¿Cómo se puede aumentar la fiabilidad de las centrales nucleares?

The fleet as a whole are disgracefully too old and obsolete. You adding additional U235 and the outages are getting shorter and shorter. We should replace them all with new tech, but the public doesn’t trust you. Nuclear power as a whole, it was our nation’s worst failed implementation of a miraculous new technological energy source. Even the little new nukes are collapsing right before our eyes from financial corruption!

A key to maintaining and improving the reliability of nuclear plants is to ensure the quality standards for their design, operation and maintenance are maintained throughout the life of the plant. In my experience as a nuclear plant Site Quality Manager for 6 years, there is a direct correlation between how well the line organizations (i.e. Operations, Maintenance, Work Controls, Engineering, Procurement, etc.) own and adhere to their Quality Assurance Program (QAP), and the reliability and performance of the plant. When the Chief Nuclear Officer and senior managers apply the proper emphasis on enforcing QAP requirements, a high degree of reliability and plant performance can be achieved.

System Reliability is a built-in attribute, thus in component design and selection for a Nuclear Power Plant, as a critical infrastructure, appropriate material selection and combination are key to preventing system failure that could result from corrosion, wear, and component failures. In addition, the development of Structural Health Monitoring, Reliability Centered Maintenance, and a Strategic Asset Management Plan are necessary to build-in high reliability in the system.

Reliability of plants is not the issue. They are reliable and safe. Unscheduled maintenance requiring plant shut downs is extremely rare, and in Canada, almost unheard of.

You have to not only have a well-trained staff; they must also be experienced! And the only way to get that experience, is employee retention. And pay/compensation is a directly causing factor when it comes to not only attracting talent and experience; but keeping it! Experience will notice or remember very specific situations, or very subtle trends, that could lead to unsatisfactory conditions. This will lead to losses in overall efficiency and reliability.

External events are going to happen and there are defenses in place to prevent or mitigate those that pose the highest risks to plant operations (i.e., administrative requirements, physical and cyber barriers). However, our defenses cannot stop every possible hazard we might encounter. After 3 decades of experience in commercial nuclear power, the weak point is often the site’s inability to thoroughly investigate events, to find the failed or weak defenses, and to find and eliminate their root causes. This takes a holistic systems-based approach that most nuclear power plants do not have in place. They rely on tools and techniques from the previous century that do not account for the complexities and dynamics of modern work environment.

In the 1990s I was a highly decorated Resident Inspector for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), enforcing regulations at a nuclear power station in the northeast. I participated in the shut-down of 3 nuclear power plants because there were serious gaps in their adherence to regulatory and safety requirements. To maintain safe and reliable reactor operations, regulations must be upheld by the line organizations and care taken to avoid production from overriding safety (e.g., Chernobyl). But too much regulation by INPO and the NRC are reasons why the projected renaissance of the nuclear power industry never took off; because the cost of building new reactors is too high. The silver lining is going to be the Small Modular Reactor.

Reduce the over regulation from US NRC. For example, there are three different rules for coping with a loss of offside power. The Station Blackout Rule (10 CFR 50.63), AND The B5B Rule (Advanced Accident Mitigation 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), AND The FLEX (Fukushima) Rule (which adds even MORE redundant equipment). So what's wrong with all this? Nothing, except it costs the rate payers more. As part of the Fukushima review, the 5 people who worked on the review of the event and made recommendations to be implemented also suggested that the NRC review the "overlapping and redundant regulations, and attempt to streamline them." The NRC declined. This is just one example - there are dozens more which increase cost without improving safety.