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II

(Non-legislative acts)

REGULATIONS

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1057/2014

of 8 October 2014

implementing Article 11(1) and (4) of Regulation (EU) No 753/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in Afghanistan

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 753/2011 of 1 August 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in Afghanistan ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 11(1) and (4) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) On 1 August 2011, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 753/2011.
- (2) On 11 February, 18 March, 16 May, 30 July and 20 August 2014, the United Nations Security Council Committee, established pursuant to paragraph 30 of Security Council Resolution 1988 (2011), updated and amended the list of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities subject to restrictive measures.
- (3) Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 753/2011 should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 753/2011 is hereby amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 8 October 2014.

For the Council
The President
M. LUPI

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 199, 2.8.2011, p. 1.

ANNEX

I. **The entries below shall be added to the list set out in the Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 753/2011**A. *Individuals associated with the Taliban*1. **Qari Rahmat** (*alias*: Kari Rahmat).

Grounds for listing: A Taliban commander since at least February 2010. **Address:** **a)** Kamkai Village, Achin District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. **b)** Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. **Date of Birth:** **a)** 1981 **b)** 1982. **Place of Birth:** Shadal (variant Shadaal) Bazaar, Achin District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. **Other information:** **(a)** Collects taxes and bribes on behalf of the Taliban. **(b)** Liaises with and provides Taliban operatives in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, with information, guidance, housing and weapons and has emplaced improvised explosive devices (IED) and conducted attacks against International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan forces. **Date of UN designation:** 21.8.2014.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Qari Rahmat has been a Taliban commander since at least February 2010. In early 2013, Rahmat served as a Taliban commander in the Shadaal Bazaar area of Achin District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. Rahmat directed the activities of approximately 300 Taliban operatives in Achin District and provided operational guidance and weapons to these operatives. In late 2012, Rahmat led an attack on Afghan forces in Kot District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. As of mid-2012, Rahmat served under the Taliban shadow district chief for Achin District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. During this time, Rahmat was a Taliban facilitator who emplaced improvised explosive devices and conducted attacks against International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan forces.

Rahmat also collects taxes and bribes on behalf of the Taliban. As of early 2013, Rahmat collected taxes on behalf of the Taliban from drug traffickers based in the Shadaal Bazaar, Achin District, Nangarhar Province. As of mid-2012, Rahmat was in charge of collecting taxes from narcotics traffickers for the Taliban.

Rahmat provides intelligence information to the Taliban. As of early 2013, Rahmat provided his Taliban superiors with information on the activities of Afghan government officials and Afghan security forces in Achin District, Nangarhar Province. Rahmat gathered intelligence for the Taliban from Afghan Government employees as of mid-2012 and also conducted investigations to expose ISAF and Afghan Government informants for the benefit of the Taliban.

Rahmat has also provided lethal aid, housing, and guidance to Taliban fighters. As of late 2012, Rahmat provided rocket-propelled grenades, PKM light machine guns, and AK-47 assault rifles to the Taliban. Rahmat also sheltered Taliban fighters at his guest house and provided tactical guidance to Taliban fighters during this period. As of late 2011, Rahmat had a guest house in Achin District where Taliban members often stayed.

2. **Qari Saifullah Tokhi** (*alias*: **(a)** Qari Saifullah, **(b)** Qari Saifullah Al Tokhi, **(c)** Saifullah Tokhi, **(d)** Qari Sahab).

Title: Qari. **Grounds for listing:** Taliban Shadow Deputy Governor and operational commander in Zabul Province, Afghanistan. **Address:** Chalo Bawari area, Quetta City, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. **Date of Birth:** Approximately 1964. **Place of Birth:** Daraz Village, Jaldak wa Tarnak District, Zabul Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Other information:** **(a)** Believed to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. **(b)** Responsible for the laying of improvised explosive devices and the organisation of suicide attacks. **(c)** Physical description: height: 180 cm; weight: approximately 90 kg; build: athletic build; eye colour: brown; hair colour: red; complexion: medium brown. **(d)** Distinguishing physical marks: large round face, full beard, and walks with a limp due to plastic prosthesis in place of his left lower leg.

(e) Ethnic background: Pashtun; Belongs to Tokhi (alternative tribe spelling: Torchi) tribe, Barkozai (alternative tribe spelling: Bakorzai) sub-tribe, Kishtha Barkorzai (lower Barkorzai) clan. **(f)** Marital Status: married. **(g)** Father's name: Agha Mohammad. **(h)** Brother's name: Humdullah. **Date of UN designation:** 19.3.2014.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Qari Saifullah Tokhi is the Taliban shadow Deputy Governor and an operational commander in eastern Zabul Province, Afghanistan. He has directly commanded two groups of approximately 50 Taliban fighters and had command over Taliban commanders in Zabul Province. Qari Saifullah Tokhi has used these groups to organize terrorist activities against the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Coalition Forces in eastern Zabul Province. Qari Saifullah Tokhi also issued orders to his subordinates, who conducted improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, small arms fire attacks, and rocket attacks in Zabul Province.

Three Taliban fighters were killed on the night of 2 December 2012, in Qalat District, Zabul Province, Afghanistan. They were caught emplacing IEDs and were killed as a result. All three men were known as Qari Saifullah Tokhi's men.

On 14 January 2012, six Taliban insurgents subordinate to Qari Saifullah Tokhi attacked an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) convoy. The Taliban insurgents attacked the convoy in the vicinity of Abdul Haq Kalay Village, Tarnak Wa Jaldak District with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).

On 28 September 2011, two suicide bombers under the direction of Taliban commander Qari Saifullah Tokhi were planning attacks. One suicide bomber planned to attack the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Qalat District, Zabul Province. The second suicide bomber planned to attack an ISAF base in Shajoy District. The suicide bombers had planned to attack coalition forces bases between 29 September and 1 October 2011.

The Taliban, under the leadership of Qari Saifullah Tokhi, warned local mobile phone networks on 20 April 2011 to shut down their services in Zabul Province. If services were not shut down in accordance with Taliban direction, the Taliban threatened to destroy their antennas along the roads in Zabul Province.

On 25 November 2010, Qari Saifullah Tokhi ordered a Taliban commander and Taliban shadow sub-Governor of Atghar District, Zabul Province, to transport light weapons to Qalat City, the capital of Zabul Province. The shipment included approximately 25 Kalashnikov rifles, 10 machine guns, five RPGs, and 20 grenades. Suicide bombers planned to use these weapons against ISAF forces and Afghan National Security Forces, specifically targeting the Second Afghan National Army Brigade and the Police Headquarters.

3. **Yahya Haqqani** (*alias*: (a) Yaya (b) Qari Sahab).

Grounds for listing: Senior Haqqani Network (HQN) member. **Address:** A Haqqani Madrassa in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Border Area. **Date of birth:** (a) 1982 (b) 1978. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Other information:** (a) Closely involved in the group's military, financial, and propaganda activities. (b) Injured leg. (c) Father's name is Hajji Meyawar Khan (deceased). **Date of UN designation:** 31.7.2014.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Yahya Haqqani is a senior Haqqani Network (HQN) member who has been closely involved in the group's military, financial, and propaganda activities. Yahya has acted as de facto head of the group when senior-most leaders Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (Yahya's brother-in-law), Badruddin Haqqani (deceased, formerly listed), and Khalil Haqqani were absent. Yahya has also assumed duties as a HQN logistician and has facilitated funding for Haqqani commanders including a subordinate of now-deceased HQN commander Sangin Zadran Sher Mohammad and HQN chief of suicide operations, Abdul Rauf Zakir. Yahya has also acted as Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani's Arabic interpreter and messenger.

Yahya has conducted significant facilitation activities in support of HQN attacks and other activities. In early 2013 he facilitated funding for HQN fighters. Also in early 2013, Yahya coordinated the transfer of supplies from the United Arab Emirates to HQN senior leader Khalil Haqqani. In 2012, Yahya coordinated the distribution of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and communications equipment, and he also reviewed preparations for the August 7, 2012 HQN attack against a Coalition Forward Operating Base in Logar Province, Afghanistan, in which thirteen people, including eleven Afghan civilians, were wounded. Yahya likely had advance knowledge of the June 2011 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan, directed by Sirajuddin Haqqani and Badruddin Haqqani. Eighteen people were killed and twelve were injured in the attack. As of 2011, Yahya delivered money from Sirajuddin Haqqani to HQN commanders for operations.

Yahya sometimes serves as a liaison between the HQN and Al Qaida (AQ) and he has maintained ties with AQ since at least mid-2009. In this role, Yahya has provided money to AQ members in the region for their personal expenses. As of mid-2009, he acted as the HQN's primary liaison with foreign fighters, including Arabs, Uzbeks, and Chechens.

Yahya has also conducted and managed HQN and Taliban media and propaganda activities. As of early 2012, Yahya usually met with Sirajuddin Haqqani to obtain final approval of the Taliban propaganda videos Yahya made. Yahya has worked on HQN media activities since at least 2009 when he worked out of a media studio in a HQN madrasa, editing videos from fighters in Afghanistan. As of late 2011, Yahya obtained money for HQN media expenses from Sirajuddin Haqqani or one of Sirajuddin Haqqani's surrogates.

As of early 2012, Yahya travelled about twice a month, sometimes with Saidullah Jan, to meet with now-deceased HQN financial emissary Nasiruddin Haqqani.

4. **Saidullah Jan** (*alias*: Abid Khan).

Grounds for listing: Senior member of the Haqqani Network (HQN) as of 2013. **Date of Birth:** 1982. **Place of birth:** Giyan District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan. **Other information:** (a) Provided critical facilitation support to drivers and vehicles transporting HQN ammunition. (b) Also involved in the group's recruiting efforts as of 2011. (c) Father's name is Bakhta Jan. **Date of UN designation:** 31.7.2014.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Saidullah Jan was listed on 31 July 2014 pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2160 (2014) for 'participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of' and 'otherwise supporting acts or activities of' those designated and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan.

Saidullah Jan is a senior member of the Haqqani Network (HQN) as of 2013 who has also acted at times as an HQN deputy, as the HQN commander for the Northern Zone of Afghanistan, and as a key HQN logistical coordinator.

In late 2013, Saidullah provided critical facilitation support to drivers and vehicles transporting HQN ammunition. As of late 2011, Saidullah was also involved in the group's recruiting efforts and conducted the evaluation of at least one HQN recruit.

In late 2013, Saidullah travelled to the Gulf in the company HQN fundraisers Khalil Ahmed Haqqani (TI.H.150.11.), Fazl Rabi, and other HQN members including an attack facilitator. In 2010, Saidullah travelled with a group of HQN leaders, including now-deceased HQN official Ahmed Jan Wazir Akhtar Mohammad, to the Gulf.

In late 2013, Saidullah reportedly was trusted by Al-Qaida members as an HQN associate who could help with any trouble, including arrest.

As of early 2012, Saidullah Jan sometimes travelled with Yahya Haqqani to meet with now-deceased HQN financial emissary Nasiruddin Haqqani.

5. **Muhammad Omar Zadran** (*alias*: Mohammad-Omar Jadran).

Title: a) Maulavi b) Mullah. **Grounds for listing:** Haqqani Network (HQN) leader in command of over 100 militants active in Khost Province, Afghanistan as of 2013. **Date of birth:** 1958. **Place of birth:** Sultan Kheyl Village, Spera District, Khost Province, Afghanistan. **Address:** Afghanistan/Pakistan Border Area. **Other information:** Involved in the preparation of attacks against Afghan and international forces in Afghanistan. **Date of UN designation:** 31.7.2014

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Muhammad Omar Zadran (Omar) is a Haqqani Network (HQN) leader who as of 2013 in command of over 100 militants active in Khost Province, Afghanistan. Omar served as an HQN Shadow District Governor, and as a commander under HQN leader Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani since 2005, and has planned or been instructed to plan attacks on behalf of the HQN since at least 2006. Omar has worked with the Taliban, serving in 2010 as a member of the Taliban Shura Council established by the Taliban to discuss logistics for insurgents, needs, training, assignments for commanders, and deployment of terrorist cells to south-eastern Afghanistan. Also in 2010, Omar received orders from Sirajuddin Haqqani.

Omar has participated in the preparation and planning of attacks against Afghan citizens, the Afghan Government, and Coalition personnel in Afghanistan on behalf of both the HQN and the Taliban. In early 2013, Omar was in charge of smuggling explosives into Afghanistan. In 2012, Omar and dozens of other HQN members worked on a vehicle-borne improved explosive device attack against a Coalition Forces camp and was involved in attack planning against troops in Paktiya Province, Afghanistan. As of 2011, Omar was involved in suicide attack planning. In 2010, Omar was tasked by an HQN commander to kidnap and murder local Afghan nationals working for Coalition Forces in Khost, Paktia, Paktika, and Baghlan Provinces, Afghanistan.

In 2010, Omar and other militant leaders in the region agreed to intensify attacks against the Afghan Government and Coalition forces, capture and control various districts, disrupt national assembly elections and road construction operations, and recruit local youths.

- II. **The entries in the list set out in the Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 753/2011 shall be replaced by the entries as set out below.**
- A. *Individuals associated with the Taliban*
1. **Malik Noorzai** (*alias*: (a) Hajji Malik Noorzai, (b) Hajji Malak Noorzai, (c) Haji Malek Noorzai, (d) Haji Maluk, (e) Haji Aminullah).

Title: Haji. **Grounds for listing:** Taliban financier. **Address:** (a) Boghra Road, Miralzei Village, Chaman, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, (b) Kalay Rangin, Spin Boldak District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. **Date of Birth:** (a) 1957, (b) 1960, (c) 1 Jan. 1963. **Place of birth:** (a) Chaman border town, Pakistan, (b) Pishin, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Passport no.:** Pakistani passport number FA0157612, issued on 23 Jul. 2009, expires on 22 Jul. 2014, officially cancelled as of 2013, issued under name Allah Muhammad. **National identification no.:** Pakistani national identification number 54201-247561-5, officially cancelled as of 2013. **Other information:** (a) Owns businesses in Japan and frequently travels to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Japan. (b) As of 2009, facilitated Taliban activities, including through recruitment and provision of logistical support. (c) Believed to be in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. (d) Belongs to Noorzai tribe. (e) Brother of Faizullah Khan Noorzai. (f) Father's name is Haji Akhtar Muhammad. **Date of UN designation:** 4.10.2011.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Malik Noorzai is a Pakistan-based businessman who has provided financial support to the Taliban. Malik and his brother, Faizullah Noorzai Akhtar Mohammed Mira Khan, have invested millions of dollars in various businesses for the Taliban. In late 2008, Taliban representatives approached Malik as a businessman with whom to invest Taliban funds. Since at least 2005, Malik has also personally contributed tens of thousands of dollars and distributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Taliban, some of which was collected from donors in the Gulf region and Pakistan and some of which was Malik's own money. Malik also handled a hawala account in Pakistan that received tens of thousands of dollars transferred from the Gulf every few months to support Taliban activities. Malik has also facilitated Taliban activities. As of 2009, Malik had served for 16 years as the chief caretaker of a madrassa (religious school), in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region, that was used by the Taliban to indoctrinate and train recruits. Among other things, Malik delivered the funds that supported the madrassa. Malik, along with his brother, has also played a role in storing vehicles to be used in Taliban suicide bombing operations and has helped move Taliban fighters around Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Malik owns businesses in Japan and

frequently visits Dubai and Japan for business. As early as 2005, Malik owned a vehicle import business in Afghanistan that imported vehicles from Dubai and Japan. He has imported cars, auto parts and clothing from Dubai and Japan for his businesses, in which two Taliban commanders have invested. In mid-2010, Malik and his brother secured the release of hundreds of cargo containers, reportedly worth millions of dollars, which Pakistani authorities seized earlier that year because they believed the recipients had a connection to terrorism.

2. **Khairullah Barakzai Khudai Nazar** (*alias: (a) Haji Khairullah, (b) Haji Khair Ullah, (c) Haji Kheirullah, (d) Haji Karimullah, (e) Haji Khair Mohammad*).

Title: Haji. **Grounds for listing:** Co-owner of Haji Khairullah Haji Sattar Money Exchange. **Date of Birth:** 1965. **Place of Birth:** (a) Zumbaleh village, Nahr-e Saraj District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (b) Mirmadaw village, Gereshk District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (c) Qilla Abdullah, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. **Passport no.:** BP4199631 (Pakistan passport, expires on 25 June 2014, officially cancelled as of 2013). **National identification no.:** Pakistan National Identification number 5440005229635, officially cancelled as of 2013. **Address:** Abdul Manan Chowk, Pashtunabad, Quetta, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. **Other information:** (a) Associated also with Abdul Satar Abdul Manan. (b) Belongs to Barakzai tribe. (c) Father's name is Haji Khudai Nazar. (d) Alternative father's name is Nazar Mohammad. **Date of UN designation:** 29.6.2012.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Khairullah Barakzai Khudai Nazar is a co-owner and operator of Haji Khairullah Haji Sattar Money Exchange (HKHS). As of late 2009, Khairullah and Abdul Satar Abdul Manan had an equal partnership in HKHS. They jointly operated hawalas known as HKHS throughout Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Dubai and managed an HKHS branch in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. As of early 2010, Khairullah was the chief of the HKHS branch in Kabul. As of 2010, Khairullah was a hawaladar for Taliban senior leadership and provided financial assistance to the Taliban. Khairullah, along with his business partner Satar, provided thousands of dollars to the Taliban to support Taliban activities in Afghanistan. As of 2008, Khairullah and Satar collected money from donors and distributed the funds to the Taliban using their hawala.

3. **Ahmed Shah Noorzai Obaidullah** (*alias: (a) Mullah Ahmed Shah Noorzai, (b) Haji Ahmad Shah, (c) Haji Mullah Ahmad Shah, (d) Maulawi Ahmed Shah, (e) Mullah Mohammed Shah*).

Title: (a) Mullah (b) Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** Provided financial services to Ghul Agha Ishakzai and other Taliban in Helmand Province. **Date of birth:** (a) 1 January 1985 (b) 1981 **Place of birth:** Quetta, Pakistan. **Passport no.:** Pakistani passport number NC5140251 issued on 23 October 2009 expires on 22 October 2014, officially cancelled as of 2013. **National identification no.:** Pakistani national identity card number 54401-2288025-9, officially cancelled as of 2013. **Address:** Quetta, Pakistan. **Other information:** (a) Owns and operates the Roshan Money Exchange. **Date of UN Designation:** 26.2.2013.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Ahmed Shah Noorzai Obaidullah owns and operates the Roshan Money Exchange, which provides financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, the Taliban. Roshan Money Exchange stores and transfers funds in support of Taliban military operations and the Taliban's role in the Afghan narcotics trade. As of 2011, Roshan Money Exchange was one of the primary money service providers (or 'hawalas') used by Taliban officials in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

Ahmed Shah has provided hawala services to Taliban leaders in Helmand Province for a number of years and, as of 2011, was a trusted Taliban money service provider. In early 2012, the Taliban ordered Ahmed Shah to transfer money to a number of hawalas in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province, from which a senior Taliban commander would then allocate the funds.

In late 2011, Ahmed Shah consolidated hundreds of thousands of US dollars to pass to the Taliban Finance Commission and transferred hundreds of thousands of US dollars for the Taliban, including to senior Taliban commanders. Also in late 2011, Ahmed Shah received through his hawala branch in Quetta, Pakistan, a transfer on behalf of the Taliban, money from which was used to purchase fertilizer and IED components, including batteries and detonator cord. In mid-2011, Taliban finance commission head Gul Agha Ishakzai instructed Ahmed Shah to deposit several million US dollars into Roshan Money Exchange for the Taliban. Gul Agha explained that when a money transfer was required, he would inform Ahmed Shah of the Taliban recipient.

Ahmed Shah would then provide the required funds through his hawala system. As of mid-2010, Ahmed Shah moved money between Pakistan and Afghanistan for Taliban commanders and for narcotics traffickers. In addition to his facilitation activities, Ahmed Shah also donated large but unspecified sums of money to the Taliban in 2011.

4. **Jalaluddin Haqqani** (*alias: (a) Jalaluddin Haqqani, (b) Jallalouddin Haqqani, (c) Jallalouddine Haqqani*).

Title: Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** Minister of Frontier Affairs under the Taliban regime. **Date of birth:** (a) Approximately 1942; (b) Approximately 1948. **Place of birth:** (a) Garda Saray area, Waza Zadran District, Paktia Province, Afghanistan; (b) Neka District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Other information:** (a) Father of Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani; Nasiruddin Haqqani and Badruddin Haqqani (deceased); (b) Brother of Mohammad Ibrahim Omari and Khalil Ahmed Haqqani; (c) He is an active Taliban leader, (d) Believed to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, (e) Head of the Taliban Miram Shah Shura as at 2008, (f) Belongs to Zadran tribe. **Date of UN designation:** 31.1.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Jalaluddin Haqqani has close relations with Mohammed Omar and had close relations with Usama bin Laden (deceased). He is the father of Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani, Nasiruddin Haqqani and Badruddin Haqqani (deceased), and the brother of Mohammad Ibrahim Omari and Khalil Ahmed Haqqani. He is an active Taliban leader. Jalaluddin Haqqani was also the liaison between Al-Qaida and the Taliban in 2007. He was Chairman of the Taliban 'Miram Shah Council' as at June 2008.

He was originally a commander for the Mwalawi Hezbi Islami Party in Khost, Paktika and Paktia provinces. Later he joined the Taliban and was appointed as Minister of Frontier Affairs. Following the collapse of the Taliban regime, along with Taliban and Al-Qaida elements, he escaped to northern Waziristan and started to regroup his militias for the fight against the Government of Afghanistan.

Haqqani has been accused of involvement in the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul in 2008 and the attempt to assassinate President Karzai during a military parade in Kabul earlier the same year. Haqqani was also implicated in an attack on ministry buildings in Kabul in February 2009.

Jalaluddin Haqqani is the founder of the Haqqani Network.

5. **Nasiruddin Haqqani** (*alias: (a) Naseer Haqqani, (b) Dr Naseer Haqqani, (c) Nassir Haqqani, (d) Nashir Haqqani, (e) Naseruddin, (f) Dr Alim Ghair*).

Grounds for listing: A leader of the Haqqani Network, which operates out of North Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. **Date of birth:** Approximately 1970-1973. **Place of birth:** Neka District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Address:** Pakistan. **Other information:** (a) Son of Jalaluddin Haqqani. (b) He travelled to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to raise funds for the Taliban. (c) Reportedly deceased as of 2013. **Date of UN designation:** 20.7.2010.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

The Haqqani Network is a Taliban-affiliated group of militants that operates from North Waziristan Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. It has been at the forefront of insurgent activity in Afghanistan, responsible for many high-profile attacks. The Haqqani network leadership consists of the three oldest sons of Jalaluddin Haqqani, one of whom is Nasiruddin Haqqani.

Nasiruddin Haqqani functions as an emissary for the Haqqani Network and spends much of his time raising money. In 2004, Haqqani travelled to Saudi Arabia with a Taliban associate to raise funds for the Taliban. He also provided funds in 2004 to militants in Afghanistan for the purpose of disrupting the Afghan presidential election. From at least 2005 to 2008, Nasiruddin Haqqani collected funds for the Haqqani Network through various fundraising trips, including during regular travel to the United Arab Emirates in 2007 and through a fundraising trip to another Gulf state in 2008.

As of mid-2007, Haqqani reportedly had three main sources of funding: donations from the Gulf region, drug trafficking, and payments from Al-Qaida. In late 2009, Nasiruddin Haqqani received several hundred thousand dollars from Al-Qaida-associated individuals in the Arabian Peninsula to use for Haqqani Network activities.

6. **Abdul Habib Alizai** (*alias:* **a**) Haji Agha Jan Alizai **b**) Hajji Agha Jan **c**) Agha Jan Alazai **d**) Haji Loi Lala **e**) Loi Agha **f**) Abdul Habib **g**) Agha Jan Alizai اغا جان عاليزي (formerly listed as)).

Title: Haji **Grounds for listing:** Has managed a drug trafficking network in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. **Date of birth:** **a**) 15.10.1963 **b**) 14.2.1973 **c**) 1967 **d**) Approximately 1957. **Place of birth:** **a**) Yatimchai village, Musa Qala District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan **b**) Kandahar Province, Afghanistan **Nationality:** Afghan **Other information:** **(a)** Has regularly travelled to Pakistan. **Date of UN designation:** 4.11.2010.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Agha Jan Alizai has managed one of the largest drug trafficking networks in Helmand, Afghanistan, and has provided funds to the Taliban in exchange for protection of his narco-trafficking activities. In 2008, a group of narcotics traffickers, including Alizai, agreed to pay the Taliban tax on land where opium poppy was planted in return for Taliban agreement to organize transportation for narcotics materials. The Taliban also agreed to provide security for the narco-traffickers and their storage sites, while the traffickers would provide shelter and transportation to Taliban fighters. Alizai has also been involved in the purchase of weapons for the Taliban and has travelled to Pakistan regularly to meet senior Taliban leaders. Alizai has also facilitated the procurement of fraudulent Iranian passports by Taliban members in order to travel to Iran for training. In 2009, Alizai provided a passport and funds to a Taliban commander to travel to Iran.

7. **Ahmed Jan Wazir Akhtar Mohammad** (*alias:* **(a)** Ahmed Jan Kuchi, **(b)** Ahmed Jan Zadran).

Grounds for listing: **(a)** Key commander of the Haqqani Network, which is based in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. **(b)** Acts as deputy, spokesperson and advisor for Haqqani Network senior leader Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani. **Date of birth:** 1963. **Place of birth:** Barlach Village, Qareh Bagh District, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan. **Other information:** **(a)** Official of the Ministry of Finance during the Taliban regime. **(b)** Liaises with the Taliban Supreme Council. **(c)** Has travelled abroad. **(d)** Liaises with and provides Taliban commanders in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, with money, weapons, communications equipment and supplies. **(e)** Reportedly deceased as of 2013. **Date of UN designation:** 6.1.2012.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Ahmed Jan Wazir is a key commander in the Haqqani Network, a Taliban-affiliated group of militants that operates from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. Ahmed Jan Wazir acts as a deputy, advisor and spokesperson for Sirajuddin Haqqani, a senior leader of the Haqqani Network, and conducts meetings on behalf of the Haqqani Network. In late 2010, Ahmed Jan Wazir travelled with senior Haqqani Network members to the Gulf.

Ahmed Jan Wazir has represented the Haqqani Network at the Taliban's shura and has served as a conduit between the Haqqani Network and the Taliban in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan. In 2008, Taliban and Al-Qaida militants appointed Ahmed Jan Wazir as a Taliban commander in Ghazni Province. He has provided other Taliban commanders in Ghazni Province with money and supplies, including weapons and communications equipment. During the Taliban regime, he was employed by the Ministry of Finance.

8. **Bakht Gul** (*alias: (a) Bakhta Gul, (b) Bakht Gul Bahar, (c) Shuqib*).

Grounds for listing: (a) Communications assistant to Badruddin Haqqani (deceased). (b) Also coordinates movement of Haqqani insurgents, foreign fighters and weapons in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. **Date of Birth:** 1980. **Place of Birth:** Aki Village, Zadran District, Pakiya Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Address:** Miram Shah, North Waziristan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan. **Other information:** Belongs to Zadran tribe. **Date of UN designation:** 27.6.2012.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Bakht Gul has been a key Haqqani Network communications official since at least 2009, when his predecessor was arrested in Afghanistan. As of 2011, Gul continued to report directly to Badruddin Haqqani (deceased), a senior Haqqani Network leader, and has acted as an intermediary for those wishing to contact him. Gul's responsibilities include relaying reports from commanders in Afghanistan to senior Haqqani Network officials, Taliban media officials, and legitimate media outlets in Afghanistan. Gul also works with Haqqani Network officials, including Badruddin Haqqani, to coordinate the movement of Haqqani Network insurgents, foreign fighters and weapons in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and eastern Afghanistan. As of 2010, Gul relayed operational orders from Badruddin Haqqani to fighters in Afghanistan. In late 2009, Gul distributed money to Haqqani Network sub-commanders traveling between Miram Shah and Afghanistan.

9. **Abdul-Haq Wassiq** (*alias: (a) Abdul-Haq Wasseq, (b) Abdul Haq Wasiq*).

Title: Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** Deputy Minister of Security (Intelligence) under the Taliban regime. **Date of birth:** (a) Approximately 1975, (b) 1971. **Place of birth:** Gharib village, Khogyani District, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Address:** Guantanamo Bay prison. **Other information:** In custody of the United States of America as at 2011. **Date of UN designation:** 31.1.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Abdul-Haq Wassiq is allied with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Under the Taliban regime, he held successive positions as local commander in Nimroz and Kandahar provinces. He then became Deputy Director General of Intelligence, reporting to Qari Ahmadullah. In this function, he was in charge of handling relations with Al-Qaida-related foreign fighters and their training camps in Afghanistan. He was also known for his repressive methods against Taliban opponents in the South of Afghanistan.

10. **Abdul Jalil Haqqani Wali Mohammad** (*alias: (a) Abdul Jalil Akhund (b) Akhter Mohmad (c) Haji Gulab Gul (d) Abdul Jalil Haqqani (d) Nazar Jan*).

Title: (a) Maulavi (b) Mullah. **Grounds for listing:** (a) Member of the Taliban Supreme Council as of May 2007, (b) Member of the Financial Commission of the Taliban Council, (c) Responsible for logistics for the Taliban and also active as a businessman in his personal capacity as at mid-2013. (d) Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Taliban regime. **Date of birth:** Approximately 1963. **Place of birth:** (a) Khwaja Malik village, Arghandab District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, (b) Kandahar City, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Passport no.:** (a) Passport number: OR 1961825 (issued under the name Akhter Mohmad, son of Noor Mohmad, born in 1965 in Kandahar) issued on 4.2.2003 by the Afghan Consulate in Quetta, Pakistan, expired 2.2.2006). (b) Passport number: TR024417 (issued under the name Haji Gulab Gul son of Haji Hazrat Gul, born in 1955 in Logar, Afghanistan) issued on 20.12.2003 by Central Passport Department in Kabul, Afghanistan, expired 29 December 2006. **Other information:** (a) Believed to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, (b) Belongs to Alizai tribe. (c) Brother of Atiqullah Wali Mohammad. **Date of UN designation:** 25.1.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Abdul Jalil Haqqani Wali Mohammad was a member of the Taliban Supreme Council as of May 2007 and a member of the Financial Commission of the Taliban Council.

11. **Abdulhai Motmaen** (*alias* (a) Abdul Haq).

Title: Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** (a) Director of the Information and Culture Department in Kandahar Province under the Taliban regime, (b) Spokesperson of the Taliban regime. **Date of birth:** Approximately 1973. **Place of birth:** (a) Shinkalai village, Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan; (b) Zabul Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. Afghan passport number OA462456 (issued under the name Abdul Haq son of M. Anwar Khan) issued on 31.1.2012 (11-11-1390) by the Afghan Consulate General in Peshawar, Pakistan. **Other information:** (a) Family is originally from Zabul, but settled later in Helmand, (b) Member of the Taliban Supreme Council and spokesperson for Mullah Mohammed Omar as of 2007, (c) Believed to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, (d) Belongs to Kharoti tribe. **Date of UN designation:** 23.2.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Abdulhai Motmaen was the senior spokesman for the Taliban and used to deliver Taliban foreign policy statements. He was also a close associate of Mohammed Omar (TI.O.4.01). He was a member of the Taliban Supreme Council and spokesperson for Mohammed Omar as of 2007.

12. **Najibullah Haqqani Hidayatullah** (*alias* Najibullah Haqqani).

Title: Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** (a) Deputy Minister of Finance under the Taliban regime. (b) Taliban member responsible for Laghman Province as of late 2010. **Date of birth:** 1971. **Place of birth:** Moni village, Shigal District, Kunar Province. **Nationality:** Afghan. **National identification no.:** Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 545167, issued in 1974. **Other information:** (a) Cousin of Moulavi Noor Jalal. (b) Grandfather's name is Salam. (c) Believed to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. **Date of UN designation:** 23.2.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Najibullah Haqqani Hidayatullah also served as Deputy Minister of Finance of the Taliban regime. This designation was added to the List on 18 July 2007. On 27 September 2007, the listing of this name was updated to remove the original designation of 'Deputy Minister of Public Works of the Taliban regime'.

Najibullah Haqqani Hidayatullah was a member of the Taliban Council in the Kunar Province, Afghanistan, as at May 2007. He is a cousin of Noor Jalal.

As at June 2008, the Taliban leadership appointed him the person responsible for military activity in the Kunar Province

Najibullah Haqqani Hidayatullah was a Taliban member responsible for Laghman Province as of late 2010.

13. **Abdul Raqib Takhari**

Title: Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** (a) Minister of Repatriation under the Taliban regime. (b) Member of Taliban Supreme Council responsible for Takhar and Badakhshan provinces as at December 2009. **Date of birth:** Between 1968 and 1973. **Place of birth:** Zardalu Darra village, Kalafgan District, Takhar Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Other information:** Confirmed killed on 17 February in Peshawar, Pakistan and buried in Takhar Province, Afghanistan. **Date of UN designation:** 25.1.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Abdul Raqib Takhari was a member of the Taliban Supreme Council responsible for Takhar and Badakhshan Provinces as at December 2009.

14. **Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad** (*alias* Saleh Mohammad).

Grounds for listing: (a) Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad is a narcotics trafficker who has run an organized smuggling network in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, Afghanistan, which met Taliban logistical and financial needs. **Date of birth:** (a) Approximately 1962, (b) 1961. **Place of birth:** (a) Nalghan village, Panjwai District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, (b) Sangesar village, Panjway District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Address:** Daman District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. **Other information:** (a) Has run an organised smuggling network in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, Afghanistan, (b) Previously operated heroin processing laboratories in Band-e-Temur, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, (c) Has owned a car dealership in Mirwais Mena, Dand District in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, (d) Released from custody in Afghanistan in February 2014, (e) Linked by marriage to Mullah Ubaidullah Akhund Yar Mohammad Akhund, (f) Belongs to Kakar tribe. **Date of UN designation:** 4.11.2010.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad is a narcotics trafficker who has run an organized smuggling network in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, Afghanistan, which met Taliban logistical and financial needs. Prior to his arrest by Afghan authorities, Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad operated heroin processing laboratories in the Band-e-Timor area of Kandahar Province that were protected by the Taliban.

Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad has been in contact with senior Taliban leaders, collected cash on their behalf from narco-traffickers, and managed and hid money belonging to senior Taliban members. He was also responsible for facilitating tax payments to the Taliban on behalf of narco-traffickers. Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad has owned a car dealership in Kandahar and has provided the Taliban with vehicles for use in suicide attacks.

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1058/2014**of 8 October 2014****amending for the 221st time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al Qaida network**

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al-Qaida network ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 7(1)(a) and Article 7a(1) and (5) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 lists the persons, groups and entities covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources under that Regulation.
- (2) On 23 September 2014 the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved the addition of 14 natural persons and two entities to the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee's list of persons, groups and entities to whom the freezing of funds and economic resources should apply. Furthermore it decided to amend one entry on the list.
- (3) Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 should therefore be updated accordingly.
- (4) In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this Regulation are effective, it should enter into force immediately,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

*Article 2*This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 8 October 2014.

*For the Commission,
On behalf of the President,
Head of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments*

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 9.

ANNEX

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 is amended as follows:

(1) the following entries shall be added under the heading 'Natural persons':

- (a) 'Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al-Khazmari **Al Zahrani** (*alias* (a) Abu Maryam al-Zahrani; (b) Abu Maryam al-Saudi; (c) Ahmed Abdullah S al-Zahrani; (d) Ahmad Abdullah Salih al-Zahrani; (e) Abu Maryam al-Azadi; (f) Ahmed bin Abdullah Saleh bin al-Zahrani; (g) Ahmed Abdullah Saleh al-Zahrani al-KhozMRI). Function: Senior member of Al-Qaida. Date of birth 15.9.1978. Place of birth: Dammam, Saudi Arabia. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Passport No.: E126785 (Saudi Arabian passport, issued on 27.5.2002, expired on 3.4.2007). Other information: (a) Physical description: eye colour: dark; hair colour: dark; complexion: olive; (b) Speaks Arabic; (c) Father's name is Abdullah Saleh al Zahrani; (d) Photo included in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice; (e) Located in Syria. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (b) 'Azzam Abdullah Zureik Al-Maulid **Al-Subhi** (*alias* (a) Mansur al-Harbi; (b) Azzam al-Subhi; (c) Azam Abdallah Razeeq al Mouled Alsbhua; (d) Abu Muslem al-Maky; (e) Abu Suliman al-Harbi; (f) Abu Abdalla al-Harbi; (g) Azam A.R. Alsbhua). Date of birth: 12.4.1976. Place of Birth: Al Baraka, Saudi Arabia. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Passport no.: C389664 (Saudi Arabian passport, issued on 15.9.2000, expired on 15.9.2005). Other information: (a) Physical description: eye colour: dark; hair colour: dark; complexion: dark; (b) Speaks Arabic; (c) Father's name is Abdullah Razeeq al Mouled al Sbhua; (d) Photo included in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (c) 'Anders Cameroon Ostensvig **Dale** (*alias* (a) Muslim Abu Abdurrahman; (b) Abu Abdurrahman the Norwegian; (c) Abu Abdurrahman the Moroccan). Date of birth: 19.10.1978. Place of birth: Oslo, Norway. Nationality: Norwegian. Other information: (a) Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: brown; height: 185 cm. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (d) 'Ibrahim Suleiman Hamad **Al-Hablain** (*alias* (a) Barahim Suliman H. al Hblain; (b) Abu Jabal; (c) Abu-Jabal). Function: Explosives expert and operative for the Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB). Date of birth: 17.12.1984. Place of birth: Buraidah, Saudi Arabia. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Passport no.: F800691 (Saudi Arabian passport). Other information: (a) Physical description: eye colour: dark; hair colour: dark; complexion: olive; (b) Speaks Arabic; (c) Photo included in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (e) 'Seifallah **Ben-Hassine** (*alias* (a) Seif Allah ben Hocine; (b) Saifallah ben Hassine; (c) Sayf Allah 'Umar bin Hassayn; (d) Sayf Allah bin Hussayn; (e) Abu Iyyadh al-Tunisi; (f) Abou Iyadh el-Tounsi; (g) Abu Ayyad al-Tunisi; (h) Abou Aayadh; (i) Abou Iyadh). Date of birth: 8.11.1965. Nationality: Tunisian. Other information: Leader of Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (f) 'Abd Al-Rahman Bin 'Umayr **Al-Nu'Aymi** (*alias* (a) Abd al-Rahman bin 'Amir al-Na'imi; (b) 'Abd al-Rahman al-Nu'aimi; (c) 'Abd al-Rahman bin 'Amir al-Nu'imi; (d) 'Abd al-Rahman bin 'Amir al-Nu'aymi; (e) 'Abdallah Muhammad al-Nu'aymi; (f) 'Abd al-Rahman al-Nua'yimi; (g) A. Rahman al-Naimi; (h) Abdelrahman Imer al Jaber al Naimeh; (i) A. Rahman Omair J Alnaimi; (j) Abdulrahman Omair al Neaimi). Date of birth: 1954. Passport no.: 00868774 (Qatari passport, expired on 27.4.2014). National identification no.: 25463401784 (Qatari ID, expires on 6.12.2019). Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (g) 'Abd Al-Rahman Khalaf "Ubayd Juday" **Al-Anizi** (*alias*(a) 'Abd al-Rahman Khalaf al-Anizi; (b) 'Abd al-Rahman Khalaf al-'Anzi; (c) Abu Usamah al-Rahman; (d) Abu Shaima' Kuwaiti; (e) Abu Usamah al-Kuwaiti; (f) Abu Usama; (g) Yusuf). Date of birth: 1973 (approximately). Nationality: Kuwaiti. Other information: Located in Syria since 2013. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (h) 'Anas Hasan **Khattab** (*alias* (a) Samir Ahmed al-Khayat; (b) Hani; (c) Abu Hamzah; (d) Abu-Ahmad Hadud). Title: Amir. Date of birth: 7.4.1986. Place of birth: Damascus, Syria. National identification no.: 00351762055. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (i) 'Maysar Ali Musa Abdallah **Al-Juburi** (*alias* (a) Muyassir al-Jiburi; (b) Muyassir Harara; (c) Muyassir al-Shammari; (d) Muhammad Khalid Hassan; (e) Al-Shammari; (f) Mus'ab al-Qahtani; (g) Abu Maria al-Qatani). Title: Amir. Date of birth: 1.6.1976. Place of birth: (a) Al-Shura, Mosul, Iraq; (b) Harara, Ninawa Province, Iraq. Nationality: Iraqi. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;

- (j) 'Shafi Sultan Mohammed **Al-Ajmi** (*alias* (a) Shafi al-Ajmi; (b) Sheikh Shafi al-Ajmi; (c) Shaykh Abu-Sultan). Title: Doctor. Date of birth: 1.1.1973. Place of birth: Warah, Kuwait. Address: Area 3, Street 327, Building 41, Al-Uqaylah, Kuwait. Nationality: Kuwaiti. Passport no.: 0216155930. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (k) 'Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Mustafa **Al-Qaduli** (*alias* (a) 'Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Mustafa Shaykhлари; (b) Umar Muhammad Khalil Mustafa; (c) Abdul Rahman Muhammad al-Bayati; (d) Tahir Muhammad Khalil Mustafa al-Bayati; (e) Aliazra Ra'ad Ahmad; (f) Abu-Shuayb; (g) Hajji Iman; (h) Abu Iman; (i) Abu Ala; (j) Abu Hasan; (k) Abu Muhammad; (l) Abu Zayna). Function: Senior official of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Date of birth: (a) 1959; (b) 1957. Place of birth: Mosul, Ninawa Province, Iraq. Nationality: Iraqi. Other information: Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (l) 'Emilie **Konig**. Date of birth: 9.12.1984. Place of birth: Ploemeur, France. Nationality: French. Other information: Located in Syria since 2013. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (m) 'Kevin **Guiavarch**. Date of birth: 12.3.1993. Place of birth: Paris, France. Nationality: French. Other information: Located in Syria since 2012. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (n) 'Oumar **Diaby** (*alias*: (a) Omsen (b) Oumar Omsen). Date of birth: 5.8.1975. Place of birth: Dakar, Senegal. Nationality: Senegalese. Other information: Located in Syria. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (2) the following entries shall be added under the heading 'Legal persons, groups and entities':
- (a) 'Ansar Al-shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T) (*alias* (a) AAS-T; (b) Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia; (c) Ansar al-Shari'ah in Tunisia; (d) Ansar al-Shari'ah; (e) Ansar al-Sharia; (f) Supporters of Islamic Law; (g) Al-Qayrawan Media Foundation). Other information: (a) Operates in Tunisia; (b) The leader is Seifallah ben Hassine. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (b) 'Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) (*alias* (a) AAB; (b) Abdullah Azzam Brigades; (c) Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; (d) Yusuf al-Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades). Other information: Operates in Lebanon, Syria and the Arabian Peninsula. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 23.9.2014.;
- (3) the entry 'Iyad **ag Ghali**. Date of birth: 1954. Place of birth: Abeibara, Kidal region, Mali. Nationality: Malian. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a (4) (b): 25.2.2013.' under the heading 'Natural persons' shall be replaced by the following:
- 'Iyad **ag Ghali** (*alias* (a) Sidi Mohamed Arhali). Function: Leader of Ansar Eddine. Address: Mali. Date of birth: (a) 1.1.1958; (b) 1958. Place of birth: (a) Abeibara, Kidal region, Mali; (b) Bouressa, Bourem Region, Mali. Passport No.: A1037434 (Malian passport issued on 10.8.2001, expires on 31.12.2014). Other information: (a) Name of father is Ag Bobacer Arhali, name of mother is Rhiachatou Wallet Sidi; (b) Malian birth certificate No 012546. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a (4) (b): 25.2.2013.'
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**COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1059/2014
of 8 October 2014**

**amending Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 of 27 March 2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 13(1)(d) and (e) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 lists persons, entities and bodies on the basis of determinations made by the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the Sanctions Committee) or the UN Security Council (UNSC) in accordance with paragraph 8(d) of UNSC Resolution 1718(2006) covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources under that Regulation.
- (2) On 28 July 2014, the Sanctions Committee approved the addition of a new entity to its consolidated list of individuals and entities subject to restrictive measures. Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 lists persons, entities and bodies who have been designated by the Council in accordance with Article 15(1)(a) of Council Decision 2013/183/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ⁽²⁾ in accordance with determinations by the Sanctions Committee or the UNSC. Annex IV should be amended accordingly.
- (3) On 30 July 2014, the Sanctions Committee updated the identifying information relating to a number of individuals and entities subject to restrictive measures. On 8 October 2014, on the basis of a determination by the Sanctions Committee, the Council decided ⁽³⁾ to amend the information relating to a number of entities in the list of persons, entities and bodies to whom the freezing of funds and economic resources should apply. Annex IV of the Regulation should therefore be amended accordingly.
- (4) Annex V to Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 lists persons, entities and bodies not listed in Annex IV who, in accordance with Article 15(1)(b) of Council Decision 2013/183/CFSP have been designated by the Council. On 9 October 2014, the Council decided to delete a person listed in Annex V. Annex V should therefore be amended.
- (5) In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this Regulation are effective, this Regulation must enter into force immediately,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 is amended as follows:

- (1) Annex IV is amended in accordance with Annex I to this Regulation.
- (2) Annex V is amended in accordance with Annex II to this Regulation.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 88, 29.3.2007, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 111, 23.4.2013, p. 52.

⁽³⁾ Council Decision 2014/700/CFSP of 8 October 2014 amending Decision 2013/183/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see page 34 of this Official Journal).

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 8 October 2014.

*For the Commission,
On behalf of the President,
Head of the Service for Foreign Policy Instrument*

ANNEX I

Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 is amended as follows:

(1) Under the heading 'B. Legal persons, entities and bodies' the following entry is added:

'(20) Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited (OMM) (aka OMM). Address: (a) Donghung Dong, Central District, PO Box 120, Pyongyang, DPRK; (b) Dongheung-dong Changgwang Street, Chung-Ku, PO Box 125, Pyongyang, DPRK. Other Information: (a) International Maritime Organization (IMO) Number: 1790183; (b) Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited is the operator/manager of the vessel Chong Chon Gang. It played a key role in arranging the shipment of concealed cargo of arms and related material from Cuba to the DPRK in July 2013. As such, Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited contributed to activities prohibited by the resolutions, namely the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by resolution 1874 (2009), and contributed to the evasion of the measures imposed by these resolutions. Date of designation: 30.7.2014.'

(2) Under the heading 'A. Natural persons' the following entries are replaced with updated identifying information:

(a) The entry 'Ri Je-son (alias Ri Che-son). Year of birth: 1938. Post: Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE), chief agency directing North Korea's nuclear programme. Other information: facilitates several nuclear endeavours including GB AE's management of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre and Namchongang Trading Corporation. Date of designation: 16.7.2009.' is replaced by the following:

'Ri Je-son (alias Ri Che-son). Year of birth: 1938. Post: Minister of Atomic Energy Industry since April 2014. Former Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE), chief agency directing North Korea's nuclear programme. Other information: facilitates several nuclear endeavours including GB AE's management of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre and Namchongang Trading Corporation. Date of designation: 16.7.2009.'

(b) The entry 'Chang Myong-Chin (alias Jang Myong-Jin). Post: General Manager of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. Year of birth: (a) 1966, (b) 1965. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'Chang Myong-Chin (alias Jang Myong-Jin). Post: General Manager of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and head of launch centre at which the 13 April and 12 December 2012 launches took place. Date of birth: (a) 19.2.1968; (b) 1965; (c) 1966. Other information: Gender: Male. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.'

(c) The entry 'Ra Ky'ong-Su. Post: Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'Ra Ky'ong-Su (alias Ra Kyung-Su). Post: Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. Date of birth: 4.6.1954. Passport no.: 645120196. Other information: Gender: Male. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.'

(d) The entry 'Kim Kwang-il. Post: Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'Kim Kwang-il. Post: Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. Date of birth: 1.9.1969. Passport no.: PS381420397. Other information: Gender: Male. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.'

3. Under the heading 'B. Legal persons, entities and bodies' the following entries are replaced with updated identifying information:

(a) The entry '(1) Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (aka (a) CHANGGWANG SINYONG CORPORATION; (b) EXTERNAL TECHNOLOGY GENERAL CORPORATION; (c) DPRKN MINING DEVELOPMENT TRADING COOPERATION; (d) "KOMID"). Address: Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: Leading arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Date of designation: 24.4.2009.' is replaced by the following:

'(1) Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (aka (a) CHANGGWANG SINYONG CORPORATION; (b) EXTERNAL TECHNOLOGY GENERAL CORPORATION; (c) DPRKN MINING DEVELOPMENT TRADING COOPERATION; (d) "KOMID"). Address: Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: Primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Date of designation: 24.4.2009.'

- (b) The entry '(9) Amroggang Development Banking Corporation (aka (a) AMROGGANG DEVELOPMENT BANK; (b) AMNOKKANG DEVELOPMENT BANK). Address: Tongan-dong, Pyongyang, DPRK. Date of designation: 2.5.2012.' is replaced by the following:

'(9) Amroggang Development Banking Corporation (aka (a) AMROGGANG Development Bank; (b) Amnokkang Development Bank). Address: Tongan-dong, Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: Amroggang, which was established in 2006, is a Tanchon Commercial Bank-related company managed by Tanchon officials. Tanchon plays a role in financing KOMID's sales of ballistic missiles and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). Tanchon Commercial Bank was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The Security Council designated SHIG in resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in Iran's ballistic missile programme. Date of designation: 2.5.2012.'

- (c) The entry '(10) Green Pine Associated Corporation (aka (a) CHO'NGSONG UNITED TRADING COMPANY; (b) CHONGSONG YONHAP; (c) CH'O'NGSONG YO'NHAP; (d) CHOSUN CHAWO'N KAEBAL TUJA HOESA; (e) JINDALLAE; (f) KU'MHAERYONG COMPANY LTD; (g) NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION; (h) SAEINGP'IL COMPANY). Address: (a) c/o Reconnaissance General Bureau Headquarters, Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, North Korea, (b) Nungrado, Pyongyang, DPRK. Date of designation: 2.5.2012.' is replaced by the following:

'(10) Green Pine Associated Corporation (aka (a) CHO'NGSONG UNITED TRADING COMPANY; (b) CHONGSONG YONHAP; (c) CH'O'NGSONG YO'NHAP; (d) CHOSUN CHAWO'N KAEBAL TUJA HOESA; (e) JINDALLAE; (f) KU'MHAERYONG COMPANY LTD; (g) NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION; (h) SAEINGP'IL COMPANY). Address: (a) c/o Reconnaissance General Bureau Headquarters, Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, North Korea, (b) Nungrado, Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: Green Pine Associated Corporation ("Green Pine") has taken over many of the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Green Pine is also responsible for approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by the DPRK. Green Pine has been identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related material from North Korea. Green Pine specializes in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms. Date of designation: 2.5.2012.'

- (d) The entry '(11) Korea Heungjin Trading Company (aka (a) HUNJIN TRADING CO.; (b) KOREA HENJIN TRADING CO.; (c) KOREA HENGJIN TRADING COMPANY). Address: Pyongyang, DPRK. Date of designation: 2.5.2012.' is replaced by the following:

'(11) Korea Heungjin Trading Company (aka (a) HUNJIN TRADING CO.; (b) KOREA HENJIN TRADING CO.; (c) KOREA HENGJIN TRADING COMPANY). Address: Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: The Korea Heungjin Trading Company is used by KOMID for trading purposes. Suspected to have been involved in supplying missile-related goods to Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). Heungjin has been associated with KOMID, and, more specifically, KOMID's procurement office. Heungjin has been used to procure an advanced digital controller with applications in missile design. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The Security Council designated SHIG in resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in Iran's ballistic missile programme. Date of designation: 2.5.2012.'

- (e) The entry '(12) Korean Committee for Space Technology (aka (a) DPRK Committee for Space Technology; (b) Department of Space Technology of the DPRK; (c) Committee for Space Technology; (d) KCST). Address: Pyongyang, DPRK. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'(12) Korean Committee for Space Technology (aka (a) DPRK Committee for Space Technology; (b) Department of Space Technology of the DPRK; (c) Committee for Space Technology; (d) KCST). Address: Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: The Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) orchestrated the DPRK's launches on 13 April 2012 and 12 December 2012 via the satellite control centre and Sohae launch area. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.'

- (f) The entry '(13) Bank of East Land (aka (a) Dongbang BANK; (b) TONGBANG U'NHAENG; (c) TONGBANG BANK). Address: P.O. Box 32, BEL Building, Jonseung-Dung, Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'(13) Bank of East Land (aka (a) Dongbang BANK; (b) TONGBANG U'NHAENG; (c) TONGBANG BANK). Address: P.O. Box 32, BEL Building, Jonseung-Dung, Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: DPRK financial institution Bank of East Land facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine). Bank of East Land has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions. In 2007 and 2008, Bank of East Land facilitated transactions involving Green Pine and Iranian financial institutions, including Bank Melli and Bank Sepah. The Security Council designated Bank Sepah in resolution 1747 (2007) for providing support to Iran's ballistic missile program. Green Pine was designated by the Committee in April 2012. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.'

- (g) The entry '(14) Korea Kumryong Trading Corporation. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'(14) Korea Kumryong Trading Corporation. Other information: Used as an alias by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) to carry out procurement activities. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.'

- (h) The entry '(15) Tosong Technology Trading Corporation. Address: Pyongyang, DPRK. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'(15) Tosong Technology Trading Corporation. Address: Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: The Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) is the parent company of Tosong Technology Trading Corporation. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.'

- (i) The entry '(16) Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation (aka (a) Chosun Yunha Machinery Joint Operation Company; (b) Korea Ryenha Machinery J/V Corporation; (c) Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation; (d) Ryonha Machinery Corporation; (e) Ryonha Machinery; (f) Ryonha Machine Tool; (g) Ryonha Machine Tool Corporation; (h) Ryonha Machinery Corp; (i) Ryonhwa Machinery Joint Venture Corporation; (j) Ryonhwa Machinery JV; (k) Huichon Ryonha Machinery General Plant; (l) Unsan; (m) Unsan Solid Tools; and (n) Millim Technology Company). Address: (a) Tongan-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; (b) Mangungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; (c) Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: Email addresses: (a) ryonha@silibank.com; sjc-117@hotmail.com; and (b) millim@silibank.com. Telephone numbers: (a) 850-2-18111; (b) 850-2-18111-8642; and (c) 850-2-18111-381-8642. Facsimile number: 850-2-381-4410. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'(16) Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation (aka (a) Chosun Yunha Machinery Joint Operation Company; (b) Korea Ryenha Machinery J/V Corporation; (c) Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation; (d) Ryonha Machinery Corporation; (e) Ryonha Machinery; (f) Ryonha Machine Tool; (g) Ryonha Machine Tool Corporation; (h) Ryonha Machinery Corp; (i) Ryonhwa Machinery Joint Venture Corporation; (j) Ryonhwa Machinery JV; (k) Huichon Ryonha Machinery General Plant; (l) Unsan; (m) Unsan Solid Tools; and (n) Millim Technology Company). Address: (a) Tongan-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; (b) Mangungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; (c) Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: Email addresses: (a) ryonha@silibank.com; (b) sjc-117@hotmail.com; (c) millim@silibank.com. Telephone numbers: (a) 850-2-18111; (b) 850-2-18111-8642; (c) 850-2-18111-381-8642. Facsimile number: 850-2-381-4410. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is a defense conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to that country's military-related sales. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.'

- (j) The entry '(17) Leader (Hong Kong) International (aka Leader International Trading Limited). Address: Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower, 173 Des Voeux Road, Hong Kong. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'(17) Leader (Hong Kong) International (aka (a) Leader International Trading Limited; (b) Leader (Hong Kong) International Trading Limited). Address: LM-873, RM B, 14/F, Wah Hen Commercial Centre, 383 Hennessy

Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong, China. Other information: (a) Hong Kong company registration number 1177053; (b) Facilitates shipments on behalf of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Date of designation: 22.1.2013.'

- (k) The entry '(18) Second Academy of Natural Sciences (aka (a) 2nd Academy of Natural Sciences; (b) Che 2 Chayon Kwahakwon; (c) Academy of Natural Sciences; (d) Chayon Kwahak-Won; National Defense Academy; (e) Kukpang Kwahak-Won; (f) Second Academy of Natural Sciences Research Institute; (g) Sansri). Address: Pyongyang, DPRK. Date of designation: 7.3.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'(18) Second Academy of Natural Sciences (aka (a) 2nd Academy of Natural Sciences; (b) Che 2 Chayon Kwahakwon; (c) Academy of Natural Sciences; (d) Chayon Kwahak-Won; (e) National Defense Academy; (f) Kukpang Kwahak-Won; (g) Second Academy of Natural Sciences Research Institute; (h) Sansri). Address: Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: The Second Academy of Natural Sciences is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of the DPRK's advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences uses a number of subordinate organizations to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas, including Tangun Trading Corporation, for use in the DPRK's missile and probably nuclear weapons programs. Tangun Trading Corporation was designated by the Committee in July 2009 and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support DPRK's defense research and development programs, including, but not limited to, weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programs and procurement, including materials that are controlled or prohibited under relevant multilateral control regimes. Date of designation: 7.3.2013.'

- (l) The entry '(19) Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation. Other information: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation. Location: Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Date of designation: 7.3.2013.' is replaced by the following:

'(19) Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation. Address: Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Other information: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation and is a defense conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to that country's military-related sales. Date of designation: 7.3.2013.'

ANNEX II

Annex V to Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 is amended as follows:

The following entry under the heading 'A. Natural persons referred to in Article 6(2)(a)' is deleted:

| | Name (and possible aliases) | Identifying information | Reasons |
|-----|-----------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| '1. | JON Pyong-ho | Year of birth: 1926 | Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, Head of the Central Committee's Military Supplies Industry Department controlling the Second Economic Committee of the Central Committee, member of the National Defence Commission.' |

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1060/2014
of 8 October 2014
establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 ⁽¹⁾,

Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors ⁽²⁾, and in particular Article 136(1) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto.
- (2) The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The standard import values referred to in Article 136 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 are fixed in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 8 October 2014.

For the Commission,
On behalf of the President,
Jerzy PLEWA

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 157, 15.6.2011, p. 1.

ANNEX

Standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

| (EUR/100 kg) | | |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| CN code | Third country code ⁽¹⁾ | Standard import value |
| 0702 00 00 | MA | 160,3 |
| | MK | 56,4 |
| | XS | 75,9 |
| | ZZ | 97,5 |
| 0707 00 05 | MK | 29,8 |
| | TR | 95,4 |
| | ZZ | 62,6 |
| 0709 93 10 | TR | 118,4 |
| | ZZ | 118,4 |
| 0805 50 10 | AR | 120,7 |
| | CL | 128,6 |
| | IL | 102,2 |
| | TR | 113,5 |
| | UY | 58,0 |
| | ZA | 111,4 |
| | ZZ | 105,7 |
| | ZZ | 105,7 |
| 0806 10 10 | BR | 156,1 |
| | MK | 31,8 |
| | TR | 134,0 |
| | ZZ | 107,3 |
| | ZZ | 107,3 |
| 0808 10 80 | BA | 57,3 |
| | BR | 52,7 |
| | CL | 96,7 |
| | NZ | 134,0 |
| | ZA | 115,6 |
| | ZZ | 91,3 |
| 0808 30 90 | CN | 95,2 |
| | TR | 124,7 |
| | ZZ | 110,0 |

⁽¹⁾ Nomenclature of countries laid down by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1106/2012 of 27 November 2012 implementing Regulation (EC) No 471/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics relating to external trade with non-member countries, as regards the update of the nomenclature of countries and territories (OJ L 328, 28.11.2012, p. 7). Code 'ZZ' stands for 'of other origin'.

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1061/2014**of 8 October 2014****fixing an acceptance percentage for the issuing of export licences, rejecting export-licence applications and suspending the lodging of export-licence applications for out-of-quota sugar**

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 ⁽¹⁾,Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2006 of 30 June 2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 as regards trade with third countries in the sugar sector ⁽²⁾, and in particular Article 7e in conjunction with Article 9(1) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) According to point (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 139(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 the sugar produced during a marketing year in excess of the quota referred to in Article 136 of that Regulation may be exported only within the quantitative limit fixed by the Commission.
- (2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 776/2014 of 16 July 2014 fixing the quantitative limit for the exports of out-of-quota sugar and isoglucose until the end of the 2014/2015 marketing year ⁽³⁾ sets such quantitative limits.
- (3) The quantities of sugar covered by applications for export licences exceed the quantitative limit fixed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 776/2014. An acceptance percentage should therefore be set for quantities applied for from 1 to 3 October 2014. All export-licence applications for sugar lodged after 3 October 2014 should accordingly be rejected and the lodging of export-licence applications should be suspended,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1. Export licences for out-of-quota sugar for which applications were lodged from 1 to 3 October 2014 shall be issued for the quantities applied for, multiplied by an acceptance percentage of 28,699472 %.
2. Applications for export licences for out-of-quota sugar submitted on 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 October 2014 are hereby rejected.
3. The lodging of applications for export licences for out-of-quota sugar shall be suspended for the period 13 October 2014 to 30 September 2015.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.⁽²⁾ OJ L 178, 1.7.2006, p. 24.⁽³⁾ OJ L 210, 17.7.2014, p. 11.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 8 October 2014.

*For the Commission,
On behalf of the President,
Jerzy PLEWA
Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development*

DECISIONS

COUNCIL DECISION

of 24 June 2014

establishing the position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union at the 25th session of the OTIF Revision Committee as regards certain amendments to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) and to the Appendices thereto

(2014/699/EU)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 91 in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Whereas:

- (1) The Union has acceded to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail of 9 May 1980 as amended by the Vilnius Protocol of 3 June 1999 (the 'COTIF Convention') in accordance with Council Decision 2013/103/EU ⁽¹⁾.
- (2) All Member States, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta, apply the COTIF Convention.
- (3) The Revision Committee set up in accordance with point (c) of Article 13(1) of the COTIF Convention, at its 25th session due to take place from 25 to 27 June 2014, is expected to decide upon certain amendments to the COTIF Convention as well as to certain Appendices thereto, namely Appendices B (Uniform Rules concerning the Contract of International Carriage of Goods by Rail — CIM), D (Uniform Rules concerning Contracts of Use of Vehicles in International Rail Traffic — CUV), E (Uniform Rules concerning the Contract of Use of Infrastructure in International Rail Traffic — CUI), F (Uniform Rules concerning the Validation of Technical Standards and the Adoption of Uniform Technical Prescriptions applicable to Railway Material intended to be used in International Traffic — APTU) and G (Uniform Rules concerning the Technical Admission of Railway Material used in International Traffic — ATMF).
- (4) The amendments to the COTIF Convention have the objective of updating the tasks of the Committee of Technical Experts and the definition of 'keeper' in line with Union law; and of modifying certain rules concerning the financing of the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF), its auditing and reporting as well as minor administrative changes.
- (5) The amendments to Appendix B (CIM) aim to give preference to the electronic form of the consignment note and its accompanying documents and to clarify certain provisions of the contract of carriage.
- (6) The amendments to Appendix D (CUV) presented by the Secretary-General of OTIF have the objective of clarifying the roles of the keeper and the entity in charge of maintenance in the contracts of use of vehicles in international rail traffic. France has presented a separate proposal concerning the liability for damage caused by a vehicle. Germany has also presented a separate proposal concerning the scope of the CUV Uniform rules.

⁽¹⁾ Council Decision 2013/103/EU of 16 June 2011 on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) of 9 May 1980, as amended by the Vilnius Protocol of 3 June 1999 (OJ L 51, 23.2.2013, p. 1).

- (7) The amendments to Appendix G (ATMF) aim to update the provisions concerning the technical admission of railway material used in international traffic, clarify the functions of and relations between the contracting State as defined in that Appendix, the competent authority and the assessing entity as well as harmonise terms in line with Union law.
- (8) The amendments to Appendix F (APTU) aim to maintain consistency with the revised Appendix G (ATMF).
- (9) The amendments to Appendix E (CUI) suggested by the International Rail Transport Committee (CIT) aim to extend the scope of the uniform rules concerning the contract of use of infrastructure to domestic rail transport, to create a legal basis for general terms and conditions of use of railway infrastructure and to extend the liability of the infrastructure manager for damage or losses caused by the infrastructure.
- (10) The Secretary-General of OTIF has also proposed editorial changes to replace the term 'European Communities' by 'European Union' throughout the COTIF Convention and the Appendices thereto.
- (11) Most of the proposed amendments are in line with the law and the strategic objectives of the Union, and should therefore be supported by the Union. Certain amendments have no impact on EU law and do not need a position to be agreed at Union level. Finally, some amendments need more discussion within the Union and should be rejected at this meeting of the Revision Committee; should the latter amendments be approved without modification that is acceptable for the Union, the Union should formulate an objection following the procedure established in Article 35(4) of the COTIF Convention,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1. The position to be taken on the Union's behalf at the 25th session of the Revision Committee set up by the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail shall be in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
2. Minor changes to the documents mentioned in the Annex to this Decision may be agreed by the representatives of the Union in the Revision Committee without further Decision of the Council.

Article 2

After its adoption, the Decision of the Revision Committee shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 June 2014.

For the Council
The President
E. VENIZELOS

ANNEX

1. INTRODUCTION

The Secretary-General of OTIF has convened the 25th session of the Revision Committee (RC) of COTIF Convention in Berne on 25-27 June 2014.

2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS

Documents concerning the agenda items were circulated to OTIF Member States and are available on the website of OTIF at the following link: <http://otif.org/en/law/revision-committee/working-documents.html>

3. COMMENTS ON EACH AGENDA ITEM

ITEM 1. OPENING THE MEETING AND ESTABLISHING THE QUORUM

Document: none.

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: not applicable.

Recommended coordinated position: none.

There is a quorum in the RC when the majority of the OTIF Member States enjoying the right to vote are represented there at the time of the vote. However, Article 13(3) of the COTIF Convention provides that OTIF Member States having made a declaration concerning the non-application of one or more Appendices do not have the right to vote concerning amendments to the given Appendix.

The following OTIF Member States have not withdrawn their declarations on the non-application of certain Appendices:

Pakistan, Russia (concerning Uniform Rules concerning the Contract of International Carriage of Passengers by Rail (CIV), the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID), CUV, CUI, APTU and ATMF), Georgia (concerning CUV, CUI, APTU and ATMF), the Czech Republic, Norway, Slovakia, the United Kingdom (concerning CUI, APTU and ATMF), France (concerning ATMF).

When discussing amendments to the relevant Appendices, the number of OTIF Member States having made a declaration on the non-application of the Appendix in question has to be deducted from the number of active members of OTIF (46) to establish the quorum concerning the vote on the Appendix in question.

In the case of Union competence, the Union may vote for all of its members having the right to vote, without regard to the physical presence of those members at the vote; thus, the quorum may be different in the case of the Union representing its Member States and in the case of Union Member States voting for themselves.

ITEM 2. ELECTION OF CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR

Document: none.

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: Member States.

Recommended coordinated position: none.

ITEM 3. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

Document: CR 25/3.

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: Member States.

Recommended coordinated position: none.

ITEM 4. PARTIAL REVISION OF COTIF — BASIC CONVENTION

Documents: CR 25/4, CR 25/4 Add. 1.

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: Member States.

Recommended coordinated position:

Amendments to Article 3 (International cooperation) to be supported (editorial change to replace the reference to the 'European Communities' with a reference to the 'European Union').

Amendments to Article 12 (Execution of judgments. Attachment) to be supported as it amends the definition of 'keeper' in line with Union law.

Amendments to Article 20 (Committee of Technical Experts) to be supported as they are necessary to update the APTU Uniform Rules and ATMF Uniform Rules in order to keep them in line with Union law.

Other amendments: no Union position necessary as these amendments relate to the financing of the organisation, auditing or include administrative changes regarding the work programme, the annual report and the lists of lines or services which have no impact on Union law.

ITEM 5. PARTIAL REVISION OF APPENDIX B (CIM)

Documents: CR 25/5, CR 25/5 Add. 1, CR 25/5 Add. 2, CR 25/5.1.

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: Union for Articles 6 and 6a; Member States for other Articles.

Recommended coordinated position:

Amendments to Article 6 and new Article 6a concern Union law because of the use of the consignment note and its accompanying documents for customs and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) procedures. The Union agrees with the intention of OTIF to give priority to the electronic form of consignment notes. However, at present the adoption of these amendments may lead to unintended consequences. The current simplified procedure for customs transit by rail is only possible with paper documents. Therefore, if railways opt for the electronic consignment note, they will have to use the standard transit procedure and the New Computerised Transit System (NCTS).

The Commission has started preparations for a working group to discuss the use of electronic transport documents for transit under Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council⁽¹⁾. That working group will have its kick-off meeting on 4-5 June 2014. The Union agrees also with the intention to provide the accompanying documents in electronic format. However, under current Union law there is no legal basis to provide the documents (e.g. Common Veterinary Entry Document, Common Entry Document) which have to accompany SPS-related goods in electronic format and therefore they need to be provided on paper. The Commission has prepared a draft Regulation, which will cater for electronic certification and the draft is currently under discussion in the European Parliament and the Council. That Regulation (Official Control Regulation) is envisaged to be adopted by end of 2015/beginning of 2016, however, there will be a transitional period for the enforcement.

Therefore, the Union suggests that no decision should be taken on these items at the present session of the RC and that OTIF continue cooperation with the Union on this issue in order to have a well-prepared solution for an upcoming revision of CIM which should ideally be synchronised with the Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 and its implementing provisions which are to be in force from 1 May 2016. Certain electronic procedures may be phased in between 2016 and 2020 in accordance with Article 278 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013.

Other amendments: no Union position necessary as these provisions do not interfere with Union law.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1).

ITEM 6. ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS — INFORMATION ON THE WORK OF THE RID COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS

Document: CR 25/6.

Competence: Union.

Exercising voting rights: not applicable.

Recommended coordinated position: to take note of the information.

ITEM 7. PARTIAL REVISION OF APPENDIX D (CUV)

Documents: CR 25/7, CR 25/7 Add. 1, CR 25/7 Add. 2, CR 25/7 Add. 3.

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: Union.

Recommended Union position: Amendments to Articles 2 and 9 to be supported as they clarify the roles of the keeper and of the entity in charge of maintenance in line with Union law (Directive 2008/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁽¹⁾). However, the proposed amendment to Article 7 submitted by France concerning the liability of the person who has provided a vehicle for use as a means of transport in case of damage resulting from a defect of the vehicle needs further analysis within the Union before taking a decision in OTIF. Therefore, the Union is not in a position to support this amendment proposal at this RC and proposes to postpone the decision until the next General Assembly in order to further assess this issue. The Union takes the same position, i.e. to postpone the decision until the next General Assembly in order to further assess the issue, on the proposal of Germany for a new Article 1a presented to OTIF during Union coordination.

Additional recommended Union position: In document CR 25/7 ADD 1, page 6, at the end of paragraph 8a, add: 'The amendment to Article 9, paragraph 3, first indent, does not affect the existing allocation of liabilities between ECM and the keeper of the vehicles.'

ITEM 8. REVISION OF APPENDIX G (ATMF)

Documents: CR 25/8, CR 25/8 Add. 1, CR 25/8 Add. 2.

Competence: Union.

Exercising voting rights: Union.

Recommended coordinated position:

(1) On Ref. CR 25/8 Revision of Appendix G (ATMF)

To vote in favour with the following comments:

— add the following sentence to Article 3a(3):

'When operating in the EU, railway undertakings and infrastructure managers shall only be subject to European legislation.'

The Union could accept the following alternatives:

'For railway undertakings and infrastructure managers, when operating within the EU, EU legislation takes precedence over the provisions in these Uniform Rules.');

or

'When operating within the European Union, railway undertakings and infrastructure managers are solely subject to European Union rules and shall therefore not apply these Uniform Rules except in so far as there is no EU rule governing the particular subject concerned.'

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2008/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 amending Directive 2004/49/EC on safety on the Community's railways (Railway Safety Directive) (OJ L 345, 23.12.2008, p. 62).

- Article 4(1): add the following sentence at the end (after point (b)):

‘If the vehicle is admitted in a single stage, the type of construction of the vehicle is admitted at the same time.’
- Article 5(5): Correct the reference; replace ‘Article 2w1’ with ‘Article 2wa(1)’,
- Article 19: Combine Article 19(2) and (2a) by deleting (2a) and replacing (2) by the following modified text:

‘These Uniform Rules do not affect admissions issued before 1.1.2011 for vehicles which exist as at 1.1.2011 and which are marked RIV or RIC as proof of current compliance with the technical provisions of the RIV 2000 agreement (revised edition of 1 January 2004) or the RIC agreement respectively, and for existing vehicles not marked RIV or RIC but admitted and marked according to bilateral or multilateral agreements between Contracting States notified to the Organisation.’

(2) On 25/8 Add. 1. Justification document for the Revision of Appendix G (ATMF)

- General justifications (end of page 2): modify the sentence as follows: ‘The changes which are not covered by these general justifications are explained in the rest of this document.’
- point (t) of Article 2: add a new paragraph ‘When infrastructure managers operate vehicles, e.g. freight wagons to transport materials for construction or for infrastructure maintenance activities, the infrastructure managers do so in the capacity of a railway undertaking.’
- point (b) of Article 4(1): Add module SH1 since the design type certificate issued in the design phase of this module also provides the possibility to use the procedure described. The new sentence would read:

‘According to Article 10 § 8, the appropriate manner to demonstrate that the vehicle corresponds to the admitted type of construction is a certificate of verification, it is not really a simplified procedure. The certificate of verification is issued according to the appropriate module defined in the UTP(s) concerned which may be module SD or module SF for type examination certificate or module SH1 for design examination certificate.’
- Article 7(1a): to align the interpretation of this provision with that of the Union (Article 8(7) of Commission Recommendation 2011/217/EU ⁽¹⁾), add the following sentence:

‘Due to the fact that the admission procedures can take several months, it is recommended that the rules to be applied by the competent authority for a specific admission process are those that were in force at the date of the application and that no new rule is imposed during the subsequent process.’

(3) Result of the verification of the German version of the Revision of Annex G (ATMF):

- Point (ab) of Article 2 Align the definition of accreditation with the wording of Article 2(10) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁽²⁾

‘Akkreditierung: die Bestätigung durch eine nationale Akkreditierungsstelle, dass eine Konformitätsbewertungsstelle die in europäischen harmonisierten Normen oder anwendbaren internationalen Normen festgelegten Anforderungen und, gegebenenfalls, zusätzliche Anforderungen, einschließlich solcher in relevanten sektoralen Akkreditierungssystemen, erfüllt, um eine spezielle Konformitätsbewertungstätigkeit durchzuführen.’
- Article 5(2): ‘assessing entities’ is translated as ‘Bewertungsstelle’. According to the ETV GEN-E ‘the assessing entity’ is translated as ‘Prüforgan’. In the Union the term ‘Bewertungsstelle’ is especially assigned to assessment bodies according to the common safety method for risk assessment (CSM RA). Therefore, the OTIF term according to Article 5(2) could be misleading. The proposal is to use the word ‘Prüforgan’ in ATMF. See also point (cb) of Article 2, Article 5(3)–(7), Article 6(4), Article 10(3a), (4), (6)–(8),
- Article 5(4): change the wording ‘Die Anforderungen in § 3 gelten sinngemäß für die zuständige Behörde, in Bezug auf die in § 2 genannten Aufgaben, die nicht an eine Bewertungsstelle übertragen wurden.’

⁽¹⁾ Commission Recommendation 2011/217/EU of 29 March 2011 on the authorisation for the placing in service of structural subsystems and vehicles under Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 95, 8.4.2011, p. 1).

⁽²⁾ Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30).

- Article 10(8): delete the brackets,
- Article 5(3): after the wording ‘Voraussetzungen’, replace ‘erfüllen’ by ‘erfüllt’,
- point (b) of Article 11(3): the word ‘Identifizierungscode(se)’ should be replaced by ‘Identifizierungscode(s)’,
- second sentence of Article 15(1): delete ‘nicht’,
- second sentence of Article 15a(1): put a full stop after ‘entsprechen’ and start a third sentence with ‘Es hat insbesondere:’.

(4) In the French version the definition in point (n) of Article 2 should read:

“détenteur” désigne la personne ou l’entité propriétaire du véhicule ou disposant d’un droit de disposition sur celui-ci, qui exploite ledit véhicule à titre de moyen de transport et est inscrite en tant que telle dans le registre des véhicules prévu à l’article 13.’.

ITEM 9. PARTIAL REVISION OF APPENDIX F (APTU)

Documents: Ref.: CR 25/9, CR 25/9 Add. 1.

Competence: Union.

Exercising voting rights: Union.

Recommended coordinated position: editorial amendments to be supported.

ITEM 10. MANDATE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE EXPLANATORY REPORT

Document: CR 25/10.

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: Member States.

Recommended Union position: to be supported.

ITEM 11. EDITORIAL AMENDMENTS

Document: CR 25/11.

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: Member States.

Recommended coordinated position: to be supported with the addition of the following new second indent:

‘— to provide for a period of 3 weeks open for Member States for a check of those editorial amendments before their notification.’.

ITEM 12. PARTIAL REVISION OF APPENDIX E (CUI)

Document: CR 25/12.

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: Union.

Recommended coordinated position: amendments to be rejected. These amendments suggested by CIT include the extension of the scope of CUI to domestic operations, the introduction of contractually binding General Terms and Conditions and the extension of the infrastructure manager’s liability for damage. They may deserve further consideration but as they have not been discussed in any internal forum of OTIF before the Revision Committee, their impact could not have been assessed in sufficient detail. It seems to be premature to amend CUI (which is at present in line with Union law) at this RC without proper preparation.

ITEM 13. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE WORKING GROUPS OF THE REVISION COMMITTEE CONCERNING APPENDICES A, B, D AND E

Document: CR 25/13.

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: Member States.

Recommended coordinated position: none.

ITEM 14. INFORMATION ON FUTURE WORK

Document: CR 25/14 (not available yet).

Competence: shared.

Exercising voting rights: not applicable.

Recommended coordinated position: to be determined on the spot.

COUNCIL DECISION 2014/700/CFSP**of 8 October 2014****amending Decision 2013/183/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2013/183/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 19 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) On 22 April 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/183/CFSP.
- (2) On 28 July 2014, the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the 'Sanctions Committee'), approved the addition of a new entity to its consolidated list of individuals and entities subject to restrictive measures.
- (3) On 30 July 2014, the Sanctions Committee updated the list of individuals and entities subject to restrictive measures.
- (4) In accordance with Article 22(1) of Decision 2013/183/CFSP, the list set out in Annex I to that Decision should therefore be amended accordingly.
- (5) Furthermore, in the light of the reported decease of one listed individual, Annex II to Decision 2013/183/CFSP should also be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Annexes I and II to Decision 2013/183/CFSP are amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 8 October 2014.

For the Council
The President
M. LUPI

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 111, 23.4.2013, p. 52.

ANNEX

I. The entity listed below is added to the list set out in Annex I to Decision 2013/183/CFSP:

List of persons referred to in Article 13(1)(a) and of persons and entities referred to in Article 15(1)(a)

B. Entities

| | Name | Alias | Location | Date of designation | Other information |
|-----|--|-------|---|---------------------|--|
| 20. | Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited (OMM) | | Donghung Dong, Central District, PO BOX 120, Pyongyang, DPRK; Dongheung-dong Changgwang Street, Chung-Ku, PO Box 125, Pyongyang. | 28.7.2014 | Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited (IMO Number: 1790183) is the operator/manager of the vessel Chong Chon Gang. It played a key role in arranging the shipment of concealed cargo of arms and related materiel from Cuba to the DPRK in July 2013. As such, Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited contributed to activities prohibited by the resolutions, namely the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by Resolution 1874 (2009), and contributed to the evasion of the measures imposed by these Resolutions. |

II. The entries for the following persons and entities set out in Annex I to Decision 2013/183/CFSP are replaced by the entries below:

List of persons referred to in Article 13(1)(a) and of persons and entities referred to in Article 15(1)(a)

A. Persons

| | Name | Alias | Date of birth | Date of designation | Other information |
|----|-----------|--|---------------|---------------------|--|
| 2. | Ri Je-Son | Korean name: 리제선 Chinese name: 李济善 a.k.a. Ri Che Son | Born 1938 | 16.7.2009 | Minister of Atomic Energy Industry since April 2014. Former Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE), chief agency directing DPRK's nuclear program; facilitated several nuclear endeavours including GBAE's management of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and Namchongang Trading Corporation. |

B. Entities

| | Name | Alias | Location | Date of designation | Other information |
|-----|----------------------------------|---|--|---------------------|---|
| 14. | Leader (Hong Kong) International | Leader International Trading Limited; Leader (Hong Kong) International Trading Limited | LM-873, RM B, 14/F, Wah Hen Commercial Centre, 383 Hennessy Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong, China. | 22.1.2013 | Leader International (Hong Kong company registration number 1177053), facilitates shipments on behalf of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. |

III. The person listed below is deleted from the list set out in Annex II to Decision 2013/183/CFSP:

A. Persons

5. JON Pyong-Ho.

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2014/701/CFSP**of 8 October 2014****implementing Decision 2011/486/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in Afghanistan**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2011/486/CFSP of 1 August 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in Afghanistan ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 5 and Article 6(1) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) On 1 August 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/486/CFSP.
- (2) On 11 February, 18 March, 16 May, 30 July and 20 August 2014, the United Nations Security Council Committee, established pursuant to paragraph 30 of Security Council Resolution 1988 (2011), updated and amended the list of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities subject to restrictive measures.
- (3) The Annex to Decision 2011/486/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to Decision 2011/486/CFSP is hereby amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 8 October 2014.

For the Council

The President

M. LUPI

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 199, 2.8.2011, p. 57.

ANNEX

I. The entries below shall be added to the list set out in the Annex to Decision 2011/486/CFSP

A. Individuals associated with the Taliban

1. Qari Rahmat (*alias*: Kari Rahmat).

Grounds for listing: A Taliban commander since at least February 2010. **Address:** a) Kamkai Village, Achin District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. b) Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. **Date of Birth:** a) 1981 b) 1982. **Place of Birth:** Shadal (variant Shadaal) Bazaar, Achin District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. **Other information:** (a) Collects taxes and bribes on behalf of the Taliban. (b) Liaises with and provides Taliban operatives in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, with information, guidance, housing and weapons and has emplaced improvised explosive devices (IED) and conducted attacks against International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan forces. **Date of UN designation:** 21.8.2014.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Qari Rahmat has been a Taliban commander since at least February 2010. In early 2013, Rahmat served as a Taliban commander in the Shadaal Bazaar area of Achin District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. Rahmat directed the activities of approximately 300 Taliban operatives in Achin District and provided operational guidance and weapons to these operatives. In late 2012, Rahmat led an attack on Afghan forces in Kot District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. As of mid-2012, Rahmat served under the Taliban shadow district chief for Achin District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. During this time, Rahmat was a Taliban facilitator who emplaced improvised explosive devices and conducted attacks against International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan forces.

Rahmat also collects taxes and bribes on behalf of the Taliban. As of early 2013, Rahmat collected taxes on behalf of the Taliban from drug traffickers based in the Shadaal Bazaar, Achin District, Nangarhar Province. As of mid-2012, Rahmat was in charge of collecting taxes from narcotics traffickers for the Taliban.

Rahmat provides intelligence information to the Taliban. As of early 2013, Rahmat provided his Taliban superiors with information on the activities of Afghan government officials and Afghan security forces in Achin District, Nangarhar Province. Rahmat gathered intelligence for the Taliban from Afghan Government employees as of mid-2012 and also conducted investigations to expose ISAF and Afghan Government informants for the benefit of the Taliban.

Rahmat has also provided lethal aid, housing, and guidance to Taliban fighters. As of late 2012, Rahmat provided rocket-propelled grenades, PKM light machine guns, and AK-47 assault rifles to the Taliban. Rahmat also sheltered Taliban fighters at his guest house and provided tactical guidance to Taliban fighters during this period. As of late 2011, Rahmat had a guest house in Achin District where Taliban members often stayed.

2. Qari Saifullah Tokhi (*alias*: (a) Qari Saifullah, (b) Qari Saifullah Al Tokhi, (c) Saifullah Tokhi, (d) Qari Sahab).

Title: Qari. **Grounds for listing:** Taliban Shadow Deputy Governor and operational commander in Zabul Province, Afghanistan. **Address:** Chalo Bawari area, Quetta City, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. **Date of Birth:** Approximately 1964. **Place of Birth:** Daraz Village, Jaldak wa Tarnak District, Zabul Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Other information:** (a) Believed to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. (b) Responsible for the laying of improvised explosive devices and the organisation of suicide attacks. (c) Physical description: height: 180 cm; weight: approximately 90 kg; build: athletic build; eye colour: brown; hair colour: red; complexion: medium brown. (d) Distinguishing physical marks: large round face, full beard, and walks with a limp due to plastic prosthesis in place of his left lower leg.

(e) Ethnic background: Pashtun; Belongs to Tokhi (alternative tribe spelling: Torchi) tribe, Barkozai (alternative tribe spelling: Bakorzai) sub-tribe, Kishita Barkorzai (lower Barkorzai) clan. (f) Marital Status: married. (g) Father's name: Agha Mohammad. (h) Brother's name: Humdullah. **Date of UN designation:** 19.3.2014.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Qari Saifullah Tokhi is the Taliban shadow Deputy Governor and an operational commander in eastern Zabul Province, Afghanistan. He has directly commanded two groups of approximately 50 Taliban fighters and had command over Taliban commanders in Zabul Province. Qari Saifullah Tokhi has used these groups to organize terrorist activities against the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Coalition Forces in eastern Zabul Province. Qari Saifullah Tokhi also issued orders to his subordinates, who conducted improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, small arms fire attacks, and rocket attacks in Zabul Province.

Three Taliban fighters were killed on the night of 2 December 2012, in Qalat District, Zabul Province, Afghanistan. They were caught emplacing IEDs and were killed as a result. All three men were known as Qari Saifullah Tokhi's men.

On 14 January 2012, six Taliban insurgents subordinate to Qari Saifullah Tokhi attacked an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) convoy. The Taliban insurgents attacked the convoy in the vicinity of Abdul Haq Kalay Village, Tarnak Wa Jaldak District with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).

On 28 September 2011, two suicide bombers under the direction of Taliban commander Qari Saifullah Tokhi were planning attacks. One suicide bomber planned to attack the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Qalat District, Zabul Province. The second suicide bomber planned to attack an ISAF base in Shajoy District. The suicide bombers had planned to attack coalition forces bases between 29 September and 1 October 2011.

The Taliban, under the leadership of Qari Saifullah Tokhi, warned local mobile phone networks on 20 April 2011 to shut down their services in Zabul Province. If services were not shut down in accordance with Taliban direction, the Taliban threatened to destroy their antennas along the roads in Zabul Province.

On 25 November 2010, Qari Saifullah Tokhi ordered a Taliban commander and Taliban shadow sub-Governor of Atghar District, Zabul Province, to transport light weapons to Qalat City, the capital of Zabul Province. The shipment included approximately 25 Kalashnikov rifles, 10 machine guns, five RPGs, and 20 grenades. Suicide bombers planned to use these weapons against ISAF forces and Afghan National Security Forces, specifically targeting the Second Afghan National Army Brigade and the Police Headquarters.

3. **Yahya Haqqani** (*alias*: (a) Yaya (b) Qari Sahab)

Grounds for listing: Senior Haqqani Network (HQN) member. **Address:** A Haqqani Madrassa in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Border Area. **Date of birth:** a) 1982 b) 1978. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Other information:** (a) Closely involved in the group's military, financial, and propaganda activities. (b) Injured leg. (c) Father's name is Hajji Meyawar Khan (deceased). **Date of UN designation:** 31.7.2014.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Yahya Haqqani is a senior Haqqani Network (HQN) member who has been closely involved in the group's military, financial, and propaganda activities. Yahya has acted as de facto head of the group when senior-most leaders Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (Yahya's brother-in-law), Badruddin Haqqani (deceased, formerly listed), and Khalil Haqqani were absent. Yahya has also assumed duties as a HQN logistician and has facilitated funding for Haqqani commanders including a subordinate of now-deceased HQN commander Sangin Zadrán Sher Mohammad and HQN chief of suicide operations, Abdul Rauf Zakir. Yahya has also acted as Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani's Arabic interpreter and messenger.

Yahya has conducted significant facilitation activities in support of HQN attacks and other activities. In early 2013 he facilitated funding for HQN fighters. Also in early 2013, Yahya coordinated the transfer of supplies from the United Arab Emirates to HQN senior leader Khalil Haqqani. In 2012, Yahya coordinated the distribution of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and communications equipment, and he also reviewed preparations for the August 7, 2012 HQN attack against a Coalition Forward Operating Base in Logar Province, Afghanistan, in which thirteen people, including eleven Afghan civilians, were wounded. Yahya likely had advance knowledge of the June 2011 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan, directed by Sirajuddin Haqqani and Badruddin Haqqani. Eighteen people were killed and twelve were injured in the attack. As of 2011, Yahya delivered money from Sirajuddin Haqqani to HQN commanders for operations.

Yahya sometimes serves as a liaison between the HQN and Al Qaida (AQ) and he has maintained ties with AQ since at least mid-2009. In this role, Yahya has provided money to AQ members in the region for their personal expenses. As of mid-2009, he acted as the HQN's primary liaison with foreign fighters, including Arabs, Uzbeks, and Chechens.

Yahya has also conducted and managed HQN and Taliban media and propaganda activities. As of early 2012, Yahya usually met with Sirajuddin Haqqani to obtain final approval of the Taliban propaganda videos Yahya made. Yahya has worked on HQN media activities since at least 2009 when he worked out of a media studio in a HQN madrassa, editing videos from fighters in Afghanistan. As of late 2011, Yahya obtained money for HQN media expenses from Sirajuddin Haqqani or one of Sirajuddin Haqqani's surrogates.

As of early 2012, Yahya travelled about twice a month, sometimes with Saidullah Jan, to meet with now-deceased HQN financial emissary Nasiruddin Haqqani.

4. **Saidullah Jan** (*alias*: Abid Khan).

Grounds for listing: Senior member of the Haqqani Network (HQN) as of 2013. **Date of Birth:** 1982. **Place of birth:** Giyan District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan. **Other information:** (a) Provided critical facilitation support to drivers and vehicles transporting HQN ammunition. (b) Also involved in the group's recruiting efforts as of 2011. (c) Father's name is Bakhta Jan. **Date of UN designation:** 31.7.2014.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Saidullah Jan was listed on 31 July 2014 pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2160 (2014) for 'participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of' and 'otherwise supporting acts or activities of' those designated and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan.

Saidullah Jan is a senior member of the Haqqani Network (HQN) as of 2013 who has also acted at times as an HQN deputy, as the HQN commander for the Northern Zone of Afghanistan, and as a key HQN logistical coordinator.

In late 2013, Saidullah provided critical facilitation support to drivers and vehicles transporting HQN ammunition. As of late 2011, Saidullah was also involved in the group's recruiting efforts and conducted the evaluation of at least one HQN recruit.

In late 2013, Saidullah travelled to the Gulf in the company HQN fundraisers Khalil Ahmed Haqqani (T.H.150.11.), Fazl Rabi, and other HQN members including an attack facilitator. In 2010, Saidullah travelled with a group of HQN leaders, including now-deceased HQN official Ahmed Jan Wazir Akhtar Mohammad, to the Gulf.

In late 2013, Saidullah reportedly was trusted by Al-Qaida members as an HQN associate who could help with any trouble, including arrest.

As of early 2012, Saidullah Jan sometimes travelled with Yahya Haqqani to meet with now-deceased HQN financial emissary Nasiruddin Haqqani.

5. **Muhammad Omar Zadran** (*alias*: Mohammad-Omar Jadran).

Title: a) Maulavi b) Mullah. **Grounds for listing:** Haqqani Network (HQN) leader in command of over 100 militants active in Khost Province, Afghanistan as of 2013. **Date of birth:** 1958. **Place of birth:** Sultan Kheyl Village, Spera District, Khost Province, Afghanistan. **Address:** Afghanistan/Pakistan Border Area. **Other information:** Involved in the preparation of attacks against Afghan and international forces in Afghanistan. **Date of UN designation:** 31.7.2014.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Muhammad Omar Zadran (Omar) is a Haqqani Network (HQN) leader who as of 2013 in command of over 100 militants active in Khost Province, Afghanistan. Omar served as an HQN Shadow District Governor, and as a commander under HQN leader Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani since 2005, and has planned or been instructed to

plan attacks on behalf of the HQN since at least 2006. Omar has worked with the Taliban, serving in 2010 as a member of the Taliban Shura Council established by the Taliban to discuss logistics for insurgents, needs, training, assignments for commanders, and deployment of terrorist cells to south-eastern Afghanistan. Also in 2010, Omar received orders from Sirajuddin Haqqani.

Omar has participated in the preparation and planning of attacks against Afghan citizens, the Afghan Government, and Coalition personnel in Afghanistan on behalf of both the HQN and the Taliban. In early 2013, Omar was in charge of smuggling explosives into Afghanistan. In 2012, Omar and dozens of other HQN members worked on a vehicle-borne improved explosive device attack against a Coalition Forces camp and was involved in attack planning against troops in Paktiya Province, Afghanistan. As of 2011, Omar was involved in suicide attack planning. In 2010, Omar was tasked by an HQN commander to kidnap and murder local Afghan nationals working for Coalition Forces in Khost, Paktia, Paktika, and Baghlan Provinces, Afghanistan.

In 2010, Omar and other militant leaders in the region agreed to intensify attacks against the Afghan Government and Coalition forces, capture and control various districts, disrupt national assembly elections and road construction operations, and recruit local youths.

II. **The entries in the list set out in the Annex to Decision 2011/486/CFSP shall be replaced by the entries as set out below.**

A. *Individuals associated with the Taliban*

1. **Malik Noorzai** (*alias*: (a) Hajji Malik Noorzai, (b) Hajji Malak Noorzai, (c) Haji Malek Noorzai, (d) Haji Maluk, (e) Haji Aminullah).

Title: Haji. **Grounds for listing:** Taliban financier. **Address:** (a) Boghra Road, Miralzei Village, Chaman, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, (b) Kalay Rangin, Spin Boldak District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. **Date of Birth:** (a) 1957, (b) 1960, (c) 1 January 1963. **Place of birth:** (a) Chaman border town, Pakistan, (b) Pishin, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Passport no.:** Pakistani passport number FA0157612, issued on 23 July 2009, expires on 22 July 2014, officially cancelled as of 2013, issued under name Allah Muhammad. **National identification no.:** Pakistani national identification number 54201-247561-5, officially cancelled as of 2013. **Other information:** (a) Owns businesses in Japan and frequently travels to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Japan. (b) As of 2009, facilitated Taliban activities, including through recruitment and the provision of logistical support. (c) Believed to be in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. (d) Belongs to Noorzai tribe. (e) Brother of Faizullah Khan Noorzai. (f) Father's name is Haji Akhtar Muhammad. **Date of UN designation:** 4.10.2011.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Malik Noorzai is a Pakistan-based businessman who has provided financial support to the Taliban. Malik and his brother, Faizullah Noorzai Akhtar Mohammed Mira Khan, have invested millions of dollars in various businesses for the Taliban. In late 2008, Taliban representatives approached Malik as a businessman with whom to invest Taliban funds. Since at least 2005, Malik has also personally contributed tens of thousands of dollars and distributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Taliban, some of which was collected from donors in the Gulf region and Pakistan and some of which was Malik's own money. Malik also handled a hawala account in Pakistan that received tens of thousands of dollars transferred from the Gulf every few months to support Taliban activities. Malik has also facilitated Taliban activities. As of 2009, Malik had served for 16 years as the chief caretaker of a madrassa (religious school), in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region, that was used by the Taliban to indoctrinate and train recruits. Among other things, Malik delivered the funds that supported the madrassa. Malik, along with his brother, has also played a role in storing vehicles to be used in Taliban suicide bombing operations and has helped move Taliban fighters around Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Malik owns businesses in Japan and frequently visits Dubai and Japan for business. As early as 2005, Malik owned a vehicle import business in Afghanistan that imported vehicles from Dubai and Japan. He has imported cars, auto parts and clothing from Dubai and Japan for his businesses, in which two Taliban commanders have invested. In mid-2010, Malik and his brother secured the release of hundreds of cargo containers, reportedly worth millions of dollars, which Pakistani authorities seized earlier that year because they believed the recipients had a connection to terrorism.

2. **Khairullah Barakzai Khudai Nazar** (*alias* (a) Haji Khairullah, (b) Haji Khair Ullah, (c) Haji Kheirullah, (d) Haji Karimullah, (e) Haji Khair Mohammad).

Title: Haji. **Grounds for listing:** Co-owner of Haji Khairullah Haji Sattar Money Exchange. **Date of Birth:** 1965. **Place of Birth:** (a) Zumbaleh village, Nahr-e Saraj District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (b) Mirmadaw village,

Gereshk District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (c) Qilla Abdullah, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. **Passport no.:** BP4199631 (Pakistan passport, expires on 25 June 2014, officially cancelled as of 2013). **National identification no.:** Pakistan National Identification number 5440005229635, officially cancelled as of 2013. **Address:** Abdul Manan Chowk, Pashtunabad, Quetta, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. **Other information:** (a) Associated also with Abdul Satar Abdul Manan. (b) Belongs to Barakzai tribe. (c) Father's name is Haji Khudai Nazar. (d) Alternative father's name is Nazar Mohammad. **Date of UN designation:** 29.6.2012.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Khairullah Barakzai Khudai Nazar is a co-owner and operator of Haji Khairullah Haji Sattar Money Exchange (HKHS). As of late 2009, Khairullah and Abdul Satar Abdul Manan had an equal partnership in HKHS. They jointly operated hawalas known as HKHS throughout Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Dubai and managed an HKHS branch in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. As of early 2010, Khairullah was the chief of the HKHS branch in Kabul. As of 2010, Khairullah was a hawaladar for Taliban senior leadership and provided financial assistance to the Taliban. Khairullah, along with his business partner Satar, provided thousands of dollars to the Taliban to support Taliban activities in Afghanistan. As of 2008, Khairullah and Satar collected money from donors and distributed the funds to the Taliban using their hawala.

3. **Ahmed Shah Noorzai Obaidullah** (*alias:* (a) Mullah Ahmed Shah Noorzai, (b) Haji Ahmad Shah, (c) Haji Mullah Ahmad Shah, (d) Maulawi Ahmed Shah, (e) Mullah Mohammed Shah).

Title: (a) Mullah (b) Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** Provided financial services to Ghul Agha Ishakzai and other Taliban in Helmand Province. **Date of birth:** (a) 1 January 1985 (b) 1981 **Place of birth:** Quetta, Pakistan. **Passport no.:** Pakistani passport number NC5140251 issued on 23 October 2009 expires on 22 October 2014, officially cancelled as of 2013. **National identification no.:** Pakistani national identity card number 54401-2288025-9, officially cancelled as of 2013. **Address:** Quetta, Pakistan. **Other information:** (a) Owns and operates the Roshan Money Exchange. **Date of UN Designation:** 26.2.2013.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Ahmed Shah Noorzai Obaidullah owns and operates the Roshan Money Exchange, which provides financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, the Taliban. Roshan Money Exchange stores and transfers funds in support of Taliban military operations and the Taliban's role in the Afghan narcotics trade. As of 2011, Roshan Money Exchange was one of the primary money service providers (or 'hawalas') used by Taliban officials in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

Ahmed Shah has provided hawala services to Taliban leaders in Helmand Province for a number of years and, as of 2011, was a trusted Taliban money service provider. In early 2012, the Taliban ordered Ahmed Shah to transfer money to a number of hawalas in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province, from which a senior Taliban commander would then allocate the funds.

In late 2011, Ahmed Shah consolidated hundreds of thousands of US dollars to pass to the Taliban Finance Commission and transferred hundreds of thousands of US dollars for the Taliban, including to senior Taliban commanders. Also in late 2011, Ahmed Shah received through his hawala branch in Quetta, Pakistan, a transfer on behalf of the Taliban, money from which was used to purchase fertilizer and IED components, including batteries and detonator cord. In mid-2011, Taliban finance commission head Gul Agha Ishakzai instructed Ahmed Shah to deposit several million US dollars into Roshan Money Exchange for the Taliban. Gul Agha explained that when a money transfer was required, he would inform Ahmed Shah of the Taliban recipient.

Ahmed Shah would then provide the required funds through his hawala system. As of mid-2010, Ahmed Shah moved money between Pakistan and Afghanistan for Taliban commanders and for narcotics traffickers. In addition to his facilitation activities, Ahmed Shah also donated large but unspecified sums of money to the Taliban in 2011.

4. **Jalaluddin Haqqani** (*alias: (a) Jalaluddin Haqqani, (b) Jallalouddin Haqqani, (c) Jallalouddine Haqqani*).

Title: Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** Minister of Frontier Affairs under the Taliban regime. **Date of birth:** (a) Approximately 1942; (b) Approximately 1948. **Place of birth:** (a) Garda Saray area, Waza Zadran District, Paktia Province, Afghanistan; (b) Neka District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Other information:** (a) Father of Sirajuddin Jallalouddine Haqqani; Nasiruddin Haqqani and Badruddin Haqqani (deceased); (b) Brother of Mohammad Ibrahim Omari and Khalil Ahmed Haqqani; (c) He is an active Taliban leader, (d) Believed to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, (e) Head of the Taliban Miram Shah Shura as at 2008, (f) Belongs to Zadran tribe. **Date of UN designation:** 31.1.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Jalaluddin Haqqani has close relations with Mohammed Omar and had close relations with Usama bin Laden (deceased). He is the father of Sirajuddin Jallalouddine Haqqani, Nasiruddin Haqqani and Badruddin Haqqani (deceased), and the brother of Mohammad Ibrahim Omari and Khalil Ahmed Haqqani. He is an active Taliban leader. Jalaluddin Haqqani was also the liaison between Al-Qaida and the Taliban in 2007. He was Chairman of the Taliban 'Miram Shah Council' as at June 2008.

He was originally a commander for the Mwalawi Hezbi Islami Party in Khost, Paktika and Paktia provinces. Later he joined the Taliban and was appointed as Minister of Frontier Affairs. Following the collapse of the Taliban regime, along with Taliban and Al-Qaida elements, he escaped to northern Waziristan and started to regroup his militias for the fight against the Government of Afghanistan.

Haqqani has been accused of involvement in the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul in 2008 and the attempt to assassinate President Karzai during a military parade in Kabul earlier the same year. Haqqani was also implicated in an attack on ministry buildings in Kabul in February 2009.

Jalaluddin Haqqani is the founder of the Haqqani Network.

5. **Nasiruddin Haqqani** (*alias: (a) Naseer Haqqani, (b) Dr Naseer Haqqani, (c) Nassir Haqqani, (d) Nashir Haqqani, (e) Naseruddin, (f) Dr Alim Ghair*).

Grounds for listing: A leader of the Haqqani Network, which operates out of North Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. **Date of birth:** Approximately 1970-1973. **Place of birth:** Neka District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Address:** Pakistan. **Other information:** (a) Son of Jalaluddin Haqqani. (b) He travelled to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to raise funds for the Taliban. (c) Reportedly deceased as of 2013. **Date of UN designation:** 20.7.2010.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

The Haqqani Network is a Taliban-affiliated group of militants that operates from North Waziristan Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. It has been at the forefront of insurgent activity in Afghanistan, responsible for many high-profile attacks. The Haqqani network leadership consists of the three oldest sons of Jalaluddin Haqqani, one of whom is Nasiruddin Haqqani.

Nasiruddin Haqqani functions as an emissary for the Haqqani Network and spends much of his time raising money. In 2004, Haqqani travelled to Saudi Arabia with a Taliban associate to raise funds for the Taliban. He also provided funds in 2004 to militants in Afghanistan for the purpose of disrupting the Afghan presidential election. From at least 2005 to 2008, Nasiruddin Haqqani collected funds for the Haqqani Network through various fundraising trips, including during regular travel to the United Arab Emirates in 2007 and through a fundraising trip to another Gulf state in 2008.

As of mid-2007, Haqqani reportedly had three main sources of funding: donations from the Gulf region, drug trafficking, and payments from Al-Qaida. In late 2009, Nasiruddin Haqqani received several hundred thousand dollars from Al-Qaida-associated individuals in the Arabian Peninsula to use for Haqqani Network activities.

6. **Abdul Habib Alizai** (*alias: a*) Haji Agha JanAlizai **b**) Hajji Agha Jan **c**) Agha Jan Alazai **d**) Haji Loi Lala **e**) Loi Agha **f**) Abdul Habib **g**) Agha Jan Alizai اغا جان عاليزي (formerly listed as)).

Title: Haji **Grounds for listing:** Has managed a drug trafficking network in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. **Date of birth:** **a**) 15.10.1963 **b**) 14.2.1973 **c**) 1967 **d**) Approximately 1957. **Place of birth:** **a**) Yatimchai village, Musa Qala District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan **b**) Kandahar Province, Afghanistan **Nationality:** Afghan **Other information:** **(a)** Has regularly travelled to Pakistan. **Date of UN designation:** 4.11.2010.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Agha Jan Alizai has managed one of the largest drug trafficking networks in Helmand, Afghanistan, and has provided funds to the Taliban in exchange for protection of his narco-trafficking activities. In 2008, a group of narcotics traffickers, including Alizai, agreed to pay the Taliban tax on land where opium poppy was planted in return for Taliban agreement to organize transportation for narcotics materials. The Taliban also agreed to provide security for the narco-traffickers and their storage sites, while the traffickers would provide shelter and transportation to Taliban fighters. Alizai has also been involved in the purchase of weapons for the Taliban and has travelled to Pakistan regularly to meet senior Taliban leaders. Alizai has also facilitated the procurement of fraudulent Iranian passports by Taliban members in order to travel to Iran for training. In 2009, Alizai provided a passport and funds to a Taliban commander to travel to Iran.

7. **Ahmed Jan Wazir Akhtar Mohammad** (*alias: (a)* Ahmed Jan Kuchi, **(b)** Ahmed Jan Zadran)

Grounds for listing: **(a)** Key commander of the Haqqani Network, which is based in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. **(b)** Acts as deputy, spokesperson and advisor for Haqqani Network senior leader Sirajuddin Jallalouline Haqqani. **Date of birth:** 1963. **Place of birth:** Barlach Village, Qareh Bagh District, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan. **Other information:** **(a)** Official of the Ministry of Finance during the Taliban regime. **(b)** Liaises with the Taliban Supreme Council. **(c)** Has travelled abroad. **(d)** Liaises with and provides Taliban commanders in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, with money, weapons, communications equipment and supplies. **(e)** Reportedly deceased as of 2013. **Date of UN designation:** 6.1.2012.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Ahmed Jan Wazir is a key commander in the Haqqani Network, a Taliban-affiliated group of militants that operates from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. Ahmed Jan Wazir acts as a deputy, advisor and spokesperson for Sirajuddin Haqqani, a senior leader of the Haqqani Network, and conducts meetings on behalf of the Haqqani Network. In late 2010, Ahmed Jan Wazir travelled with senior Haqqani Network members to the Gulf.

Ahmed Jan Wazir has represented the Haqqani Network at the Taliban's shura and has served as a conduit between the Haqqani Network and the Taliban in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan. In 2008, Taliban and Al-Qaida militants appointed Ahmed Jan Wazir as a Taliban commander in Ghazni Province. He has provided other Taliban commanders in Ghazni Province with money and supplies, including weapons and communications equipment. During the Taliban regime, he was employed by the Ministry of Finance.

8. **Bakht Gul** (*alias: (a)* Bakhta Gul, **(b)** Bakht Gul Bahar, **(c)** Shuqib).

Grounds for listing: **(a)** Communications assistant to Badruddin Haqqani (deceased). **(b)** Also coordinates movement of Haqqani insurgents, foreign fighters and weapons in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. **Date of Birth:** 1980. **Place of Birth:** Aki Village, Zadran District, Pakiya Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Address:** Miram Shah, North Waziristan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan. **Other information:** Belongs to Zadran tribe. **Date of UN designation:** 27.6.2012.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Bakht Gul has been a key Haqqani Network communications official since at least 2009, when his predecessor was arrested in Afghanistan. As of 2011, Gul continued to report directly to Badruddin Haqqani (deceased), a senior Haqqani Network leader, and has acted as an intermediary for those wishing to contact him. Gul's responsibilities include relaying reports from commanders in Afghanistan to senior Haqqani Network officials, Taliban

media officials, and legitimate media outlets in Afghanistan. Gul also works with Haqqani Network officials, including Badruddin Haqqani, to coordinate the movement of Haqqani Network insurgents, foreign fighters and weapons in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and eastern Afghanistan. As of 2010, Gul relayed operational orders from Badruddin Haqqani to fighters in Afghanistan. In late 2009, Gul distributed money to Haqqani Network sub-commanders travelling between Miram Shah and Afghanistan.

9. **Abdul-Haq Wassiq** (*alias: (a) Abdul-Haq Wasseq, (b) Abdul Haq Wasiq*).

Title: Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** Deputy Minister of Security (Intelligence) under the Taliban regime. **Date of birth:** (a) Approximately 1975, (b) 1971. **Place of birth:** Gharib village, Khogyani District, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Address:** Guantanamo Bay prison. **Other information:** In custody of the United States of America as at 2011. **Date of UN designation:** 31.1.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Abdul-Haq Wassiq is allied with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Under the Taliban regime, he held successive positions as local commander in Nimroz and Kandahar provinces. He then became Deputy Director-General of Intelligence, reporting to Qari Ahmadullah. In this function, he was in charge of handling relations with Al-Qaida-related foreign fighters and their training camps in Afghanistan. He was also known for his repressive methods against Taliban opponents in the South of Afghanistan.

10. **Abdul Jalil Haqqani Wali Mohammad** (*alias: (a) Abdul Jalil Akhund (b) Akhter Mohmad (c) Haji Gulab Gul (d) Abdul Jalil Haqqani (d) Nazar Jan*)

Title: (a) Maulavi (b) Mullah. **Grounds for listing:** (a) Member of the Taliban Supreme Council as of May 2007, (b) Member of the Financial Commission of the Taliban Council, (c) Responsible for logistics for the Taliban and also active as a businessman in his personal capacity as at mid-2013. (d) Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Taliban regime. **Date of birth:** Approximately 1963. **Place of birth:** (a) Khwaja Malik village, Arghandab District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, (b) Kandahar City, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Passport no.:** (a) Passport number: OR 1961825 (issued under the name Akhter Mohmad, son of Noor Mohmad, born in 1965 in Kandahar) issued on 4.2.2003 by the Afghan Consulate in Quetta, Pakistan, expired 2.2.2006). (b) Passport number: TR024417 (issued under the name Haji Gulab Gul son of Haji Hazrat Gul, born in 1955 in Logar, Afghanistan) issued on 20.12.2003 by Central Passport Department in Kabul, Afghanistan, expired 29 December 2006. **Other information:** (a) Believed to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, (b) Belongs to Alizai tribe. (c) Brother of Atiqullah Wali Mohammad. **Date of UN designation:** 25.1.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Abdul Jalil Haqqani Wali Mohammad was a member of the Taliban Supreme Council as of May 2007 and a member of the Financial Commission of the Taliban Council.

11. **Abdulhai Motmaen** (*alias (a) Abdul Haq*)

Title: Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** (a) Director of the Information and Culture Department in Kandahar Province under the Taliban regime, (b) Spokesperson of the Taliban regime. **Date of birth:** Approximately 1973. **Place of birth:** (a) Shinkalai village, Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan; (b) Zabul Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. Afghan passport number OA462456 (issued under the name Abdul Haq son of M. Anwar Khan) issued on 31.1.2012 (11-11-1390) by the Afghan Consulate General in Peshawar, Pakistan. **Other information:** (a) Family is originally from Zabul, but settled later in Helmand, (b) Member of the Taliban Supreme Council and spokesperson for Mullah Mohammed Omar as of 2007, (c) Believed to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, (d) Belongs to Kharoti tribe. **Date of UN designation:** 23.2.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Abdulhai Motmaen was the senior spokesman for the Taliban and used to deliver Taliban foreign policy statements. He was also a close associate of Mohammed Omar. He was a member of the Taliban Supreme Council and spokesperson for Mohammed Omar as of 2007.

12. **Najibullah Haqqani Hidayatullah** (*alias* Najibullah Haqqani)

Title: Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** (a) Deputy Minister of Finance under the Taliban regime. (b) Taliban member responsible for Laghman Province as of late 2010. **Date of birth:** 1971. **Place of birth:** Moni village, Shigal District, Kunar Province. **Nationality:** Afghan. **National identification no.:** Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 545167, issued in 1974. **Other information:** (a) Cousin of Moulavi Noor Jalal. (b) Grandfather's name is Salam. (c) Believed to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. **Date of UN designation:** 23.2.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Najibullah Haqqani Hidayatullah also served as Deputy Minister of Finance of the Taliban regime. This designation was added to the List on 18 July 2007. On 27 September 2007, the listing of this name was updated to remove the original designation of 'Deputy Minister of Public Works of the Taliban regime'.

Najibullah Haqqani Hidayatullah was a member of the Taliban Council in the Kunar Province, Afghanistan, as at May 2007. He is a cousin of Noor Jalal.

As at June 2008, the Taliban leadership appointed him the person responsible for military activity in the Kunar Province

Najibullah Haqqani Hidayatullah was a Taliban member responsible for Laghman Province as of late 2010.

13. **Abdul Raqib Takhari**

Title: Maulavi. **Grounds for listing:** (a) Minister of Repatriation under the Taliban regime. (b) Member of Taliban Supreme Council responsible for Takhar and Badakhshan provinces as at December 2009. **Date of birth:** Between 1968 and 1973. **Place of birth:** Zardalu Darra village, Kalafgan District, Takhar Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Other information:** Confirmed killed on 17 February in Peshawar, Pakistan and buried in Takhar Province, Afghanistan. **Date of UN designation:** 25.1.2001.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Abdul Raqib Takhari was a member of the Taliban Supreme Council responsible for Takhar and Badakhshan Provinces as at December 2009.

14. **Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad** (*alias* Saleh Mohammad)

Grounds for listing: (a) Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad is a narcotics trafficker who has run an organized smuggling network in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, Afghanistan, which met Taliban logistical and financial needs. **Date of birth:** (a) Approximately 1962, (b) 1961. **Place of birth:** (a) Nalghan village, Panjwai District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, (b) Sangesar village, Panjway District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. **Nationality:** Afghan. **Address:** Daman District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. **Other information:** (a) Has run an organised smuggling network in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, Afghanistan, (b) Previously operated heroin processing laboratories in Band-e-Temur, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, (c) Has owned a car dealership in Mirwais Mena, Dand District in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, (d) Released from custody in Afghanistan in February 2014, (e) Linked by marriage to Mullah Ubaidullah Akhund Yar Mohammad Akhund, (f) Belongs to Kakar tribe. **Date of UN designation:** 4.11.2010.

Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad is a narcotics trafficker who has run an organized smuggling network in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, Afghanistan, which met Taliban logistical and financial needs. Prior to his arrest by Afghan authorities, Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad operated heroin processing laboratories in the Band-e-Timor area of Kandahar Province that were protected by the Taliban.

Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad has been in contact with senior Taliban leaders, collected cash on their behalf from narco-traffickers, and managed and hid money belonging to senior Taliban members. He was also responsible for facilitating tax payments to the Taliban on behalf of narco-traffickers. Saleh Mohammad Kakar Akhtar Muhammad has owned a car dealership in Kandahar and has provided the Taliban with vehicles for use in suicide attacks.

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION**of 7 October 2014****amending Decision 2007/131/EC on allowing the use of the radio spectrum for equipment using ultra-wideband technology in a harmonised manner in the Community***(notified under document C(2014) 7083)*

(2014/702/EU)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) Commission Decision 2007/131/EC ⁽²⁾ as amended by Decision 2009/343/EC ⁽³⁾, harmonises the technical conditions for radio equipment using ultra-wideband (hereinafter 'UWB') technology in the Union. It ensures that the radio spectrum is available across the Union under harmonised conditions, eliminates barriers to the uptake of UWB technology and creates an effective single market for UWB systems with significant economies of scale and benefits to the consumer.
- (2) Rapid changes in technology and in the use of the radio spectrum need to be adequately reflected in the regulation of UWB technology, to allow European society to benefit from the introduction of innovative applications based on this technology, while ensuring that other spectrum users are not adversely affected. The latest version of Decision 2007/131/EC therefore needs to be amended.
- (3) For this reason, on 28 May 2012 the Commission issued a Fifth Mandate, pursuant to Decision No 676/2002/EC, to the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) on UWB technology, to clarify technical parameters in the light of a potential update to Decision 2007/131/EC.
- (4) In CEPT Report 45, approved on 21 June 2013 by the Electronic Communications Committee (ECC) and submitted in response to the fifth mandate, CEPT advised the Commission to take a more streamlined approach on subsequent amendments of Decision 2007/131/EC, taking into account the description of mitigation techniques with all the relevant detailed parameters within the harmonised European standards developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
- (5) CEPT Report 45 clarified the technical conditions under which specific mitigation techniques enable UWB equipment to be operated with higher transmission powers, while offering equivalent protection for existing UWB limits on generic use, Automotive and railway vehicles use and location-tracking equipment. In addition to the recommendations from this report, which should be applied across the EU, the definitions and the technical parameters of these mitigation techniques should also be made binding, as set out in the relevant standards, as these techniques only provide a mitigation effect when used with appropriate operational parameters.
- (6) UWB equipment onboard aircraft should be permitted only on the condition that they fulfil air safety standards, with appropriate airworthiness certification and other relevant aeronautical provisions, and electronic communication standards. Airworthiness certificates valid throughout the Community are issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency, pursuant to Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 108 24.4.2002, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ Commission Decision 2007/131/EC of 21 February 2007 on allowing the use of the radio spectrum for equipment using ultra-wideband technology in a harmonised manner in the Community (OJ L 55, 23.2.2007, p. 33).

⁽³⁾ Commission Decision 2009/343/EC of 21 April 2009 amending Decision 2007/131/EC on allowing the use of the radio spectrum for equipment using ultra-wideband technology in a harmonised manner in the Community (OJ L 105, 25.4.2009, p. 9).

⁽⁴⁾ Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 of 3 August 2012 laying down implementing rules for the airworthiness and environmental certification of aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, as well as for the certification of design and production organisations (OJ L 224, 21.8.2012, p. 1).

- (7) Material sensing devices have a number of uses in detecting and characterising objects and materials or taking pictures of pipes, wires and other intra-wall structures in residential or commercial buildings. CEPT has advised the Commission that more relaxed limits on the use of material sensing devices are possible, as the way they are used, combined with their very low deployment densities and activity factors, further mitigate the possibility of harmful interference to radio-communication services. The revised limits are set out in ECC Decision ECC/DEC/(07)01 of 30 March 2007, as amended on 26 June 2009.
- (8) Pursuant to Directive 1999/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁽¹⁾, the Commission has given mandate M/407 to the European standardisation organisations to draw up a set of harmonised standards. These will cover UWB equipment to be recognised under this Directive, and there will be a presumption of conformity with its requirements. In response to mandate M/407 from the Commission, ETSI has developed the harmonised standards: EN 302 065-1 on common technical requirements for short-range devices using UWB, EN 302 065-2, on requirements for UWB location tracking and EN 302 065-3 on requirements for UWB devices for road and rail vehicles.
- (9) The Memorandum of Understanding between the ECC and ETSI, signed on 20 October 2004, ensures coordination of the development of harmonised standards and the regulatory conditions for the use of the spectrum relevant to such standards. Technical details of mitigation techniques are set through ETSI-harmonised European standards and ECC Decision (06)04, and these will remain aligned in any subsequent modifications, as set out in the ECC-ETSI Memorandum of Understanding. As a result, the Commission Decision should only list appropriate mitigation techniques.
- (10) Decision 2007/131/EC should therefore be amended accordingly.
- (11) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Radio Spectrum Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2007/131/EC is amended as follows:

(1) in Article 2, points 6, 7 and 8 are replaced by:

- ‘6. “e.i.r.p.” means equivalent isotropically radiated power, which is the product of the power supplied to the antenna and the antenna gain in a given direction relative to an isotropic antenna (absolute or isotropic gain);
7. “maximum mean power spectral density”, specified as e.i.r.p. of the radio device under test at a particular frequency, is the average power per unit bandwidth (centred on that frequency) radiated in the direction of the maximum level under the specified conditions of measurement;
8. “peak power”, specified as e.i.r.p., contained within a 50 MHz bandwidth at the frequency at which the highest mean radiated power occurs, radiated in the direction of the maximum level under the specified conditions of measurement;’;

(2) in Article 2, point 9 is deleted;

(3) in Article 2, point 11 is replaced by:

- ‘11. “total radiated power spectral density” means the average of the mean power spectral density values measured over a sphere around the measurement scenario with a resolution of at least 15 degree. The detailed measuring setup is contained within ETSI EN 302 435;’;

⁽¹⁾ Directive 1999/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 1999 on radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition of their conformity (OJ L 91, 7.4.1999, p. 10).

(4) in Article 2, the following points 12 and 13 are added:

‘12. “onboard aircraft” means the use of radio links for intra-aircraft communications purposes inside an aircraft;

13. “LT1” are systems intended for general location tracking of people and objects that can be put into service on an unlicensed basis.’;

(5) Article 3, is replaced by the following:

Article 3

The Member States shall allow the use of the radio spectrum on a non-interference and non-protected basis by equipment using ultra-wideband technology provided that such equipment meets the conditions set out in the Annex and it is used indoors or, if it is used outdoors, it is not attached to a fixed installation, a fixed infrastructure or a fixed outdoor antenna. Equipment using ultra-wideband technology which meets the conditions set in the Annex shall also be allowed in automotive and railway vehicles’;

(6) the Annex is replaced by the text in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall take effect from 1 February 2015.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 7 October 2014.

For the Commission
Neelie KROES
Vice-President

ANNEX

1. GENERIC UWB USAGE

| Technical requirements | | |
|------------------------|---|---|
| Frequency range | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) | Maximum peak power (e.i.r.p) (defined in 50 MHz) |
| $f \leq 1,6$ GHz | – 90 dBm/MHz | – 50 dBm |
| $1,6 < f \leq 2,7$ GHz | – 85 dBm/MHz | – 45 dBm |
| $2,7 < f \leq 3,1$ GHz | – 70 dBm/MHz | – 36 dBm |
| $3,1 < f \leq 3,4$ GHz | – 70 dBm/MHz or – 41,3 dBm/MHz using LDC ⁽¹⁾ or DAA ⁽²⁾ | – 36 dBm or 0 dBm |
| $3,4 < f \leq 3,8$ GHz | – 80 dBm/MHz or – 41,3 dBm/MHz using LDC ⁽¹⁾ or DAA ⁽²⁾ | – 40 dBm or 0 dBm |
| $3,8 < f \leq 4,8$ GHz | – 70 dBm/MHz or – 41,3 dBm/MHz using LDC ⁽¹⁾ or DAA ⁽²⁾ | – 30 dBm or 0 dBm |
| $4,8 < f \leq 6$ GHz | – 70 dBm/MHz | – 30 dBm |
| $6 < f \leq 8,5$ GHz | – 41,3 dBm/MHz | 0 dBm |
| $8,5 < f \leq 9$ GHz | – 65 dBm/MHz or – 41,3 dBm/MHz using DAA ⁽²⁾ | – 25 dBm or 0 dBm |
| $9 < f \leq 10,6$ GHz | – 65 dBm/MHz | – 25 dBm |
| $f > 10,6$ GHz | – 85 dBm/MHz | – 45 dBm |

⁽¹⁾ Within the band 3,1 GHz to 4,8 GHz, The Low Duty Cycle mitigation technique and its limits are defined in ETSI Standard EN 302 065-1.

⁽²⁾ Within the band 3,1 GHz to 4,8 GHz and 8,5 GHz to 9 GHz. The Detect and Avoid mitigation technique and its limits are defined in ETSI Standard EN 302 065-1.

2. LOCATION TRACKING SYSTEMS TYPE 1 (LT1)

| Technical requirements | | |
|------------------------|---|---|
| Frequency range | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) | Maximum peak power (e.i.r.p) (defined in 50 MHz) |
| $f \leq 1,6$ GHz | – 90 dBm/MHz | – 50 dBm |
| $1,6 < f \leq 2,7$ GHz | – 85 dBm/MHz | – 45 dBm |
| $2,7 < f \leq 3,4$ GHz | – 70 dBm/MHz | – 36 dBm |
| $3,4 < f \leq 3,8$ GHz | – 80 dBm/MHz | – 40 dBm |

| Technical requirements | | |
|------------------------|---|---|
| Frequency range | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) | Maximum peak power (e.i.r.p) (defined in 50 MHz) |
| $3,8 < f \leq 6,0$ GHz | - 70 dBm/MHz | - 30 dBm |
| $6 < f \leq 8,5$ GHz | - 41,3 dBm/MHz | 0 dBm |
| $8,5 < f \leq 9$ GHz | - 65 dBm/MHz or - 41,3 dBm/MHz using DAA ⁽¹⁾ | - 25 dBm or 0 dBm |
| $9 < f \leq 10,6$ GHz | - 65 dBm/MHz | - 25 dBm |
| $f > 10,6$ GHz | - 85 dBm/MHz | - 45 dBm |

⁽¹⁾ The Detect and Avoid mitigation technique and its limits are defined in ETSI Standard EN 302 065-2

3. UWB DEVICES INSTALLED IN ROAD AND RAIL VEHICLES

| Technical requirements | | |
|------------------------|---|--|
| Frequency range | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) | Maximum peak power (e.i.r.p) (defined in 50 MHz) |
| $f \leq 1,6$ GHz | - 90 dBm/MHz | - 50 dBm |
| $1,6 < f \leq 2,7$ GHz | - 85 dBm/MHz | - 45 dBm |
| $2,7 < f \leq 3,1$ GHz | - 70 dBm/MHz | - 36 dBm |
| $3,1 < f \leq 3,4$ GHz | - 70 dBm/MHz or - 41,3 dBm/MHz using LDC ⁽¹⁾ + e,1, ⁽⁴⁾ or - 41,3 dBm/MHz using TPC ⁽³⁾ + DAA ⁽²⁾ + e,1, ⁽⁴⁾ | - 36 dBm or ≤ 0 dBm or ≤ 0 dBm |
| $3,4 < f \leq 3,8$ GHz | - 80 dBm/MHz or - 41,3 dBm/MHz using LDC ⁽¹⁾ + e,1, ⁽⁴⁾ or - 41,3 dBm/MHz using TPC ⁽³⁾ + DAA ⁽²⁾ + e,1, ⁽⁴⁾ | - 40 dBm or ≤ 0 dBm or ≤ 0 dBm |
| $3,8 < f \leq 4,8$ GHz | - 70 dBm/MHz or - 41,3 dBm/MHz using LDC ⁽¹⁾ + e,1, ⁽⁴⁾ or - 41,3 dBm/MHz using TPC ⁽³⁾ + DAA ⁽²⁾ + e,1, ⁽⁴⁾ | - 30 dBm or ≤ 0 dBm or ≤ 0 dBm |
| $4,8 < f \leq 6$ GHz | - 70 dBm/MHz | - 30 dBm |
| $6 < f \leq 8,5$ GHz | - 53,3 dBm/MHz or - 41,3 dBm/MHz using LDC ⁽¹⁾ + e,1, ⁽⁴⁾ or - 41,3 dBm/MHz using TPC ⁽³⁾ + e,1, ⁽⁴⁾ | - 13,3 dBm or ≤ 0 dBm or ≤ 0 dBm |

| Technical requirements | | |
|------------------------|--|---|
| Frequency range | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) | Maximum peak power (e.i.r.p) (defined in 50 MHz) |
| 8,5 < f ≤ 9 GHz | – 65 dBm/MHz or – 41,3 dBm/MHz using TPC ⁽³⁾ + DAA ⁽²⁾ + e,l, ⁽⁴⁾ | – 25 dBm or ≤ 0 dBm |
| 9 < f ≤ 10,6 GHz | – 65 dBm/MHz | – 25 dBm |
| f > 10,6 GHz | – 85 dBm/MHz | – 45 dBm |

(1) The Low Duty Cycle (LDC) mitigation technique and its limits are defined in ETSI Standard EN 302 065-3
(2) The Detect and Avoid (DAA) mitigation technique and its limits are defined in ETSI Standard EN 302 065-3
(3) The Transmit Power Control (TPC) mitigation technique and its limits are defined in ETSI Standard EN 302 065-3
(4) The exterior limit (e,l) ≤ – 53,3 dBm/MHz is required. The exterior limit is defined in ETSI Standard EN 302 065-3

4. UWB ONBOARD AIRCRAFT

The values for maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) and maximum peak power (e.i.r.p) for Short Range Devices (SRD) using Ultra Wide Band technology (UWB), with or without use of mitigation techniques are listed in the table below.

| Technical requirements | | | |
|------------------------|---|---|--|
| Frequency range | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) | Maximum peak power (e.i.r.p) (defined in 50 MHz) | Requirements for mitigation techniques |
| f ≤ 1,6 GHz | – 90 dBm/MHz | – 50 dBm | |
| 1,6 < f ≤ 2,7 GHz | – 85 dBm/MHz | – 45 dBm | |
| 2,7 < f ≤ 3,4 GHz | – 70 dBm/MHz | – 36 dBm | |
| 3,4 < f ≤ 3,8 GHz | – 80 dBm/MHz | – 40 dBm | |
| 3,8 < f ≤ 6,0 GHz | – 70 dBm/MHz | – 30 dBm | |
| 6,0 < f ≤ 6,650 GHz | – 41,3 dBm/MHz | 0 dBm | |
| 6,650 < f ≤ 6,6752 GHz | – 62,3 dBm/MHz | – 21 dBm | notch of 21 dB should be implemented to meet a level – 62,3 dBm/MHz ⁽¹⁾ |
| 6,6752 < f ≤ 8,5 GHz | – 41,3 dBm/MHz | 0 dBm | 7,25 to 7,75 GHz (FSS and MetSat (7,45 to 7,55 GHz) protection) ⁽¹⁾ ⁽²⁾ 7,75 to 7,9 GHz (MetSat protection) ⁽¹⁾ ⁽³⁾ |
| 8,5 < f ≤ 10,6 GHz | – 65 dBm/MHz | – 25 dBm | |
| f > 10,6 GHz | – 85 dBm/MHz | – 45 dBm | |

(1) Alternative mitigation techniques offering equivalent protection such as the use of shielded portholes could be a solution,

(2) 7,25 to 7,75 GHz (Fixed Satellite Service) and 7,45 to 7,55 GHz (Meteorological Satellite) protection: – 51,3 – 20*log₁₀(10 [km]/x[km])(dBm/MHz) for heights above ground above 1 000 m, where x is the aircraft height above ground in kilometres, – 71,3 dBm/MHz for heights above ground of 1 000 m and below,

(3) 7,75 to 7,9 GHz (Meteorological satellite) protection: – 44,3 – 20*log₁₀(10[km]/x[km]) (dBm/MHz) for heights above ground above 1 000 m, where x is the aircraft height above ground in kilometres, and – 64,3 dBm/MHz for heights above ground of 1 000 m and below.

5. MATERIAL SENSING DEVICES USING UWB TECHNOLOGY

5.1. Material sensing devices

Material sensing devices permitted under this Decision shall fulfil the following requirements:

— Fixed installation (application A)

- The transmitter has to switch off if the machine is not running, 'running sensor';
- The transmitter shall implement a TPC with a dynamic range of 10 dB, as described in the harmonised standard EN 302 498-2 for ODC (*Object Discrimination and Characterisation*) applications;
- The transmitter shall be attached to a fixed installation.

— Non-fixed installation (application B)

- Transmitter-on only if manually operated with a non-locking switch (e.g. it may be a sensor for the presence of the operators hand) plus being in contact or close proximity to the investigated material and the emissions being directed into the direction of the object (e.g. measured by a proximity sensor or imposed by the mechanical design);
- The transmitter has to switch off if the machine is not running, 'running sensor'

Emissions radiating from material sensing devices permitted under this decision shall be kept to a minimum and in any case not exceed the e.i.r.p. density limits within the following Table. The compliance with the limits of the following Table for non-fixed installations (application B) has to be ensured with the device on a representative structure of the investigated material (e.g. representative wall as defined in ETSI EN 302 435-1 or ETSI EN 302 498-1).

| Frequency range | Fixed installations (Application A) | | Non-fixed installations (Application B) Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) |
|------------------|---|--|--|
| | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) in the horizontal plane (– 20° to 30° elevation) | |
| Below 1,73 GHz | – 85 dBm/MHz | | – 85 dBm/MHz |
| 1,73 to 2,2 GHz | – 65 dBm/MHz | – 70 dBm/MHz | – 70 dBm/MHz |
| 2,2 to 2,5 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | | – 50 dBm/MHz |
| 2,5 to 2,69 GHz | – 65 dBm/MHz ⁽¹⁾ | – 70dBm/MHz | – 65 dBm/MHz ⁽¹⁾ ⁽²⁾ |
| 2,69 to 2,7 GHz | – 55 dBm/MHz | – 75 dBm/MHz | – 70 dBm/MHz ⁽³⁾ |
| 2,7 to 2,9 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | – 70 dBm/MHz | – 70 dBm/MHz |
| 2,9 to 3,4 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | – 70 dBm/MHz | – 70 dBm/MHz ⁽¹⁾ |
| 3,4 to 3,8 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | – 70 dBm/MHz | – 50 dBm/MHz ⁽²⁾ ⁽³⁾ |
| 3,8 to 4,8 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | | – 50 dBm/MHz |
| 4,8 to 5 GHz | – 55 dBm/MHz | – 75 dBm/MHz | – 55 dBm/MHz ⁽²⁾ ⁽³⁾ |
| 5 to 5,25 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | | – 50 dBm/MHz |
| 5,25 to 5,35 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | – 60 dBm/MHz | – 60 dBm/MHz |
| 5,35 to 5,6 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | | – 50 dBm/MHz |
| 5,6 to 5,65 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | – 65 dBm/MHz | – 65 dBm/MHz |

| Frequency range | Fixed installations (Application A) | | Non-fixed installations (Application B) Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) |
|-------------------|---|---|--|
| | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) in the horizontal plane (– 20° to 30° elevation) | |
| 5,65 to 5,725 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | – 60 dBm/MHz | – 60 dBm/MHz |
| 5,725 to 8,5 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | | – 50 dBm/MHz |
| 8,5 to 10,6 GHz | – 65 dBm/MHz | | – 65 dBm/MHz |
| Above 10,6 GHz | – 85 dBm/MHz | | – 85 dBm/MHz |

The peak power (in dBm) measured in a bandwidth of 50 MHz shall be less than a limit that is obtained by adding a conversion factor (25 dB) to the 'maximum mean power spectral density' (in dBm/MHz) limit.

- (¹) devices using a Listen Before Talk (LBT) mechanism, as described in the harmonised standard EN 302 498-2, are permitted to operate in frequency ranges 2,5 to 2,69 and 2,9 to 3,4 GHz with a maximum mean power spectral density of – 50 dBm/MHz,
- (²) to protect the radio services, non-fixed installations (application B) must fulfil the following requirement for total radiated power spectral density:
- In the frequency ranges 2,5 to 2,69 GHz and 4,8 to 5 GHz, the total radiated power spectral density has to be 10 dB below the maximum mean power spectral density;
 - In the frequency ranges 3,4 to 3,8 GHz, the total radiated power spectral density has to be 5dB below the maximum mean power spectral density.
- (³) Limitation of the Duty Cycle to 10 % per second.

5.2. Building material analysis devices (BMA)

- BMA Devices permitted under this Decision shall fulfil the following requirements:
 - Transmitter-On only if manually operated with a non-locking switch plus being in contact or close proximity to the investigated material and the emissions being directed into the direction of the object;
 - The BMA transmitter has to switch-off after max 10s without movement;
 - The total radiated power spectral density has to be 5 dB below the maximum mean power spectral density limits in the table below;
- Emissions radiating from BMA devices shall be kept to a minimum and in any case not exceed the maximum power limits within the table below with the BMA device on a representative wall as defined within ETSI Standards EN 302 435-1 and EN 302 498-2.

| Technical requirements | | |
|------------------------|---|---|
| Frequency range | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) | Maximum peak power (e.i.r.p) (defined in 50 MHz) |
| Below 1,73 GHz | – 85 dBm/MHz (¹) | – 45 dBm |
| 1,73 to 2,2 GHz | – 65 dBm/MHz | – 25 dBm |
| 2,2 to 2,5 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | – 10 dBm |
| 2,5 to 2,69 GHz | – 65 dBm/MHz (¹) | – 25 dBm |
| 2,69 to 2,7 GHz | – 55 dBm/MHz (²) | – 15 dBm |
| 2,7 to 3,4 GHz | – 70 dBm/MHz (¹) | – 30 dBm |
| 3,4 to 4,8 GHz | – 50 dBm/MHz | – 10 dBm |

Technical requirements

| Frequency range | Maximum mean power spectral density (e.i.r.p) | Maximum peak power (e.i.r.p) (defined in 50 MHz) |
|-----------------|---|---|
| 4,8 to 5 GHz | - 55 dBm/MHz ^(?) | - 15 dBm |
| 5 to 8,5 GHz | - 50 dBm/MHz | - 10 dBm |
| Above 8,5 GHz | - 85 dBm/MHz | - 45 dBm |

⁽¹⁾ Devices using a Listen Before Talk (LBT) mechanism described in the harmonised standard EN 302 435-1 are permitted to operate in frequency range 1,215 to 1,73 GHz with a maximum mean power spectral density of - 70 dBm/MHz and in the frequency ranges 2,5 to 2,69 and 2,7 to 3,4 GHz with a maximum mean power spectral density of - 50 dBm/MHz.

⁽²⁾ To protect the Radio Astronomy Service (RAS) bands 2,69 to 2,7 GHz and 4,8 to 5 GHz, the total radiated power spectral density has to be below - 65 dBm/MHz.

CORRIGENDA

Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EU) No 1387/2013 of 17 December 2013 suspending the autonomous Common Customs Tariff duties on certain agricultural and industrial products and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1344/2011

(Official Journal of the European Union L 354 of 28 December 2013)

On page 271, Annex I, columns 'CN code'/'TARIC', entry 'ex 3920 49 10'/'30', column 'Description':

- for:* 'Film of a (polyvinyl)chloride-copolymer
— containing by weight 45 % or more of fillers
— on a support (!)',
- read:* 'Film of a (polyvinyl)chloride-copolymer
— containing by weight 45 % or more of fillers
— on a support';

On page 313, Annex I, columns 'CN code'/'TARIC', entry 'ex 9405 40 39'/'10', column 'Description':

- for:* 'Ambient light module with a length of 300 mm or more but not more than 600 mm, based on a light engine of a series of 3 or more but not more than 9 specific one chip red green and blue light emitting diodes mounted on a PCB, with light coupled to the front and/or back of the flat TV set (!)',
- read:* 'Ambient light module with a length of 300 mm or more but not more than 600 mm, based on a light engine of a series of 3 or more but not more than 9 specific one chip red green and blue light emitting diodes mounted on a PCB, with light coupled to the front and/or back of the flat TV set'.
-

Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EU) No 722/2014 of 24 June 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 1387/2013 suspending the autonomous Common Customs Tariff duties on certain agricultural and industrial products

(Official Journal of the European Union L 192 of 1 July 2014)

On page 29, Annex I, columns 'CN code'/'TARIC', entry 'ex 9014 10 00'/'30', column 'Description':

for: 'Electronic compass, as a geomagnetic sensor, in a housing (e.g. CSWLP, LGA, SOIC) suitable for fully automated printed circuit board (PCB) assembly, with the following main components:

- a combination of one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC) and
- one or more micro-electromechanical sensors (MEMS) manufactured with semiconductor technology, with mechanical components arranged in three-dimensional structures on the semiconductor material,

of a kind used in the manufacture of products falling in chapters 84-90 and 94 (1)';

read: 'Electronic compass, as a geomagnetic sensor, in a housing (e.g. CSWLP, LGA, SOIC) suitable for fully automated printed circuit board (PCB) assembly, with the following main components:

- a combination of one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), and
- one or more micro-electromechanical sensors (MEMS) manufactured with semiconductor technology, with mechanical components arranged in three-dimensional structures on the semiconductor material,

of a kind used in the manufacture of products falling in chapters 84-90 and 94'.

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