24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/1

24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/2

—

having regard to Articles 232 and 341 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—

having regard to Protocol 6, annexed to the Treaties, on the location of the seats of the institutions and of certain bodies, offices, agencies and departments of the European Union,

—

having regard to Articles 10, 14 and 48 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

—

having regard to its stated position on these matters, in particular in its recommendation from 21 June 1958 (1), its resolution of 7 July 1981 on the seat of the EC institutions and in particular of the European Parliament (2), its recommendations for the Intergovernmental Conference of 13 April 2000 (3), and its accompanying resolutions: its resolution of 8 June 2011 on Investing in the future: a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for a competitive, sustainable and inclusive Europe (4); its resolution of 10 May 2012 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2010, Section I — European Parliament (5); its resolution of 16 February 2012 on the guidelines for the 2013 budget procedure, Section I — European Parliament, Section II — Council, Section IV — Court of Justice, Section V — Court of Auditors, Section VI — European Economic and Social Committee, Section VII — Committee of the Regions, Section VIII — European Ombudsman, Section IX — European Data Protection Supervisor, Section X — European External Action Service (6); its resolution of 29 March 2012 on Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2013 (7) and its resolution of 4 July 2012 on the mandate for the trilogue on the 2013 Draft Budget (8),

—

having regard to Written Questions E-000181-2007, E-006174-2009, E-006258-2009, E-002934-2012, E-002935-2012, E-004134-2012 and E-004135-2012 to the Commission and to the Council,

—

having regard to the Secretary-General’s reports of September 2002 and August 2013 regarding the cost of maintaining three places of work,

—

having regard to the joint working group report of the Bureau and the Committee on Budgets on Parliament’s budget for 2012,

—

having regard to its activity reports for 1993-1999, 1999-2004, 2004-2009 and 2009-2011,

—

having regard to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), in particular Cases C-230/81 (9), C-345/95 (10) and joined cases C-237/11 and C-238/11 (11),

—

having regard to Petition 630/2006 by the One Seat campaign, which was endorsed by more than one million EU citizens,

—

having regard to the vote held in plenary on 23 October 2012, in which a majority (78 %) of its Members called on the Member States to revise their views on the issue of Strasbourg as Parliament’s official seat;

—

having regard to Rules 5(3), 29, 41, 48, 74a, 201 and 202(4) of its Rules of Procedure;

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Petitions (A7-0350/2013),

A.

whereas Article 341 TFEU establishes that the seats of the institutions of the Union shall be determined by common accord of the governments of the Member States;

B.

whereas the Member States have done so in Protocol 6 annexed to the Treaties, establishing Brussels as seat of the Commission, the Council (with its meetings to be held in Luxembourg during the months of April, June and October), the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, establishing Luxembourg as seat of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, establishing Frankfurt as seat of the European Central Bank and establishing The Hague as seat of the European Police Office;

C.

whereas the decision by the Member States on these seats was reached in a broader deal, taking into account the historical development of the European Union and its institutions as well as considerations of geographical dispersion;

D.

whereas Parliament plays a distinct and unique role as the only institution that is directly elected by and accountable to the European citizens, and, since its role has undergone the most significant changes amongst all the EU institutions, this report will primarily focus on Parliament’s seat and working arrangements;

E.

whereas Protocol 6 annexed to the Treaties establishes that Parliament shall have its seat in Strasbourg, where 12 periods of monthly plenary sessions — including the budget session — shall be held, that the periods of additional plenary sessions shall be held in Brussels, that its committees shall meet in Brussels, and that its General Secretariat and its departments shall remain in Luxembourg;

F.

whereas Articles 10 and 14 TEU state that the EU is a representative democracy, with Parliament as the direct representative of the European citizens at Union level, and that as co-legislator Parliament is on equal terms with the Council;

G.

whereas Article 232 TFEU allows Parliament to adopt its own rules of procedure, under which it may determine the length of plenary sessions, in accordance with the treaties and the case law of the ECJ;

H.

whereas the ECJ has stated that the location of the seat is not to hinder the well-functioning of Parliament; whereas it has further stated that while there are disadvantages and costs engendered by the plurality of working locations, any modification of the seat or working locations would require a Treaty change and, thus, the consent of the Member States;

I.

whereas Parliament has undergone a complete transformation, from a consultative body with 78 seconded members that — mostly for practical reasons — shared its facilities with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, to a fully-fledged, directly elected Parliament with currently 766 members that is today co-legislator on equal terms with the Council;

J.

whereas the growth of its legislative capacity is illustrated by the increase in the number of co-decision procedures (now ordinary legislative procedures) from 165 in 1993-1999 to 454 in 2004-2009, to an even greater number in the current legislature;

K.

whereas the changing role of Parliament is also reflected in the increase by 150 % of inter-institutional meetings, from 16 000 to an estimated 40 000 between 2009 and 2013, and in the constant negotiations and trilogues, with the Commission, the Council and individual Member States, that now are part of the legislative process, and that have led to a sharp increase in the number of first-reading agreements, from 28 % in 1999-2004 to 72 % in 2004-2009;

L.

whereas the structure of Parliament’s calendar (fixed during the Edinburgh Summit in 1992) predates all changes to its role arising from the adoption of the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon;

M.

whereas the Council and the European Council have already concentrated their work in Brussels, where all European Council meetings — which previously were always held in the country of the rotating presidency — are now exclusively held;

N.

whereas the geographical distance between the official seats of the co-legislative bodies — 435 km — isolates Parliament, not only from the Council and the Commission but also from other stakeholders, such as NGOs, civil society organisations and Member State representations, and from one of the world’s largest international journalistic communities;

O.

whereas the additional annual costs resulting from the geographic dispersion of Parliament have been estimated to range between EUR 156 million and EUR 204 million (12), equivalent to approximately 10 % of Parliament’s annual budget, while the environmental impact is also significant, with the CO2 emissions associated with the transfers to and from the three working locations estimated to be between 11 000 (13) and 19 000 tonnes (14);

P.

whereas Parliament’s current working arrangements also impose additional costs and travel on the other European Union institutions, in particular the Commission and Council, Member States’ representations, journalists and civil society representatives;

Q.

whereas 78 % of all missions by Parliament statutory staff (on average, 3 172 each month) arise as a direct result of its geographic dispersion; whereas while Parliament’s buildings in Strasbourg are currently only being used 42 days per year (remaining unused for 89 % of the time), they need to be heated, staffed and maintained for the entire year;

R.

whereas the expenditure arising from the geographic dispersion of Parliament constitutes an important area of potential savings, particularly in the current economic climate;

S.

whereas Parliament, since its suggestion in 1958 to be sited in proximity to the Council and the Commission, has via numerous reports, declarations and statements repeatedly expressed its wish for a more practical and efficient working arrangement;

T.

whereas citizens of the EU — including over one million citizens who endorsed a petition asking for a single seat — have repeatedly expressed their discontent with the current arrangements;

U.

whereas arrangements affecting a parliament’s right to organisational self-determination are among the foremost concerns for a parliamentary system;

V.

whereas in addition to the subjects dealt with in this report, there are other essential matters directly related to Parliament’s status and its function within the EU institutional machinery, and — on those points — convincing solutions have yet to be found; whereas these unresolved questions pertain to issues of electoral law, rules for a no-protest zone, immunity matters and points related to the Statute for Members; whereas attending to these should either be encompassed within Parliament’s right of organisational self-determination, exercised in the form of a general decision-making power, or, at the very least, be brought within the scope of the ordinary legislative procedure based on codecision;

1.

Believes that the European Parliament, given that it is the only body directly representing the European citizens, should be granted the prerogative of determining its own working arrangements, including the right to decide where and when it holds its meetings;

2.

Agrees with the principle that the European Parliament would be more effective, cost-efficient and respectful of the environment if it were located in a single place; notes that the continuation of the monthly migration between Brussels and Strasbourg has amongst most EU citizens become a symbolic, negative issue detrimental to the European Union’s reputation, especially at a time when the financial crisis has led to serious and painful expenditure cuts in the Member States;

3.

Considers it perfectly legitimate to launch a debate on its right to determine its own working arrangements, including the right to decide where and when it is to meet;

4.

Commits itself, therefore, to initiating an ordinary treaty revision procedure under Article 48 TEU with a view to proposing the changes to Article 341 TFEU and Protocol 6 necessary to allow Parliament to decide on the location of its seat and its internal organisation;

5.

Decides not to make any recommendations regarding the seats of the other EU institutions;

6.

Maintains that it will be necessary to evaluate the financial and economic consequences entailed in a change of seat or place of work and to agree on an appropriate compromise whereby existing Parliament buildings can continue to be used;

7.

Acknowledges that any future decision by Parliament on its working arrangements must allow sufficient time for debate and reflection, as well as for an orderly transition;

8.

Asks the Court of Auditors, or a similar independent agency, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the potential savings for the EU budget if Parliament had only one seat; asks that this analysis include budgetary aspects and ancillary costs such as savings made through reduced loss of working time and greater efficiency;

9.

Calls on the Bureau to commission Eurobarometer, or a similar professional polling service, to conduct, by 1 January 2014, a survey of the European citizens’ views on the prospect of maintaining Parliament’s three places of work, with specific reference to the financial, environmental and efficiency costs of this arrangement;

10.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Council, and the Heads of State and Government and parliaments of the Member States.

24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/6

—

having regard to the Doha Ministerial Declaration of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of 14 November 2001,

—

having regard to the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of the WTO of 18 December 2005,

—

having regard to its resolution of 4 April 2006 on the assessment of the Doha Round following the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong (1),

—

having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2008 entitled ‘Towards a reform of the World Trade Organisation’ (2),

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), in particular those of 9 October 2008 (3), 16 December 2009 (4), and of 14 September 2011 (5),

—

having regard to the Declaration adopted on 29 May 2013 at the 28th session of the Steering Committee of the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO,

—

having regard to the statements made at the informal meetings of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) of 11 April and 3 June 2013 and at the formal TNC meeting of 22 July 2013,

—

having regard to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals,

—

having regard to the Fourth Global Review of Aid for Trade, which took place from 8 to 10 July 2013,

—

having regard to Rule 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the Doha Round was launched in 2001 with the objectives of creating new trading opportunities, strengthening multilateral trade rules and addressing current imbalances in the trading system by placing the needs and interests of developing countries, and especially of the least developed countries (LDCs), at the heart of the negotiations; whereas these objectives stem from the conviction that a multilateral system based on more just and equitable rules can contribute to fair and free trade at the service of the economic development of all continents and the alleviation of poverty;

B.

whereas the EU has consistently advocated for a strong multilateral rules-based approach to trade, whilst recognising that complementary approaches such as bilateral, regional and plurilateral agreements may also foster trade opening, especially by unlocking liberalisation and upgrading rules and disciplines in policy areas tackled less thoroughly in the WTO, and may support the multilateral system, provided such agreements are WTO-compliant;

C.

whereas the WTO and the rules enshrined in the WTO-covered agreements have been instrumental in avoiding fully fledged and widespread protectionism as a response to the most serious financial and economic crisis since the 1930s;

D.

whereas open and fair multilateral trade is being constrained more by various non-tariff barriers (NTBs) than by trade tariffs, which are being waived substantially as globalisation progresses;

E.

whereas the WTO Ministerial Meeting to conclude the Doha Round stalled at the end of July 2008;

F.

whereas there have been various attempts and initiatives in the last few years aimed at giving much-needed impetus to the stalled Doha Development Agenda;

G.

whereas the Ninth Ministerial WTO Conference will take place in Indonesia from 3 to 6 December 2013;

1.

Reiterates its full commitment to the enduring value of multilateralism, but supports a structural reform of the WTO, which is needed in order better to guarantee an open, fair and non-discriminatory trading system based on shared rules, which takes greater account of the role and interests of SMEs;

2.

Emphasises the systemic importance of achieving an ambitious and balanced outcome at the Ninth Ministerial Conference which would be acceptable to all WTO members and help set the stage for further multilateral negotiations;

3.

Calls for a trade agenda based on free and fair trade for the benefit of all, which should have development at the centre of the process; stresses the importance of taking full account in the negotiations of the special needs and interests of low-income developing countries and LDCs; reiterates the imperative need to ensure that the principle of special and differential treatment (S&DT) constitutes an integral part of all layers of the negotiations, reflecting the varying economic development levels of WTO members as set out in paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration; considers that meaningful S&DT provisions should be made more precise, subject to periodic reviews and targeted;

4.

Believes that trade liberalisation is an important tool to ensure sustainable economic growth and development, but that it needs to be accompanied by appropriate flanking policies encompassing macro- and micro-economic interventions, including budget transparency, fiscal policies and tax equity, administrative simplification, education and training, institutional reforms and social policies, so as to maximise and distribute better the benefits of trade reforms and effectively counterbalance any negative effects;

5.

Stresses that WTO Members have recognised that, as there are still countries that do not have the human, institutional and infrastructural capacity to participate effectively in international trade, the multilateral system needs to be accompanied by improvements in trade capacity, which is an essential complement to the Doha Development Agenda; also believes, however, that assistance for countries seeking to accede to the WTO should continue to be a priority;

6.

Emphasises in this context the successful role that the Aid for Trade Initiative has played; regrets the fact that, for the first time since its launch in 2005, the amount of the commitments was reduced in 2011 because of the financial crisis, which resulted in less support for large economic infrastructure projects, with commitments in the transport and energy sector falling; notes that technical assistance in the field of trade and multilateral initiatives such as the preferential tariff treatment granted under the WTO can help to offset this reduction in commitments; calls on the WTO members, particularly developed countries and emerging economies, to make greater use of this possibility;

7.

Insists on the need to renew the WTO system, taking into account the requirements of SMEs in international trade and the need for simplified rules, in terms of both trade facilitation and international arbitration court systems, in order to avoid the difficulties involved in disputes with customs or trade authorities in some WTO member countries;

8.

Draws attention to the Fourth Aid for Trade Review Conference held in July 2013 in Geneva, which showed the benefits that developing countries gain from global value chains; points, however, to the fact that participants identified trade-related constraints that prevent developing-country firms from linking to or moving up value chains, such as inadequate infrastructure, high transportation and shipping costs, inadequate access to trade finance, inability to attract foreign direct investment, lack of comparative advantage and high market entry costs;

9.

Recognises the importance of the agricultural sector; believes that the EU should support measures addressing genuine food security concerns of developing countries; recalls that, in this connection, the EU should ensure coherence between the various EU policies in the field of external action, as enshrined notably in Articles 205 to 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, namely development policy and the common commercial policy, taking account of the needs and concerns both of its Member States and of developing countries;

10.

Calls on developed countries and emerging economies to follow the example of the EU Everything but Arms initiative, offering the least developed countries (LDCs) 100 % duty-free, quota-free market access, and to ensure that the LDC services waiver is implemented;

11.

Considers that a binding agreement on trade facilitation would bring significant benefits to all WTO members, and in particular to developing countries and to relevant economic operators, by enhancing transparency and legal certainty and reducing the administrative costs and the length of customs procedures, which would in turn enable them to benefit fully from the opportunities provided by the growing prevalence of regional and global supply chains and enable SMEs to take advantage of more open markets; points out that capacity building and technical assistance should continue to be made available to developing countries, in order to enable them to increase their production capacities so that they can benefit from a bigger share of the value added in global value chains;

12.

Recalls that a recent EU-commissioned DDA impact study indicates that trade facilitation could be worth as much in economic terms as the gains from goods and services liberalisation put together; recalls that improved customs procedures alone have the potential to add EUR 68 billion a year in world GDP and that for many developing countries trade facilitation would be the main source of gains;

13.

Considers that due priority should be given at WTO level to trade and investment barriers that affect the service sectors, including ICT and telecommunications, professional and business services, financial services, e-commerce, construction, retail and distribution; these non-tariff measures, including domestic regulations, ownership restrictions and various crisis measures (including discriminatory provisions in public procurement), are of particular importance given the higher value added of services trade and the EU’s position as the largest exporter of services;

14.

Welcomes, therefore, the opening of negotiations on a plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), which is in keeping with the Eighth Ministerial Conference’s objective of exploring new ways for the WTO membership to further liberalise trade in services; stresses the EU’s commitment to promoting work in this area and working towards ‘multilateralising’ the TiSA by ensuring that it takes over the definitions, rules and principles forming the core of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); underlines the importance of ensuring that any agreement is ambitious, expanding the coverage and deepening the rules regarding liberalisation of trade in services, while preserving WTO members’ national policy objectives and their right to regulate services of general interest and to take bilateral and plurilateral commitments, and that the outcome is firmly anchored to the WTO architecture;

15.

Considers that the transfer of technology can be a vector for economic growth and foster trade; welcomes the resumption of negotiations on the expansion of the Information Technology Agreement, which increases both the range of products covered and the number of countries within its scope; strongly encourages all parties to the negotiations to continue their efforts with a view to reaching an agreement in time for the Ninth Ministerial Conference;

16.

Welcomes the revision of the WTO plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) as agreed in March 2012, and recognises the importance of the EU approving the revised GPA before the Ninth Ministerial Conference with a view to its being able to enter into force by 2014; believes that clearer and more stringent rules for award procedures will foster transparency in public procurement and, together with the extended coverage of goods and services and entities, will provide greater opportunities for its signatories; calls on WTO Members, in particular developing countries and current observers of the GPA, to consider joining the agreement, in order to take advantage of the new provisions for developing countries that increase flexibility and to reap its benefits;

17.

Is pleased by the positive decision taken in June 2013 to extend the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rules (TRIPS) exemption by another eight years until 1 July 2021 for LDCs, which is a further way of ensuring that the world trading system does not adopt a one-size-fits-all approach but rather takes account of the specificities of each developing country;

18.

Encourages the WTO membership to proactively support the WTO’s efforts in establishing effective and efficient working links and deeper cooperation with other international organisations whose work has a bearing on world trade talks, in particular the International Labour Organisation, the World Health Organisation, and the UN and its agencies and bodies, such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the UN Environment Programme, the UN Development Programme and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD, in order to ensure mutual support and synergies between trade and non-trade concerns; supports efforts aiming for the adoption of international standards and regulatory cooperation;

19.

Calls for thorough consideration of the issue of how better to address non-trade concerns under the WTO rules, in order to allow its members to pursue legitimate policy objectives while safeguarding market access; stresses, in this connection, that efforts for the adoption and effective implementation of international social, labour, environmental and human rights standards should be strongly supported, and the necessary aid granted to developing countries to enable them to meet such standards;

20.

Is convinced that the failure to differentiate sufficiently between developing countries, in spite of their widely varying economic development levels and specific needs, could be an obstacle to adopting effective measures to benefit these countries in accordance with the stated objective of the Doha Round and is to the detriment of those developing countries that are most in need; urges advanced developing countries to take their share of responsibility already during the current round and to make contributions commensurate with their level of development and sectoral competitiveness;

21.

Takes the view that serious consideration should be given to the issue of categorisation or sub-categorisation, not only of developing countries but also of all other WTO members, on the basis of objective criteria which are not exclusively linked to gross national product, with a view to a possible differentiated application of existing agreements or of those under negotiation;

22.

Believes that it is vital to conclude the longstanding Doha Round with its development mandate fulfilled; urges all WTO members, therefore, to explore all possible options with that end-goal in mind in order to achieve a balanced result;

23.

Insists that the EU should continue to play a leading role in promoting tangible progress in the ongoing WTO negotiations with a view to the full conclusion of the Doha Development Round in the foreseeable future, as well as in facilitating the full participation of LDCs in global trade by acting as a bridge between the various positions of the WTO members;

24.

Stresses the crucial importance of the WTO as regards implementing and enforcing binding commitments and resolving trade disputes;

25.

Considers that WTO members should nevertheless intensify their efforts in other areas identified by the Doha Ministerial Declaration, such as trade in environmental goods and services, which could significantly contribute to sustainable development and the fight against climate change; calls on WTO members to take note of the APEC List of Environmental Goods; urges the EU to continue pushing for the initiation of an Environmental Technology Agreement aimed at reducing tariffs on environmental technology products and to seek clarification on the legal relationship between WTO rules and multilateral environmental agreements;

26.

Calls on the Commission and the Council to ensure that Parliament continues to be closely involved in the preparation of the Ninth Ministerial Conference taking place in Bali from 3 to 6 December 2013, is promptly updated and, if necessary, is consulted during the Ministerial Conference; calls on the Commission to continue to make the case to other WTO Members for increasing the importance of the parliamentary dimension of the WTO;

27.

Calls on WTO members to ensure democratic legitimacy by strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the WTO; stresses, in this connection, the need to ensure that parliamentarians have better access to trade negotiations and are involved in the formulation and implementation of WTO decisions, and that trade policies are properly scrutinised in the interests of their citizens; calls, therefore, for the establishment of a permanent European parliamentary delegation to the WTO;

28.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Director-General of the WTO.

24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/11

—

having regard to the question to the Commission on the Entrepreneurship 2020 action plan — Reigniting the entrepreneurial spirit in Europe (O-000110/2013 — B7-0520/2013),

—

having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

1.

Expects that all the measures proposed to promote entrepreneurship at national and European level will concern all types of enterprise, such as the liberal professions, cooperatives, craft enterprises and social enterprises;

2.

Points out that business and entrepreneurial aptitudes and skills are key competences for lifelong learning and that, in response to low economic growth and high unemployment, more decisive short-term and medium-term measures are needed to promote and enable entrepreneurship, especially among young people;

3.

Acknowledges that Member States are responsible for business, entrepreneurial and social education and training and that training schemes are often more targeted and cost-effective if structured at local and national level; believes that EU initiatives could and should complement Member States’ actions in this field in a useful way, in particular through cooperation and the exchange of best practices;

4.

Stresses the need to give incentives to employers who offer low-skilled or unskilled people (including Roma) training and opportunities to acquire practical experience directly at the workplace;

5.

Is concerned about the decline in the number of EU citizens contemplating self-employment, in the current climate of economic uncertainty; considers that the EU and the Member States should step up their coordinated efforts to improve entrepreneurial culture in Europe and to explore the possibility of adopting specific measures and targets to make entrepreneurship attractive again, including for skilled employees with professional experience and particularly in sectors which are of strategic importance for the Union; believes, for example, that a strong link should be established between such initiatives and the Commission’s activities in the field of industrial policy; believes that such measures should include actions to facilitate business creation;

6.

Takes note of the Commission’s proposed measures and initiatives on entrepreneurial education and training, and calls on the Member States to implement them without delay, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity; highlights in this regards the EU’s ‘New skills for new jobs’ initiative; welcomes the call on Member States to include entrepreneurial education and training as key competences in national programmes;

7.

Believes that, in order to give new potential entrepreneurs the skills to run a business in a way that enhances its positive contribution to society whilst minimising negative impacts on people and the environment, initiatives should be taken to include strong sustainability and social responsibility criteria in entrepreneurial education;

8.

Regards the ‘Network of SME Envoys’ as a potential core forum for exchanging proven practice and assessing progress on implementation;

9.

Supports the ambition that lies behind the planned introduction of the Youth Guarantee and the willingness to allocate sufficient funding to it as an important measure to help Member States in their efforts to mitigate the effects of massive youth unemployment, particularly in countries harshly affected by the crisis; underscores the importance of the planned measures to promote entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial education and training, as they are aimed at creating sustainable employment and entail virtually no windfall effects; calls on the Commission and Member States to assess further measures, such as tax relief, to encourage SMEs to employ young people;

10.

Calls on the Commission to strengthen its back-up, advisory and assistance measures for businesses, especially smaller ones, through intermediary organisations, and to set up programmes to facilitate guidance and assistance by older entrepreneurs who have the motivation to act as mentors or tutors for young entrepreneurs who are about to launch start-ups or take over crisis-stricken companies, by providing know-how and experience;

11.

Calls on the Commission to promote the establishment of clusters, i.e. of business networks and associations which help to develop competitive advantage, benefit from the common management of human resources and bring about increased competitiveness;

12.

Points out that small and medium-sized enterprises that adopt information and communication technologies (ICT) grow at a two to three times faster rate; calls, therefore, on the Commission to facilitate measures which enable entrepreneurs to exploit all the opportunities offered by the digital single market;

13.

Calls on the Commission and Member States to further develop the Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs programme and to create more national contact points where these are still required; suggests that greater reliance be placed on the existing structures of the Enterprise Europe Network; considers that a target should be set of 10 000 exchanges per year, with a minimum rate of 10 % annual growth until this target is reached;

14.

Sees great potential in the further expansion of the Leonardo exchange programme for trainees and stresses the need for so-called ‘intermediary organisations’ that support SMEs in organisational aspects (e.g. searching for suitable partners abroad, finding premises, etc.); emphasises the entrepreneurial potential of dual training (apprenticeships) for graduates;

15.

Proposes that Member States should be able to apply for additional funding from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund and the European Social Fund as long as this is used to finance short-term measures such as support and advice for business start-ups and transfers and not to justify the further relocation of enterprises;

16.

Proposes closer coordination of existing and future tools for the promotion of entrepreneurship with a view to generating incentives and synergies at national, regional and local levels;

17.

Expects the next Commission, within the framework of its responsibilities, to make the promotion of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial education and training a key theme and to launch a European partnership within which Member States will be judged by the progress they make on the basis, inter alia, of the following criteria:

18.

Encourages Member States to adopt, as a matter of urgency, national, regional and local strategies for the inclusion of entrepreneurial education and training in curricula (for primary, secondary, vocational, university and adult education); expects these strategies to cover all types of enterprise as well as the social and environmental impacts of entrepreneurship; underscores the importance of the practice-oriented and interactive aspects of social, business and entrepreneurial education and training;

19.

Considers that Vocational Education and Training (VET) can provide the skills, knowledge and competences needed in the labour market, especially for the unemployed, as well as individualised job-search advice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen the provision of VET across Europe in order to enhance the transparency, recognition and quality of competences and qualifications, thus making the mobility of learners and workers easier;

20.

Stresses that knowledge about the functioning of markets, the economy and financial systems is essential for running a business well, and should therefore also be included in national basic education systems as well as in EU training programmes; calls on the Commission and the Member States to make financial education an immediate part of their training programmes;

21.

Underlines the importance of apprenticeships for young people in economic sectors with a bright perspective, as a valuable step in the transition from education to professional life;

22.

Welcomes the Knowledge and Innovation Community (KIC) concept which, with its focus on entrepreneurship through integration of the knowledge-triangle components of research, higher education and innovation, is an important driver of innovation with respect to major societal challenges and thus an important instrument for creating growth and jobs in Europe; stresses, therefore, that all KICs should have entrepreneurship embedded in their structure and in their approach to research, innovation and training; emphasises that KICs should integrate and share best practices regarding the use of innovative education and training concepts and technologies; recommends furthermore that a longer-term assessment be carried out into the creation of a KIC dedicated to further developing such innovative education and training concepts with a particular focus on entrepreneurial education;

23.

Asks the Commission and the EIB Group to step up their efforts in the field of information in order to make SMEs more aware of funding possibilities, in collaboration with SME associations;

24.

Emphasises that the creation of flexible financing alternatives is of crucial relevance to business start-ups; stresses that the distinction for tax purposes between equity and debt must be removed and that a tax allowance for investment must be introduced; stresses that since bank loans are one of the main forms of financing for SMEs, it is important to secure the supply of credit and, moreover, to seek to strengthen equity financing through a better environment for private equity and venture capital, including support for SME funds and crowd investment without expensive prospectus costs; calls for the introduction of a tax allowance for private equity investment;

25.

Reiterates that administrative burdens are still considered to be one of the main obstacles to the start-up or continued existence of a company; insists that the reduction of unnecessary administrative burdens remains very high on the political agenda and expects the next Commission to produce specific proposals for policies and measures up to 2020 in the context of the Small Business Act priorities, which may include concrete, quantitative targets (e.g. 25 % reduction in the administrative burden through EU regulations by 2020);

26.

Welcomes the measures proposed by the Commission under this ‘action pillar’ and notes the relevant points made by Parliament in its resolutions of 23 October 2012 on Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs): competitiveness and business opportunities (1) and of 5 February 2013 on improving access to finance for SMEs (2);

27.

Welcomes the Commission’s renewed calls on Member States to reduce the costs and time needed to start a company; points out the limited progress achieved since the Small Business Act and urges Member States to increase their efforts in this regard;

28.

Emphasises that the different variety of business models, such as family businesses, cooperative enterprises and others, should be taken into account when creating a business-friendly environment through appropriate business support services;

29.

Points out that EU support measures for SMEs remain unbalanced and that many Member States still do not take into consideration the specific characteristics of small businesses when designing legislation;

30.

Emphasises that access to finance remains one of the main obstacles to the development of SMEs; calls on the Commission to assess fully whether financing instruments aimed at SMEs such as the PROGRESS microfinance tool actually make it easier for SMEs to access finance, especially in view of the fact that financial institutions in some Member States set excessively strict conditions for lending to SMEs;

31.

Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to help Member States improve their fiscal and administrative arrangements for business transfers; sees a need to improve the taxation approach to innovative forms of financing, such as group financing, venture capital financing or business angel financing; invites Member States to increase their support for business transfers through financial instruments at national level by means of loan guarantees, as well as other forms of financing such as group financing or business angel financing, and welcomes the Commission’s emphasis on crowdfunding platforms; believes that business transfers should also be facilitated through appropriate training initiatives on management skills, such as in cases where businesses are transferred to employees;

32.

Notes that complicated VAT rules have long been one of the main obstacles that prevent entrepreneurs from using the potential of the single market; urges the Commission to submit the planned proposals to align rules and cut the costs of VAT compliance in a single declaration as soon as possible, so as to enable their adoption during the current legislative term;

33.

Sees the proposed measures to reduce the administrative burden (which may include an unnecessary or disproportionate burden through regulation) and bureaucratic burden as complementary to the principles of the Small Business Act; regrets that the action plan does not mention certain important initiatives, e.g. measures to apply the SME test at national level, the future role of the High-Level Group on the Reduction of Administrative Burdens, or the establishment of a yearly scoreboard on regulatory burdens in the EU and Member States; calls on the Commission, under the leadership of its SME Envoy, to set out a timely roadmap for the review and revision of the ‘Top 10’ most burdensome EU measures in order to reduce unnecessary or excessive burdens; affirms that, in any event, such a reduction must not erode core social and environmental standards;

34.

Calls on Member States to grant start-ups a period of grace for social security contributions and for all ‘on account’ taxes so that companies only pay taxes on profits actually made in the first years; insists that the system must be completely transparent so that it cannot be abused;

35.

Underlines the importance of knowledge transfer between knowledge centres, such as research institutes and centres of excellence, and SMEs for their success; stresses the need for a clear definition of the process of transferring knowledge into practice and its benefits for successful entrepreneurial clusters;

36.

Supports the Commission’s stated aims of giving a second chance to honest bankrupts and reducing the regulatory burden on entrepreneurs;

37.

Emphasises the importance of the liberal professions in terms of entrepreneurship in Europe; welcomes the Commission’s declared intention to set up a working group to assess the specific needs of the liberal professions; asks the Commission to take account of the conclusions of this working group when conducting impact assessments for legislative proposals, as well as for monitoring the measures related to the Small Business Act; suggests that this work could lead to the creation of a European charter for the liberal professions;

38.

Emphasises the importance of developing innovation skills in general and support for employee-driven innovation in both new and existing companies; stresses also that the most entrepreneurially successful companies are often spin-offs from existing companies where employees have the opportunity to develop their ideas within secure and resourceful frameworks; stresses furthermore that many entrepreneurs have skilled or unskilled backgrounds, so entrepreneurial efforts should not be aimed only at academics; points out that vocational and practical training also play an important role in efforts to promote entrepreneurship and innovation;

39.

Emphasises the importance of developing positive incentives to encourage employees to start up their own part-time businesses;

40.

Calls for use of the flexibility provisions under the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME) and particularly for its financial instruments; insists that the MFF should continue to provide for microfinancing programmes such as the European Progress Microfinance Facility and the JASMINE (Joint Action to Support Microfinance Institutions) initiative;

41.

Emphasises that the creation of flexible financing alternatives is of crucial relevance to business start-ups and SMEs in order to facilitate their access to finance; recognises that different contributions of debt, equity and hybrid capital can be appropriate for different business models, and invites Member States to remove the distinction for tax purposes between equity and debt and to consider introducing tax allowances for investment in the real economy to stimulate sustainable growth and create jobs; calls on the Commission to assess the benefits of the securitisation of micro-loans;

42.

Encourages the Member States to encourage the division of public procurement contracts into lots in order to facilitate participation by SMEs in public tenders, for instance by including the ‘apply or explain’ principle in their national procurement law;

43.

Regrets that stringent requirements still apply in some Member States for business start-ups; calls on the Commission to ensure that Member States shorten to one month the time taken to grant the licences and other permits required to start a business;

44.

Emphasises the importance of special start-up services for recent graduates who have taken special entrepreneurship courses during their training;

45.

Calls on the Member States to establish one-stop shops where all business support services would be combined, including in the area of access to funding from various sources, advice on business start-ups, and information on business opportunities within and outside the EU;

46.

Calls on the Member States to adopt a balanced approach in their national laws on discharge times and debt settlement so that honest bankrupts receive a ‘second chance’ and risks for creditors are minimised;

47.

Supports the establishment of a Europe-wide ‘EU Entrepreneurship Day’ to highlight — and, most importantly, draw media attention to — entrepreneurial success stories; considers that a particular focus should be placed on examples of entrepreneurs able to create economic added value while respecting EU sustainability and social responsibility core principles; hopes that schools and educational establishments will participate in the event, through meetings with entrepreneurs and visits to enterprises;

48.

Emphasises that women represent a major pool of entrepreneurial potential, and calls on the Commission to produce reliable data so that existing legislation can be more accurately evaluated and any obstacles in the way of female entrepreneurs can be more effectively removed;

49.

Highlights the potential of cooperatives and social enterprises as a tool for generating employment, and particularly youth employment, owing to the role they play in sustainable local development, not just in economic terms but also in social and employment terms;

50.

Stresses the key role of ICT in entrepreneurship, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop and promote programmes to build ICT skills, particularly for young people and women;

51.

Considers that special attention also needs to be paid to other groups that are under-represented in the entrepreneurial world, such as the young, the elderly, the disabled and immigrants;

52.

Believes that the demographic challenges require a broader strategy that combines job creation with meeting new and emerging needs on the European labour market; believes in this respect that further progress must be made in improving the mobility of EU workers, including researchers and other professionals, with a view to achieving a Europe without barriers within the EU internal market;

53.

Emphasises that the lack of recognition of foreign educational and vocational qualifications constitutes a major obstacle to migrants seeking to set up a business; calls, therefore, for agreement on the directive on the recognition of professional qualifications to be reached without delay;

54.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/17

—

having regard to the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular the parts concerning the European Security and Defence Policy (14605/1/2012),

—

having regard to Articles 2, 3, 21, 24 and 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

—

having regard to Title V TEU and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 December 2012,

—

having regard to conclusions of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security Defence Policy of 6 September 2013,

—

having regard to the European Security Strategy entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003, and to the report on its implementation entitled ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’, endorsed by the European Council on 11-12 December 2008,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy of 1 December 2011 and of 23 July 2012, as well as to the Council conclusions on pooling and sharing of military capabilities of 23 March 2012,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions on maritime security strategy of 26 April 2010.

—

having regard to the Council conclusions on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection of 27 May 2011 and to the previous Council’s conclusions on cyber security,

—

having regard to the Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing adopted by the EU defence ministers on 19 November 2012,

—

having regard to the Commission Communication of 24 July 2013 entitled ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’ (COM(2013)0542),

—

having regard to Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (1),

—

having regard to Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (2),

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2013 on the maritime dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy (3) and on the EU’s military structures: state of play and future prospects (4), of 22 November 2012 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (5), on the EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and operational dimensions (6), on the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters (7), and on Cyber Security and Defence (8), of 14 December 2011 on the impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector in the EU Member States (9), of 11 May 2011 on the development of the common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (10) and of 23 November 2010 on civilian-military cooperation and the development of civilian-military capabilities (11),

—

having regard to its recommendation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, to the Council and to the Commission of 13 June 2013 on the 2013 review of the organisation and the functioning of the EEAS (12) and to the EEAS Review 2013 presented by the High Representative in July 2013 (13),

—

having regard to the report of 15 October 2013 by the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission on the Common Security and Defence Policy,

—

having regard to the EEAS report on the revision of CSDP crisis management procedures, adopted by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 18 June 2013,

—

having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

—

having regard to Rule 119(1) of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0360/2013),

1.

Notes the significant and ongoing changes in the geopolitical environment characterised by multidimensional and asymmetric threats, by transnational terrorism, by the rise of emerging powers and a strategic shift in attention by the US towards the Pacific region, by increased poverty, hunger and instability in the EU’s southern neighbourhood, by growing maritime security challenges, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and increased illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, by challenges in energy security, and by major systemic financial failure and a severe and long-lasting financial and economic crisis with a major impact on the GDP of many EU Member States and, consequently, on national defence budgets on both sides of the Atlantic;

2.

Believes that reassessing and strengthening Europe's role in the world constitutes one of the major challenges of the 21st century and that the time has come for the Member States of the Union to show the political will needed for making the EU a relevant global actor and security provider with real strategic autonomy; considers that a change of mindset on the part of Member States is required in order to anchor a European approach to a committed and effective security and defence policy;

3.

Welcomes, therefore, the European Council decision to hold a discussion dedicated to security and defence at the December 2013 Summit; considers that this provides a timely opportunity to underline at the highest political level and to communicate to the public in Europe that security and defence issues still matter and that the European dimension is more relevant than ever; strongly believes that the EU needs to be able to provide security for its citizens, to promote and defend its fundamental values, to assume its share of responsibility for world peace and to play an effective role in preventing and managing regional crises in its wider neighbourhood, contributing to their resolution and protecting itself against the negative effects of these crises;

4.

Welcomes also the report by the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission on the CSDP, which pinpoints a number of obstacles which the policy faces; deplores the fact, however, that the report does not propose more in the way of measures aimed specifically at remedying the shortcomings of the CSDP;

5.

Looks forward to substantive decisions being taken at the December Summit and puts forward its own recommendations with this report, building upon relevant positions taken by Parliament in the recent past and paying close attention to the ongoing debate on the three main issues (clusters) identified by the December 2012 European Council;

6.

Notes that the Lisbon Treaty introduced several new instruments in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which have not yet been put into practice;

7.

Emphasises in this regard the possibility of establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) among Member States (Article 46(6) TEU), of entrusting CSDP instruments and military planning and conduct capabilities in particular to that group of Member States (Articles 42(5) and 44(1) TEU), and of establishing a start-up fund for preparatory activities for missions which are not charged to the Union budget (Article 41(3) TEU) and are not incorporated into the ATHENA mechanism; calls, therefore on the President of the European Council and the Vice-President/High Representative to establish the start-up fund; highlights in this context the importance of mainstreaming CSDP matters into those EU policies which have a multifaceted impact on security and defence or contribute to CSDP, such as development and human rights, industrial research and innovation, internal market, international trade and space policies and others, in order to support those Member States which are engaged in further strengthening the CSDP;

8.

Stresses the importance of these commonly agreed provisions for the development of the CSDP and calls on the European Council to conduct a serious discussion about their implementation in a coherent manner; calls on the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the Vice-President/High Representative (VP/HR) to play an active role in this process;

9.

Points out that, according to the Treaties, the EU’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples (Article 3 TEU) and that its action on the international scene seeks to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and to prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders (Article 21 TEU); is convinced that the CSDP serves these aims and underlines the need to upgrade it;

10.

Stresses that the main asset of the European Union is the availability of various policies and instruments, combined through the ‘comprehensive approach’, and that it is possible to achieve better results at all levels by better integrating the CSDP into this approach; welcomes in this respect the review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS published by the VP/HR in July 2013, which recognises the problems of coordination and those related to the speed and effectiveness of decision-making in the area of the CSDP; looks forward to specific decisions being taken at the December Summit and expects the further integration of the CSDP to be analysed thoroughly in the upcoming joint Communication by the VP/HR and the Commission on the implementation of the comprehensive approach;

11.

Reiterates its conviction that although elements of the 2003 European Security Strategy, as supplemented in 2008, remain valid, the EU needs to review and to complement this strategy by taking recent developments and the new array of security challenges and risks into account and redefining its strategic interests, objectives and priorities, with a greater emphasis on the protection of its citizens, the defence of critical infrastructures and its neighbourhood, and by dovetailing the different regional and topical sub-strategies; believes that such an exercise will provide a clearer strategic framework for external action by the EU, enhance consistency and, at the same time, communicate better to the citizens the challenges and risks facing them in the future; requests therefore that the European Council launch a debate on the appropriate strategic framework for the Union, mandate the VP/HR to come forward with proposals in this respect before the end of 2014 and ensure sustainable follow-up, subject to regular updates, as primarily defined in the context of the European Security Strategy;

12.

Calls for the review of the EU strategic framework to form the basis for a White Paper on EU security and defence policy and suggests that the European Council could set the necessary process in motion; urges the EU Member States, furthermore, to give serious consideration to the European dimension in their national security strategies, White Papers and decision-making in the field of defence; calls on the VP/HR to develop a common template for the shaping of concurrent national reviews;

13.

Points to the need to ensure that the EU is in a position to contribute, by means of crisis management operations, to conflict prevention, stabilisation and resolution;

14.

Believes that the introduction of a mutual defence clause and a solidarity clause by the Treaties (Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU) reinforces the sense of common destiny among European citizens; reminds Member States that only in a spirit of commitment, mutual understanding and genuine solidarity will the Union be able to fulfil its global role, thus enhancing the security of Europe and that of its citizens; commends, therefore, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) for the Joint Proposal on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause and calls on the Heads of State and Government to reaffirm their commitment to mutual solidarity and to provide a clear operative interpretation of the two clauses;

15.

Notes with concern that the number and timeliness of CSDP missions and operations, and the development of civilian and especially military means and capabilities for the CSDP, fall short of what is required, given the EU's increasingly insecure and unstable neighbourhood; deplores, in particular, the limited overall scope of the CSDP missions related to the crises in Libya and Mali and regrets the lack of flexibility within the Union’s decision-making procedures which account for delayed effective responses in crisis scenarios, as the two examples illustrate; calls for the situation to be monitored and for the operational engagement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus, which has yielded positive results, to be maintained; calls for greater ambition and serious efforts to improve the design of future CSDP missions and operations under a ‘lessons learned process’ and to develop appropriate exit strategies; invites the VP/HR to steer this process and welcomes in this respect her report published on 15 October 2013 as an important step on how to make the CSDP more effective and proactive;

16.

Emphasises the need to enhance the visibility of European crisis management and to place all efforts under the CSDP, making use, where appropriate, of the provision in Article 44 TEU for a Council decision entrusting the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task;

17.

Expresses its concern, based on experience in the recent past, that the comprehensive approach to crisis management has not yet reached its full potential; considers that missions and operations are more meaningful when they are embedded into a regional strategy, as the positive example of the Horn of Africa demonstrates; takes note of the ‘Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations’ endorsed by the Member States on 18 June 2013;

18.

Asks that the functional problems of civilian CSDP missions, notably regarding the speed of deployment and staffing, be tackled by reviewing their legal and financial framework, which often complicates the decision-making process and leads to delays; calls for an increase in the number of qualified and politically independent strategic planners, which is too small in comparison to the number of missions; further asks Member States to create a ‘civilian reserve corps’ that could be deployed quickly if needed welcomes in this regard the recently established permanent CSDP warehouse;

19.

Recalls its 2001 resolution, which called for the creation of a European Civil Peace Corps; welcomes recent efforts to create a Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps within the Commission and a pool of experts in mediation, dialogue and reconciliation within the External Action Service; also welcomes the existence and continuation of the Peacebuilding Partnership between the External Action Service and relevant civil society stakeholders;

20.

Stresses the important role of mediation and dialogue in preventing and resolving conflicts peacefully; commends the progress which the EEAS has made in strengthening its mediation capacities and reiterates its support for further enhancing Europe’s capacities in this field; believes that Parliament’s successful involvement in mediation processes has demonstrated the important role parliamentarians can play in supporting mediation and dialogue processes and intends to further step up its efforts in this field;

21.

Proposes the inclusion of human rights and gender advisors in all CSDP missions and encourages the exchange of best practices among CSDP missions to ensure that human rights concerns are fully taken into account and women are fully protected and included in conflict and post-conflict resolution; invites the Council and the EEAS to take further steps to include gender aspects in staff planning for CSDP missions;

22.

Highlights the fact that successful military operations require a clear command and control function; reiterates therefore its call for the establishment of a permanent military operational headquarters; notes with regret the lack of progress on this issue and the strong resistance by some Member States; stresses further that an effective CSDP requires adequate early warning and intelligence support; considers, therefore, that these headquarters should include cells for intelligence gathering and for early warning/situational awareness;

23.

Reiterates its support for a provisional solution and draws attention to its proposal to improve the status of the currently active Operations Centre for the Horn of Africa and assist military planning and coordination among those operating on the ground; asks the VP/HR to develop such an option, within the constraints of its current size and infrastructure, in order to optimise the use of existing resources, and to examine the feasibility of widening the geographical area of operations to encompass other important regions; considers that this body should have legal capacity and be assigned the role of coordinating procurement between Brussels and individual mission headquarters, using economies of scale to maximise savings;

24.

Notes the fact that EU battlegroups have never yet been deployed and considers that their existence will be difficult to justify over time; stresses that they constitute an important tool for timely force generation, training and rapid reaction; welcomes the decision to address this issue during the December Summit; is convinced that the EU should dispose of high-readiness standing battle forces, with land, air, naval, cyber and special forces components and a high level of ambition; underlines the fact that EU battlegroups should be deployable for all types of crises, including climate-driven humanitarian crisis; favours a more flexible and targeted approach to enhance the response and adaptability to different crisis situations, and to improve modularity in order to close gaps during the initial phases of the launch of CSDP operations without, however, compromising the operational capacity of the battlegroup as a whole;

25.

Highlights the fact that greater efforts should be made to integrate at EU level initiatives such as the Eurocorps and the European Air Group;

26.

Confirms that the existing financial system of ‘costs lie where they fall’ constitutes a serious problem for the CSDP, leading to delays or complete blockages in decision-making, notably on the quick deployment of battlegroups; recommends that Member States agree on an EU financing mechanism based on burden-sharing for the use of battlegroups under the EU flag, in order to give them a realistic future; also calls — in the interests of consistency and efficiency — for the EEAS to be given control over the financial instruments linked to the crisis management measures that it plans and carries out; expects the VP/HR and interested Member States to put forward concrete proposals in this respect;

27.

Expresses its concern, furthermore, that the economic and debt crisis may have an impact on the willingness of EU Member States to contribute to CSDP missions and operations, particularly those with military and defence implications; calls therefore for extension of the scope of the ATHENA mechanism and use of the start-up fund (Article 41(3) TEU) to ensure the rapid financing of urgent tasks; stresses, however, that even if the CSDP needs to be reenergised, this should be done in accordance with budgetary constraints;

28.

Invites Member States to exploit the possibilities offered by PESCO and to start implementing this Treaty provision in order to tackle the prevailing ‘CSDP fatigue’ and deepen military cooperation and integration; calls on the European Council to deliver clear guidelines for its implementation and invites Member States that are not interested to act constructively; stresses that the possibility of joining at a later stage should be left open in order to ensure flexibility and to avoid a two-speed Europe;

29.

Points out that the EU has a vital interest in a secure and open maritime environment that allows the free passage of commerce and the peaceful, legal and sustainable use of the oceans’ riches; stresses the need to develop an EU maritime foreign policy which aims at protecting and preserving critical infrastructure, open sea routes and natural resources and puts an emphasis on the peaceful resolution of conflicts, within the context of international law and in line with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; looks forward to the adoption of the EU Maritime Security Strategy, in line with the April 2010 Council conclusions, and calls for the development of a specific implementation plan; points out that the integration of maritime surveillance across sectors and borders is already a cross-sectoral tool of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy (IPM); highlights the importance of swiftly implementing the Common Information Sharing Environment project and building a ‘bridge’ between the IPM and the CSDP to improve information sharing between them;

30.

Underlines the need to prevent the militarisation of regions like the Arctic and stresses the need to use peaceful means of conflict resolution, including trade instruments;

31.

Requests that the European Council reconfirm the importance of space, which underpins the strategic autonomy of the EU and its Member States and the potential to gain autonomous access to space by developing launchers and satellites; reiterates the importance of gathering precise intelligence for both civil and military CSDP missions and operations; emphasises in particular the role of space-based assets in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management before, during and after a crisis; invites the Commission to develop a specific policy to support the development of multiple-use space assets;

32.

Reiterates the growing importance of tackling cyber security threats; invites the European Council to develop guidelines for the implementation of the EU Cyber Security Strategy and to take concrete measures regarding the protection of cyber infrastructure, and investing in enhancing EU-wide cooperation on crisis management procedures, cyber exercises, training and education; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to ensure that cyber-security policy is enacted in a cross-sectoral manner, so as to ensure adequate bridging arrangements between the EU’s internal and external security policies, and on all Member States to develop or finalise their respective national Cyber Security Strategies and to aim for a greater degree of synchronisation at Union level;

33.

Asks the European Council to reaffirm the significance of Europe’s energy supply and a diversified and sustainable access to energy resources; notes that some Member States lack the capacity to diversify their energy supplies and are thus becoming increasingly vulnerable; in this respect, strongly supports the collaborative efforts of Member States in crisis situations; stresses that the protection of critical infrastructure in Europe should activate the mutual defence and/or solidarity clause; notes also that operation ATALANTA is already performing an energy security role by combating pirates who have hijacked a number of oil tankers since 2008; believes, therefore, that these aspects need to be part of the necessary strategic approach; emphasises, in this connection, that energy supply is a crucial factor for successful CSDP missions and operations;

34.

Underscores the importance of energy efficiency in the field of defence, in particular, stressing the need to assess the impact of energy consumption on defence budgets and military effectiveness and develop a comprehensive energy efficiency strategy for the armed forces;

35.

Underlines the importance for the EU to further develop partnerships and deepen its security dialogue with the UN, regional organisations and relevant players, including Eastern Partnership and Southern Neighbourhood countries;

36.

Points out that the EU should further engage with the UN, the African Union, the OSCE and ASEAN in order to share analysis and cooperate in addressing the challenges of environmental policy and climate change, including their security implications; underlines the need for preventive action and urges the EU to develop and improve early warning capabilities;

37.

Calls for stronger cooperation between the EU and NATO structures through a complementary approach and closer coordination in order to help avoid duplication between the two partners and to effectively tackle the new threats; is convinced that strengthening the CSDP does no harm to, and indeed reinforces, collective security and transatlantic links; asserts that the development of defence capabilities within an EU context also benefits NATO; notes the constructive collaboration regarding the EU’s pooling and sharing initiative and NATO’s smart defence initiative; welcomes the Republic of Cyprus’s intention to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme, which can be a game changer, and urges Turkey to adopt an equally constructive attitude; urges the development of a comprehensive framework for EU-NATO cooperation and the deepening of political dialogue with full respect for the decision-making of each party;

38.

Takes the view that the EU needs to be able to act autonomously, particularly in its own neighbourhood, but always in line with the provisions of the UN Charter and ensuring full respect for international humanitarian law;

39.

Echoes concerns that further cuts in national defence budgets will make it impossible to maintain critical military capabilities and will result in the irreversible loss of know-how and technologies; notes that the shortfalls in Member States’ capabilities became apparent during the operations in Libya and Mali and that the economic crisis has exacerbated existing structural problems; reiterates its view, however, that the problem is less of a budgetary nature than of a political one;

40.

Notes the proposals put forward by the VP/HR in her October 2013 report on the CSDP, in particular those intended to create incentives, including tax incentives, for cooperation in the defence capability field; stresses the opportunity for Member States to enjoy the full benefits of working closer together to generate military efficiency and to decide to optimise and spend scarce resources in a better and smarter way, by creating synergies and by a coordinated reduction of unnecessary duplication, redundant and obsolete capabilities;

41.

Welcomes the ongoing revision of the Capability Development Plan as the basis for a long-term joint transformation concept for capability-building; believes that this transformation concept should be discussed regularly and its implementation streamlined and, as appropriate, reviewed;

42.

Draws attention to the mission of the European Defence Agency (EDA), as provided for in Articles 42(3) and 45 TEU, according to which the Agency is entrusted with important tasks in terms of implementing permanent structured cooperation, formulating a European capabilities and armaments policy, developing the military capabilities of Member States and strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, but without financial implications for the EU budget;

43.

Considers that, although not a panacea, the pooling and sharing of military capabilities constitutes an important response to shortfalls in European capabilities; welcomes the facilitating role of the EDA and the progress achieved so far; believes that pooling and sharing should not only be considered in terms of joint sourcing, but also in terms of integration, and should cover the shared maintenance and utilisation of capabilities;

44.

Calls for the European Defence Agency (EDA) to be given a stronger role in coordinating capabilities, with a view to ending duplication and the existence of parallel programmes in the Member States, which place an excessive burden on taxpayers;

45.

Invites the EU Member States to improve information-sharing on defence planning and, in line with the Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing, to include pooling and sharing solutions in national defence planning cycles and decision-making processes;

46.

Stresses that mutual trust, transparency and reliability are key factors for the success of any common endeavour in the area of security and defence; is convinced that the development of defence capabilities must be embedded into a strategic approach that determines the appropriate mix of capabilities and the goals for which they should be used;

47.

In the light of the above, expects the upcoming Defence Summit:

48.

Welcomes the Commission Communication entitled ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’, which brings forward some fresh ideas and proposals; fully supports the Commission’s efforts to deepen the internal defence and security market and to develop a defence industrial policy, providing adequate support for SMEs which play a key role in innovation, R&D, job creation and economic growth, in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy;

49.

Underlines the fact that strengthening the technological and industrial base of the defence sector is an objective of the Union enshrined in Articles 42(3) and 45 TEU; stresses that a solid European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) which is able to sustain CSDP and further enhance Europe’s military capabilities, whilst preserving the EU’s strategic autonomy, is crucial for an effective European defence; highlights the link between research, industry and capability development, which are all necessary elements for economic growth, job creation and competitiveness, as well as for a stronger CSDP;

50.

Reiterates the need for a strong and less fragmented European defence industry that is capable of sustaining the CSDP and enhancing the EU’s strategic autonomy; highlights the importance of certification and standardisation for improving the interoperability of the armed forces; calls on the European Council to mandate the EDA to prepare a roadmap for the development of defence industrial standards, and on the Member States to streamline European certification procedures with the mutual recognition of certificates and to harmonise their certification procedures;

51.

Stresses that the anticipation and management of change and restructuring are an integral part of any industrial policy; considers, therefore, that further market integration in the defence sector must go hand in hand with active social dialogue and the mitigation of its negative impacts on regional and local economies, making full use of EU financial instruments, such as the European Social Fund and the European Globalisation Fund;

52.

Calls on the European Council to take action in these areas through sound financing of R&D, including at Union level; supports the development of effective and cost-efficient cooperation between civilian security and defence research activities; stresses, however, the continued need for an effective dual-use export regime;

53.

Stresses the need to ensure new sources of financing for research and innovation in the defence field, e.g. through Horizon 2020;

54.

Fully supports holding a debate on the three clusters at the December Defence Summit; highlights their equal importance and the fact that they are interlinked by an inherent logic serving the same strategic goals;

55.

Calls on the European Council, as well as policymakers at all levels in the Member States of the Union, to show greater ambition and courage in launching a public debate, this being even more important in times of economic austerity; stresses the need to invest more and step up cooperation in the area of security and defence, and to explain the causal nexus between security and defence on the one hand, and freedom, democracy, rule of law and prosperity on the other;

56.

Stresses the indivisible link between internal and external security and that a peaceful, secure and stable environment is a precondition for preserving the political, economic and social model in Europe;

57.

Expresses its high hopes that this European Council will not be an isolated event, but the starting point of a continuous process that revisits security and defence matters at European Council level on a regular basis; favours, as a follow-up to the European Council, the establishment of a roadmap with specific benchmarks and timelines, and a reporting mechanism; advocates the creation of a Council of Defence Ministers in the medium term in order to give security and defence matters the weight they deserve;

58.

Resolves to maintain and strengthen closer links with the Member States’ national parliaments through regular meetings in order to promote dialogue and exchanges of views on matters of security and defence;

59.

Believes that the CSDP is a basic pillar of the European integration process;

60.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the VP/HR, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of NATO, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Chair of the Assembly of the African Union and the Secretary General of ASEAN.

24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/26

—

having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 21, 42, 45 and 46 thereof, and Articles 173, 179-190 and 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and its Protocol No 10,

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 13-14 December 2012 and to the process leading to the European Council meeting on defence scheduled for 19-20 December 2013,

—

having regard to the Commission Communication of 24 July 2013 entitled ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’ (COM(2013)0542),

—

having regard to the Commission Communication of 5 December 2007 entitled ‘A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry’ (COM(2007)0764),

—

having regard to the European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003, and to the report on its implementation, endorsed by the European Council on 11-12 December 2008,

—

having regard to the declaration on the enhancement of the European Security and Defence Policy, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2008, and to the declaration on strengthening capabilities, adopted by the Council on 11 December 2008,

—

having regard to the Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, adopted by the European Defence Agency (EDA) Steering Board on 14 May 2007,

—

having regard to Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP of 12 July 2011 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency and repealing Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP (1),

—

having regard to Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security (2),

—

having regard to its resolutions of 22 November 2012 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (3), and of 14 December 2011 on the impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector in the EU Member States (4),

—

having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and to the opinions of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A7-0358/2013),

1.

Recalls that an operational Common Security and Defence Policy needs a strong European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), constituting a key element for Europe's capacity to ensure the security of its citizens, protect its values and promote its interests; points out that the European defence sector is a major source of growth and innovation, key features for stability and security; believes that the establishment and development of a competitive EDTIB should be part of the strategic priorities of the EU;

2.

Recalls the level of operational ambitions outlined in the Council Declaration on strengthening capabilities of 11 December 2008 and the civilian and military tasks outlined in Article 43(1) TEU; recalls the Member States’ commitment to improve their military capabilities; calls on the European Council to launch the development of a European capabilities and armaments policy (ECAP) to that end, as provided for in Article 42(3) TEU;

3.

Notes that while some third countries such as China, India, Brazil and Russia are increasing their defence spending, EU defence budgets are being cut back; draws attention to the changing strategic global landscape, reduced defence budgets, caused especially by the economic and financial crisis, the quickening pace of technological development and the fact that European defence companies are adjusting to this situation by putting the emphasis on exports to third countries, at the cost of transferring sensitive technologies and intellectual property rights, and moving production outside the EU;

4.

Is concerned about the reductions in defence investment, and calls on the Member States, the EDA and the Commission to take countermeasures in response to the increasing exposure of the EDTIB in the future to the risk of being controlled and constrained in its activities by third powers with different strategic interests; urges the Member States to reinforce European industrial cooperation with a view to ensuring, as far as possible, strategic autonomy by developing and producing efficient military and security capabilities using the most advanced technologies;

5.

Stresses that with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EU’s industrial, space and research policies extend to the defence remit; points out that Union programmes in other areas such as internal and border security, disaster management and development offer a significant prospect of jointly developing capabilities relevant to those policies and to the conduct of CSDP missions;

6.

Recalls the need to make progress in consolidating the EDTIB and notes that — in the face of the increasing sophistication and costs of technologies, growing international competition and decreasing defence budgets and production volumes, there is continued scope for multinational defence projects and that it is no longer possible in any of the Member States for the defence industry to be sustainable on a strictly national basis; regrets the fact that, while a certain level of concentration has been achieved in the European aerospace industries, the land and naval equipment sectors are still overwhelmingly fragmented along national lines;

7.

Stresses that the construction of a European defence industry should be carried out in a sustainable manner, in all Member States, on the basis of existing industrial infrastructure and of the established norms of European industrial policies as referred to in Article 173 TFEU, and not solely according to the principle of free competition;

8.

Reminds the EU Member States, the VP/HR, the European Commission and the European Defence Agency that more than two decades after the Cold War and after having had the benefit of relatively high national defence budgets, the EU Member States were not able to fulfil the Helsinki Headline Goals and other joint military capability development objectives;

9.

Recalls that if Europe wishes to maintain a solid security and defence industry its Member States need to coordinate their defence budgets in order to avoid duplication and to strengthen their joint research programmes;

10.

Notes that in spite of the crisis and the budget cuts, European citizens are still calling for European defence and industrial coordination and cooperation, which they perceive as a factor promoting security, efficiency and savings;

11.

Notes the Commission Communication of 24 July 2013 and the report by the HR/VP of 15 October 2013 on the Common Security and Defence Policy; considers it regrettable that the Commission and the EEAS did not issue a joint European declaration in preparation for the European Council’s defence summit in December of this year; looks forward to the specific legislative suggestions by the Commission on how to use the European Structural Investment Funds, the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN), the European Social Fund and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund in order to assure the equitable development of the defence industry in all parts of the European Union;

12.

Recalls that the Commission and EU defence ministers already underlined the need for urgent action in this field in 2007 with a dedicated Commission Communication and the EDA’s EDTIB strategy; regrets the lost opportunities regularly to submit implementation reports and update strategies following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty; considers it regrettable that the new communication does not take stock of previous strategies; calls for the Commission and the EDA to develop a joint EDTIB strategy in the future, based on past experiences;

13.

Considers, in its own broad assessment, that both strategies have been insufficiently implemented because of the lack of a common understanding of EDTIB resulting from differing national and industrial interests, and the persistence of established national habits in the armaments sectors; takes note of the fact that there are Member States with no national defence industry and/or niche industries of their own that are striving to obtain the best value for money globally, with less competitive defence industries favouring national supply chains and with more powerful national defence industries accepting strong global competition;

14.

Welcomes the European Council's decision to put the strengthening of Europe's defence on the agenda for its December summit; calls on the European Council to provide the necessary fresh and ambitious impetus and to lay down guidelines, overarching political priorities and timelines for supporting a truly European defence technological and industrial base, which will be backed by appropriate integrity- and trust-building measures and which will be capability-driven and will promote synergies, provide for the efficient use of the limited resources, avoid duplication and be integrated and competitive on the global market;

15.

Considers it regrettable that past efforts to consolidate demand have not improved the fragmentation of demand in the EU, with 28 national defence customers and an even higher number of customers of products for civilian and military use; regrets the limited results of the EDA’s Capability Development Plan; calls, therefore, on the European Council to launch a European defence review process and make the coordination of national defence planning processes at EU level a reality; based on this assessment, calls on the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to initiate a wide-ranging process to develop a White Paper on European Security and Defence in order to streamline the EU’s strategic ambitions and capability development processes;

16.

Calls on the Member States to further explore the possibility of synchronising and jointly planning the life-cycle management of their defence capabilities in cooperation with the EDA; considers that a higher degree of synergies leading to a common European capabilities and armaments policy, as referred to in Article 42 TEU, would be a prerequisite for turning the harmonisation of military requirements into harmonised equipment acquisition among Member States, thus creating the conditions for a successful demand-driven transnational restructuring of the defence industry in the EU;

17.

Notes the work of the NATO defence planning process, through which members of the alliance, including 26 European allies, coordinate — where appropriate — in order to ensure that the right defence capabilities are developed and maintained to address future challenges; notes that NATO has long recognised the need for close cooperation with industry, not least in order to assist the development of military capability requirements, especially regarding standardisation and interoperability, while fostering transatlantic defence technological and industrial cooperation;

18.

Considers that a European industrial defence policy should have the aim of optimising Member States’ capabilities by coordinating the development, deployment and maintenance of a range of capabilities, installations, equipment and services with a view to performing the full range of tasks, including the most demanding missions, by strengthening Europe’s defence industry, by promoting research and technology cooperation and by developing equipment cooperation programmes;

19.

Recognises the importance of the European defence industries for innovation and growth, giving rise, directly and indirectly, to approximately 400 000 jobs in the Union; highlights the fact that while the European defence economy is facing several challenges, there is a need for a new approach avoiding duplication and leading to larger economies of scale and increased industrial competition;

20.

Believes that it is time to promote a voluntary approach in acting on the fragmentation of the European industrial defence market, furthering its consolidation (and initiating harmonisation) as regards supply and demand, rules and standards, and that it is also time to invest in an integrated sustainable industrial policy based on research, innovation, increasing efficiency of resources, a strategy for raw materials, the strengthening of SMEs and the development of regional networks; fully supports Commission efforts to underpin the internal defence and security market through suitable assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises playing a major role in innovation, in developing specialised capabilities and in state-of-the-art technologies and job creation under the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy;

21.

Considers it important for Member States to step up cooperation in order to meet industrial challenges and notes that budgetary constraints and increasing global competition mean that the EU needs internal partnerships and other groupings as well as task-sharing; supports the EDA in its endeavour to promote regional clusters;

22.

Takes the view that the very specific nature of defence markets should be recognised in view of the export control and anti-proliferation obligations and the strict confidentiality requirements which apply, and the fact that the number of companies supplying the market is limited and demand comes almost exclusively from governments;

23.

Believes that the defence industry is very specific in nature, given lengthy product development and the need to keep systems operational for several decades, the substantial and growing cost of programmes and finally the fact that product commercialisation is highly dependent on Member State governments;

24.

Supports the potential and encourages the dual use of the products of the security and defence industries, particularly in the space, maritime, aviation and telecommunications fields; stresses that the defence industry is an important driver for advanced technologies to be used at a later stage for commercial purposes;

25.

Urges the European Council to give all possible support to the EDTIB, and to that end first and foremost to define its scope more clearly, particularly as regards those involved, by conferring a specific status on them, that of Economic Defence Operators in Europe (EDOEs);

26.

Calls for EDOEs to be granted that status on the grounds of the real added value, both technological and socio-economic, they bring to Europe; considers, therefore, that only these economic defence operators in Europe should benefit from European programmes;

27.

Believes that the concept of ‘Economic Defence Operator in Europe’ should be acknowledged and that reasonable criteria relating to jobs, scientific and technological expertise, decision-making and production within the EU should be met with a view to their protection;

28.

Calls on the Member States to develop their defence industrial and technological bases and centres of excellence around key technologies, and provide them with effective corporate governance mechanisms within the European Union, thus enhancing the interdependence between these facilities;

29.

Urges the Member States to encourage cooperation between major defence companies and universities; emphasises that the knowledge base of universities can be widened through such cooperation;

30.

Calls on the Member States and the Commission to minimise unnecessary regulatory obstacles, to improve dialogue between defence undertakings and to promote the rationalisation of these undertakings so that they can acquire the equipment best suited to their needs in terms of performance and cost; calls for an urgent restructuring of European companies to overcome national barriers and adopt a global outlook;

31.

Takes the view that small and medium-sized enterprises, which design and manufacture many innovative products, play a vital part in maintaining and consolidating the EDTIB; notes that the fragmentation of the European defence market is an obstacle to the ability of SMEs to market their products; calls on the Member States, the EDA and the Commission to work together to develop ways and means of consolidating small and medium-sized enterprises in a sustainable manner and of facilitating their access to defence procurement; emphasises that a common system of standardisation and certification would be of benefit to European companies, including SMEs, as it would improve their access to European and international markets, create employment and expand their access to EU funding;

32.

Reiterates the fundamental importance of standardisation of defence equipment for the establishment of a competitive single European defence market, as well as for ensuring interoperability and facilitating cooperation on armaments programmes, for pooling and sharing projects, and for sustained interoperability among Member States’ forces, thereby reducing maintenance and operational cost levels and ensuring that optimum use can be made of Member States' defence capabilities in joint operations;

33.

Recalls that there is a proliferation of competing industrial standards for civilian and military products; regrets the limited success of the implementation of NATO's standardization agreements (STANAG) and recommendations (STANREC); calls on the Commission and EDA to promote a coherent set of common standards in defence and to develop ‘hybrid standards’ in dual-use areas; calls on the Member States to ensure that their future steps to set defence standards are based on the civilian suggestions made by the Commission and European standardisation organisations;

34.

Encourages the Member States to explore the possibilities offered by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in terms of drafting European standards for military products and applications, for example for the construction of hospital ships or in the field of remote-controlled aerial systems;

35.

Welcomes the Commission’s proposals on standardisation, and calls on the European Council to note them and put forward concrete proposals in this area;

36.

Calls on the Member States to streamline European certification procedures, with the mutual recognition of certificates and the development of common civilian and military European certification procedures;

37.

Highlights, in the context of the industry's restructuring, the importance of ensuring that security of supply is not put at risk; calls on the Member States, the EDA and the Commission rapidly to develop a comprehensive and ambitious EU-wide security-of-supply regime, in particular for strategic materials and critical technologies, based on a system of mutual guarantees and an analysis of risks and needs, and possibly using the legal basis of permanent structured cooperation;

38.

Urges the Member States, as first steps towards this objective, to fully exploit the potential of the general and global licences under Directive 2009/43/EC on transfers of defence-related products within the EU and to speed up work to operationalise the 2006 Framework Arrangement for Security of Supply in Circumstances of Operational Urgency;

39.

Calls on the EDA and the Commission to submit a joint non-dependency strategy on critical technologies, in particular as regards unlimited access to and availability of civilian and military (dual-use) emerging and key enabling technologies, such as cutting-edge micro-/nano-electronics, artificial intelligence and photonics, which must be regarded as critical to CSDP missions; calls on the Member States to use the EDTIB to strengthen the EU's self-sufficiency in these key areas;

40.

Encourages the Member States to address the industrial overcapacities that result from declining demand by launching new joint projects, relying more heavily on the under-used and under-funded EDA and learning the lessons from recent joint operations which have revealed shortcomings, e.g. in strategic and tactical airlift and air and space observation; recommends in particular developing key enablers with civil-military applications, which are sorely lacking in the majority of the Member States, such as some remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), fostering the development of high technologies and helping sustain key competencies within Europe; encourages EU participation in joint projects through leasing and/or acquisition of dual-use capabilities and the possible procurement of prototypes;

41.

Considers, in the light of past experience, that the sharing of development and production activities in the context of joint arms programmes should be organised strictly in accordance with the principle of industrial efficiency and economic performance, so as to prevent duplication and spiralling costs;

42.

Calls on the Member States to give preference, when exploring large-scale defence technology acquisitions, to intra-EU projects or joint schemes, or European-based new technologies, which can foster at the same time European trade, increased cooperation and competition in terms of quality and price on the global defence market;

43.

Urges the European Council, against the background of the existing administrative arrangement between the EDA and the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), to ensure the successful implementation of common projects and envisage stronger links between the two organisations;

44.

Calls on the European Council to enable the EDA fully to assume its institutional role, as outlined in Articles 42(3) and 45 TEU, by giving it the necessary resources; reiterates the urgent need for Member States to provide the EDA with adequate funding for the full range of its missions and tasks; takes the view that this would be best done by financing the Agency's staffing and running costs from the Union budget, starting with the forthcoming multiannual financial framework;

45.

Notes that the economic and financial crisis and the cuts in the defence budgets of most Member States risk causing considerable reductions, setbacks or delays in the research and technological innovation programmes of almost all Member States, which will probably continue to affect the European defence industry and the Union’s scientific progress in this area; stresses that this situation risks entailing job losses in the medium and long term and loss of industrial capacity and know-how;

46.

Emphasises the importance of research and innovation in the security and defence sector and of the Horizon 2020 research programme; in particular, the seventh societal challenge dedicated to ‘Secure societies: protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens’; emphasises the importance of fostering multinational cooperation among Member States and their respective agencies in this field; believes, given the high degree of confidentiality inherent to innovative research for the defence industry, that it is vital to finance such research in a manner related to needs; feels, in this context, that establishing a European Defence and Security Institute under the JRC should be considered;

47.

Welcomes the Commission’s intention to launch a preparatory action for EU-funded research in support of CSDP missions, and invites the Commission to make a specific proposal as a precursor to such programmes early in the forthcoming multiannual financial framework;

48.

Considers that EDTIB-related defence research and innovation continues to constitute a valid ethical basis; notes that a whole chapter of the Treaty of Lisbon is devoted to the common security and defence policy, which includes defence technology research and the framing of a common Union defence; calls on the Member States and the EDA to significantly increase the quantity and quality of joint research and development projects;

49.

Recalls that Article 179 TFEU requires the Union to promote all the research activities deemed necessary by virtue of the Treaties;

50.

Recalls that in November 2007 European Ministers of Defence agreed collective benchmarks to increase defence R&T spending to 2 % of all defence expenditure and to bring European collaborative defence R&T spending to a level of 20 %;

51.

Supports the Defence Task Force, which includes the European Commission, European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Defence Agency (EDA), in its efforts to ensure that the results of Horizon 2020 research can feed into innovation-related research in the defence field and to optimise synergies between civil and military applications; calls, further, for consideration to be given to ways of using public-private funding through the creation of joint undertakings, in accordance with Article 187 TFEU;

52.

Encourages the EDA to build on its track record of successful joint investment programmes and to work in liaison with the Commission in order to launch research and development programmes, based on Article 185 TFEU;

53.

Highlights the importance of synergies between civilian and military research in areas with high added value; stresses that, while taking into account that certain projects have mainly civilian uses and others are sovereign matters, the possibility of more effective dual use might be explored with a view to pooling costs, since these are sectors which create growth and jobs; further stresses that such synergies could also take the form of consolidating supply from private European sources to market outlets;

54.

Calls on the Member States to establish an appropriate platform for bringing defence research to the civilian sphere, with a focus on cutting-edge technological applications; calls on the Member States also to focus research in the area of defence technology on managing natural disasters (over the last 40 years, the number of natural disasters in Europe has quadrupled);

55.

Believes that the EU defence industry should maintain a high level of innovation in both military and civilian terms, in order to respond to all the threats and challenges the Member States and the EU will have to face in the years to come by making use of the most promising technological advances, whether developed specifically for defence or for civilian purposes;

56.

Stresses the need to make sure that research results are properly safeguarded in a common intellectual property policy and believes that the role of the EDA in this area should be further strengthened in order to facilitate, at an early stage, future technological and industrial cooperation between EU partners;

57.

Is convinced that the space sector contributes to the strategic autonomy of the EU and that the possibility for Member States to have independent access plays a vital role in the area of defence and security; stresses the importance of maintaining the excellence of this technologically innovative and efficient industry in order to ensure the technological independence of the European Union;

58.

Welcomes the creation and development of a European satellite system (Galileo, Copernicus and EGNOS); stresses that the development of a system of that kind will be a major boost not only to the space industry but also to Europe’s autonomy and that it provides an opportunity to develop a critical component of the industrial and technological base of European defence;

59.

Stresses the need to protect Europe’s space infrastructures by developing its space surveillance and tracking (SST) capacity;

60.

Points out that the digital era brings about increasing challenges for the safety and security of infrastructure and technology, therefore highlights the need for greater cooperation and exchange of know-how among Member States, on the one hand, and between the European Union and its key partners, on the other;

61.

Stresses the importance of developing European ICT and cyber-security standards and integrating them with international standards;

62.

Calls on the Commission and Member States to cooperate with one another to ensure that cyber-security is a key element, which should therefore be particularly promoted through research and innovation in the security and defence sector and should be part of the short-, medium- and long-term strategy;

63.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take cyber-security issues into account as a matter of course in existing or future European civilian and military programmes (Galileo, Copernicus, Single Sky/Sesar, etc.);

64.

Recalls that Member States urgently need to improve the transparency and increase the openness of their defence markets, while stressing the specific nature of defence procurement and pointing out that it affects vital national security interests and cannot therefore be placed on the same footing as other sectors; calls on the Member States and the Commission to make sure that the 2009 directives on defence procurement and transfers are correctly and coherently applied, in particular with regard to any exemptions from EU rules under Article 346 TFEU, in order to strengthen the single market by reducing the complexity of procurement rules in the defence sector where appropriate;

65.

Urges the Commission to step up efforts to build a level playing field in the defence market, limiting the use of market-distorting practices to the strict minimum of duly justified derogations; points out, in particular, the need to strengthen state aid control, and urges the Member States to practise greater transparency with regard to state aid and procurement practices in the defence sector, towards both European authorities and agencies and the general public;

66.

Is concerned by the fact that a number of Member States are preparing to buy used F-16 fighter jets without giving European companies a fair chance to compete; considers that such a practice runs counter to the objective of the European Council to strengthen the European Defence Industrial Base; reminds these Member States of the need also to implement the principles of non-discrimination and transparency, as laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon, in relation to government-to-government sales;

67.

Calls on the Member States, the EDA and the Commission to work together towards the gradual phasing-out of offset requirements, while fostering the integration of smaller Member States' industries into the European defence technological and industrial base by means other than offsets; encourages Member States in particular to make full use of the Directives’ provisions on subcontracting and General Licences to achieve this objective;

68.

Stresses that greater use of innovative procurement techniques — especially e-procurement and pre-commercial procurement, as well as incentives setting for R&D — should be encouraged in defence procurement, as they may be particularly suited to this field and can play a major role in reducing the administrative burden and costs related to procurement procedures; believes that at the same time the protection of intellectual property rights and know-how needs to be ensured; urges the Member States to make strategic use of defence procurement and to implement innovative awarding principles based on the concept of the Most Economically Advantageous Tender;

69.

Considers that contracting authorities and entities in the fields of defence and security should have access to a specific procurement procedure in respect of contracts where there is a need for the development of an innovative product or service or innovative works and the subsequent purchase of the resulting supplies, services or works, which cannot be met by solutions already available on the market;

70.

Considers furthermore that such a procedure would improve the functioning of the internal market and the development of a European defence equipment market and a European defence technological and industrial base and would drive growth for innovative SMEs; stresses that such a procedure has already been agreed in the revised Classic and Utilities Procurement Directives, allowing contracting authorities to establish a long-term innovation partnership for the development and subsequent purchase of new, innovative products, services or works, providing the necessary ‘market pull’ and incentivising the development of an innovative solution without foreclosing the market;

71.

Calls, therefore, on the Commission to take these developments into account in its implementation report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Defence Procurement Directive (Directive 2009/81/EC), which is due by 21 August 2016, and to accompany this report with a legislative proposal amending Directive 2009/81/EC, introducing the innovation partnerships procedure for the contracts concerned;

72.

Urges the Member States also to take steps to eliminate duplication and excess capacity in the sector by boosting cooperation in the internal market; highlights the potential benefits of joint procurement in terms of economies of scale and interoperability; points out that shared projects will reduce costs and enable long-term investment;

73.

Recalls that the contracts awarded in the field of defence and security are often technically complex; stresses that in order to facilitate cross-border tendering there is a need to review — where appropriate — unnecessary, incompatible or disproportionate technical requirements so as to minimise and, where possible, eliminate barriers to the internal market;

74.

Notes that the development of a viable EDTIB can only be conceived as part of the global market and encourages the Commission and the European Council to approach the issue with a global outlook; considers that taking protectionist measures would be contrary to the goal of enhancing the competitiveness of the European defence industry;

75.

Deplores the existing inequality in terms of mutual market access between the US and Europe and the resulting imbalance in defence trade; calls for efforts to achieve genuine reciprocity in access to public defence procurement on both sides of the Atlantic;

76.

Urges the Member States to comply strictly with the obligations set out in Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, and to make sure they rigorously assess all licence applications against all the eight criteria as required; calls on the Member States and the EU to act in international forums in favour of greater transparency in international defence procurement markets, in order to increase the controllability of global trade flows in armaments, in particular by promoting the Arms Trade Treaty; calls on the Member States to ratify the Treaty expeditiously so that it can enter into force, following the consent of Parliament;

77.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the parliaments of the Member States, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Secretary-General of NATO.

24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/35

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 2 October 2013 entitled ‘Strengthening the social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)’ (COM(2013)0690),

—

having regard to the report by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, to the European Council of 26 June 2012 entitled ‘Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ (1),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 30 November 2012 entitled ‘A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: Launching a European Debate’ (COM(2012)0777),

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 December 2012 on the roadmap for the completion of Economic and Monetary Union (2),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2013 entitled ‘Towards a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: The introduction of a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument’ (COM(2013)0165),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2013 entitled ‘Towards a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Ex ante coordination of plans for major economic policy reforms’ (COM(2013)0166),

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 March 2013 (3), 28 June 2013 (4) and 25 October 2013 (5),

—

having regard to its resolution of 20 November 2012 entitled ‘Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ (6),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 February 2013 entitled ‘Towards Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion — including implementing the European Social Fund 2014-2020’ (COM(2013)0083) and to its resolution of 12 June 2013 thereon (7),

—

having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2013 on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: implementation of 2013 priorities (8),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 October 2009 entitled ‘Solidarity in health: Reducing health inequalities in the EU’(COM(2009)0567),

—

having regard to the public hearing organised by its Employment and Social Affairs Committee on 9 July 2013 on the ‘Social Dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) — European Unemployment Benefit Scheme’,

—

having regard to the Paper on Automatic Stabilisers of 4 October 2013 by the Commission’s DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion working group,

—

having regard to the Policy Brief of 13 September 2013 by the European Policy Centre (EPC) entitled ‘Developing the social dimension of a deep and genuine Economic and Monetary Union’,

—

having regard to Notre Europe’s ‘Blueprint for a Cyclical Shock Insurance in the euro area’ of September 2013,

—

having regard to the International Monetary Fund staff discussion note of September 2013 entitled ‘Toward a Fiscal Union for the Euro Area’ (9),

—

having regard to its resolution of 4 July 2013 entitled ‘Impact of the crisis on access to care for vulnerable groups’ (10),

—

having regard to the Commission’s EU Employment and Social Situation: Quarterly Review of October 2013,

—

having regard to the question to the Commission on the social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union (O-000122/2013 — B7-0524/2013),

—

having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas unemployment in the EU has reached the alarming level of 26,6 million people (11);

B.

whereas youth unemployment rates have reached unprecedented levels, averaging 23 % for the EU as a whole;

C.

whereas long-term unemployment has risen in most Member States and reached an all-time high in the EU as a whole;

D.

whereas structural unemployment and mismatches between labour supply and demand have been growing;

E.

whereas poverty levels have been increasing in the EU since 2007, while household incomes are declining, with the result that 24,2 % of the EU population is currently at risk of poverty or social exclusion;

F.

whereas in-work poverty has been increasing steadily since the onset of the crisis;

G.

whereas increases in the rate of in-work poverty and the number of jobless households have resulted in rising levels of child poverty;

H.

whereas inequalities both within and between Member States, especially in the euro area, have been rising;

I.

whereas there are persistent divergences between Member States, resulting in the rapid polarisation of unemployment rates, and whereas such divergences are also increasing among regions and social groups in some countries;

J.

whereas social imbalances have grown faster inside the euro area than in the EU as a whole;

K.

whereas the Social Protection Performance Monitor identified key social trends to watch;

L.

whereas unemployment rates on the periphery of the euro area reached an average of 17,3 % in 2012, compared with 7,1 % in the core of the euro area;

M.

whereas the rate of young people on the periphery of the euro area who are not in employment, education or training (NEETs) reached an average of 22,4 % in 2012, compared with 11,4 % in the core of the euro area;

N.

whereas poverty levels have increased in two thirds of the Member States, but stabilised in the remaining third;

O.

whereas major steps have been taken to reinforce the EU’s economic governance; whereas, however, the prospect of achieving the Europe 2020 targets is currently under threat;

P.

whereas the discussion of social imbalances should be put on the same footing as the discussion of macroeconomic imbalances;

Q.

whereas its Committee on Employment and Social Affairs held a public hearing on 9 July 2013 on the ‘Social dimension of the EMU — European unemployment benefit scheme’, which discussed and explored the idea of automatic stabilisers at the euro area level and possible modalities for their introduction;

R.

whereas the Troika has confirmed that high-quality participation by the social partners and strong social dialogue, including at national level, are necessary and may contribute to the success of any reforms, in particular reforms of the EMU;

S.

whereas the economic situation in some Member States has compromised the quality of employment, social protection and health and safety standards;

1.

Welcomes the Commission communication entitled ‘Strengthening the social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)’ and considers it to be a first step towards building a social dimension of the EMU;

2.

Recognises explicitly that the implementation of the social dimension of the EMU is subject to the subsidiarity principle and can be best achieved through the best practice method and the peer review method at European level;

3.

Believes, however, that more specific proposals are needed to ensure that economic governance respects the social dimension;

4.

Urges that social considerations be placed at the core of European integration and mainstreamed into all EU policies and initiatives;

5.

Considers that the social dimension should be a reconciliation/trade-off factor in terms of ‘benchlearning’;

6.

Notes that the purpose of the social dimension of the EMU is to provide social security and a sufficient living standard for current and future generations; considers it important, therefore, for EU citizens to see that their Union is capable of promoting social progress;

7.

Considers that the development of a social Europe, with the target of a ‘social union’, is a consequence of European integration;

8.

Supports the proposed establishment of a scoreboard of key employment and social indicators complementary to the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) with a view to making the social consequences of economic and other policies more transparent through ex ante and ex post impact assessments or monitoring, and which could be used in the drafting of the Commission’s Joint Employment Report (JER);

9.

Rejects any harmonisation or alignment which results in the minimisation of social standards in the Member States;

10.

Notes the fact that the proposed indicators are a possible way of ensuring comprehensive coverage of the Member States’ employment and social situations;

11.

Calls on the Commission to ensure that all relevant indicators are gender-sensitive;

12.

Calls for the proposed indicator on youth unemployment levels to include young people up to the age of 30 on a voluntary basis, as provided for by the Youth Guarantee;

13.

Calls for the scoreboard to include indicators relating to child poverty levels, access to healthcare, homelessness, and a decent work index in order to allow proper assessment of the social situation in the EU;

14.

Calls on the Council and the Commission to take concrete action to make the social impact of policies and reforms more transparent, through the ex ante and ex post impact assessment and monitoring of policy reforms;

15.

Calls on the Council to define concrete benchmarks for the employment and social indicators in the form of an EU social protection floor, with a view to promoting upward social convergence and social progress;

16.

Invites the Commission and the Member States to allow Parliament and the social partners to be involved in defining the employment and social indicators;

17.

Stresses the need to support the great potential of social entrepreneurship in respect of all aspects of social innovation at the European level, in order to foster national social systems, boost growth and create new jobs in the white and green economies, especially for young people, in all Member States and regions;

18.

Stresses the need to ensure that the monitoring of employment and social developments is able to contribute to better understanding and aims to reduce social divergences between Member States and prevent social dumping;

19.

Calls on the Commission to monitor the compliance of all Member State reports with Europe 2020 targets, notably with regard to poverty reduction and employment, and to look carefully at the interconnections and interdependence between policies;

20.

Regrets the fact that the aforementioned Commission communication of 2 October 2013 does not address the role and modalities of stabilisers;

21.

Welcomes the proposed involvement of the social partners in the European Semester process, inter alia in the framework of the Social Dialogue Committee prior to the adoption of the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) each year;

22.

Welcomes the call for optimum use of the EU budget with a view to developing the social dimension of the EMU and further supporting voluntary worker mobility in order to derive maximum benefit from the EU’s employment potential;

23.

Calls for the social partners to play an even more active role in the European Semester; considers regrettable the overly formal nature of the macroeconomic dialogue;

24.

Calls on the Commission better to integrate Parliament’s aforementioned resolution of 23 October 2013, the aforementioned Commission communication of 2 October 2013 and this resolution thereon in the drafting of the 2014 AGS;

25.

Recalls that good governance of the EMU and its impact can be effective only if all stakeholders, including the social partners, are involved; invites the Commission and the Member States to ensure that all stakeholders, including the social partners, are involved in economic governance, and in particular in the European Semester process;

26.

Invites the December 2013 European Council to define the steps forward in terms of strengthening the social aspect of the EMU;

27.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the European Council.

24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/39

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Bangladesh, in particular those of 23 May 2013 (1), 14 March 2013 (2), 17 January 2013 (3), 10 July 2008 (4) and 6 September 2007 (5),

—

having regard to the letter sent by the European Union Heads of Mission to mark the European Day against the Death Penalty on 10 October 2013,

—

having regard to the statement issued by the EU Delegation to Bangladesh on 12 August 2013 on the detention of Adilur Rahman Khan,

—

having regard to the statement of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay of 6 November 2013 on Bangladesh’s sentencing of 152 soldiers to death over the bloody mutiny in 2009,

—

having regard to the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1998,

—

having regard to the Universal Periodic Review on Bangladesh of 2013,

—

having regard to Rules 122(5) and 110(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the EU has good, long-standing relations with Bangladesh, including through the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development;

B.

whereas parliamentary elections are to be held in Bangladesh before 25 January 2014, following five years of rule by an elected, civilian government; whereas free, fair and transparent elections are essential in order to strengthen the relatively stable democratic governance that the country has developed over the past five years;

C.

whereas so far some 30 Bangladeshis have been killed, and hundreds wounded, in political violence during general strikes (‘hartals’) called for by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, with its ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami party, demanding that the forthcoming election be overseen by a ‘non-party’ caretaker government and calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina;

D.

whereas these shutdowns have led to five senior opposition leaders being arrested by the government, along with — according to BNP sources — the arrest of approximately 1 000 BNP followers in rural areas since Friday, 8 November 2013;

E.

whereas the incumbent ministers have resigned and Prime Minister Hasina, of the Awami League, has offered to form an ‘all-party government’, but whereas the principal opposition party has not taken up this offer so far;

F.

whereas over the years both the BNP and the Awami League have held contradictory and changing views on the merits of a caretaker government, while in May 2011 the Supreme Court declared illegal the 15-year-old constitutional provision mandating an elected government to transfer power on completion of its term to an appointed non-partisan caretaker administration which would oversee a new parliamentary election; whereas, however, the Supreme Court stated that the voided system could be continued for another two parliamentary terms for the sake of the ‘safety of the state and its people’; whereas the system was discredited by the last military-backed caretaker government in 2007-2008, when it refused to hold elections for nearly two years and sent the leaders of the two main parties, Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia (along with her son Tarique Rahman), to jail;

G.

whereas, following this judgment, the Awami League introduced the 15th Constitutional Amendment Bill and scrapped the caretaker system, notwithstanding the refusal of the BNP opposition to cooperate on the reform;

H.

whereas, since Sheikh Hasina came to power, five regional elections have been held in Bangladesh which the Awami League has lost and which have not given rise to any claims of irregularities;

I.

whereas the impoverished part of the Bangladeshi population, which is dependent on daily pay to survive, is severely affected by the strikes, and whereas Bangladesh’s fragile economy, which has already had to cope with the recent traumatic accidents in the garment sector, is likely to suffer further;

J.

whereas there are allegations that Jamaat-e-Islami is promoting the strikes in order to obstruct the proceedings of war crimes cases against its leaders;

K.

whereas on 5 November 2013, in one of the largest trials in history, 152 soldiers were handed death sentences by the special court set up to prosecute crimes committed during the 2009 mutiny, when 74 people, including 57 army officers, were brutally murdered; whereas UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay expressed alarm at these death sentences, following reports that the accused had been tortured and that the mass trials fell short of human rights standards;

L.

whereas NGO activists, lawyers, journalists and trade unionists who defend civil rights continue to be put under pressure, and whereas the authorities have failed to launch effective investigations into extrajudicial killings, torture and disappearances, as in the case of labour leader and human rights defender Aminul Islam;

1.

Expresses its serious concern over the continuing paralysis of everyday life in Bangladesh as a result of general strikes organised by the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami opposition and the confrontation between the two political camps — the Awami League and the opposition — in the run-up to the parliamentary elections;

2.

Regrets the fact that the Bangladeshi parliament did not manage to achieve an all-party consensus for the exercise of power by the government in the pre-election period, bearing in mind that most democracies manage this phase without a caretaker government, and urgently calls on the Bangladeshi Government and the opposition to put Bangladesh’s best interests first and to find a compromise which would give the Bangladeshi people a chance to express their democratic will;

3.

Recognises Bangladesh’s reputation as a tolerant and multi-confessional society, and condemns groups and factions trying to stir up inter-community tensions for their own ends; calls on all groups and individuals to exercise tolerance and restraint, especially in the lead-up to, during, and after the elections;

4.

Calls on all parties not to boycott the elections, as this would deprive citizens of a political choice and undermine Bangladesh’s social and economic stability and its impressive development progress, notably on the Millennium Development Goals, disaster management, labour rights and the empowerment of women;

5.

Calls on the Bangladesh Election Commission to organise and oversee the next general elections in a fully transparent manner; supports the recognition of new political parties that intend to participate in the next general elections and meet reasonable criteria for political participation and representation;

6.

Calls on all political parties to refrain from any violence or instigation of violence during the electoral process and to prevent a repetition of the politically motivated violent clashes that occurred in the first half of 2013; expresses its serious concerns, in this connection, about the recent flare-up of politically motivated violence that left dozens of people dead at the end of October 2013;

7.

Acknowledges the need for reconciliation, justice and accountability for the crimes committed during the 1971 war of independence; stresses and supports the important role of the International Crimes Tribunal in this respect;

8.

Deplores, however, the increasing numbers on death row in Bangladesh and the mass death sentences handed down in the trials of those involved in the 2009 border guard mutiny; insists on the application of national and international standards relating to fair trials and due process;

9.

Reiterates its strong opposition to the use of the death penalty in all cases and under any circumstances, and calls on the competent authorities in Bangladesh to introduce an official moratorium on executions as a first step towards the abolition of capital punishment;

10.

Calls on the Bangladeshi Government to restore the enabling environment for civil society organisations, including human rights defenders, which has contributed much to Bangladesh’s development, so that they can carry out their activities freely;

11.

Urges the Bangladeshi authorities to carry out prompt, independent and transparent investigations into cases involving violations of the rights of human rights defenders, including threats, attacks, killings, torture and ill-treatment, in order to identify all those responsible and bring them to justice; underlines, in particular, the case of labour leader Aminul Islam, as well as those of journalists Sagar Sarowar and Meherun Runi;

12.

Welcomes the joint initiative by the Government of Bangladesh and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), in collaboration with government, employers’ and workers’ representatives, on ‘Improving Working Conditions in the Ready-Made Garment Sector’; urges European and other international clothing brands to fulfil the promises and pledges made in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza factory collapse, including under the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh;

13.

Calls on the Bangladeshi Government to scrap the 30 % ‘representativity’ requirement for the registration of trade unions, to extend the scope of the Labour Act to cover categories of workers currently excluded, to adopt a prohibition on employers interfering in internal trade union affairs, to extend the scope of the Labour Act to apply to export processing zones, and to grant collective bargaining rights to Workers’ Welfare Associations (WWA), while making it easier to register WWAs;

14.

Is looking forward to Bangladesh fully cooperating with the UN Treaty Bodies and extending a standing invitation to the UN Human Rights Council Special Procedures;

15.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General, the UN Human Rights Council and the Government and Parliament of Bangladesh.

24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/42

—

having regard to its resolution of 24 March 2011 on European Union relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (1),

—

having regard to the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting in Manama, Bahrain, of 30 June 2013,

—

having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families of 18 December 1990,

—

having regard to the announcement by the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) of 2 December 2010 regarding the selection of Qatar as the venue for the 2022 Football World Cup,

—

having regard to Qatar’s ratification of the International Labour Organisation Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (C029) on 12 March 1998,

—

having regard to the decisions of the Qatari Minister of Civil Service and Housing on the application of Labour Law No 14/2004 on regulating the conditions and procedures for issuing licences to Qatari nationals wanting to employ foreign workers, of 22 August 2005, and on Qatar’s Sponsorship Law No 4, of 2009,

—

having regard to the mission statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, of 10 November 2013,

—

having regard to the reports of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (AI) on the situation of Qatar’s construction workers ahead of the World Cup and the recent visit to Qatar by the Secretary General of Amnesty International,

—

having regard to Rules 122(5) and 110(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas there are an estimated 1.35 million foreign nationals in Qatar, making up nearly 90 % of the country’s workforce; whereas migrants are employed largely in construction, services and domestic work; whereas these figures give Qatar the highest ratio of migrant workers to domestic population in the world; whereas at least 500 000 more migrant workers are expected in Qatar to accelerate construction work in preparation for the 2022 Football World Cup; whereas the majority of migrant workers come from India and Nepal, but also from Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka;

B.

whereas, according to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), figures obtained from the Embassies of India and Nepal in Qatar show that an average of 200 workers from each of those two countries die every year in Qatar, a situation that may further deteriorate in the run-up to the 2022 World Cup;

C.

whereas the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has warned that Qatar has not yet fully implemented the international convention banning the use of forced or compulsory labour, which it ratified in 1998; whereas the ILO has set up a tripartite committee to review the evidence and make recommendations to the Government of Qatar on how to comply with its international commitments;

D.

whereas the Chair of Qatar’s National Human Rights Committee admitted that ‘there had been some problems’ and pledged that he and the government were doing their utmost to put these right; whereas the Qatari authorities have announced that the labour laws will be amended and that accommodation for workers is being built;

E.

whereas the visa sponsorship rules, known as the ‘kafala’ system, mean that workers cannot change jobs without their employer’s permission and cannot leave the country unless their employer signs an exit permit; whereas the kafala system is often exploited, as employers withhold workers’ passports and wages and workers are charged fees as high as USD 3 500 to obtain a visa from the ‘kafeel’, or sponsor, leaving migrant workers with excessively high debts;

F.

whereas the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) lodged a complaint with the Qatari Ministry of Labour against a number of Qatari companies in March 2013; whereas the Labour Relations Department of the Qatari Ministry of Labour received 6 000 worker complaints in 2012; whereas the ITUC and Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) have denounced this situation and jointly filed complaints with the ILO about working conditions and freedom of association in Qatar;

1.

Considers regrettable the deaths of migrant workers in Qatar and expresses its condolences to their families;

2.

Is concerned about the situation of migrant workers in Qatar, including long working hours, hazardous working conditions, going unpaid for months, having their passports confiscated, being forced to live in overcrowded camps, being denied the right to form unions, and having no access to free drinking water in extreme heat;

3.

Recognises the challenges facing the Qatari authorities in managing a national labour force of which nearly 90 % is made up of migrant workers, as well as the practical challenges related to enforcing the law in this respect;

4.

Welcomes the announcement by the Qatari Government that it will blacklist companies that abuse migrant workers; welcomes the efforts made by the government and, in particular, by Qatar’s National Human Rights Council (NHRC) to raise awareness among migrant workers about their rights and duties under international law; commends, in this connection, the NHRC’s decision to set up a new centre to address and resolve migrant workers’ complaints;

5.

Calls on the Qatari authorities to effectively implement existing legislation in this field, including by enforcing the ban on confiscating passports, by prosecuting violations and by imposing meaningful sanctions on companies and individuals who violate laws designed to protect migrants’ rights; welcomes the Qatari authorities’ commitment to adopt legislation on domestic workers that includes meaningful protection of labour rights and effective compliance mechanisms; calls, in this connection, for the speedy adoption of the draft law on domestic workers that is currently being debated by the Supreme Council of Family Affairs; notes that the majority of domestic workers are women;

6.

Welcomes the proposal by the relevant government authorities to conduct investigations into all allegations, and the Qatari authorities’ promise to increase the number of labour inspectors charged with monitoring the enforcement of proper labour laws; expects the labour inspectors to receive training on human rights standards and hopes that they will be supported in their work by interpreters;

7.

Is concerned about the detention of individuals solely because they have ‘run away’ from their employers and calls on the Qatari authorities to stop such practices; further urges that all migrants deprived of their liberty have the means of contacting their families and consular services, have access to a lawyer and an interpreter, and have the right to challenge their detention promptly;

8.

Welcomes the reported movement towards resolving the problems facing the French football players Zahir Belounis and Stéphane Morello, who have fallen foul of the sponsorship system and have thus been prevented from leaving the country, and calls on the Qatari authorities and on FIFA to make sure that such cases do not occur again;

9.

Calls on Qatar to ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;

10.

Calls on Qatar to ratify the ILO conventions, including those on migrant workers, freedom of association, the right to organise and collective bargaining, domestic workers, and private employment agencies and to consider seeking technical assistance from the ILO to ensure that Qatari legislation and practice is in line with these conventions;

11.

Calls for the establishment of more shelters for migrant workers, with a special focus on shelters for women and children which are suitable for their needs; welcomes the announcement on 9 November 2013 of the construction of accommodation for 60 000 workers, to be opened in December 2013;

12.

Reiterates that the ratification and full implementation by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states, including Qatar, of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families should be a key issue in EU-GCC relations;

13.

Appeals to the responsibility of European corporations building stadiums or other infrastructure projects in Qatar to provide working conditions that are in line with international human rights standards and encourages the EU Member States to take steps to ensure that their engineering, construction and consultancy firms comply with Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development guidelines and with the Ruggie Principles;

14.

Calls on the Qatari authorities to work closely with the relevant authorities in migrant workers’ countries of origin, which should monitor the role of recruitment agencies supplying migrant workers to Qatar; calls on the European External Action Service to support the sending governments, notably in Asia, in delivering better treatment of the migrant labour force;

15.

Welcomes the call by the international footballers’ union, FIFPro, for independent workplace experts, appointed by FIFA and the ILO, to be given access to all sites and the power to make binding recommendations to ensure that international labour standards are respected in Qatar;

16.

Reminds FIFA that its responsibility goes beyond the development of football and the organisation of competitions and calls on it, with the active support of its European members, to send a clear and strong message to Qatar to prevent the preparations for the 2022 Football World Cup being overshadowed by allegations of forced labour;

17.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and Parliament of the State of Qatar, the governments and parliaments of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/45

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and especially Articles 9 and 10 thereof,

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been signed and ratified by Bolivia, and especially Articles 9, 10, 14, 15 and 16 thereof,

—

having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which has been signed and ratified by Bolivia,

—

having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, and especially Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 thereof,

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and especially Articles 47 and 48 thereof,

—

having regard to the American Convention on Human Rights, which has been signed and ratified by Bolivia,

—

having regard to the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, which has been signed and ratified by Bolivia,

—

having regard to the Bolivian Constitution and Code of Criminal Proceedings,

—

having regard to the declaration of 23 May 2012 by the Committee on Human Rights, Minority, Civic and Religious Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian National Assembly; having regard to the declaration adopted by the Bolivian House of Representatives on 12 June 2012 in response to the Hungarian declaration,

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in Bolivia,

—

having regard to Rules 122(5) and 110(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas on 16 April 2009, in the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the Bolivian Special Forces arrested Előd Tóásó, a Hungarian citizen, and Mario Tadić, a Croatian citizen; whereas three other people, namely Árpád Magyarósi, a Romanian citizen, Michael Martin Dwyer, an Irish citizen, and Eduardo Rózsa-Flores, a Hungarian citizen, died in the shooting;

B.

whereas Előd Tóásó and Mario Tadić have been held without charge in pre-trial detention ever since, in disregard of the Bolivian law that sets a maximum length for pre-trial detention of 36 months, a period which should have ended on 16 April 2012;

C.

whereas it is alleged that the basic human rights of Előd Tóásó and Mario Tadić have been breached, both on their arrest and during the criminal proceedings;

D.

whereas on 18 May 2010, when Előd Tóásó and Mario Tadić were already in custody, Article 239 of the Bolivian Code of Criminal Procedure, referring to the length of pre-trial detention, was amended to prolong the maximum period from 12 to 36 months, with retrospective effect;

E.

whereas on 17 December 2010 charges of terrorism were publicly formulated;

F.

whereas Opinion No 63/2011 (Plurinational State of Bolivia) of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated that Bolivia was in breach of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on several points and reaffirmed that Előd Tóásó had been arrested without a warrant and kept in jail illegally; whereas the UN Working Group accordingly called on the Bolivian Government to release Előd Tóásó immediately;

1.

Calls on the Bolivian authorities to ensure a fair and independent trial in the cases of Előd Tóásó and Mario Tadić;

2.

Takes note of the report adopted and subsequently widely disseminated by the Bolivian parliament, based on its own political investigation into the case;

3.

Calls for an independent investigation, involving international experts, into the deaths of Árpád Magyarósi, Michael Martin Dwyer and Eduardo Rózsa-Flores;

4.

Calls on the European External Action Service to keep the case high on the agenda in its contacts with the Bolivian Government, and to take concrete measures and steps on the matter;

5.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the parliaments and governments of the Member States, the Government and Plurinational Legislative Assembly of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the UN Human Rights Council.

24.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/47

—

having regard to the draft interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management,

—

having regard to Articles 310, 311, 312 and 323 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—

having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2012 in the interests of achieving a positive outcome of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 approval procedure (1),

—

having regard to the conclusions of the European Council adopted on 8 February 2013,

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2013 on the European Council conclusions of 7-8 February 2013 concerning the Multiannual Financial Framework (2),

—

having regard to the conclusions of the European Council adopted on 28 June 2013,

—

having regard to its resolution of 3 July 2013 on the political agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 (3),

—

having regard to Rule 127(1) of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Budgets (A7-0337/2013),

A.

Whereas a political agreement was reached on 27 June 2013 at the highest political level between the European Parliament, the Irish Presidency of the Council and the Commission on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014-2020 and on a new interinstitutional agreement;

B.

Whereas new provisions relating to the MFF as introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, in particular with regard to the greater role and prerogatives granted by them to the European Parliament, were used for the first time;

C.

Whereas it is appropriate to adopt, in the context of the MFF, an interinstitutional agreement for implementing budgetary discipline and for improving the functioning of the annual budgetary procedure and cooperation between the institutions on budgetary matters;

1.

Accepts the political agreement reached on the MFF for 2014-2020 and on a new interinstitutional agreement; is determined to make full use, in the course of forthcoming budgetary procedures, of the new instruments established, notably as regards flexibility;

2.

Highlights that the long and laborious process of negotiations, both within Council and at interinstitutional level, together with its outcome constitute an unsatisfactory implementation of the new provisions relating to the MFF as introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, in particular with regard to the greater role and prerogatives granted by them to the European Parliament;

3.

Denounces the negotiating strategy of the Council, in which its negotiators were bound by conclusions of the European Council of 8 February 2013 in matters falling under the ordinary legislative procedure, such as detailed allocation criteria, envelopes by programmes or beneficiary, and discretionary financial allocations adjusting the level of national returns from the Union budget, thus preventing both legislative arms from conducting proper negotiations;

4.

Regrets, moreover, that the numerous contacts and meetings held over the past few years between its delegation and the successive presidencies of the Council had no impact on the spirit, calendar or content of the negotiations or on the Council’s position, including the need to distinguish the legislative from the budgetary aspects of the agreement on the MFF;

5.

Concludes that, in line with Article 312(5) TFEU, alternative working arrangements should be defined in the future to facilitate the adoption of the MFF, ensuring that Parliament’s legislative and budgetary powers, as granted by the TFEU, are fully respected, that the Council actually negotiates any so-called ‘MFF-related’ parts of the legal bases for the programmes also, and that the European Council refrains from acting as a legislator, in breach of the TFEU;

6.

Calls for its Committee responsible for budgets, in cooperation with its Committee responsible for constitutional affairs, to draw the necessary conclusions and come forward with new proposals, in due time ahead of the 2016 post-electoral revision, on the modalities of MFF negotiations, so as to ensure the democratic and transparent nature of the whole budget-setting process;

7.

Approves conclusion of the agreement below;

8.

Instructs its President to sign the agreement with the President of the Council and the President of the Commission and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

9.

Instructs its President to forward this decision, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission for information.