cost of the optimal solution conditioned on respecting the partial permutation π_j . We use a slight modification of this score function: we force the cover to contain all sets from the bucket and denote as $\widetilde{cost}(R, \pi)$ the resulting cover defined by R on π . We then define $\widetilde{cost}(R, \pi_j)$ naturally as $\min_{\pi \text{ extends } \pi_j} \widetilde{cost}(R, \pi)$. We first record the following easy facts:

Observation 6.13. *For any R , $\min_{\pi} \widetilde{cost}(R, \pi) = \min_{\pi} cost(R, \pi) = \text{OPT}$. Moreover, for any π , $\widetilde{cost}(R, \pi) \geq cost(R, \pi)$.*

To get (π_j, T_j) given (π_{j-1}, T_{j-1}) , we insert a permutation σ_j of \mathcal{S}_j after the first T_{j-1} elements of π_{j-1} , and choose T_j , where both σ_j and T_j are chosen using the exponential mechanism. The base measure on σ_j is uniform and the base measure on $T_j - T_{j-1}$ is the geometric distribution with parameter $1/m^2$.

Let $\widetilde{cost}(A, (\sigma_j, T_j))$ be defined as $\widetilde{cost}(A, \pi_j) - \widetilde{cost}(A, \pi_{j-1})$, where π_j is constructed from π_{j-1} and (σ_j, T_j) as above. The score function we use to pick (σ_j, T_j) is $score_j(R, (\sigma_j, T_j)) = 2^j \widetilde{cost}(R, (\sigma_j, T_j))$. Thus $Pr[(\sigma_j, T_j)] \propto (1/m^2(T_j - T_{j-1})) \exp(\varepsilon score_j((\sigma_j, T_j)))$.

Let the optimal solution to the instance contain n_j sets from \mathcal{S}_j . Thus $\text{OPT} = \sum_j 2^{-j} n_j$. We first show that $\widetilde{cost}(R, \pi_L)$ is $O(\text{OPT} \log m/\varepsilon)$. By Observation 6.13, the approximation guarantee would follow.

The probability that the n_j sets in OPT fall in the bucket when picking from the base measure is at least $1/m^{3n_j}$. When that happens, $\widetilde{cost}(R, \pi_j) = \widetilde{cost}(R, \pi_{j-1})$. Thus the exponential mechanism ensures that except with probability $1/\text{poly}(m)$:

$$\widetilde{cost}(R, \pi_j) \leq \widetilde{cost}(R, \pi_{j-1}) + 4 \cdot 2^{-j} \log(m^{3n_j})/\varepsilon = \widetilde{cost}(R, \pi_{j-1}) + 12 \cdot 2^{-j} n_j \log m/\varepsilon$$

Thus with high probability,

$$\begin{aligned} \widetilde{cost}(R, \pi_L) &\leq \widetilde{cost}(R, \pi_0) + 12 \sum_j 2^{-j} n_j \log m/\varepsilon \\ &= \text{OPT} + 12\text{OPT} \log m/\varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Finally, we analyze the privacy. Let $e \in U$ be an element such that the cheapest set covering U has cost 2^{-j_e} . Let A and B be two instances that differ in element e . It is easy to see that $|\widetilde{cost}(A, (\sigma_j, T_j)) - \widetilde{cost}(B, (\sigma_j, T_j))|$ is bounded by 2^{-j} for all j . We show something stronger:

Lemma 6.14. *For any good partial permutation π_j and any A, B such that $A = B \cup \{e\}$,*

$$|score(A, (\sigma_j, T_j)) - score_j(B, (\sigma_j, T_j))| \leq \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } j > j_e \\ 2^{j_e - j + 1} & \text{if } j \leq j_e \end{cases}$$

Proof. Let π_B be the permutation realizing $\widetilde{cost}(B)$. For $j \leq j_e$, if e is covered by a set in the bucket in π_B , then the cost of π_B is no larger in instance A and hence $\widetilde{cost}(A, \pi_j) = \widetilde{cost}(B, \pi_j)$ ¹. In the case that the bucket in π_B does not cover e , then $\widetilde{cost}(A, \pi_j) \leq \widetilde{cost}(A, \pi_B) = \widetilde{cost}(B, \pi_B) + 2^{-j_e} = \widetilde{cost}(B, \pi_j) + 2^{-j_e}$. Since this also holds for π_{j-1} , this implies the claim from $j \leq j_e$.

For $j > j_e$, observe that the first set in π_B that covers e is fully determined by the partial permutation π_j , since the sets in $\cup_{i > j_e} \mathcal{S}_i$ do not contain e . Thus $\widetilde{cost}(A, (\sigma_j, T_j)) = \widetilde{cost}(B, (\sigma_j, T_j))$ and the claim follows. \square

¹We remark that this is not true for the function $cost$, and is the reason we had to modify it to \widetilde{cost} .

Then for any $j \leq j_e$, lemma 6.14 implies that for any (σ_j, T_j) , $\exp(\epsilon(\text{score}(A, (\sigma_j, T_j)) - \text{score}(B, (\sigma_j, T_j)))) \in [\exp(-\epsilon 2^{j_e - j + 1}), \exp(\epsilon 2^{j_e - j + 1})]$. Thus

$$\frac{\Pr[\sigma_j, T_j | A]}{\Pr[\sigma_j, T_j | B]} \in [\exp(-2^{j - j_e + 2} \epsilon), \exp(2^{j - j_e + 2} \epsilon)]$$

Moreover, for any $j > j_e$, this ratio is 1. Thus

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[\sigma_j, T_j | A]}{\Pr[\sigma_j, T_j | B]} &\in [\prod_{j \leq j_e} \exp(-2^{j - j_e + 2} \epsilon), \prod_{j \leq j_e} \exp(2^{j - j_e + 2} \epsilon)] \\ &\subseteq [\exp(-8\epsilon), \exp(8\epsilon)], \end{aligned}$$

which implies 8ϵ -differential privacy.

7 Facility Location

Consider the metric facility location problem: we are given a metric space (V, d) , a facility cost f and a (private) set of demand points $D \subseteq V$. We want to select a set of facilities $F \subseteq V$ to minimize $\sum_{v \in D} d(v, F) + f \cdot |F|$. (Note that we assume “uniform” facility costs here instead of different costs f_i for different $i \in V$.) Assume that distances are at least 1, and let $\Delta = \max_{u, v} d(u, v)$ denote the diameter of the space.

We use the result of Fakcharoenphol et al. [FRT04] that any metric space on n points can be approximated by a distribution over dominating trees with expected stretch $O(\log n)$; moreover all the trees in the support of the distribution are rooted 2-HSTs—they have $L = O(\log \Delta)$ levels, with the leaves (at level 0) being exactly $= V$, the internal nodes being all Steiner nodes, the root having level L , and all edges between levels $(i + 1)$ and i having length 2^i . Given such a tree T and node v at level i , let T_v denote the (vertices in) the subtree rooted at v .

By Corollary 4.6, it is clear that we cannot output the actual set of facilities, so we will instead output instructions in the form of an HST $T = (V_T, E_T)$ and a set of facilities $F \subseteq V_T$: each demand $x \in D$ then gets assigned to its ancestor facility at the lowest level in the tree. (We guarantee that the root is always in F , hence this is well-defined.) Now we are charged for the connection costs, and for the *facilities that have at least one demand assigned to them*.

Algorithm 7 The Facility Location Algorithm

- 1: **Input:** Metric (V, d) , facility cost f , demands $D \subseteq V, \epsilon$.
 - 2: Pick a random distance-preserving FRT tree T ; recall this is a 2-HST with $L = O(\log \Delta)$ levels.
 - 3: **let** $F \leftarrow \text{root } r$.
 - 4: **for** $i = 1$ to L **do**
 - 5: **for** all vertices v at level i **do**
 - 6: **let** $N_v = |D \cap T_v|$ and $\widetilde{N}_v = N_v + \text{Lap}(L/\epsilon)$.
 - 7: **if** $\widetilde{N}_v \cdot 2^i > f$ **then** $F \leftarrow F \cup v$.
 - 8: **end for**
 - 9: **end for**
 - 10: **output** (T, F) : each demand $x \in D$ is assigned to the ancestor facility at lowest level in T .
-

Theorem 7.1. *The above algorithm preserves ϵ -differential privacy and outputs a solution of cost $\text{OPT} \cdot O(\log n \log \Delta) \cdot \frac{\log \Delta}{\epsilon} \log \left(\frac{n \log^2 \Delta}{\epsilon} \right)$.*

For the privacy analysis, instead of outputting the set F we could imagine outputting the tree T and all the counts \widetilde{N}_v ; this information clearly determines F . Note that the tree is completely oblivious of the demand set. Since adding or removing any particular demand vertex can only change L counts, and the noise added in Step 6 gives us ϵ/L -differential privacy, the fact that differential privacy composes linearly gives us the privacy claim.

For the utility analysis, consider the “noiseless” version of the algorithm which opens a facility at v when $N_v \cdot 2^i \geq f$. It can be shown that this ideal algorithm incurs cost at most $f + O(\log n \log \Delta) \cdot \text{OPT}$ (see, e.g., [Ind04, Theorem 3]). We now have two additional sources of error due to the noise:

- Consider the case when $N_v \cdot 2^i \geq f > \widetilde{N}_v \cdot 2^i$, which increases the connection cost of some demands in D . However, the noise is symmetric, and so we overshoot the mark with probability at most $1/2$ —and when this happens the 2-HST property ensures that the connection cost for any demand x increases by at most a factor of 2. Since there are at most $L = O(\log \Delta)$ levels, the expected connection cost increases by at most a factor of L .
- Consider the other case when $N_v \cdot 2^i < f \leq \widetilde{N}_v \cdot 2^i$, which increases the facility cost. Note that if $N_v \cdot 2^i \geq f/2$, then opening a facility at v can be charged again in the same way as for the noiseless algorithm (up to a factor of 2). Hence suppose that $\widetilde{N}_v - N_v \geq \frac{1}{2}(f/2^i)$, and hence we need to consider the probability p_i of the event that $\text{Lap}(L/\epsilon) > \frac{1}{2}(f/2^i)$, which is just $\frac{L}{\epsilon} \exp(-\frac{f}{2^{i+1}} \frac{\epsilon}{L})$.

Note that if for some value of i , $f \geq \frac{L2^{i+1}}{\epsilon} \log \frac{L^2 n}{\epsilon}$, the above probability p_i is at most $1/Ln$, and hence the expected cost of opening up spurious facilities at nodes with such values of i is at most $(1/Ln) \cdot Ln \cdot f = f$. (There are L levels, and at most n nodes at each level.)

For the values of i which are higher; i.e., for which $f < \frac{L2^{i+1}}{\epsilon} \log \frac{L^2 n}{\epsilon}$, we pay for this facility only if there is a demand $x \in D$ in the subtree below v that actually uses this facility. Hence this demand x must have used a facility above v in the noiseless solution, and we can charge the cost f of opening this facility to length of the edge 2^{i+1} above v . Thus the total cost of spurious facilities we pay for is the cost of the noiseless solution times a factor $\frac{L}{\epsilon} \log \frac{L^2 n}{\epsilon}$.

Thus the expected cost of the solution is at most

$$\text{OPT} \cdot O(\log n \log \Delta) \cdot \frac{\log \Delta}{\epsilon} \log \left(\frac{n \log^2 \Delta}{\epsilon} \right). \quad (7.8)$$

8 Combinatorial Public Projects (Submodular Maximization)

Recently Papadimitriou et al.[PSS08] introduced the Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPP Problem) and showed that there is a succinctly representable version of the problem for which, although there exists a constant factor approximation algorithm, no efficient *truthful* algorithm can guarantee an approximation ratio better than $m^{\frac{1}{2}-\epsilon}$, unless $NP \subseteq BPP$. Here we adapt our set cover algorithm to give a privacy preserving approximation to the CPP problem within logarithmic (additive) factors.

In the CPP problem, we have n agents and m resources publicly known. Each agent submits a private non-decreasing and *submodular* valuation function f_i over subsets of resources, and our goal is to select a size- k subset S of the resources to maximize $\sum_{i=1}^n f_i(S)$. We assume that we have oracle access to the functions f_i . Note that since each f_i is submodular, so is $\sum_{i=1}^n f_i(S)$, and our goal is to produce an algorithm for submodular maximization that preserves the privacy of the individual agent valuation functions. Without loss of generality, we will scale the valuation functions such that they take maximum value 1: $\max_{i,S} f_i(S) = 1$.

Once again, we have an easy computationally inefficient algorithm.

Theorem 8.1. *The exponential mechanism when used to choose k sets runs in time $O(\binom{m}{k} \text{poly}(n))$ and has expected quality at least $(1 - 1/e)\text{OPT} - O(\log \binom{m}{k}/\epsilon)$.*

We next give a computationally efficient algorithm with slightly worse guarantees. We adapt our un-weighted set cover algorithm, simply selecting k items greedily:

Algorithm 8 CPP Problem

- 1: **Input:** A set of M of m resources, private functions f_1, \dots, f_n , a number of resources k , ϵ, δ .
 - 2: **let** $M_1 \leftarrow M$, $F(x) := \sum_{i=1}^m f_i(x)$, $S_1 \leftarrow \emptyset$, $\epsilon' \leftarrow \frac{\epsilon}{e \ln(e/\delta)}$.
 - 3: **for** $i = 1$ to k **do**
 - 4: **pick** a resource r from M_i with probability proportional to $\exp(\epsilon'(F(S_i + \{r\}) - F(S_i)))$.
 - 5: **let** $M_{i+1} \leftarrow M_i - \{r\}$, $S_{i+1} \leftarrow S_i + \{r\}$.
 - 6: **end for**
 - 7: **Output** S_{k+1} .
-

8.1 Utility Analysis

Theorem 8.2. *Except with probability $O(1/\text{poly}(n))$, the algorithm for the CPP problem returns a solution with quality at least $(1 - 1/e)\text{OPT} - O(k \log m/\epsilon')$.*

Proof. Since F is submodular and there exists a set S^* with $|S^*| = k$ and $F(S^*) = \text{OPT}$, there always exists a resource r such that $F(S_i + \{r\}) - F(S_i) \geq (\text{OPT} - F(S_i))/k$. If we always selected the optimizing resource, the distance to OPT would decrease by a factor of $1 - 1/k$ each round, and we would achieve an approximation factor of $1 - 1/e$. Instead, we use the exponential mechanism which, by (2.4), selects a resource within $4 \ln m/\epsilon'$ of the optimizing resource with probability at least $1 - 1/m^3$. With probability at least $1 - k/m^3$ each of the k selections decreases $\text{OPT} - F(S_i)$ by a factor of $(1 - 1/k)$, while increasing it by at most an additive $4 \ln m/\epsilon'$, giving $(1 - 1/e)\text{OPT} + O(k \ln m/\epsilon')$. \square

8.2 Privacy Analysis

Theorem 8.3. *For any $\delta \leq 1/2$, the CPP problem algorithm preserves $(\epsilon'(e - 1) \ln(e/\delta), \delta)$ -differential privacy.*

Proof. Let A and B be two CPP instances that differ in a single agent I with utility function f_I . We show that the output set of resources, even revealing the order in which the resources were chosen, is privacy preserving. Fix some ordered set of k resources, π_1, \dots, π_k write $S_i = \bigcup_{j=1}^{i-1} \{\pi(j)\}$ to denote the first $i - 1$ elements, and write $s_{i,j}(A) = F_A(S_i + \{j\}) - F_A(S_i)$ to denote the marginal utility of item j at time i in instance A . Define $s_{i,j}(B)$ similarly for instance B . We consider the relative probability of our mechanism outputting ordering π when given inputs A and B :

$$\frac{\Pr[M(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[M(B) = \pi]} = \prod_{i=1}^k \left(\frac{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,\pi_i}(A)) / (\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(A)))}{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,\pi_i}(B)) / (\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(B)))} \right),$$

where the sum over j is over all remaining unselected resources. We can separate this into two products

$$\prod_{i=1}^k \left(\frac{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,\pi_i}(A))}{\exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,\pi_i}(B))} \right) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^k \left(\frac{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(B))}{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(A))} \right).$$

If A contains agent I but B does not, the second product is at most 1, and the first is at most $\exp(\epsilon' \sum_{i=1}^k (F_I(S_i) - F_I(S_{i-1}))) \leq \exp(\epsilon')$. If B contains agent I , and A does not, the first product is at most 1, and in the remainder of the proof, we focus on this case. We will write $\beta_{i,j} = s_{i,j}(B) - s_{i,j}(A)$ to be the additional marginal utility of item j at time i in instance B over instance A , due to agent I . Thus

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[M(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[M(B) = \pi]} &\leq \prod_{i=1}^k \left(\frac{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(B))}{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(A))} \right) \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^k \left(\frac{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \beta_{i,j}) \cdot \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(A))}{\sum_j \exp(\epsilon' \cdot s_{i,j}(A))} \right) \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^k \mathbb{E}_i[\exp(\epsilon' \beta_i)], \end{aligned}$$

where β_i is the marginal utility actually achieved at time i by agent I , and the expectation is taken over the probability distribution over resources selected at time i in instance A . For all $x \leq 1$, $e^x \leq 1 + (e - 1) \cdot x$. Therefore, for all $\epsilon' \leq 1$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \prod_{i=1}^k \mathbb{E}_i[\exp(\epsilon' \beta_i)] &\leq \prod_{i=1}^k \mathbb{E}_i[1 + (e - 1)\epsilon' \beta_i] \\ &\leq \exp((e - 1)\epsilon' \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb{E}_i[\beta_i]). \end{aligned}$$

As in the set-cover proof, we split the set of possible outputs into two sets. We call an output sequence q -good for an agent I in instance A if this sum $\sum_{i=1}^k E_i[\beta_i]$ is bounded above by q , and call it q -bad otherwise. For a $(\ln(e\delta^{-1}))$ -good output π , we can then write

$$\frac{\Pr[M(A) = \pi]}{\Pr[M(B) = \pi]} \leq \exp((e-1)\epsilon' \cdot \ln(e\delta^{-1})).$$

Moreover, note that since the total realized utility of any agent is at most 1, if agent I has realized utility u_{i-1} before the i th set is chosen, then β_i is distributed in $[0, 1 - u_{i-1}]$. Moreover, $u_i = u_{i-1} + \beta_i$. Lemma B.2 then implies that the probability that the algorithm outputs a $(\ln(e\delta^{-1}))$ -bad permutation is at most δ . The theorem follows. \square

Remark 1. By choosing $\epsilon' = \epsilon/k$, we immediately get ϵ -differential privacy and expected utility at least $(1 - 1/e)\text{OPT} - O(k^2 \ln m/\epsilon)$. This may give better guarantees for some values of k and δ .

We remark that the k -coverage problem is a special case of the CPP problem. Therefore:

Corollary 8.4. *The CPP algorithm (with sets as resources) is an (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy preserving algorithm for the k -coverage problem achieving approximation factor at least $(1 - 1/e)\text{OPT} - O(k \log m \log(2/\delta)/\epsilon)$.*

8.3 Truthfulness

The CPP problem can be viewed as a mechanism design problem when each agent i has a choice of whether to submit his actual valuation function f_i , or to lie and submit a different valuation function f'_i if such a misrepresentation yields a better outcome for agent i . A mechanism is *truthful* if for every valuation function of agents $j \neq i$, and every valuation function f_i of agent i , there is never a function $f'_i \neq f_i$ such that agent i can benefit by misrepresenting his valuation function as f'_i . Intuitively, a mechanism is approximately truthful if no agent can make more than a slight gain by not truthfully reporting.

Definition 3. *A mechanism for the CPP problem is γ -truthful if for every agent i , for every set of player valuations f_j for $j \neq i$, and for every valuation function $f'_i \neq f_i$:*

$$E[f_i(M(f_1, \dots, f_i, \dots, f_n))] \geq E[f_i(M(f_1, \dots, f'_i, \dots, f_n))] - \gamma$$

Note that 0-truthfulness corresponds to the usual notion of (exact) truthfulness.

(ϵ, δ) -differential privacy in our setting immediately implies $(2\epsilon + \delta)$ -approximate truthfulness. We note that Papadimitriou et al. [PSS08] showed that the CPP problem is inapproximable to an $m^{\frac{1}{2}-\epsilon}$ multiplicative factor by any polynomial time 0-truthful mechanism. Our result shows that relaxing that to γ -truthfulness allows us to give a constant approximation to the utility whenever $\text{OPT} \geq 2k \log m \log(1/\gamma)/\gamma$ for any γ .

8.4 Lower Bounds

Theorem 8.5. *No ϵ -differentially private algorithm for the maximum coverage problem can guarantee profit larger than $\text{OPT} - (k \log(m/k)/20\epsilon)$.*

The proof is almost identical to that of the lower bound Theorem 4.5 for k -median, and hence is omitted.

9 Steiner Forest

Consider the Steiner network problem, where we are given a metric space $M = (V, d)$ on n points, and a (private) subset $R \subseteq V \times V$ of source-sink (terminal) pairs. The goal is to buy a minimum-cost set of edges $E(R) \subset \binom{V}{2}$ such that these edges connect up each terminal pair in R . As in previous cases, we give instructions in the form of a tree $T = (V, E_T)$; each terminal pair $(u, v) \in R$ takes the unique path $P_T(u, v)$ in this tree T between themselves, and the (implicit) solution is the set of edges $E(R) = \bigcup_{(u,v) \in R} P_T(u, v)$.

The tree T is given by the randomized construction of Fakcharoenphol et al. [FRT04], which guarantees that $\mathbb{E}[\text{cost}(E(R))] \leq O(\log n) \cdot \text{OPT}$; moreover, since the construction is oblivious to the set R , it preserves the privacy of the terminal pairs perfectly (i.e., $\epsilon = 0$). The same idea can be used for a variety of network design problem (such as the “buy-at-bulk” problem) which can be solved by reducing it to a tree instance.

10 Private Amplification Theorem

In this section, we show that differentially private mechanisms that give good guarantees in expectation can be repeated privately to amplify the probability of a good outcome. First note that if we simply repeat a private algorithm T times, and select the best outcome, we can get the following result:

Theorem 10.1. *Let $M : D \rightarrow R$ be an ϵ -differentially private mechanism such that for a query function q , and a parameter Q , $\Pr[q(A, M(A)) \geq Q] \geq \frac{1}{2}$. Then for any $\delta > 0$, $\epsilon' \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, there is a mechanism M' which satisfies the following properties:*

- **Utility:** $\Pr[q(A, M(A)) \geq Q] \geq (1 - 2^{-T})$.
- **Efficiency:** M' makes T calls to M .
- **Privacy:** M' satisfies (ϵT) -differential privacy.

Note that the privacy parameter degrades linearly with T . Thus to bring down the failure probability to inverse polynomial, one will have to make T logarithmic. To get ϵ' -differential privacy, one would then take ϵ to be ϵ'/T . If Q was inversely proportional to ϵ , as is the case in many of our algorithms, this leads to an additional logarithmic loss. The next theorem shows a more sophisticated amplification technique that does better.

Theorem 10.2 (Private Amplification Theorem). *Let $M : D \rightarrow R$ be an ϵ -differentially private mechanism such that for a query function q with sensitivity 1, and a parameter Q , $\Pr[q(A, M(A)) \geq Q] \geq p$ for some $p \in (0, 1)$. Then for any $\delta > 0$, $\epsilon' \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, there is a mechanism M' which satisfies the following properties:*

- $\Pr[q(A, M(A)) \geq Q - \frac{4}{\epsilon'} \log(\frac{1}{\epsilon'\delta p})] \geq (1 - \delta)$.
- M' makes $O((\frac{1}{\epsilon'\delta p})^2 \log(\frac{1}{\epsilon'\delta p}))$ calls to M .
- M' satisfies $(\epsilon + 8\epsilon')$ -differential privacy.

Proof. Let $T = (\frac{8}{\epsilon'\delta p})^2 \log(\frac{1}{\epsilon'\delta p})$. The mechanism M' runs M on the input A independently $(T + 1)$ times to get outputs $S_1 = \{r_1, \dots, r_{T+1}\}$. It also adds in $T' = \frac{\sqrt{4T \log T}}{\epsilon'}$ dummy outcomes $S_2 = \{s_1, \dots, s_{T'}\}$ and selects an outcome from $S_1 \cup S_2$ using the exponential mechanism with privacy parameter ϵ' and score function

$$\tilde{q}(A, r) = \begin{cases} \min(Q, q(A, r)) & \text{if } r \in S_1 \\ Q & \text{if } r \in S_2 \end{cases}$$

The efficiency of M' is immediate from the construction. To analyze the utility, note that (2.4) ensures that the exponential mechanism's output r satisfies $\tilde{q}(A, r) > Q - \frac{4}{\epsilon'} \log(\frac{1}{\epsilon'\delta p})$ with probability $(1 - \frac{\delta}{2})$. Conditioned on the output r satisfying this property, the ratio $\Pr[r \in S_1] / \Pr[r \in S_2]$ is at least $|\{r \in S_1 : q(A, r) \geq Q\}| / |S_2|$. Since the numerator is at least pT in expectation, the probability of r being a dummy outcome is at most $\frac{\delta}{2}$. This establishes the utility property.

We now show the privacy property. For any $r_0 \in R$,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[M'(A) = r_0] &= \sum_{i=1}^{T+1} \Pr[r_i = r_0] \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{\exp(\epsilon' \tilde{q}(A, r_0))}{\sum_{r \in S_1} \exp(\epsilon' \tilde{q}(A, r)) + T' \exp(\epsilon' Q)} \mid r_i = r_0 \right] \\ &= (T + 1) \cdot \Pr[M(A) \text{ outputs } r_0] \cdot \exp(\epsilon' \tilde{q}(A, r_0)) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{\sum_{r \in S_1} \exp(\epsilon' \tilde{q}(A, r)) + T' \exp(\epsilon' Q)} \mid r_{T+1} = r_0 \right] \\ &= (T + 1) \cdot \Pr[M(A) \text{ outputs } r_0] \cdot \exp(\epsilon' \tilde{q}(A, r_0)) \cdot \exp(-\epsilon' Q) \cdot \\ &\quad \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{\sum_{r \in S_1 \setminus \{r_0\}} \exp(\epsilon' (\tilde{q}(A, r) - Q)) + \exp(\epsilon' (\tilde{q}(A, r_0) - Q)) + T'} \right] \end{aligned} \tag{10.9}$$

where the expectation is also taken over runs $1, \dots, T$ of M (we've explicitly conditioned on run $(T + 1)$ producing r_0).

It is easy to bound the change in the first two terms when we change from input A to a neighboring input B , since M satisfies ϵ -differential privacy, and \tilde{q} has sensitivity 1. Let $D = D(A)$ denote the denominator in

the final expectation; we would like to show that $\mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{D(A)}] \leq \exp(\epsilon)\mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{D(B)}]$ for neighboring inputs A and B . Let $C = \exp(\epsilon'(\tilde{q}(A, r_0) - Q)) + T'$ denote the constant term in $D(A)$.

First observe that

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[D(A)] &= C + T \cdot \mathbb{E}_{r \in M(A)}[\exp(\epsilon'(\tilde{q}(A, r) - Q))] \\ &\geq C + T \cdot \exp(-\epsilon') \cdot \mathbb{E}_{r \in M(A)}[\exp(\epsilon'(\tilde{q}(B, r) - Q))] \\ &\geq C + T \cdot \exp(-2\epsilon') \cdot \mathbb{E}_{r \in M(B)}[\exp(\epsilon'(\tilde{q}(B, r) - Q))] \\ &\geq \exp(-2\epsilon') \cdot \mathbb{E}[D(B)],\end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality follows from the sensitivity of q and the second from the ϵ -differential privacy of M . Thus $\mathbb{E}[D(A)]$ is close to $\mathbb{E}[D(B)]$. We now show that $\mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{D(A)}]$ is close to $\frac{1}{\mathbb{E}[D(A)]}$ for each A , which will complete the proof.

The first step is to establish that $D(A)$ is concentrated around its expectation. Since $D = C + \sum_{i=1}^T Y_i$, where the Y_i 's are i.i.d. random variables in $[0, 1]$, standard concentration bounds imply

$$\Pr[D \geq \mathbb{E}[D] + t] \leq \exp(-2t^2/T); \quad \Pr[D \leq \mathbb{E}[D] - t] \leq \exp(-2t^2/T);$$

Since $\frac{1}{D} \geq \frac{1}{C}$, we can now estimate

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{D}] &\leq \frac{\exp(\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]} + \int_{\frac{\exp(\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]}}^{\frac{1}{C}} \Pr[\frac{1}{D} \geq y] dy \\ &\leq \frac{\exp(\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]} + \int_C^{\exp(-\epsilon')\mathbb{E}[D]} \frac{\Pr[D \leq z]}{z^2} dz \\ &\leq \frac{\exp(\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]} + \frac{1}{C^2} \int_C^{\exp(-\epsilon')\mathbb{E}[D]} \exp(-2(z - \mathbb{E}[D])^2/T) dz \\ &\leq \frac{\exp(\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]} + \frac{(\exp(-\epsilon')\mathbb{E}[D] - C)}{C^2} \exp(-(\epsilon'\mathbb{E}[D])^2/T) \\ &\leq \frac{\exp(\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]} + \frac{1}{T^2}\end{aligned}$$

since $\mathbb{E}[D] > C > \frac{\sqrt{4T \log T}}{\epsilon'}$, $\mathbb{E}[D] < 2T$, and $C > 1$. Thus $\mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{D}] \leq \frac{\exp(2\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]}$.

Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{D}] &\geq \frac{\exp(-\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]} - \int_0^{\frac{\exp(-\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]}} \Pr[\frac{1}{D} \leq y] dy \\ &\geq \frac{\exp(-\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]} - \int_{\exp(\epsilon')\mathbb{E}[D]}^{\infty} \frac{\Pr[D \geq z]}{z^2} dz \\ &\geq \frac{\exp(-\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]} - \frac{\exp(-2\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]^2} \int_{\exp(\epsilon')\mathbb{E}[D]}^{\infty} \exp(-2(z - \mathbb{E}[D])^2/T) dz \\ &\geq \frac{\exp(-\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]} - \frac{\exp(-2\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]^2} \sqrt{T} \\ &\geq \frac{\exp(-\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]} - \frac{\epsilon'}{\mathbb{E}[D]},\end{aligned}$$

so that $\mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{D}] \geq \frac{\exp(-3\epsilon')}{\mathbb{E}[D]}$.

Thus $\mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{D(A)}] \leq \exp(7\epsilon')\mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{D(B)}]$ for neighboring inputs A and B . Now using this fact in expression (10.9) for $\Pr[M'(A) = r_0]$ above, we conclude that M' satisfies $(\epsilon + 8\epsilon')$ -differential privacy. \square

References

- [AGK⁺04] Vijay Arya, Naveen Garg, Rohit Khandekar, Adam Meyerson, Kamesh Munagala, and Vinayaka Pandit. Local search heuristics for k -median and facility location problems. *SIAM J. Comput.*, 33(3):544–562, 2004.
- [BCNW06] A. Beimel, P. Carmi, K. Nissim, and E. Weinreb. Private approximation of search problems. In *Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing*, pages 119–128. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2006.
- [BHN07] A. Beimel, R. Hallak, and K. Nissim. Private Approximation of Clustering and Vertex Cover. *Theory of Cryptography Conference*, 4392:383, 2007.
- [BLR08] A. Blum, K. Ligett, and A. Roth. A learning theory approach to non-interactive database privacy. In *Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing*, pages 609–618. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2008.
- [BMNW07] A. Beimel, T. Malkin, K. Nissim, and E. Weinreb. How Should We Solve Search Problems Privately? In *CRYPTO*, volume 4622, page 31. Springer, 2007.
- [BNO08] Amos Beimel, Kobbi Nissim, and Eran Omri. Distributed private data analysis: Simultaneously solving how and what. In David Wagner, editor, *CRYPTO*, volume 5157 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 451–468. Springer, 2008.
- [Chv79] V. Chvátal. A greedy heuristic for the set-covering problem. *Mathematics of operations research*, pages 233–235, 1979.
- [DKM⁺06] Cynthia Dwork, Krishnaram Kenthapadi, Frank McSherry, Ilya Mironov, and Moni Naor. Our data, ourselves: privacy via distributed noise generation. In *Advances in cryptology—EUROCRYPT 2006*, volume 4004 of *Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci.*, pages 486–503. Springer, Berlin, 2006.
- [DMNS06] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis. *Proceedings of the 3rd Theory of Cryptography Conference*, pages 265–284, 2006.
- [DNR⁺09] C. Dwork, M. Naor, O. Reingold, G.N. Rothblum, and S. Vadhan. On the complexity of differentially private data release: efficient algorithms and hardness results. In *Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing*, pages 381–390. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2009.
- [Dwo06] Cynthia Dwork. Differential privacy. In *Automata, languages and programming. Part II*, volume 4052 of *Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci.*, pages 1–12. Springer, Berlin, 2006.
- [Dwo08] C. Dwork. Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results. In *Theory and Applications of Models of Computation—TAMC 2008*, volume 4978 of *Lecture Notes In Computer Science*, pages 1–19, 2008.
- [FF56] L.R. Ford and D.R. Fulkerson. Maximal flow through a network. *Canadian Journal of Mathematics*, 8(3):399–404, 1956.
- [FFKN09] D. Feldman, A. Fiat, H. Kaplan, and K. Nissim. Private coresets. In *Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing*, pages 361–370. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2009.
- [FIM⁺06] Joan Feigenbaum, Yuval Ishai, Tal Malkin, Kobbi Nissim, Martin J. Strauss, and Rebecca N. Wright. Secure multiparty computation of approximations. *ACM Trans. Algorithms*, 2(3):435–472, 2006.

- [FRT04] Jittat Fakcharoenphol, Satish Rao, and Kunal Talwar. A tight bound on approximating arbitrary metrics by tree metrics. *J. Comput. System Sci.*, 69(3):485–497, 2004.
- [HKKN01] S. Halevi, R. Krauthgamer, E. Kushilevitz, and K. Nissim. Private approximation of NP-hard functions. In *Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing*, pages 550–559. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2001.
- [Hoc82] D.S. Hochbaum. Approximation algorithms for the set covering and vertex cover problems. *SIAM Journal on Computing*, 11:555, 1982.
- [Ind04] P. Indyk. Algorithms for dynamic geometric problems over data streams. In *Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pages 373–380. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2004.
- [IW06] P. Indyk and D. Woodruff. Polylogarithmic Private Approximations and Efficient Matching. *Theory of Cryptography*, 3876:245, 2006.
- [Joh74] D.S. Johnson. Approximation algorithms for combinatorial problems. *J. Comput. Syst. Sci.*, 9:256–278, 1974.
- [Kar93] David R. Karger. Global min-cuts in RNC, and other ramifications of a simple min-cut algorithm. In *Proceedings of the Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Austin, TX, 1993)*, pages 21–30, New York, 1993. ACM.
- [KLN⁺08] Shiva Kasiviswanathan, Homin K. Lee, Kobbi Nissim, Sofya Raskhodnikova, and Adam Smith. What can we learn privately? In *Proceedings of the 49th annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, 2008.
- [MKA⁺08] Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Daniel Kifer, John M. Abowd, Johannes Gehrke, and Lars Vilhuber. Privacy: Theory meets practice on the map. In *ICDE*, pages 277–286. IEEE, 2008.
- [MT07] F. McSherry and K. Talwar. Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy. In *Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, pages 94–103, 2007.
- [NRS07] Kobbi Nissim, Sofya Raskhodnikova, and Adam Smith. Smooth sensitivity and sampling in private data analysis. In *STOC’07—Proceedings of the 39th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pages 75–84. ACM, New York, 2007.
- [NWF78] GL Nemhauser, LA Wolsey, and ML Fisher. An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions I. *Mathematical Programming*, 14(1):265–294, 1978.
- [Pit85] L. Pitt. A simple probabilistic approximation algorithm for vertex cover. Technical report, Yale University, 1985.
- [PSS08] C. Papadimitriou, M. Schapira, and Y. Singer. On the Hardness of Being Truthful. In *Proceedings of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, 2008.

A Unweighted Vertex Cover Algorithm: An Alternate View

In this section, we consider a slightly different way to implement the vertex cover algorithm. Given a graph $G = (V, E)$, we mimic the randomized proportional-to-degree algorithm for αn rounds ($\alpha < 1$), and output the remaining vertices in random order. That is, in each of the first αn rounds, we select the next vertex i with probability proportional to $d(i) + 1/\epsilon$: this is equivalent to imagining that each vertex has $1/\epsilon$ “hallucinated” edges in addition to its real edges. (It is most convenient to imagine the other endpoint of these hallucinated edges as being fake vertices which are always ignored by the algorithm.)

When we select a vertex, we remove it from the graph, together with the real and hallucinated edges adjacent to it. This is equivalent to picking a random (real or hallucinated) edge from the graph, and outputting a random real endpoint. Outputting a vertex affects the real edges in the remaining graph, but does not change the hallucinated edges incident to other vertices.

Privacy Analysis. The privacy analysis is similar to that of Theorem 5.1: imagine the weights being $w_i = 1/\epsilon$ for the first αn rounds and $w_i = \infty$ for the remaining rounds, which gives us $2 \sum_{i=(1-\alpha)n}^n \frac{1}{iw_i} \leq \epsilon \left(\frac{2\alpha}{1-\alpha}\right)$ -differential privacy.

Utility Analysis. To analyze the utility, we couple our algorithm with a run of the non-private algorithm \mathcal{A} that at each step picks an arbitrary edge of the graph and then picks a random endpoint: it is an easy exercise that this is a 2-approximation algorithm.

We refer to vertices that have non-zero “real” degree at the time they are selected by our algorithm as *interesting vertices*: the cost of our algorithm is simply the number of interesting vertices it selects in the course of its run. Let I_1 denote the number of interesting vertices it selects during the first αn steps, and I_2 denote the number of interesting vertices it selects during its remaining $(1 - \alpha)n$ steps, when it is simply ordering vertices randomly. Clearly, the total cost is $I_1 + I_2$.

We may view the first phase of our algorithm as selecting an edge at random (from among both real and hallucinated ones) and then outputting one of its endpoints at random. Now, for the rounds in which our algorithm selects a real edge, we can couple this selection with one step of an imagined run of \mathcal{A} (selecting the same edge and endpoint). Note that this run of \mathcal{A} maintains a vertex cover that is a subset of our vertex cover, and that once our algorithm has completed a vertex cover, no interesting vertices remain. Therefore, while our algorithm continues to incur cost, \mathcal{A} has not yet found a vertex cover.

In the first phase of our algorithm, every interesting vertex our algorithm selects has at least one real edge adjacent to it, as well as $1/\epsilon$ hallucinated edges. Conditioned on selecting an interesting vertex, our algorithm had selected a real edge with probability at least $\epsilon' = 1/(1 + 1/\epsilon)$. Let R denote the random variable that represents the number of steps \mathcal{A} is run for. $E[R] \leq 2\text{OPT}$ since \mathcal{A} is a 2-approximation algorithm. By linearity of expectation:

$$2\text{OPT} \geq E[R] \geq \epsilon' \cdot E[I_1] \tag{A.10}$$

We now show that most of our algorithm’s cost comes from the first phase, and hence that I_2 is not much larger than I_1 .

Lemma A.1.

$$E[I_1] \geq \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\right) \cdot E[I_2]$$

Proof. Consider each of the αn steps of the first phase of our algorithm. Let n_i denote the number of interesting vertices remaining at step i . Note that $\{n_i\}$ is a non-increasing sequence. At step i , there are n_i interesting vertices and $n - i + 1$ remaining vertices. Note that the probability of picking an interesting vertex is strictly greater than $n_i/(n - i + 1)$ at each step. We may therefore bound the expected number of interesting vertices picked in the first phase:

$$E[I_1] > \sum_{i=1}^{\alpha n} \frac{E[n_i]}{n - i + 1} \geq E[n_{\alpha n}] \sum_{j=(1-\alpha)n}^n \frac{1}{j} \geq \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\right) \cdot E[n_{\alpha n}]$$

Noting that $E[I_2] \leq E[n_{\alpha n}]$ completes the proof. \square

Combining the facts above, we get that

$$\frac{E[\text{cost}]}{\text{OPT}} \leq \frac{2}{\epsilon'} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\ln(1-\alpha)^{-1}}\right). \tag{A.11}$$

B Missing Proofs

In this section, we prove Lemma 6.4. The lemma is a consequence of the following more general inequality.

Consider the following n round probabilistic process. In each round, an adversary chooses a $p_i \in [0, 1]$ possibly based on the first $(i - 1)$ rounds and a coin is tossed with heads probability p_i . Let Z_i be the indicator for the event that no coin comes up heads in the first i steps. Let Y_j denote the random variable $\sum_{i=j}^n p_i Z_i$ and let $Y = Y_1$.

Lemma B.1. *Let Y be defined as above. Then for any q , $\Pr[Y > q] \leq \exp(-q)$.*

Proof. We claim that for any j and any q , $\Pr[Y_j > q] \leq \exp(-q)$, which implies the lemma. The proof is by reverse induction on j . For $j = n$, Y_n is 0 if the n th coin or any coin before it comes up heads and p_n otherwise. Thus for $q \geq p_n$, the left hand side is zero. For $q \in [0, p_n)$, the left hand side is at most $(1 - p_n) \leq \exp(-p_n) \leq \exp(-q)$. Finally, for $q < 0$ the right hand side exceeds 1.

Now suppose that for any adversary's strategy and for all q , $\Pr[Y_{j+1} > q] \leq \exp(-q)$. We will show the claim for Y_j . Once again, for $q \leq 0$, the claim is trivial. In round j , if the adversary chooses p_j , there is a probability p_j that the coin comes up heads so that $Y_j = 0$. Thus for any $q \geq 0$, $\Pr[Y_j > q] = \Pr[p_j Z_j + Y_{j+1} > q] = (1 - p_j) \Pr[Y_{j+1} > q - p_j]$. Using the inequality $(1 - x) \leq \exp(-x)$ and the inductive hypothesis, the claim follows for Y_j . \square

To map the randomized algorithm to the setting of lemma B.1, we consider running the randomized weighted set cover algorithm as follows. When choosing a set S in step i , the algorithm first tosses a coin whose heads probability is $p_i(A)$ to decide whether to pick a set covering I or not. Then it uses a second source of randomness to determine the set S itself, sampling from $\{S : I \in S\}$ or $\{S : I \notin S\}$ with the appropriate conditional probabilities based on the outcome of the coin. Clearly this is a valid implementation of the weighted set cover algorithm. Note that the probabilities $p_i(A)$ may depend on the actual sets chosen in the first $(i - 1)$ steps if none of the first $(i - 1)$ coins come up heads. Since lemma B.1 applies even when $p_i(A)$'s are chosen adversarially, lemma 6.4 follows.

We also prove a more general version of Lemma B.1 that applies to non-Bernoulli distributions. This lemma will be needed to prove the privacy of our algorithm for submodular minimization in Section 8. We now consider a different n round probabilistic process. In each round, an adversary chooses a distribution \mathcal{D}_i over $[0, 1]$, possibly based on the first $(i - 1)$ rounds and a sample R_i is drawn from the distribution \mathcal{D}_i . Let $Z_0 = 1$ and let $Z_{i+1} = Z_i - R_i Z_i$. Let Y_j denote the random variable $\sum_{i=1}^n Z_i E[R_i]$ and let Y denote Y_1 .

Lemma B.2. *Let Y be defined as above. Then for any q , $\Pr[Y > q] \leq e \exp(-q)$.*

Proof. We prove a stronger claim. We show that for $\Pr[Y_j \geq q Z_j] \leq e \exp(-q)$. The proof is by reverse induction on j . For $j = n$, $Y_n = E[R_n] Z_n \leq Z_n$ since \mathcal{D}_n is supported on $[0, 1]$ and hence has expectation at most 1. Thus the claim is trivial for any $q \geq 1$. For $q \leq 1$, the right hand side is at least 1 and there is nothing to prove. Suppose that for any q and any strategy of the adversary, $\Pr[Y_{j+1} \geq q Z_{j+1}] \leq e \exp(-q)$. We show the claim for Y_j . Once again the case $q \leq 1$ is trivial, so we assume $q \geq 1$. Let μ_j denote $E[R_j]$. Note that $Y_j = Z_j \mu_j + Y_{j+1}$. Moreover, $Z_{j+1} = (1 - R_j) Z_j$. Thus,

$$\Pr[Y_j \geq q Z_j] = E_{R_j \in \mathcal{D}_j} [\Pr[Y_{j+1} \geq q Z_j - \mu_j Z_j]] = E_{R_j \in \mathcal{D}_j} [\Pr[Y_{j+1} \geq \frac{q - \mu_j}{1 - R_j} Z_{j+1}]] \leq E_{R_j \in \mathcal{D}_j} [e \exp(-\frac{q - \mu_j}{1 - R_j})].$$

We show that for any distribution \mathcal{D} , the last term is bounded by $e \exp(-q)$, which will complete the proof. Re-arranging, it suffices to show that for any distribution \mathcal{D} on $[0, 1]$,

$$E_{R \in \mathcal{D}} [\exp(\frac{\mu - qR}{1 - R})] \leq 1.$$

Since $\frac{\mu - qR}{1 - R}$ is positive when $R \leq \mu/q$ and negative otherwise, one can verify that for any R , $\exp(\frac{\mu - qR}{1 - R}) \leq \exp(\frac{\mu - qR}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}})$. Moreover, since $\exp(\cdot)$ is convex, the function lies below the chord and we can conclude that $\exp(\frac{\mu - qR}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}) \leq \exp(\frac{\mu}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}) + R(\exp(\frac{\mu - q}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}) - \exp(\frac{\mu}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}))$. Thus it suffices to prove that

$$\exp(\frac{\mu}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}) + \mu(\exp(\frac{\mu - q}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}) - \exp(\frac{\mu}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}})) \leq 1,$$

or equivalently

$$1 + \mu(\exp(\frac{-q}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}) - 1) \leq \exp(\frac{-\mu}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}).$$

This rearranges to

$$1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}\right) \leq \mu\left(1 - \exp\left(-\frac{q}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}\right)\right).$$

Consider the function $f(x) = 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{x}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}\right)$. f is convex with $f(0) = 0$ and $f(1) \leq f(q) = \left(1 - \exp\left(-\frac{q}{1 - \frac{\mu}{q}}\right)\right)$. Thus $f(\mu) \leq \mu f(1) \leq \mu f(q)$, for $q \geq 1$. The claim follows. \square