1.

1.1.

1.1.1.

1.1.2.

1.1.3.

1.1.4.

1.2.

2.

2.1.

2.2.

2.2.1.

2.2.2.

2.2.3.

2.2.4.

2.3.

2.4.

3.

4.

4.1.

4.2.

4.2.1.

4.2.2.

4.2.3.

4.3.

4.3.1.

4.3.2.

4.4.

4.4.1.

4.4.2.

4.4.3.

4.4.4.

4.4.5.

4.4.6.

4.5.

4.5.1.

4.5.2.

4.6.

4.6.1.

4.7.

4.7.1.

4.8.

4.8.1.

4.8.2.

5.

6.

6.1.

6.2.

6.2.1.

6.2.2.

6.2.3.

6.2.4.

6.2.5.

6.2.6.

6.2.7.

6.2.8.

7.

7.1.

7.1.1.

7.1.2.

7.1.3.

7.2.

7.2.1.

7.2.2.

7.2.3.

7.2.4.

7.3.

7.3.1.

7.3.2.

Appendix A:

Appendix B:

(a)

This TSI concerns the following subsystems as defined in Directive 2008/57/EC: control-command and signalling (‘CCS’), infrastructure (‘INF’), energy (‘ENE’), operation (‘OPE’), and rolling stock (locomotives and passenger units ‘LOC&PAS’).

(b)

The purpose of this TSI is to define a coherent set of tunnel specific measures for the infrastructure, energy, rolling stock, control-command and signalling and operation subsystems, thus delivering an optimal level of safety in tunnels in the most cost-efficient way.

(c)

It shall permit free movement of vehicles which are in compliance with this TSI to run under harmonised safety conditions in railway tunnels.

(d)

Only measures, designed to reduce specific tunnel risks, are prescribed in the present TSI. Risks related to pure railway operation, such as derailment and collision with other trains, are addressed by general railway safety measures.

(e)

The existing safety level shall not be reduced in a country as stipulated in Directive 2004/49/EC Art 4.1. Member States can retain more stringent requirements, as long as these requirements do not prevent the operation of TSI compliant trains.

(f)

Member States can prescribe new and more stringent requirements for specific tunnels in accordance with Directive 2004/49/EC Art 8; such requirements shall be notified to the Commission before they are introduced. Such higher requirements must be based on a risk analysis and must be justified by a particular risk situation. They shall be the result of a consultation of the Infrastructure Manager and of the relevant authorities for emergency response, and they shall be subject to a cost-benefit assessment.

(a)

This TSI applies to new, renewed and upgraded tunnels which are located on the European Union rail network, and which are in accordance with the definition in clause 2.4 of this TSI.

(b)

Stations that are in tunnels shall be in conformity with the national rules on fire safety. When they are used as safe areas, they shall comply only with the specifications for clauses 4.2.1.5.1, 4.2.1.5.2 and 4.2.1.5.3 of this TSI. When they are used as fire fighting points, they shall comply only with the specifications of clauses 4.2.1.7 (c) and 4.2.1.7 (e) of this TSI.

(a)

This TSI applies to rolling stock which is in the scope of the LOC&PAS TSI.

(b)

Rolling stock categorised ‘A’ or ‘B’ according to the previous SRT TSI (Decision 2008/163/EC) shall retain its category in this TSI as defined in clause 4.2.3.

(a)

This TSI covers only specific risks to the safety of passengers and on-board staff in tunnels for the subsystems above. It also covers risks for people in the neighbourhood of a tunnel where collapse of the structure could have catastrophic consequences.

(b)

Where a risk analysis comes to the conclusion that other tunnel incidents might be of relevance, specific measures to deal with these scenarios shall be defined.

(c)

Risks not covered by this TSI are as follows:

—

The trans-European conventional rail system network (TEN) as described in Annex I section 1.1 ‘Network’ of Directive 2008/57/EC

—

The trans-European high-speed rail system network (TEN) as described in Annex I section 2.1 ‘Network’ of Directive 2008/57/EC

—

Other parts of the network of the whole rail system, following the extension of scope described in Annex I section 4 of Directive 2008/57/EC,

(a)

The line of defence for the promotion of safety in tunnels comprises four successive layers: Prevention, mitigation, evacuation and rescue.

(b)

The largest contribution is in the area of prevention followed by mitigation and so on.

(c)

The layers of safety combine to produce a low level of residual risk.

Residual risk

Safe side

Rescue

Evacuation

Mitigation

Prevention

Risks in tunnels

(d)

A major feature of railways is their inherent ability to prevent accidents through the traffic running on a guide-way and generally being controlled and regulated using a signalling system.

(a)

This TSI provides measures which could prevent or mitigate the difficulty of evacuation or rescue operations following a tunnel-specific railway incident.

Not considered

No measures required

Tunnel-specific

incident scenarios:

— Collision

— Derailment

— Fire

— Explosion

— Toxic gas release

— Spontan evaciation

Prolonged stop

Not tunnel-specific

Taken care of by general safety measures

Rescue measures

Evacuation measures

Mitigation measures

Prevention measures

Railway risks

(b)

Relevant measures have been identified, which will control or significantly reduce the risks arising from the tunnel-specific incident scenarios identified above.

(c)

They have been developed, in the categories prevention/mitigation/evacuation/rescue; however they do not appear under these headings in this TSI but under the headings of the concerned subsystems.

(d)

The measures prescribed can be considered as a response to the following three types of incident.

(a)

The main danger is fire. Fire is understood as a combination of heat, flames and smoke.

(b)

The fire starts on a train.

The fire is detected, either by on-board fire detectors, or by persons on-board. The driver is notified of a problem, either that there is a fire by an automatic notification or that there is a problem in general by passengers using the passenger alarm.

The driver is instructed to act appropriately depending on the local circumstances.

Ventilation is shut down to prevent smoke distribution. For rolling stock of category B, the passengers in the affected area will move to a non-affected area of the train where they are protected from fire and fumes

Whenever possible the train leaves the tunnel. Passengers are evacuated, directed by the train crew, or by self-rescue, to a safe area in the open air.

If appropriate, the train may stop at a fire fighting point inside the tunnel. Passengers are evacuated, directed by the train crew, or by self-rescue, to a safe area.

If a fire extinguishing system can extinguish the fire, the incident will become a ‘cold’ incident.

(c)

The fire starts in the tunnel.

If fire starts in a tunnel or in a technical room, the driver is instructed to act appropriately depending on the local circumstances in compliance with the tunnel-specific incident scenarios, described in the Emergency Plan.

(a)

The tunnel specific measures concentrate on access/egress facilities to support evacuation and the intervention of the emergency response services.

(b)

The difference compared to the hot incidents is that there is no time constraint due to the presence of a hostile environment created by a fire.

(a)

Prolonged stop (an unplanned stop in a tunnel, without the occurrence of a hot or cold incident, for longer than 10 minutes) is not by itself a threat to passengers and staff.

(b)

However it may lead to panic and to spontaneous, uncontrolled evacuation that exposes people to dangers present in a tunnel environment.

(a)

The definition of the role of the emergency response services is a matter for the relevant national legislation.

(b)

The measures specified in this TSI for rescue are based on the assumption that the emergency response services intervening in a tunnel incident shall protect lives as a priority.

(c)

It is assumed that they are expected to:

(d)

No demands on time or performance requirements are included in this TSI.

(e)

Considering that incidents in railway tunnels involving multiple fatalities are rare, it is implicit that there might be events, with an extremely low probability, for which even well-equipped emergency response services would be restricted, such as a major fire involving a freight train.

(f)

If the expectations of the emergency response services expressed in emergency plans go beyond the assumptions described above, then additional measures or tunnel equipment can be provided.

(a)

Railway tunnel: A railway tunnel is an excavation or a construction around the track provided to allow the railway to pass for example higher land, buildings or water. The length of a tunnel is defined as the length of the fully enclosed section, measured at rail level. A tunnel in the context of this TSI is 0.1 km or longer. Where certain requirements apply only to longer tunnels, thresholds are mentioned in the relevant clauses.

(b)

Safe area: a safe area is a temporary survivable space, inside or outside the tunnel, for passengers and staff to find refuge after they have evacuated from a train.

(c)

Fire fighting point: a fire fighting point is a defined location, inside or outside the tunnel, where fire fighting equipment can be used by rescue services and where passengers and staff can evacuate from a train.

(d)

Technical rooms: Technical rooms are enclosed spaces with doors for access/egress inside or outside the tunnel with safety installations which are necessary for at least one of the following functions: self-rescue, evacuation, emergency communication, rescue and fire fighting, signalling and communication equipment, and traction power supply.

(e)

Freight train: A freight train is a train composed of one or more locomotive(s) and one or more wagon(s). A freight train including at least one wagon carrying dangerous goods is a dangerous goods train.

(f)

All definitions related to rolling stock are defined in the LOC&PAS TSI and the WAG TSI.

(a)

The European Union rail system, to which Directive 2008/57/EC applies and of which the subsystems are parts, has been developed to become an integrated system for which the consistency must be verified.

(b)

This consistency has been checked in relation to the development of the specifications within this TSI, its interfaces with respect to the systems in which it is integrated and also the operating rules for the railway.

(c)

Taking account of all the applicable essential requirements, the basic parameters related to safety in railway tunnels are set out for the subsystems infrastructure, energy and rolling stock in section 4.2 of this TSI. The operational requirements and responsibilities are set out in the OPE TSI and in section 4.4 of this TSI.

(a)

Unauthorised access to technical rooms shall be prevented.

(b)

Where emergency exits are locked for security purposes, it shall always be possible to open them from inside.

(a)

In the event of fire, the integrity of the tunnel lining shall be maintained for a period of time that is sufficiently long to permit self-rescue, evacuation of passengers and staff and intervention of the emergency response services. That period of time shall be in accordance with the evacuation scenarios considered and reported in the emergency plan.

(b)

In the cases of immersed tunnels and tunnels which can cause the collapse of important neighbouring structures, the main structure of the tunnel shall withstand the temperature of the fire for a period of time that is sufficient to allow evacuation of the endangered tunnel zones and neighbouring structures. This period of time shall be reported in the emergency plan.

(a)

This specification applies to construction products and building elements inside tunnels.

(b)

Tunnel building material shall fulfil the requirements of classification A2 of Commission Decision 2000/147/EC. Non-structural panels and other equipment shall fulfil the requirements of classification B of Commission Decision 2000/147/EC.

(c)

Materials that would not contribute significantly to a fire load shall be listed. They are allowed to not comply with the above.

(a)

A safe area shall allow the evacuation of trains that use the tunnel. It shall have a capacity corresponding to the maximum capacity of the trains planned to be operated on the line where the tunnel is located.

(b)

The safe area shall maintain survivable conditions for passengers and staff during the time needed for the complete evacuation from the safe area to a final place of safety.

(c)

In case of underground/undersea safe areas, the provisions shall allow people to move from the safe area to the surface without having to re-enter the affected tunnel tube.

(d)

The lay-out of an underground safe area and its equipment shall take into account the control of smoke, in particular to protect people who use the self-evacuation facilities.

(a)

Safe areas shall be accessible for people who commence self-evacuation from the train as well as for the emergency response services.

(b)

One of the following solutions shall be selected for access points from a train to the safe area:

(c)

Doors giving access from the escape walkway to the safe area shall have a minimum clear opening of 1,4 m wide and 2,0 m high. Alternatively it is permitted to use multiple doors next to each other which are less wide as long as the flow capacity of people is demonstrated to be equivalent or higher.

(d)

After passing the doors, the clear width shall continue to be at least 1,5 m wide and 2,25 m high.

(e)

The way in which the emergency response services access the safe area shall be described in the emergency plan.

(a)

Emergency lighting shall be provided to guide passengers and staff to a safe area in the event of an emergency.

(b)

Illumination shall comply with the following requirements:

(c)

Autonomy and reliability: an alternative power supply shall be available for an appropriate period of time after failure of the main power supply. The time required shall be consistent with the evacuation scenarios and reported in the Emergency Plan.

(d)

If the emergency light is switched off under normal operating conditions, it shall be possible to switch it on by both of the following means:

(a)

The escape signage indicates the emergency exits, the distance and the direction to a safe area.

(b)

All signs shall be designed according to the requirements of Directive 92/58/EEC of 24 June 1992 concerning the provision of health and/or safety signs at work and to the specification referenced in appendix A, index 1.

(c)

Escape signs shall be installed on sidewalls along escape walkways.

(d)

The maximum distance between escape signs shall be 50 m.

(e)

Signs shall be provided in the tunnel to indicate the position of emergency equipment, where such equipment is present.

(f)

All doors leading to emergency exits or cross-passage shall be marked.

(a)

Walkways shall be constructed in a single track tunnel tube on at least one side of the track and in a multiple track tunnel tube on both sides of the tunnel tube. In tunnel tubes with more than two tracks, access to a walkway shall be possible from each track.

(b)

Continuous handrails shall be installed between 0.8 m and 1.1 m above the walkway providing a route to a safe area.

(a)

For the purpose of this clause, two or more consecutive tunnels will be considered as a single tunnel unless both of the following conditions are met:

(b)

Fire fighting points shall be created

(c)

Requirements for all fire fighting points:

(d)

Requirements for fire fighting points outside the portals of the tunnel

In addition to the requirements in 4.2.1.7 (c), fire fighting points outside the portals of the tunnel shall comply with the following requirements:

(e)

Requirements for fire fighting points inside the tunnel

In addition to the requirements in 4.2.1.7 (c), fire fighting points inside the tunnel shall comply with the following requirements

(a)

Radio communication between the train and the infrastructure manager control centre shall be provided in each tunnel with GSM-R.

(b)

Radio continuity shall be provided for permitting the emergency response services to communicate with their on-site command facilities. The system shall allow the emergency response services to use their own communication equipment.

(a)

The traction energy supply system in tunnels shall be divided into sections, each not exceeding 5 km. This specification applies only if the signalling system permits the presence of more than one train in the tunnel on each track simultaneously.

(b)

Remote control and switching of each ‘switching section’ shall be provided.

(c)

A means of communication and lighting shall be provided at the switching location to enable safe manual operation and maintenance of the switching equipment.

(a)

Earthing devices shall be provided at tunnel access points and, if the earthing procedures allow the earthing of a single section, close to the separation points between sections. These shall be either portable devices or manually or remotely controlled fixed installations.

(b)

Communication and lighting means necessary for earthing operations shall be provided.

(c)

Procedures and responsibilities for earthing shall be defined between the Infrastructure Manager and the emergency response services, based on the emergency scenarios considered within the emergency plan.

(a)

Electrical installations relevant for safety (Fire detection, emergency lighting, emergency communication and any other system identified by the Infrastructure Manager or contracting entity as vital to the safety of passengers in the tunnel) shall be protected against damage arising from mechanical impact, heat or fire.

(b)

The distribution system shall be designed to enable the system to tolerate unavoidable damage by (for example) energizing alternative links.

(c)

Autonomy and reliability: an alternative power supply shall be available for an appropriate period of time after failure of the main power supply. The time required shall be consistent with the evacuation scenarios considered and included in the emergency plan.

(a)

In the context of this TSI the subsystem rolling stock is subdivided into the following categories.

(b)

The rolling stock category shall be recorded in the technical file and will remain valid regardless of future revisions of this TSI.

(a)

Operating rules are developed within the procedures described in the Infrastructure Manager safety management system. These rules take into account the documentation related to operation which forms a part of the technical file as required in Article 18(3) and set out in Annex VI of Directive 2008/57/EC.

(a)

The operational rule is to monitor the train condition before entering a tunnel in order to detect any defect detrimental to its running behaviour and to take appropriate action.

(b)

In the case of an incident outside the tunnel, the operational rule is to stop a train with a defect that could be detrimental to its running behaviour before entering a tunnel.

(c)

In the case of an incident inside the tunnel the operational rule is to drive the train out of a tunnel, or to the next fire fighting point.

(a)

An emergency plan shall be developed under the direction of the Infrastructure Manager(s), in cooperation with the emergency response services and the relevant authorities for each tunnel. Railway Undertakings intending to use the tunnel shall be involved in the development or adaptation of the Emergency Plan. Station managers shall be equally involved if one or more stations in a tunnel are used as a safe area or a fire fighting point.

(b)

The emergency plan shall be consistent with the self-rescue, evacuation, fire-fighting and rescue facilities available.

(c)

Detailed tunnel-specific incident scenarios adapted to the local tunnel conditions shall be developed for the emergency plan.

(a)

Prior to the opening of a single tunnel or a series of tunnels, a full-scale exercise comprising evacuation and rescue procedures, involving all categories of personnel defined within the emergency plan, shall take place.

(b)

The emergency plan shall define how all organisations involved can be familiarised with the infrastructure and how often visits to the tunnel and table top or other exercises have to take place.

(a)

If disconnection of the traction power supply is required, the infrastructure manager shall make sure that relevant sections of the catenary or the conductor rail have been disconnected, and inform the emergency response services before they enter the tunnel or a section of the tunnel.

(b)

It is the responsibility of the infrastructure manager to disconnect the traction power supply.

(c)

The responsibility and procedure for earthing shall be defined in the emergency plan. Provision shall be made for isolation of the section in which the incident has taken place.

(a)

Railway undertakings shall inform passengers of on board emergency and safety procedures related to tunnels.

(b)

When such information is in written or spoken form, it shall be presented in the language of the country the train is running in as a minimum, plus English.

(c)

An operating rule shall be in place describing how the train crew ensures the complete evacuation of the train when this is necessary, including those people with hearing impairments that may be in closed areas.

(a)

Vehicles in conformity with the TSI as defined in clause 4.2.3 shall be permitted to operate in tunnels in accordance with the following principles:

(b)

Operation of Category A rolling stock is permitted on lines where the distance between fire fighting points, or the length of tunnels exceeds 5 km, in the case where there are no passengers on board.

(c)

Operational rules shall be put in place to avoid panic and spontaneous, uncontrolled evacuation in the case of a prolonged stop of a train in a tunnel without the occurrence of a hot or cold incident.

(1)

Identification of elements which are subject to wear, failure, ageing or other forms of deterioration or degradation,

(2)

Specification of the limits of use of the elements under (1) and a description of the measures to be taken to prevent these limits being exceeded,

(3)

Identification of those elements which are relevant to emergency situations and their management,

(4)

Necessary periodic checks and servicing activities to ensure the proper functioning of the parts and systems under (3).

(a)

All professional staff driving and accompanying a train, as well as staff that authorise train movements, shall have the knowledge and ability to apply that knowledge to manage degraded situations in the event of an incident.

(b)

For staff undertaking the tasks of accompanying trains, the general requirements are specified in the OPE TSI.

(c)

Train crew as defined in the OPE TSI shall have knowledge of the appropriate safety behaviour in tunnels and in particular be able to evacuate the people on board a train, when the train is stopped in a tunnel.

(d)

This involves in particular instructing the passengers to go to the next coach or to exit the train, and to lead them outside the train to a safe area.

(e)

Auxiliary train staff (e.g. catering, cleaning), who do not form part of the train crew as defined above shall, in addition to their basic instruction, be trained to support the actions of the train crew.

(f)

Professional training of engineers and managers responsible for maintaining and operating the subsystems shall include the subject of safety in railway tunnels.

(a)

The EC verification of a Subsystem shall be performed according to one or a combination of the following modules as defined in Decision 2010/713/EU:

—   Module SB: EC-type examination

—   Module SD: EC verification based on quality management system of the production process

—   Module SF: EC verification based on product verification

—   Module SG: EC verification based on unit verification

—   Module SH1: EC verification based on full quality management system plus design examination

(b)

The approval process and the contents of the assessment shall be defined between the applicant and a Notified Body according to the requirements defined in this TSI and in conformance with the rules set out in section 7 of this TSI.

(a)

The applicant shall choose one of the modules or module combinations indicated in the following table.

Assessment procedures

(b)

The characteristics of the subsystem to be assessed during the relevant phases are indicated in appendix B.

(a)

If an existing solution is already assessed for an application under comparable conditions and is in service, then the following process applies:

(b)

The applicant shall demonstrate that the results of tests and verifications for the previous assessment of the application are in conformity with the requirements of this TSI. In this case the previous type assessment of the subsystem related characteristics shall remain valid in the new application.

(a)

Innovative solutions are technical solutions which do meet the functional requirements and spirit of this TSI, but are not fully in compliance with it.

(b)

If an innovative solution is proposed, the manufacturer or his authorised representative established within the European Union shall apply the procedure described in Article 8.

(a)

According to Article 18(3) of Directive 2008/57/EC, a notified body shall be responsible for compiling the technical file, containing the documentation requested for operation and maintenance.

(b)

The notified body shall verify only that the documentation requested for operation and maintenance, as defined in clause 4.5 of this TSI, is provided. The notified body is not required to verify the information contained in the documentation provided.

(a)

Emergency exit doors to the surface and doors to technical rooms are provided with suitable locks

(b)

The locks provided are consistent with the overall strategy for security for the tunnel and adjacent infrastructure

(c)

Emergency exits are not lockable from the inside and shall be able to be opened by evacuating persons

(d)

Access arrangements are in place for the emergency response services

(1)

To demonstrate that the integrity of the tunnel lining is maintained during a period of time that is sufficiently long to permit self-rescue, evacuation of passengers and staff and intervention of the emergency response services, demonstration that the tunnel lining can withstand a temperature of 450 °C at ceiling level during that same period of time is sufficient.

(2)

Evaluation of the resistance of immersed tunnels or tunnels which can cause the collapse of important neighbouring structures shall be carried out according to a suitable ‘temperature-time curve’ chosen by the applicant.

(a)

The Notified Body shall check that the solution adopted is clearly identified by a statement in the technical file and is in conformity with the requirements of clause 4.2.1.5. For assessing the evolution of the conditions in the safe area during an incident, the Notified Body shall verify that doors and structures separating the safe area from the tunnel can withstand the elevation of temperature in the closest tube.

(b)

In the case where clause 4.2.1.2 (b) applies, doors giving access to the safe areas can be assessed according to a different curve to that selected according to clause 6.2.7.2 (2) above.

(a)

This TSI does not require modifications of subsystems which are already in service unless they are upgraded or renewed.

(b)

If not defined otherwise in section 7.3 ‘Specific Cases’, all new TSI compliant category B rolling stock is deemed to achieve a higher fire and tunnel safety level than non-TSI compliant rolling stock. This assumption is used to justify the safe operation of new TSI-compliant rolling stock in old non-TSI compliant tunnels. Therefore, all TSI compliant category B trains are deemed to be suitable for safe integration in accordance with Article 15(1) of Directive 2008/57/EC with all non-TSI compliant tunnels within the geographical scope of this TSI.

(c)

Notwithstanding the above, measures over and above those set out in this TSI may be necessary to achieve the desired tunnel safety level. Such measures may only be imposed on the subsystems Infrastructure, Energy and Operations and shall not restrict the authorisation or use of TSI compliant rolling stock.

(a)

This TSI is applicable to all subsystems in its scope which are placed into service after the date of application of this TSI, except when defined otherwise in the sections below.

(b)

The application of this TSI to on-track machines is voluntary. Where on-track machines are not assessed and declared to be in conformity with this TSI, they shall be subject to national rules. In the latter case Articles 24 and 25 of Directive 2008/57/EC apply.

(a)

Operational aspects and their implementation are set out in the OPE TSI.

(b)

When commissioning an upgraded or renewed tunnel, the requirements for new tunnels in this TSI apply.

(a)

The category of new rolling stock intended to be operated in existing tunnels shall be selected according to clause 4.4.6 (a).

(b)

However, a Member State may allow operation of new rolling stock of category A in existing tunnels longer than 5 km under the condition that the operation of such new rolling stock offers an equivalent or improved level of fire safety compared to the operation of previous rolling stock. The equivalent or improved level of safety to passengers and staff shall be demonstrated using the Common Safety Method on risk assessment.

(a)

The specific cases, as listed in the following clause, describe special provisions that are needed and authorised on particular networks of each Member State.

(b)

These specific cases are classified as ‘T’ cases: ‘temporary’ cases: it is planned that they can be included in the target system in the future. Consequently they will be re-examined in the course of future revisions of this TSI.

(c)

Any specific case applicable to rolling stock within the scope of this TSI in detailed in the LOC&PAS TSI.