(1)

Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 provides for the authorisation of additives for use in animal nutrition and for the grounds and procedures for granting such authorisation.

(2)

In accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003, an application was submitted for the authorisation of the preparation set out in the Annex to this Regulation. That application was accompanied by the particulars and documents required under Article 7(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003.

(3)

The application concerns a new authorisation of the amino acid L-valine with a purity of at least 98 %, produced by Escherichia coli (K-12 AG314) FERM ABP-10640 as a feed additive for all species, to be classified in the additive category ‘nutritional additives’.

(4)

From the opinions of the European Food Safety Authority (the Authority) of 30 January 2008 (2) and of 18 November 2008 (3) it results that the amino acid L-valine with a purity of at least 98 %, does not have an adverse effect on animal health, human health or the environment and that it is considered a source of available valine for all species. The Authority does not consider that there is a need for specific requirements of post-market monitoring. It also verified the report on the method of analysis of the feed additive in feed submitted by the Community Reference Laboratory set up by Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003.

(5)

The assessment of that preparation shows that the conditions for authorisation, provided for in Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003, are satisfied. Accordingly, the use of that preparation should be authorised as specified in the Annex to this Regulation.

(6)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

(1)

Natural resources, the pursuit of prudent and rational utilisation of which Article 174(1) of the Treaty requires, include oil, which is the principal energy source in the European Union but is also a major source of pollutant emissions.

(2)

The Commission Communication of 15 May 2001 entitled ‘A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development’, presented to the Gothenburg European Council of 15 and 16 June 2001, identified greenhouse gas emissions and pollution caused by transport among the main obstacles to sustainable development.

(3)

Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme (4) acknowledged the need for specific measures to enhance energy efficiency and energy saving and for the integration of climate change objectives into transport and energy policies as well as the need for specific measures in the transport sector to address energy use and greenhouse gas emissions.

(4)

The Commission Communication of 10 January 2007 entitled ‘An energy policy for Europe’ proposed a commitment on the part of the European Union to achieve at least a 20 % reduction of greenhouse gases by 2020 compared to 1990. In addition, binding targets for further improvement of energy efficiency by 20 %, a level of 20 % of renewable energy and a 10 % share of renewable energy in transport in the Community by 2020 have been proposed, inter alia, to improve security of energy supply by diversifying the fuel mix.

(5)

The Commission Communication of 19 October 2006 entitled ‘Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential’ announced that the Commission will continue its efforts to develop markets for cleaner, smarter, safer and energy-efficient vehicles through public procurement and awareness-raising.

(6)

The mid-term review of the Commission’s 2001 Transport White Paper entitled ‘Keep Europe moving – Sustainable mobility for our continent’, of 22 June 2006, announced that the Union will stimulate environmentally-friendly innovation in particular by successive European emission standards (Euro Norms) and by the promotion of clean vehicles on the basis of public procurement.

(7)

In its Communication of 7 February 2007 entitled ‘Results of the review of the Community Strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and light-commercial vehicles’, the Commission presented a comprehensive new strategy to enable the Union to reach its 120 g/km objective for CO2 emissions from new passenger cars by 2012. A legislative framework was proposed to ensure vehicle technology improvements. Complementary measures should promote the procurement of fuel-efficient vehicles.

(8)

The Commission Green Paper on Urban Transport of 25 September 2007 entitled ‘Towards a new culture for urban mobility’ notes the support of stakeholders for promoting the market introduction of clean and energy-efficient vehicles through green public procurement. It proposes that a possible approach could be based on the internalisation of external costs by using lifetime costs for energy consumption, CO2 emissions, and pollutant emissions linked to the operation of the vehicles to be procured as award criteria, in addition to the vehicle price. In addition, public procurement could give preference to new Euro standards. The earlier use of cleaner vehicles could then improve air quality in urban areas.

(9)

The CARS 21 High Level Group report of 12 December 2005 supported the Commission’s initiative on the promotion of clean and energy-efficient vehicles, on condition that a technology-neutral and performance-based integrated approach involving vehicle manufacturers, oil or fuel suppliers, repairers, customers or drivers and public authorities is taken.

(10)

The High Level Group on competitiveness, energy and the environment, in its report of 27 February 2007, recommended that private and public procurement should take account of full lifetime costs with emphasis on energy efficiency. Member States and the Community should develop and publish public purchasing guidance on how to move beyond lowest price tendering to procurement of more sustainable intermediate goods in line with Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (5) and Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (6).

(11)

This Directive aims to stimulate the market for clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles, and especially – since this would have a substantial environmental impact – to influence the market for standardised vehicles produced in larger quantities such as passenger cars, buses, coaches and trucks, by ensuring a level of demand for clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles which is sufficiently substantial to encourage manufacturers and the industry to invest in and further develop vehicles with low energy consumption, CO2 emissions, and pollutant emissions.

(12)

Member States should inform national, regional or local contracting authorities and contracting entities and operators which provide public passenger transport services of the provisions relating to the purchase of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles.

(13)

Clean and energy-efficient vehicles initially have a higher price than conventional ones. Creating sufficient demand for such vehicles could ensure that economies of scale lead to cost reductions.

(14)

This Directive addresses the need to provide support for Member States through facilitating and structuring the exchange of knowledge and best practices for promoting the purchase of clean and energy-efficient vehicles.

(15)

Procurement of vehicles for public transport services can make a significant impact on the market if harmonised criteria are applied at Community level.

(16)

The biggest impact on the market, together with the best cost/benefit result, is obtained through mandatory inclusion of lifetime costs for energy consumption, CO2 emissions, and pollutant emissions as award criteria in the procurement of vehicles for public transport services.

(17)

In line with the scope of Directive 2004/17/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC and whilst fully respecting the implementation in national law of those directives, this Directive should cover road transport vehicles purchased by contracting authorities and contracting entities, irrespective of whether such authorities and entities are public or private. Furthermore, this Directive should cover the purchase of road transport vehicles used for performing public passenger transport services under a public service contract, leaving to Member States the freedom to exclude minor purchases with a view to avoiding an unnecessary administrative burden.

(18)

In line with Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles (Framework Directive) (7) and with a view to avoiding an undue administrative burden, Member States should be able to exempt authorities and operators from the requirements laid down in this Directive when purchasing vehicles designed and constructed for special use.

(19)

This Directive should provide for a set of options for taking into account energy and environmental impacts. This would enable authorities and operators that have already developed methods tailored to meeting local needs and conditions to continue applying these methods.

(20)

Including energy consumption, CO2 emissions, and pollutant emissions in the award criteria does not impose higher total costs but rather anticipates operational lifetime costs in the procurement decision. Complementary to the legislation on Euro Norms, which sets maximum emission limits, this approach monetises the actual pollutant emission and does not require any additional standard setting.

(21)

When fulfilling the requirement to take energy and environmental impacts into account by setting technical specifications, contracting authorities, contracting entities and operators are encouraged to set specifications of a higher level of energy and environmental performance than laid down in Community legislation, taking into account, for example, Euro Norms which are already adopted but have not yet become obligatory.

(22)

The ExternE Study (8), the Commission Clean Air for Europe (CAFE) (9) Programme and the HEATCO Study (10) have provided information on the costs of CO2, oxides of nitrogen (NOx), non-methane hydrocarbons (NMHC) and particulate matter emissions. Costs are taken at present value to keep the award procedure simple.

(23)

This Directive should define a range for the costs of CO2 and pollutant emissions which, on the one hand, enables flexibility for contracting authorities, contracting entities and operators to take account of their local situation, and, on the other hand, ensures an appropriate degree of harmonisation.

(24)

Mandatory application of criteria for the procurement of clean and energy-efficient vehicles does not preclude the inclusion of other relevant award criteria. It also does not prevent the choice of retro-fitted vehicles upgraded for higher environmental performance. Such other relevant award criteria may also be included in procurements subject to Directives 2004/17/EC or 2004/18/EC, provided they are linked to the subject-matter of the contract, do not confer an unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority or contracting entity, are expressly mentioned and comply with the fundamental principles of the Treaty.

(25)

The method of calculating operational lifetime costs for pollutant emissions for the purpose of vehicle procurement decisions, including the numerical values defined in this Directive, does not prejudge other Community legislation addressing external costs.

(26)

Reviews and revisions of the calculation method defined in this Directive should consider relevant related Community legislative measures and should aim for consistency with them.

(27)

The energy and environmental award criteria should be among the various award criteria taken into consideration by contracting authorities or contracting entities when they are called upon to take a decision on the procurement of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles.

(28)

This Directive should not prevent contracting authorities and contracting entities from giving preference to the latest Euro Norms in the purchase of vehicles for public transport services before those standards become obligatory. It should also not prevent contracting authorities and contracting entities from giving preference to alternative fuels, for example hydrogen, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) and biofuels, provided the lifetime energy and environmental impacts are taken into account.

(29)

Standardised Community test procedures should be developed for additional vehicle categories in order to improve comparability and transparency of manufacturer data. Manufacturers should be encouraged to provide data for total lifetime energy consumption, CO2 emissions and pollutant emissions.

(30)

The possibility of public support for the purchase of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles, including the retrofitting of vehicles with engines and replacement parts, which go beyond the mandatory environmental requirements, is recognised in the Community guidelines for State aid for environmental protection (11) and Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation) (12). In this context, the guidelines included in the Commission Communication entitled ‘Community guidelines on State aid for railway undertakings’ (13), in particular footnote 1 to point 34 and footnote 3 to point 36, are also relevant. However, the rules of the Treaty, and in particular Articles 87 and 88 thereof, will continue to apply to such public support.

(31)

The possibility of public support in favour of the promotion of development of infrastructures necessary for the distribution of alternative fuels is recognised in the Community guidelines for State aid for environmental protection. However, the rules of the Treaty, and in particular Articles 87 and 88 thereof, will continue to apply to such public support.

(32)

The purchase of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles offers an opportunity to cities wishing to brand themselves as environmentally conscious. In this context, disclosure on the Internet of information on public procurement pursuant to this Directive is important.

(33)

The publication on the Internet of relevant information related to the financial instruments available in the Member States for urban mobility and for the promotion of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles should be encouraged.

(34)

The measures necessary for the implementation of this Directive should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (14).

(35)

In particular the Commission should be empowered to adapt to inflation and to technical progress the data for the calculation of the operational lifetime costs of road transport vehicles. Since those measures are of general scope and are designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive, they must be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny provided for in Article 5a of Decision 1999/468/EC.

(36)

Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to promote and stimulate the market for clean and energy-efficient vehicles and to improve the contribution of the transport sector to the environment, climate and energy policies of the Community, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, in order to provide a critical mass of vehicles for cost-efficient developments by European industry, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(37)

The Member States and the Commission should continue to promote clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles. In this context, national and regional operational programmes, as defined by Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund (15) could play an important role. Furthermore, Community programmes such as Civitas and Intelligent Energy Europe could contribute to improving urban mobility while reducing its adverse effects.

(38)

In accordance with point 34 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making (16), Member States are encouraged to draw up, for themselves and in the interests of the Community, their own tables illustrating, as far as possible, the correlation between this Directive and the transposition measures, and to make them public,

(a)

contracting authorities or contracting entities in so far as they are under an obligation to apply the procurement procedures set out in Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC;

(b)

operators for the discharge of public service obligations under a public service contract within the meaning of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road (17) in excess of a threshold which shall be defined by Member States not exceeding the threshold values as set out in Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC.

1.

‘contracting authorities’ means contracting authorities as defined in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2004/17/EC and in Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18/EC;

2.

‘contracting entities’ means contracting entities as referred to in Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/17/EC;

3.

‘road transport vehicle’ means a vehicle covered by the vehicle categories listed in Table 3 of the Annex.

(1)

Excessive risk-taking in the financial services industry and in particular in banks and investment firms has contributed to the failure of financial undertakings and to systemic problems in the Member States and globally. These problems have spread to the rest of the economy and led to high costs for society.

(2)

Whilst not the main cause of the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007 and 2008, there is a widespread consensus that inappropriate remuneration practices in the financial services industry also induced excessive risk-taking and thus contributed to significant losses of major financial undertakings.

(3)

Remuneration practices in a large part of the financial services industry have been running counter to effective and sound risk management. These practices tended to reward short-term profit and gave staff incentives to pursue unduly risky activities which provided higher income in the short term while exposing financial undertakings to higher potential losses in the longer term.

(4)

In principle, if risk management and control systems were strong and highly effective, the risk-taking incentives provided by remuneration practices would be consistent with the risk tolerance of a financial undertaking. However, all risk management and control systems have limitations and, as the financial crisis has shown, can fail to deal with the risks created by inappropriate incentives, due to the increasing complexity of the risks and the range of ways by which risk may be taken. Consequently, a simple functional separation between business units and staff responsible for risk management and control systems is necessary but no longer sufficient.

(5)

Creating appropriate incentives within the remuneration system itself should reduce the burden on risk management and increase the likelihood that these systems become effective. Therefore, there is a need to establish principles on sound remuneration policies.

(6)

Given the competitive pressures in the financial services industry and the fact that many financial undertakings operate cross-border, it is important to ensure that principles on sound remuneration policy are applied consistently throughout the Member States. However, it is acknowledged that to be more effective, principles on sound remuneration policy would need to be implemented globally and in a consistent manner.

(7)

In its Communication to the Spring European Council ‘Driving European Recovery’ (1), the Commission presented its plan to restore and maintain a stable and reliable financial system. In particular, the Communication announced that a new Recommendation on remuneration in the financial services sector would be presented in order to improve risk management in financial firms and align pay incentives with sustainable performance.

(8)

This Recommendation sets out general principles applicable to remuneration policy in the financial services sector and should apply to all financial undertakings operating in the financial services industry.

(9)

Those general principles may be of more relevance to certain categories of financial undertakings than others, in the light of existing regulations and common practices in the financial services industry. These principles should apply in parallel to any rule or regulation governing a specific financial sector. In particular, fees and commissions received by intermediaries and external service providers in case of outsourced activities should not be addressed, since the compensation practices relating to such fees and commissions are already partially covered by particular regimes, in particular Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments (2) and Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 on insurance mediation (3). Furthermore, this Recommendation is without prejudice to the rights, where applicable, of social partners in collective bargaining.

(10)

With respect to financial undertakings whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market within the meaning of Directive 2004/39/EC in one or more Member States, this Recommendation apply in addition to and together with Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC of 14 December 2004 fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (4) and Commission Recommendation 2009/385/EC of 30 April 2009 complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (5).

(11)

The remuneration policy of a particular financial undertaking should also be linked to the size of the financial undertaking concerned, as well as the nature and the complexity of its activities.

(12)

A risk-focused remuneration policy, which is consistent with effective risk management and does not entail excessive risk exposure, should be adopted.

(13)

Remuneration policy should cover those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the financial undertaking. In order to avoid incentives for excessive risk-taking, special arrangements should be adopted with regard to the remuneration of these categories of staff.

(14)

Remuneration policy should aim at aligning the personal objectives of staff members with the long-term interests of the financial undertaking concerned. The assessment of the performance-based components of remuneration should be based on longer-term performance and take into account the outstanding risks associated with the performance. The assessment of performance should be set in a multi-year framework, for example of three to five years, in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over the business cycle of the company.

(15)

Financial undertakings should be able to reclaim variable components of remuneration that were awarded for performance based on data which has subsequently proven to be manifestly misstated.

(16)

As a general principle, payments related to early termination of a contract which are awarded on a contractual basis should not be a reward for failure. For directors of listed financial undertakings, specific provisions on termination payments set out in Recommendation 2009/385/EC should apply.

(17)

In order for remuneration policy to be in line with the objectives, the business strategy, the values and the long-term interests of the financial institution, other factors, apart from financial performance, should be considered, such as compliance with systems and controls of the financial institution, as well as compliance with the standards governing the relationship with clients and investors.

(18)

Effective governance is a necessary condition for the remuneration policy to be sound. The decision-making process regarding the remuneration policy of a financial undertaking should be internally transparent and should be designed in such a way as to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure the independence of the persons involved.

(19)

The governing body of the financial undertaking should have the ultimate responsibility for establishing the remuneration policy for the whole financial undertaking and monitoring its implementation. In order to provide necessary expertise, control functions and, where appropriate, human resources departments and experts should be involved in the process. In particular, control functions should also be involved in the design and the review of the implementation of the remuneration policy, and should be adequately rewarded so as to attract skilled individuals and to ensure their independence from the business units they control. The statutory auditor, within the limits of current reporting duties, should report on material weaknesses in the review of the implementation of the remuneration policy to the (supervisory) board or to the audit committee.

(20)

Control of the design and implementation of the remuneration policy is more likely to be effective if the stakeholders of the financial undertaking, including, where applicable, employee representatives, are properly informed of and engaged in the process of setting up and monitoring remuneration policy. For that purpose, financial undertakings should disclose the relevant information to their stakeholders.

(21)

The implementation of the principles laid down in this Recommendation should be reinforced through supervisory review at the national level. Therefore, supervisor’s overall assessment of the soundness of the financial undertaking should include the assessment of compliance of the remuneration policy of the financial undertaking with the principles laid down in this Recommendation.

(22)

Member States should ensure that branches of financial undertakings having their registered office or their head office in a third country and which operate in the territory of a Member State should be subject to similar principles on remuneration policy which apply to financial undertakings having their registered office or their head office in the territory of a Member State.

(23)

This Recommendation should apply without prejudice to measures which might be adopted by Member States with respect to remuneration policies of financial undertakings which benefit from State assistance.

(24)

The notification of measures by Member States in accordance with this Recommendation should include a clear timeframe for financial undertakings to adopt remuneration policies consistent with the principles set out in this Recommendation,

(1)

On 14 December 2004, the Commission adopted Recommendation 2004/913/EC fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (1) and on 15 February 2005 the Commission adopted Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board (2). The main objectives of those Recommendations are to ensure transparency of remuneration practices, shareholder control on the remuneration policy and individual remuneration through disclosure and the introduction of a mandatory or advisory vote on the remuneration statement and shareholder approval for share-based remuneration schemes, effective and independent non-executive supervision and at least an advisory role of the remuneration committee with regard to remuneration practices.

(2)

It follows from those Recommendations that the Commission should monitor the situation, including implementation and application of the principles included in those Recommendations, and assess the need for further measures. Moreover, experience over the last years, and more recently in relation to the financial crisis, has shown that remuneration structures have become increasingly complex, too focused on short-term achievements and in some cases led to excessive remuneration, which was not justified by performance.

(3)

Whilst the form, structure and level of directors’ remuneration continue to be matters primarily falling within the competence of companies, their shareholders and, where applicable, employee representatives, the Commission considers that there is a need for additional principles regarding the structure of directors’ remuneration, as set out in a company’s remuneration policy and the process of determining remuneration and control on that process.

(4)

This Recommendation is without prejudice to the rights, where applicable, of social partners in collective bargaining.

(5)

The existing regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies should be strengthened by principles which are complementary to those contained in Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC.

(6)

The structure of directors’ remuneration should promote the long-term sustainability of the company and ensure that remuneration is based on performance. Variable components of remuneration should therefore be linked to predetermined and measurable performance criteria, including criteria of a non-financial nature. Limits should be set on the variable components of remuneration. Significant variable components of remuneration should be deferred for a certain period, for example, three to five years, subject to performance conditions. Further, companies should be able to reclaim variable components of remuneration that were paid on the basis of data, which proved to be manifestly misstated.

(7)

It is necessary to ensure that termination payments, so-called ‘golden parachutes’, are not a reward for failure and that the primary purpose of termination payments as a safety net in case of early termination of the contract is respected. To that purpose, termination payments should be limited to a certain amount or duration beforehand, which, in general, should not be more than two years’ annual remuneration (on the basis of only the non-variable component of the annual remuneration) and not be paid if the termination is due to inadequate performance or if a director leaves on his own account. This does not preclude termination payments in situations of early termination of the contract, due to changes in the strategy of the company or in merger and/or takeover situations.

(8)

Schemes under which directors are remunerated in shares, share options or any other right to acquire shares or be remunerated on the basis of share price movements should be better linked to performance and long-term value creation of the company. Therefore, an appropriate vesting period should apply to shares, whereby vesting is made subject to performance conditions. Share options and rights to acquire shares or be remunerated on the basis of share price movements should be not be exercisable during an appropriate period and the right to exercise them should be made subject to performance conditions. In order to further prevent conflicts of interest of directors who hold shares in the company, these directors should be obliged to retain a part of their shares until the end of their mandate.

(9)

In order to facilitate the shareholders’ assessment of the company’s approach to remuneration and strengthen the company’s accountability towards its shareholders, the remuneration statement should be clear and easily understandable. Moreover, further disclosure of information relating to the structure of remuneration is necessary.

(10)

In order to increase accountability, shareholders should be encouraged to attend general meetings and make considered use of their voting rights. In particular, institutional shareholders should take a leading role in the context of ensuring increased accountability of boards with regard to remuneration issues.

(11)

Remuneration committees, as referred to in Recommendation 2005/162/EC, fulfil an important role in designing a company’s remuneration policy, preventing conflicts of interests and supervising the (managing) board’s behaviour in the context of remuneration. To strengthen the role of those committees, at least one member thereof should have expertise in the field of remuneration.

(12)

Remuneration consultants may have conflicting interests, for instance when they advise the remuneration committee on remuneration practices and arrangements, and at the same time advise the company or the executive or managing director(s). It is appropriate for remuneration committees to exercise caution when hiring remuneration consultants in order to ensure that the same consultants do not advise the human resources department of the company or executive or managing directors at the same time.

(13)

In view of the importance of the question of remuneration of directors and in order to enhance the effective application of the Community framework on directors’ remuneration, the Commission intends to make extended use of different monitoring mechanisms, such as annual scoreboards and mutual evaluation by Member States. Moreover, the Commission intends to explore the possibilities of standardising disclosure of directors’ remuneration policy.

(14)

The notification of measures by Member States in accordance with this Recommendation should include a clear time-frame for companies to adopt remuneration policies consistent with the principles set out in this Recommendation,