Appeal brought on 29 May 2008 by Massimo Giannini against the judgment delivered on 12 March 2008 in Case T-100/04 Massimo Giannini v Commission

(Case C-231/08 P)

(2008/C 223/34)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Massimo Giannini (represented by: L. Levi and C. Ronzi, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: Commission of the European Communities

Form of order sought

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant relies in essence on three principal grounds in support of his appeal.

In his first ground of appeal, the appellant complains that the Court of First Instance infringed his right to a fair trial and, more particularly, the right to have his case determined within a reasonable time. Four years elapsed between the date of the case being brought before the Court of First Instance and the date of delivery of the contested judgment. According to the appellant, there was no exceptional circumstance which in this case justified such a length of time. The documents before the Court were neither particularly voluminous nor legally complex and the proceedings had real importance for the appellant.

In his second ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the Court of First Instance infringed Articles 4, 27 and 29 of the Staff Regulations and misinterpreted both the concept of the interests of the service and the duty of the Community institutions to have regard for the welfare of their servants and officials. According to the appellant, the Court of First Instance confused in that regard entry into the Community civil service, by means of an open competition intended to establish a recruitment reserve, and the career development of persons already employed by means of the mechanisms, provided for by the Staff Regulations, of transfers and promotions.

In his third ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the Court of First Instance disregarded the obligation to state reasons in judgments and the principles of non-discrimination and respect for the rights of the defence, and that the Court distorted the clear sense of the evidence presented for its assessment. This ground of appeal can be broken down into three parts.

In the first part of the third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the Court of First Instance disregarded both the principle of non-discrimination and its obligation to state reasons and the rules on the adducing of evidence by concluding that the fact that some candidates in the competition had knowledge of the document on which the written test was based did not imply an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination and by not requiring that the Commission provide concrete evidence of the absence of discrimination linked to that fact.

In the second part of this third ground of appeal, the appellant claims that there was an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination and a distortion of the clear sense of the evidence presented for assessment by the Court of First Instance since the Court considered that the selection board was sufficiently constant in composition to ensure the objective comparison and marking of candidates, when the evidence in the documents before the Court demonstrated on the contrary that the composition of that selection board was not sufficiently constant and when several essential pieces of factual information were not made known to the Court of First Instance by the Commission.

Lastly, in the third part of this ground of appeal, the appellant relies on a further infringement of the principle of non-discrimination and the rules on the adducing of evidence, and a violation of the rights of the defence, in relation to the conclusions drawn by the Court of First Instance as regards the impartiality of the members of the selection board.