28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/1

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/2

1.

Does the ‘polluter pays’ principle, affirmed in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, together with Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which establish the basic principles of equality and non-discrimination, when applied to the provisions in Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2009/72/EC, (1) insofar as it is intended, among other aims, to achieve a competitive and non-discriminatory market in electricity that may be altered only on grounds of general economic interest, including the protection of the environment, preclude the introduction of taxes that apply solely to electricity generation companies that use nuclear energy, when the main purpose of those taxes is not environmental but to increase the volume of the electric power financial system in such a way that these companies contribute more to funding the tariff deficit than other companies that carry on the same activity?

2.

In a competitive and non-discriminatory electricity market, does EU legislation permit the levying of environmental taxes on grounds of the pollution caused by nuclear activities, although this is not specified in the legislation (the grounds are referred to in the Preamble to the Law), with the result that, as regards the tax on the production of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the statutory provisions having legislative force fail to reflect the internalisation of the costs to be covered, and there is also a lack of specificity as regards the storage of radioactive waste, given that the management and storage costs are already covered by other levies, and there is also a failure to establish clearly what the revenue raised is to be used for, and the companies in question are required to assume civil liabilities of up to 1 200 million in this regard?

3.

Is Article 3(2) of the abovementioned Directive, which requires any obligations imposed on grounds of general economic interest, including environmental protection, to be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and verifiable, satisfied if the environmental objective and the essential characteristics that define environmental taxes are not specified in the statutory provision having legislative force?

4.

Do the ‘polluter pays’ principle in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the principles of equality and non-discrimination in Articles 20 and 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Articles 3 and 5 of Directive 2005/89/EC, (2) insofar as they seek to ensure ‘the proper functioning of the internal market for electricity’ and call on Member States to ensure ‘that any measures adopted in accordance with this Directive are non-discriminatory and do not place an unreasonable burden on the market actors’, preclude a provision in national legislation that requires all electricity companies (other than generators of hydroelectricity, which is classified as renewable energy) to fund the tariff deficit, but which imposes a particularly heavy tax burden on nuclear generators, which are required to contribute more than other actors in the energy market, some of which are more polluting, but that do not have to pay these charges, the reasons given being grounds of environmental protection in view of the risks and uncertainties inherent in nuclear activities, without specifying the costs involved or stipulating that the revenue raised is to be used for environmental protection purposes (and given that waste management and storage are already covered by other levies, and nuclear generation companies assume civil liability), and that distorts the free competition required by the liberalised internal market by favouring other electricity generators that do not have to pay environmental taxes even when their sources of production are more highly polluting?

5.

Is a tax on the production of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from nuclear power generation imposed on the nuclear generation industry alone and not applicable to any other sector that may generate such waste, which means that other firms that could use nuclear material or nuclear sources in their activities are not taxed, even though they affect the environment that is to be protected, contrary to the ‘polluter pays’ principle in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/3

1)

Does the ‘polluter pays’ principle, affirmed in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, together with Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which establish the basic principles of equality and non-discrimination, when applied to the provisions in Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2009/72/EC, (1) insofar as it is intended, among other aims, to achieve a competitive and non-discriminatory market in electricity that may be altered only on grounds of general economic interest, including the protection of the environment, preclude the introduction of taxes that apply solely to electricity generation companies that use nuclear energy, when the true purpose of those taxes is not environmental but to increase the volume of revenue in the electric power financial system in such a way that these companies contribute more to funding the tariff deficit than other companies that carry on the same activity?

2)

In a competitive and non-discriminatory electricity market, does EU legislation preclude the levying of environmental taxes on grounds of the pollution caused by nuclear activities, although this is not specified in the legislation (the grounds are referred to in the preamble to the law), with the result that, as regards the tax on the production of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the statutory provisions having legislative force fail to reflect the internalisation of the costs to be covered, and there is also a lack of specificity as regards the storage of radioactive waste, given that the management and storage costs are already covered by other levies, and there is also a failure to establish clearly what the revenue raised is to be used for, and the companies in question are required to assume civil liabilities of up to 1 200 million in this regard?

3)

Does Article 3(2) of Directive 2009/72/EC, in accordance with which the specific obligations placed on the nuclear power generating industry that have to be imposed on grounds of general economic interest, including environmental protection, must be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and verifiable, preclude the taxes provided for in Law 15/2012 if the environmental objective and the essential characteristics that define environmental taxes are not specified in the statutory provision having legislative force?

4)

Do the ‘polluter pays’ principle in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the principles of equality and non-discrimination in Articles 20 and 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Articles 3 and 5 of Directive 2005/89/EC, (2) insofar as they seek to ensure ‘the proper functioning of the internal market for electricity’ and call on Member States to ensure ‘that any measures adopted in accordance with this Directive are non-discriminatory and do not place an unreasonable burden on the market actors’, preclude a provision in national legislation that requires all electricity companies (other than generators of hydroelectricity, which is classified as renewable energy) to fund the tariff deficit, but which imposes a particularly heavy tax burden on nuclear generators, which are required to contribute more than other actors in the energy market, some of which are more polluting, but that do not have to pay these charges, the reasons given being grounds of environmental protection in view of the risks and uncertainties inherent in nuclear activities, without specifying the costs involved or stipulating that the revenue raised is to be used for environmental protection purposes, when the cost of waste management and storage is already covered by other levies, and nuclear generation companies assume civil liability, distorting the free competition required by the liberalised internal market by favouring other electricity generators that do not have to pay environmental taxes even when their sources of production are more highly polluting?

5)

Does Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which lays down ‘the polluter pays principle’, preclude a tax on the production of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from nuclear power generation imposed on the nuclear generation industry alone and not applicable to any other sector that may generate such waste, which means that other undertakings that carry on activities using nuclear material or sources are not taxed, despite their effect on the values of environmental protection?

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/4

1.

Does the ‘polluter pays’ principle, affirmed in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, together with Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which establish the basic principles of equality and non-discrimination, when applied to the provisions in Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2009/72/EC, (1) insofar as it is intended, among other aims, to achieve a competitive and non-discriminatory market in electricity that may be altered only on grounds of general economic interest, including the protection of the environment, preclude the introduction of taxes that apply solely to electricity generation companies that use nuclear energy, when the main purpose of those taxes is not environmental but to increase the volume of the electric power financial system in such a way that these companies contribute more to funding the tariff deficit than other companies that carry on the same activity?

2.

In a competitive and non-discriminatory electricity market, does EU legislation permit the levying of environmental taxes on grounds of the pollution caused by nuclear activities, although this is not specified in the legislation (the grounds are referred to in the Preamble to the Law), with the result that, as regards the tax on the production of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the statutory provisions having legislative force fail to reflect the internalisation of the costs to be covered, and there is also a lack of specificity as regards the storage of radioactive waste, given that the management and storage costs are already covered by other levies, and there is also a failure to establish clearly what the revenue raised is to be used for, and the companies in question are required to assume civil liabilities of up to 1 200 million in this regard?

3.

Is Article 3(2) of the abovementioned Directive, which requires any obligations imposed on grounds of general economic interest, including environmental protection, to be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and verifiable, satisfied if the environmental objective and the essential characteristics that define environmental taxes are not specified in the statutory provision having legislative force?

4.

Do the ‘polluter pays’ principle in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the principles of equality and non-discrimination in Articles 20 and 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Articles 3 and 5 of Directive 2005/89/EC, (2) insofar as they seek to ensure ‘the proper functioning of the internal market for electricity’ and call on Member States to ensure ‘that any measures adopted in accordance with this Directive are non-discriminatory and do not place an unreasonable burden on the market actors’, preclude a provision in national legislation that requires all electricity companies (other than generators of hydroelectricity, which is classified as renewable energy) to fund the tariff deficit, but which imposes a particularly heavy tax burden on nuclear generators, which are required to contribute more than other actors in the energy market, some of which are more polluting, but that do not have to pay these charges, the reasons given being grounds of environmental protection in view of the risks and uncertainties inherent in nuclear activities, without specifying the costs involved or stipulating that the revenue raised is to be used for environmental protection purposes (and given that waste management and storage are already covered by other levies, and nuclear generation companies assume civil liability), and that distorts the free competition required by the liberalised internal market by favouring other electricity generators that do not have to pay environmental taxes even when their sources of production are more highly polluting?

5.

Is a tax on the production of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from nuclear power generation imposed on the nuclear generation industry alone and not applicable to any other sector that may generate such waste, which means that other firms that could use nuclear material or nuclear sources in their activities are not taxed, even though they affect the environment that is to be protected, contrary to the ‘polluter pays’ principle in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/6

1.

Does the ‘polluter pays’ principle, affirmed in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, together with Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which establish the basic principles of equality and non-discrimination, when applied to the provisions in Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2009/72/EC, (1) insofar as it is intended, among other aims, to achieve a competitive and non-discriminatory market in electricity that may be altered only on grounds of general economic interest, including the protection of the environment, preclude the introduction of taxes that apply solely to electricity generation companies that use nuclear energy, when the main purpose of those taxes is not environmental but to increase the volume of the electric power financial system in such a way that these companies contribute more to funding the tariff deficit than other companies that carry on the same activity?

2.

In a competitive and non-discriminatory electricity market, does EU legislation permit the levying of environmental taxes on grounds of the pollution caused by nuclear activities, although this is not specified in the legislation (the grounds are referred to in the Preamble to the Law), with the result that, as regards the tax on the production of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the statutory provisions having legislative force fail to reflect the internalisation of the costs to be covered, and there is also a lack of specificity as regards the storage of radioactive waste, given that the management and storage costs are already covered by other levies, and there is also a failure to establish clearly what the revenue raised is to be used for, and the companies in question are required to assume civil liabilities of up to 1 200 million in this regard?

3.

Is Article 3(2) of the abovementioned Directive, which requires any obligations imposed on grounds of general economic interest, including environmental protection, to be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and verifiable, satisfied if the environmental objective and the essential characteristics that define environmental taxes are not specified in the statutory provision having legislative force?

4.

Do the ‘polluter pays’ principle in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the principles of equality and non-discrimination in Articles 20 and 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Articles 3 and 5 of Directive 2005/89/EC, (2) insofar as they seek to ensure ‘the proper functioning of the internal market for electricity’ and call on Member States to ensure ‘that any measures adopted in accordance with this Directive are non-discriminatory and do not place an unreasonable burden on the market actors’, preclude a provision in national legislation that requires all electricity companies (other than generators of hydroelectricity, which is classified as renewable energy) to fund the tariff deficit, but which imposes a particularly heavy tax burden on nuclear generators, which are required to contribute more than other actors in the energy market, some of which are more polluting, but that do not have to pay these charges, the reasons given being grounds of environmental protection in view of the risks and uncertainties inherent in nuclear activities, without specifying the costs involved or stipulating that the revenue raised is to be used for environmental protection purposes (and given that waste management and storage are already covered by other levies, and nuclear generation companies assume civil liability), and that distorts the free competition required by the liberalised internal market by favouring other electricity generators that do not have to pay environmental taxes even when their sources of production are more highly polluting?

5.

Is a tax on the production of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from nuclear power generation imposed on the nuclear generation industry alone and not applicable to any other sector that may generate such waste, which means that other firms that could use nuclear material or nuclear sources in their activities are not taxed, even though they affect the environment that is to be protected, contrary to the ‘polluter pays’ principle in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/7

1.

Can Article 12(1) of Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA (1) be interpreted as meaning that, when a confiscation order transferred by an issuing State is executed in the Netherlands, a term of imprisonment pending payment as referred to in Article 577c of the Netherlands Code of Criminal Procedure may be applied, having regard to, inter alia, the decision of the Hoge Raad of 20 December 2011 (2) to the effect that a term of imprisonment pending payment must be deemed to be a penalty within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the ECHR?

2.

Does it make any difference to the possibility of applying a term of imprisonment pending payment whether the law of the issuing State also makes provision for the possibility of applying a term of imprisonment pending payment?

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/8

—

set aside the judgment of the Eighth Chamber of the General Court of 30 November 2017 (T-475/16);

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/8

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/9

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/9

1.

Is Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 2002/65/EC (1) to be interpreted as precluding national legislation or practice such as that of the main proceedings which does not provide for the right of withdrawal to be inapplicable in the case of distance loan contracts whose performance has been fully completed by both parties at the consumer’s express request before the consumer exercises his right of withdrawal?

2.

Are Article 4(2), Article 5(1), the second indent of the second subparagraph of Article 6(1) and Article 6(6) of Directive 2002/65/EC to be interpreted as meaning that, for proper receipt of information as provided for by national law in accordance with Article 5(1) and Article 3(1)(3)(a) of Directive 2002/65/EC and the exercise of the right of withdrawal by the consumer pursuant to national law, reference must be made to no consumer other than a reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect average consumer, having regard to all the relevant facts and all the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of this contract?

3.

In the event that Questions 1 and 2 are answered in the negative:

Is Article 7(4) of Directive 2002/65/EC to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which provides that, after withdrawal from a distance consumer loan contract has been declared, the supplier must also pay to the consumer, beyond the sum he has received from the consumer in accordance with the distance contract, compensation for the benefit of use on this sum?

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/10

1.

Must paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1484/95, (1) read in conjunction with Article 141 of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007, (2) be interpreted as meaning that the control mechanism described therein, including ex post controls, is merely intended to ensure that the competent authorities quickly become aware of any facts or circumstances relating to chain transactions that could give rise to doubts about whether the cif import price reported is correct and could constitute grounds for a supplementary inspection?

Or is an opposing interpretation correct, in other words, must the control mechanism described in paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 of Article 3 of Regulation No 1484/95, including ex post controls, be interpreted as meaning that, if the importer makes one or more resales on the Community market at a price below the reported cif import price of the consignment plus the amount of import duties due, this does not satisfy the required conditions (or conditions of disposal) on the Community market and additional duties are therefore due for this reason alone? To answer the latter question, is it relevant whether the importer made the aforementioned resale or resales at a price below the applicable representative price? In this context is it significant that the representative price was calculated in a different way prior to 11 September 2009 than in the period since that date? Furthermore, in order to answer these questions, is it relevant whether the customers within the European Union and the importer are related companies?

2.

If it follows from the answers to the questions set out under 1 above that reselling at a loss constitutes a sufficient ground for rejecting the reported cif import price, how should the level of the additional duties due be determined? Should that basis be established in accordance with the methods for determining customs value laid down in Articles 29 to 31 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 (3) establishing the Community Customs Code? Or must it be established solely on the basis of the applicable representative price? Does Article 141(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 preclude use of the representative price determined prior to 11 September 2009?

3.

If it follows from the answers to Questions 1 and 2 that the decisive factor in additional duties being owed is the resale of imported products at a loss on the Community market, and the representative price must then be taken as a basis for calculating the level of those additional duties, are paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1484/95 compatible with Article 141 of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in the light of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 13 December 2001, Kloosterboer Rotterdam B.V., C-317/99, EU:C:2001:681?

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/11

1.

Must Article 8(2) of Regulation No 261/2004 (1) be interpreted as meaning that a passenger who, under Directive 90/[314]/EEC (2) on package travel (as implemented in national law), has the right to hold his tour organiser liable for reimbursement of the cost of his ticket, can no longer claim reimbursement from the air carrier?

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, can a passenger nevertheless hold the air carrier liable for reimbursement of the cost of his ticket if it is to be assumed that his tour organiser, if it were to be held liable, would be financially incapable of actually reimbursing the cost of the ticket and that tour organiser has also not taken any safeguard measures to guarantee reimbursement?

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/12

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/12

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/13

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/13

1.

the purchased object is going to be processed and subsequently sold on in the course of that business person’s economic activities;

2.

transactions subject to VAT will occur when the purchased property is reintroduced into the course of trade; and

3.

in such transactions the applicable legislation in that same Member State does not permit the business person or professional to deduct the amount paid by way of that tax in respect of the initial purchase?

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/14

—

declare that, by introducing, in Article 13(1) to (3) of the Ustawa z dnia 12 lipca 2017 r. o zmianie ustawy — Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych (Law of 12 July 2017 amending the Law on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts), a distinction between the retirement age for men and women working as ordinary judges, Supreme Court judges, and prosecutors, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and under Articles 5(a) and 9(1)(f) of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast); (1) and that,

—

by lowering, by means of Article 13(1) of that law, the retirement age applicable to ordinary court judges, and at the same time granting the Minister for Justice the right to decide whether to extend the period of active service of judges pursuant to Article 1(26)(b) and (c) of that law, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

—

order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/15

—

the ‘sale and lease back’ is created by the combined and simultaneous granting of a right of emphyteusis (being a temporary right in rem) by the taxable person to two financial institutions and by a leasing by those two institutions to the taxable person;

—

that ‘sale and lease back’ is a purely financial transaction designed to increase the liquidity of the taxable person;

—

the ‘sale and lease back’ transaction was not subject to VAT;

—

the investment property remained in the possession of the taxable person and was used for the taxable activity of the taxable person in a continuous and sustainable manner, both before and after the transaction?

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/16

—

declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to ensure compliance with Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market, (1) or, in any event, by failing to notify the Commission of such provisions, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 43 of that directive;

—

order the Republic of Poland, pursuant to Article 260(3) TFEU, to pay a penalty payment for failure to fulfil its obligation to notify the measures transposing Directive 2014/26/EU at a daily rate of EUR 87 612 from the day on which judgment is delivered in the present case;

—

order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/17

—

set aside the judgment under appeal;

—

rule on the action at first instance, upholding it and, in consequence, annulling Articles 1 to 5 of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/154 of 22 July 2015 concerning State aid SA.13869 (C 68/2002) (ex NN 80/2002); (1)

—

rule definitively on the first plea in law and the first part of the second plea in law of the action at first instance, upholding the first part of the second plea and, in consequence, hold that the principle of the market economy operator applies to the contested measure;

—

refer the dispute back to a differently-composed General Court for a ruling on the other pleas and arguments set out by the applicant in its application of 22 December 2015 and reserve the costs of the first instance;

—

refer the dispute back to a differently-composed General Court for a ruling on all the pleas and arguments set out by the applicant in its application of 22 December 2015 (including the pleas in the alternative) and reserve the costs of the first instance;

—

order the Commission to pay all the costs of the present instance.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/18

—

set aside, pursuant to Articles 56 and 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, the judgment of 25 January 2018, notified on 29 January 2018, delivered by the General Court of the European Union in Case T-91/16, concerning the annulment of Commission Decision C(2015) 9413 of 17 December 2015, notified on 18 December 2015, concerning the reduction of the European Social Fund contribution for the operational programme for the Region of Sicily, which forms part of the Community support framework for structural interventions in the Italian regions covered by objective No 1 (POR Sicily 2000-2006); and to annul that Commission decision.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/20

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders H to pay the costs.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/20

1.

Dismisses the action as inadmissible;

2.

Orders Alcogroup and Alcodis to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures;

3.

Orders the Orde van Vlaamse Balies, the Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and the Ordre français des avocats du barreau de Bruxelles to bear their own respective costs incurred in the present proceedings.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/21

1.

The application for interim measures is rejected.

2.

The order of 10 November 2016, Valencia Club de Fútbol v Commission (T-732/16 R), is set aside.

3.

The costs are reserved.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/22

1.

The application for interim measures is rejected.

2.

The order of 11 November 2016, Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission (T-766/16 R), is set aside.

3.

The costs are reserved.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/22

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

2.

Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd, Berzelius Metall GmbH and Société de traitements chimiques des métaux (STCM) shall pay the costs.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/23

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

2.

UD shall bear her own costs and shall pay those incurred by the European Commission.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/23

—

alter the contested decision in its entirety;

—

order the registration of the mark.

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/24

—

annul debit note No 2017-1635 issued by the Secretary-General of the European Parliament;

—

annul the recovery decision, in the amount of EUR 264 196,11, adopted by the Secretary-General of the European Parliament on 30 November 2017.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that, in the Secretary-General’s decision, the findings concerning reimbursement of travel expenses and of expenses for accredited parliamentary assistants were unfounded. The applicant claimed the reimbursement of travel expenses only in those cases in which he was entitled to do so in accordance with Decision No 2009/C 159/01 of the Bureau of the European Parliament concerning implementing measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament.

The accredited parliamentary assistants referred to in the decision, who had a contractual relationship with the European Parliament, performed support tasks in relation to the applicant’s role as a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) in Brussels and Strasbourg.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of equality of arms.

The applicant did not have access to the evidence supporting the facts set out in the Secretary-General’s decision. Although the applicant submitted a written request, the Secretary-General did not provide him with that evidence, which prevented him from at any time submitting observations on the substance. The Secretary-General’s decision, on which the debit note was based, as a legal measure affecting the applicant, was adopted in breach of the principles of impartial and fair procedure, equality of arms and the applicant’s rights of defence.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Secretary-General’s decision was vitiated by an error of law as regards the burden of proof. Contrary to what was stated in the Secretary-General’s decision, the arguments set out in paragraph 54 of the Court’s judgment of 10 October 2014 in Case T-479/13, Marciani v Parliament, cannot be considered relevant in the present case, precisely because in the case of MEP Marciani the so-called ‘GDD Rules’ (Rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances to Members of the European Parliament) had to be applied, whereas, during the applicant’s mandate as a MEP, Council Regulation (EC) No 160/2009 was already in force.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that there is no legal basis for reimbursement of the salary paid to the accredited parliamentary assistants. This plea has two limbs:

The first limb of the fourth plea alleges that there is no legal relationship between the applicant and the European Parliament. Since the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 160/2009, it is the European Parliament, and not the MEP, which has a legal relationship with the accredited parliamentary assistant and the European Parliament does not reimburse expenses, but pays a salary. As regards the employment relationship of accredited parliamentary assistants, the applicant has no contractual relationship with the European Parliament. The European Parliament did not pay the applicant the relevant salary for the accredited parliamentary assistant. In the absence of any legal relationship or any basis in law, the applicant cannot be under any obligation to reimburse the European Parliament.

The second limb of the fourth plea in law alleges that activity outside the accredited parliamentary assistants’ work does not give rise to any right to the repayment of the salary paid. Article 12 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union does not prohibit the exercise of an activity outside the service, but requires only that the relevant consent be obtained from the appointing authority. On the other hand, where consent is not requested, the rules do not lay down penalties in the form of full reimbursement of the salary paid.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that a rule which lays down a requirement may not be applied retroactively. Point 8 of the Secretary-General’s decision refers to, as part of the legal basis for the decision, Article 39a of the Implementing Measures, although the Decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament amending the Implementing Measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament (2015/C 397/03) has been applicable from 1 January 2016, with the result that it is not relevant to the present dispute.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging a failure to state reasons and infringement of the principle of proportionality, as regards the determination of the amount. The amount claimed is not justified in detail or by means of a calculation, and assumes that the parliamentary assistant never worked for the applicant.

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging that an assessment was made of the document confirming the date of travel, attached to the request for reimbursement of travel expenses, which departed from its purpose and drew an incorrect inference from that document.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/26

—

order the defendants to pay the applicants the sums shown in the schedule annexed to this application plus interest accruing from 26 March 2013 until the judgment of the Court;

—

order the defendants to pay the costs.

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find that the European Union and/or the defendant institutions have incurred non-contractual liability;

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determine the procedure to be followed in order to establish the recoverable loss actually suffered by the applicants; and

—

order the defendants to pay the costs.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/26

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annul, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the European Central Bank’s Decision SNC-2016-0026 of 14 March 2018;

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declare, pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, that Article 18(6) of the SSM Regulation (1) is unlawful, and therefore annul the said decision; and

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order the ECB to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the ECB infringed Article 18(1) of the SSM Regulation and Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by imposing an administrative pecuniary penalty on the grounds of a legal framework based on non-directly effective EU and national law.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the ECB infringed Article 132(1)(b) of Regulation 468/2014, (4) as it orders the publication of an administrative pecuniary penalty on a non-anonymised basis.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that Article 18(6) of the SSM Regulation is unlawful and in breach of Article 263, sixth paragraph, TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in that it imposes a duty to publish an administrative pecuniary penalty irrespective of the fact that the applicant has the intention to bring an action before the General Court within the time limits provided in Article 263, sixth paragraph, TFEU.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/28

—

annul the contested decision;

—

declare the proprietor’s Community design registered under No 1 783 655-0002 invalid, on all the grounds set out in the present application;

—

order the defendant and the proprietor to pay the procedural costs relating to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, pursuant to Article 190 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court;

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order EUIPO and the potential other party to the present proceedings to pay the entirety of the costs of the proceedings.

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Incorrect interpretation and application of Article 6 CDR;

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Infringement of Article 25(1)(e) CDR;

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Infringement of Article 25(1)(f) CDR.

28.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/29

—

declare the present application admissible and well founded;

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annul the decision of 26 March 2018 by which the European Commission rejected the tender of the consortium led by the applicant for Lot No. 3 in the context of the ‘Framework contract for the implementation of external aid 2018 (SIEA EUROPAID/138778/DH/SER/MULTI’)’ call for tenders (‘Call for Tenders’) relating to a framework contract for the supply of services for the benefit of third countries receiving external EU aid and by which it awarded Lot No. 3 to 10 other tenderers,

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call on the defendant, by way of measures of organisation of procedure (cf. Article 55 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court), to provide the following: (i) the characteristics and relative advantages of the 10 successful tenders for Lot No. 3 along with the scores obtained with regard to the criteria set out in points 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6 of the technical assessment grid contained in Part C-I of ‘the Global Organisation and Methodology and the ‘technical’ and ‘financial’ scores obtained by those tenders for Lot No. 3 (ii) a copy of the evaluation committee’s detailed report;

—

declare the claim for damages in the amount of EUR 2 400 000 with a gross margin admissible and well founded;

—

order the defendant to pay all the costs.

1.

A first plea, alleging that, by failing to exclude, on the ground of irregularities, a member of one of the tendering consortia to which the contract was awarded, the Commission infringed Article 106 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ 2012 L 298, p. 1) (‘the Financial Regulation’) and point 4 of the Instructions to Tenderers (‘the Instructions’).

2.

A second plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment by the Commission and that, by failing to carry out a sufficiently careful examination of abnormally low tenders, the Commision infringed Article 110(5) of the Financial Regulation, Article 151 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ 2012 L 362, p. 1) (‘the implementing regulation’), the obligation under Article 41(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) to have due regard for the principle of sound administration and point 15.3 of the Instructions.

3.

A third plea, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons arising from 113(2) of the Finance Regulation and of Article 161(1) of the implementing regulation.

4.

A fourth plea, alleging breach of the right to an effective remedy, as laid down in Article 47 of the Charter.

5.

A fifth plea, alleging that the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, and the guarantee of fair competition under Article 102(1) and (2) of the Financial Regulation have been infringed as a result of the illegality of point 7 of the Instructions.

6.

A sixth plea, alleging breach of the principle of sound administration under Article 41 of the Charter as a result of the illegality of point 7.3 of the Instructions.