

## ANNEX 2

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Special measure 2014 in favour of Ukraine

### Action Document for Ukraine Civil Society Support Programme

#### 1. IDENTIFICATION

Title/Number	Ukraine Civil Society Support Programme CRIS number: ENI/2014/033-833		
Total cost	Total estimated cost: EUR 10.8 million Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 10 million Estimated co-financing by grant beneficiaries: EUR 0.8 million		
Aid method / Management mode and type of financing	Project Approach Direct management - grants (calls for proposals) and procurement of services		
DAC-code	15150	Sector	Democratic participation and civil society

#### 2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT

##### 2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives

This action document sets out the implementation modalities of the Ukraine 2014 Civil Society Support Programme. First and foremost this support programme accompanies and complements the support provided to Ukraine under the State Building Contract. The present programme works also in complementarity and synergy with other EU instruments and programmes such as the EIDHR, the Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities (CSO-LA) thematic programme and the ongoing Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility projects implemented in Ukraine. The overall objective of the Ukraine 2014 Civil Society Support Programme is to enhance the role of civil society promoting and monitoring democratic reforms and inclusive socio-economic development in Ukraine.

The action will be implemented through calls for proposals for funding actions implemented by civil society organisations (CSOs) and through technical assistance providing capacity building and support to structured dialogue.

##### 2.2. Context

###### 2.2.1. *Country context: political context in Ukraine*

This Programme is prepared in response to challenges and opportunities emerging as a result of several months of protests in Ukraine since November 2013 and the need to support a greater role of the civil society in the transition to a new regime.

At the eve of the Vilnius Summit, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine took a decision to suspend the preparation for the signing of the Association Agreement with its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) in order notably to restore economic ties with the Russian Federation. This led to demonstrations in Kyiv which were brutally suppressed.

The suppression led to a strong wave of anti-government protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities exemplified by the Maidan. Citizen mobilisation, new media and civil society have played a significant role in this process. President Yanukovich, together with the leaders of the opposition, agreed to an EU-brokered compromise to end the protests but fled Kyiv on 22 February 2014.

As a consequence, the Verkhovna Rada elected a new speaker who automatically became Acting President. The Verkhovna Rada decided to revert to the 2004 Constitution on which basis a new government, selected from the previous Opposition, was approved on 27 February with a constitutional majority.

The new government has indicated in its programme a clear intention to take a radical approach towards the overall implementation of reforms and specifically towards the fight against corruption. It has opened a window of opportunity giving civil society higher chances than ever before to be involved in the democratic transition process. It has also presented organised civil society and media with a challenge to uphold the expectations of exercising an efficient oversight of public authorities.

Despite the favourable context of the transitional period, it is important to keep in mind the pre-Maidan condition of the civil society, as many characteristics can still be considered valid.

### **2.2.2. Sector context: policies and challenges**

#### EU's engagement with civil society in partner countries

The new approach towards the EU neighbouring countries outlined in the Joint Communication "A new response to a changing Neighbourhood" of May 2011<sup>8</sup>, acknowledged civil society's role to contribute to policy-making and hold governments to account. The Communication reiterated the EU commitment to support a greater role for civil society through helping civil society organisations develop their advocacy capacity, the ability to monitor reform and their involvement in implementing and monitoring EU programmes. The Communication also stressed on the more intensive engagement with all stakeholders involved in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, including the Civil Society Forum and its national platforms.

In September 2012 the Commission adopted the Communication on "The Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe's Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations"<sup>9</sup>. Endorsed by the Council in October 2012, the Communication set out a new policy for a deepened and more strategic EU engagement with civil society, with a focus on CSOs in partner countries and the different roles they play. These roles range from promoting inclusive policy-making, accountability and transparency to their initiatives in service delivery and in inclusive and sustainable growth. The Communication responds to recent developments at the global level such as greater recognition of CSOs as key development actors and deterioration of the space for CSOs to operate.

The Communication put forward three priorities for EU support:

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<sup>8</sup> COM(2011)303 of 25 May 2011.

<sup>9</sup> COM(2012)492 of 12 September 2012.

1. To enhance efforts to promote an enabling environment for CSOs in partner countries;
2. To promote a meaningful and structured participation of CSOs in domestic policies of partner countries, in the EU programming cycle and in international processes;
3. To increase the capacity of CSOs to perform their roles as independent development actors more effectively.

The Communication has sent a strong message about the importance the EU attaches to a dynamic, pluralistic and competent civil society and to its constructive relations with the authorities.

### Civil society context in Ukraine

Civil society in Ukraine has been quite active in a number of sectors and its impact and role in the Ukrainian society have grown over the past 20 years.

The overall environment for civil society in Ukraine can be characterised as favourable, with a satisfactory legal framework and vibrant and diverse civil society actors, especially in such sectors as elections, human rights protection and environment. At the same time, civil society organisations have been developing against the backdrop of ever increasing pressure, especially during the years of Yanukovich's presidency.

Civil society participation in policy and decision-making processes has been rather poor. With a handful of exceptions, such as the preparation of the laws on civil society organisations, access to public information or freedom of peaceful assembly, CSO opinions on key reform processes have not been taken into account by the authorities. The best consultation process CSOs could hope for was the online publication of draft laws prepared in closed political circles. Any feedback sent by CSO experts to such public consultations has rarely been taken into account.

Civil society representatives were invited to participate in consultative/advisory committees established under national and local government bodies, the President, and the Cabinet of Ministers. However, these councils have remained largely decorative with very few independent experts included. At the same time, these structures have been useful in terms of getting out the message and allowing for direct interaction with governmental officials. Negative examples, however, could be found with the Ministry of Finance public council where none of the relevant CSOs were present and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where religious groups were present but not a single relevant think tank. The councils tended to work better at local level but they could not be expected to function as a genuine dialogue instrument, as they were often a "tick-the-box" mechanism built around "Governmental Non Governmental Organisations" (GoNGOs).

Since the departure of Yanukovich, the validity of structures of consultation and interaction between the authorities and civil society has been discussed with and among civil society. While the majority of experts agree that the previous structures were mostly inadequate and ineffective, it is generally perceived it was not due to the structures themselves, but due to such factors as: lack of will for a meaningful consultation, focus on process and procedures (and not on content), inadequacy of the process itself (i.e. consultation on a draft law, and no consultation during the preparation of the draft law), sometimes lack of expertise or constructive input from civil society.

While the formal organisational aspects of CSOs have improved, the following factors still hamper the functioning of the civil society in Ukraine:

- Despite the recent events, freedom of assembly is still undermined by the lack of modern legislation and previous restrictive practices could easily reappear: frequent court bans on peaceful demonstrations regularly limit this right, especially for oppositional or non-mainstream and minority groups. There is a clear need for adoption of a law on freedom of assembly in line with the internationally accepted standards which then should be properly implemented by the Ukrainian authorities.
- The period of the previous 3 years witnessed a striking increase of administrative and judicial pressure on CSO activities. Up to now, the law-enforcement agencies have failed to properly investigate cases of physical aggression against journalists and civic activists. It remains to be seen how attacks on journalists and protesters of the last 3 months will be investigated. The lack of proper investigation will send the wrong signal to the society and law enforcement bodies, with a culture of impunity prevailing.
- As to media, most national television channels belong to owners close to the previous ruling party; it is not clear yet how the media landscape will look like in few months. The control of the television landscape is expected to even further increase with the planned switch-over to digital television. The media outlets working in the regions of Ukraine are also under heavy pressure from the local authorities. A majority of Ukrainians get their news from television where little, if any, space exists for alternative points of view, open discussions, and expert opinions. Journalists continue to face the threat of violence in the course of their work. Numerous journalists were directly attacked during the protests. There is a lack of pluralism in the media sphere. However, it should be noted that several print media and the "blogosphere" provide a significant and largely unrestricted platform for expression of independent and oppositional views. Social and internet-based media, such as internet-TV, have played a crucial role during the Maidan revolution, and will continue to have an important role in the oversight and monitoring of public policies.

### **2.3. Lessons learnt**

While it is yet early to draw up an exhaustive list of lessons learnt about the "post-Maidan" civil society, a preliminary assessment can include the following points:

- Civil society organisations have played a key role in the process. The Civic Sector of Maidan, composed of various and diverse CSOs active during the protests, has been instrumental in keeping the revolutionary process as less political as possible, and especially in terms of catalysing the energies and potential violence into non-violent protest. Considering the risks of polarisation of the entire society, especially with the on-going external pressure and a forceful acquisition of part of Ukrainian territory, it is important to underline and capitalise on the potential stabilising role of civil society.
- The protests also increased a networking and communication of CSOs not only across the sectors, but also between regions. The importance of working in coalitions, defining each other's role and tasks, is well reflected in the recent initiative of the Civic Sector of Maidan known as the "reanimation package of reforms". It can be expected that the interest of CSOs to continue working in coalitions in order to have a greater impact at policy level will remain.
- The need for outreach to civic activism and communicating the actions to the population. Most people in the protests were not affiliated with any political party or CSO. As a result, the Maidan events were not communicated adequately to the whole population of Ukraine. Eastern Ukrainians, many of them Russian speaking, may have seen the news of the last 3

months through the spectrum of state-sponsored Russian media. The disconnect between CSOs and the society at large can clearly be detrimental to the effectiveness of the CSOs work, in particular in the policy and reform areas.

The feedback from meetings with civil society and evaluations of on-going programmes point to the following aspects that have to be considered in civil society strengthening programme:

- Dialogue with authorities: there should not be a one-size-fits-all approach, as the various contexts, levels and sectors require different responses. For example, there is often a gap between national and local level advocacy, due to different agendas and contexts for advocacy. The national level advocacy relies on expertise and access to decision-making processes, while the local advocacy relies on physical mobilisation and pre-existing credibility in community. While they are seen as not performing at national level, public councils at municipal level have potential, but only if CSOs push to participate and act constructively. Since citizen participation mechanisms in smaller communities are not yet institutionalised, and this could be one of the mechanisms to be promoted. Before the Maidan events, CSOs had underlined the increasing risks of seeing fake consultation processes to be developed further, through public councils. The new, less restrictive legal framework had been reportedly used to create more easily GoNGOs which were then occupying all seats at public councils. The development of a parallel, pro-governmental “civil society” was seen as a real risk, especially in a context of very limited access to media for non-pro-governmental or non-mainstream voices. This risk will have to be closely monitored in the new context.
- CSO legitimacy and capacity: formal CSO groups often struggle to connect to informal activism in communities. There is poor feedback mechanism to ensure that the needs of beneficiaries are reflected in planning CSO activities. The focus on CSO legitimacy and connection to citizens have been present in few donors' supported initiatives, and establishing independent boards as a pathway to legitimacy and transparency was perceived as a best practice. A strong emphasis on communication and outreach to citizens is seen as an important cross-cutting priority of civil society programmes. Outside the narrow circle of few think tanks, a large number of CSOs do not fully understand the policymaking process, a key aspect of advocacy and policy change. The outreach to grass root level should be further strengthened. Increased use of re-granting has to be accompanied by capacity development in areas such as organisational management, financial control and evidence-based advocacy.

#### **2.4. Complementary actions**

The EU Delegation to Ukraine ensures the complementarity and synergies with other EU instruments. In the implementation of this Programme complementarity will be ensured with ongoing projects funded under EIDHR, CSO-LA and other thematic programmes, regarding the objectives and types of projects, both at country and regional level. While the EIDHR will clearly focus on the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy, the CSO-LA programme will focus on areas not covered under this programme, such as social sectors, multi-actor partnerships and cooperation with local authorities.

The present programme also complements and accompanies the State Building Contract by supporting civil society's role in monitoring the implementation of the related specific reforms (public administration reform, public finance management, fight against corruption, elections, Judiciary and Constitutional reforms).

Furthermore, the present programme builds on the on-going work of the EU-funded regional project "Strengthening non-State actors' Capacities to Promote Reform and increase Public Accountability", whose overall purpose is to strengthen the overall capacities of civil society

organisations, facilitate their involvement in policy dialogue and increase their contribution to the political and institutional framework of the Eastern Partnership countries.<sup>10</sup>

Many donors support programmes for civil society are in the process of being revised to the new situation. The following initiatives can be underlined as they are the most complementary, in terms of scale and modalities, with the present programme:

- US support is channelled either through USAID or US Embassy grant programmes (Democracy support and media development funds). In view of the recent events, USAID has increased its on-going support to civil society and media. The bulk of the assistance related to civil society is implemented through two large scale programmes with re-granting and mentoring capacity: UNITER programme (Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms) with USD 14 million until 2016, and U-Media with USD 16 million over 8 years. Both programmes are implemented through international non-governmental organisations.
- The regional strategy of the Government of Sweden covering Eastern Europe countries is being finalised, one of 3 areas being "strengthened democracy, greater respect for human rights and more developed rule of law" (the two others being economic integration and environment). The indicative annual budget for Ukraine is likely to be around EUR 25 million. This programme aims at a more diverse and pluralistic civil society including a broader spectrum of political actors with strong popular support, and improved conditions for democratic accountability and participation in political processes, including the promotion of free elections. The Swedish Development assistance strategy is complementary to and closely coordinated with the EU programmes in Ukraine. The overall objectives are similar, but the Sweden mechanism of organisational funding allows focusing on emerging or already important civil society organisations. Benefiting from the organisational assessment, core funding and capacity to strategise better, these organisations will be prepared to implement successfully EU-funded projects.

## 2.5. Donor coordination

A number of support programmes for civil society are already implemented by Member States and other donors in Ukraine. Further development of the specific activities under this Programme at implementation state will have to take into account specific donor initiatives designed for Ukraine. The EU Delegation will keep other donors informed of progress under this Programme in the framework of regular meetings of the donor coordination group, and particularly with the preparation of the roadmap for engagement civil society.

Donor coordination on civil society (including media, and elections when appropriate) is very active in Ukraine, with EU Delegation regularly convening and chairing the meetings. The present situation leads many donors to re-evaluate their strategy, and the information above will be monitored and updated accordingly.

## 3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

### 3.1. Objectives

The **overall objective** of this Programme is to enhance civil society role in promoting democratic reforms and inclusive socio-economic development in Ukraine.

The **specific objectives** are:

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<sup>10</sup> More information can be found in website of the Civil Society Dialogue for Progress project ([www.csdialogue.eu](http://www.csdialogue.eu)).

1. To strengthen the capacity and participation of CSOs in policy dialogue, monitoring and oversight, and concrete actions, to advance the implementation of the national reform agenda;
2. To contribute to foster a conducive environment for civil society, including legislative, institutional and social dimensions<sup>11</sup>.

### **3.2. Expected results and main activities**

#### Expected results related to global objective:

0.1 – Civil society plays a stronger role in the promotion and monitoring of the implementation of the reform agenda in Ukraine.

0.2 – Civil society is engaged in developing and piloting initiatives to ensure an inclusive socio-economic development in Ukraine.

#### Expected results related to specific objective 1:

1.1 – Increased technical capacity of CSO to perform their role: institutional and management capacity; internal governance; sustainability; research, analytical, policy formulation, advocacy and outreach skills; understanding of policy and budget and processes including EU policy processes where relevant.

1.2 – Through policy dialogue, civil society has a greater impact on the quality of public policy and reforms.

1.3 – Oversight and monitoring by civil society provide for an effective mechanism to ensure that announced reforms are implemented and sustained.

1.4 – Through pilot projects, especially at local level, CSOs increase their contribution to socio-economic development and an inclusive society and are involved in the implementation of reforms.

#### Expected results related to specific objective 2:

2.1 – Legal environment is more conducive for civil society development (i.e. legislative framework is improved and implemented, tax code favouring donations, improved mechanism for CSOs to provide social services).

2.2 – Result-oriented interaction and dialogue between public authorities and civil society organisations:

- CSOs are better coordinated and act through platforms and coalitions;
- CSOs and authorities have functioning and efficient mechanisms for dialogue and oversight, both formal and informal, at national and local level;
- CSOs and civil servants have improved their skills in working together, seeing it as a useful partnership for their work;

2.3 – Increased trust of society at large towards CSOs, increased representativeness and legitimacy of CSOs.

#### Sectors:

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<sup>11</sup> This can include: legislative environment, institutional environment, interaction and dialogue between public authorities and civil society organisations (formal and informal structures of dialogue with authorities), representativeness and legitimacy of CSOs. See Commission Communication COM(2012)492.

Several factors justify the necessity to keep a broad spectrum of sectors to be addressed under this Programme:

- Geopolitical developments: in light of the very high instability and lack of a clear outlook regarding the future developments in Ukraine, CSOs can play an increasing stabilising role;
- Internal political developments: whatever the political affiliation of the President elected in May 2014, governance, accountability and the rule of law will be key sectors to be monitored by civil society, in line with the State Building Contract that accompanies this Programme;
- Political relations with the EU: in case the Association Agreement will be implemented in full in the country, support to inclusive socio-economic development and social sectors would be a crucial component of the present Programme to ensure positive impact of the Agreement, thus mitigating the negative short-term impact that the Agreement may have on the socio-economic stability of the country.

#### Activities:

The present programme builds on the on-going work of EU funded initiatives, such as the regional project to support civil society in Eastern Neighbourhood, and the ongoing and upcoming CSO projects supported under the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility. Activities below are indicative and will be adapted to the situation and to the results of the on-going mapping and needs assessment of civil society.

To ensure the complementarity of actors and their roles, most activities related to capacity building and dialogue mechanisms will be implemented both by CSOs themselves through two successive calls for proposals (with a one-year interval) and by a technical assistance project. The technical assistance project will ensure synergies and complementarity between projects and initiatives, guaranteeing a demand driven and locally owned process.

*Related to expected result 1.1 (and impacting on other results, such as 2.2 and 2.3):*

- A comprehensive set of capacity development programmes, with trainings, exchanges with EU-based CSOs, mentoring and learning by doing<sup>12</sup>;
- Training of trainers for civil society and civil servants (particularly on interaction and dialogue mechanisms);
- Support to locally owned capacity building mechanism such as the NGO Capacity Development Marketplace<sup>13</sup>;
- Potential themes for capacity development, to be adapted after a needs assessment exercise:
- Policy and budget process, research, advocacy and lobbying;
- Management and internal governance; project identification, formulation and financial management; fundraising;
- Outreach, communication and new media;
- Gender mainstreaming, EU policies.

*Related to expected results 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 (effective monitoring and impact of civil society projects):*

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<sup>12</sup> in line with guidance materials on capacity development of CSOs to be developed by the European Commission

<sup>13</sup> See [www.ngomarket.org.ua](http://www.ngomarket.org.ua). A presentation of the state of play is available at <http://prezi.com/eh3xbpuudj3t/capacity-development-marketplace-today/>.



- CSO projects in specific sectors target policy dialogue and interaction with authorities with concrete goals (example: local development plans under the foreseen decentralisation);
- Initiation and support to multi-stakeholders' dialogue;

*Related to expected result 2.1:*

- Screening of the state of play in terms of legal and procedural environment;
- CSO projects, such as advocacy by CSO coalitions;
- Specific expertise and good practice from the EU including accession countries or the Neighbourhood region on support to a conducive environment.

*Related to expected result 2.2:*

- Identification of proper consultation mechanisms at local and national level, through participatory process and consultation and exposure to best practices;
- Use of these identified mechanisms as appropriate;
- Support to the structuring of CSO and to the emergence of new civil society initiatives.

*Related to expected result 2.3:*

- All above mentioned activities will contribute to expected result 2.3 .

### **3.3. Risks and assumptions**

A non-exhaustive list of key assumptions includes the following:

- Political stability;
- Sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity;
- Commitment of authorities at all levels to reform and cooperation with civil society;
- Adequate operating environment for CSOs;
- Access to information and basic government accountability mechanism in place to enable CSO to play a monitoring and oversight role;
- Proper internal governance for CSOs in place;
- CSO to be interested in policy dialogue;
- Basic capacity of CSOs to engage with government and donors.

Risks and mitigating measures:

Mitigating measures will be developed as risks arise:

- In case of a deterioration of the situation (territorial, political, economic, social), the objectives of the calls for proposals would focus on the stabilising role of CSOs at national and especially at local level;
- An insufficient commitment of the stakeholders will be addressed by political dialogue between the EU Delegation and the main stakeholders, and increased explanation of the win-win situation of an efficient dialogue;

- The potential lack of interest of CSOs in advocacy and monitoring can be mitigated by a stronger focus on those groups who can have a role and clearer explanation that advocacy is about partnership and dialogue and not confrontation;
- GoNGOs and “grant-eaters” could undermine the legitimacy and efficiency of civil society work; the assessment of CSOs participating in the Programme will be carefully done, ensuring that involvement of such structures will be avoided.

### **3.4. Cross-cutting issues**

This Programme is actor-oriented and not limited to one sector. The inclusive approach used to define civil society organisations will ensure a representation of multiple sectors of activities.

The objective of the programme is to strengthen civil society's involvement in the decision-making process and improve interaction between government and civil society. This participatory approach to decision-making is a core element of democratic governance. The Programme will further contribute to the government's accountability and the implementation of reforms. It will also contribute to greater representativeness and transparency of the civil society organisations themselves.

The implementation of specific actions under this programme will build upon the existing thematic, regional and bilateral programmes already implemented with civil society organisations active in the fields of gender equality, rights of minorities and youth development.

### **3.5. Stakeholders**

This Programme primarily supports civil society organisations in the wide definition of the term as provided for in Article 1.2 of the Communication on "The Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe's Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations"<sup>14</sup>. Civil society organisations include all non-state, not-for-profit structures<sup>15</sup>, non-partisan and non-violent, through which citizens organise to pursue shared objectives and ideas, whether political, cultural, social or economic. Operating from the local to the national, regional and international levels, they comprise urban and rural, formal and informal organisations.

Other key stakeholders involved are national and local government authorities which should be associated to the activities under this Programme, to the extent possible. This Programme will continue to foster the ability and willingness of the authorities to engage with civil society organisations in policy dialogues and the implementation of reforms. In addition, media outlets are instrumental in supporting civil society in performing its oversight role and communicating about its activities, experiences and best practices.

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<sup>14</sup> COM(2012)492.

<sup>15</sup> They include membership-based, cause-based and service-oriented CSOs. Among them, community-based organisations, non-governmental organisations, faith-based organisations, foundations, research institutions, gender and LGBT organisations, cooperatives, professional and business associations, the not-for-profit media, trade unions and employers' organisations.

## **4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

### **4.1. Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

### **4.2. Indicative operational implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in sections 3.2 and 4.3 will be carried out, is **60 months** from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement or, where none is concluded, from the adoption of this Action Document, subject to modifications to be agreed by the responsible authorising officer in the relevant agreements. The European Parliament and the relevant Committee shall be informed of the extension of the operational implementation period within one month of that extension being granted.

### **4.3. Implementation components and modules**

#### **4.3.1. Grants: 2 calls for proposals "Support to Civil Society" (direct management)**

##### **4.3.1.1. Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results**

Objectives and expected results of the calls will reflect all those of the present programme (see sections 3.1 and 3.2).

##### **4.3.1.2. Eligibility conditions**

The essential eligibility criteria for applicants will be as per Article 1.2 of the Communication on "The Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe's Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations" (see 3.5).

In case of launching joint call for proposals with funds under other programmes (e.g. thematic programmes/instruments or other programmes in support of civil society under the ENPI/ENI), participation may be restricted or broadened in order to harmonise eligibility conditions (nationality of applicants and/or co-applicants) with those defined in the financing decisions funding other thematic or ENPI/ENI programmes.

##### **4.3.1.3. Essential selection and award criteria**

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

##### **4.3.1.4. Maximum rate of co-financing**

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants under this call is 90%.

The maximum possible rate of co-financing may be up to 100 % in accordance with Articles 192 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the responsible authorising officer in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

#### 4.3.1.5. Indicative trimester to launch the call

The first call for proposals will be indicatively launched 3 months after the entry into force of the Financing Agreement.

The second call for proposals will be launched 15 months after the entry into force of the Financing Agreement.

The actual launch dates will be determined taking into account the planning of other relevant civil society oriented programmes (e.g. thematic and ENPI/ENI programmes, or other donors programmes) in view of ensuring better impact and avoid overlaps or confusion. Launching joint call for proposals with funds under thematic and/or ENPI/ENI programmes may also be envisaged.

#### 4.3.2. Procurement (direct management)

Subject	Type	Indicative number of contracts	Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure
Technical assistance to civil society support: to contribute to objectives 1 and 2, and to all expected results	services	1	3 months after entry into force of Financing Agreement
Monitoring and evaluation	services	1	12 months after entry into force of Financing Agreement

#### 4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act shall apply.

In case of launching joint calls for proposals with funds under other programmes (e.g. thematic programmes/instruments or other programmes in support to civil society under the ENPI/ENI) and in order to have harmonised conditions, eligibility rules (nationality and origin) may be restricted or broadened in accordance with the eligibility rules defined in the financing decisions funding these other thematic or ENPI/ENI programmes.

The responsible authorising officer may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(3) of CIR Regulation<sup>16</sup> on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

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<sup>16</sup> Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external actions.

#### 4.5. Indicative budget

<b>Module</b>	<b>Amount in EUR millions</b>	<b>Third party contribution (indicative, where known)</b>
4.3.1. – Calls for proposals "Support to civil society" (direct management)	7.5	0.8
4.3.2. – Procurement (direct management)	2.0	N.A.
4.7. – Evaluation and audit	0.5	N.A.
<b>Totals</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0.8</b>

#### 4.6. Performance monitoring

Monitoring of the activities will be ensured through a monitoring element embedded in each of the contracts, in order to measure performance and achievement of the assigned objectives. A dedicated monitoring and evaluation service contract will complement this element by assessing both the activities and the programme itself. Objectively Verifiable Indicators will be developed (such as the number of consultations undertaken by governments with civil society actors, the satisfaction of international standards by national legislation on associations, etc.).

#### 4.7. Evaluation and audit

A mid-term and final evaluation of the programme will be carried out in the course of the programme implementation.

Projects financed under this Programme will be subject to expenditure verification by an independent auditor where provided for in the contract.

#### 4.8. Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

Visibility measures shall be implemented by the Commission, contractors and grant beneficiaries. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, financing agreements, procurement and grant contracts. In particular, the technical assistance project will develop a strategy dedicated to communication and visibility of the programme, with the support of the EU Delegation in Ukraine.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.