(12)

Following information resulting from SAFA ramp checks carried out on aircraft of certain Union air carriers, as well as area specific inspections and audits carried out by their national aviation authorities, some Member States have taken certain enforcement measures. They informed the Commission and the Air Safety Committee about these measures: Greece informed about the revocation of the Air Operator Certificate (AOC) and of the operating license of Hellas Jet on 2 November 2010 following the stop of operations on 30 April 2010. Germany informed about the suspension of the AOC of the air carrier ACH Hamburg on 27 October 2010 and about the limitation of the AOC of the air carrier Advance Air Luftfahrtgesellschaft on 30 September 2010 to exclude an aircraft with registration mark D-CJJJ. Spain confirmed that the AOC of Baleares Link Express continues to be suspended since 9 June 2010; Sweden informed that the AOC of Viking Airlines AB was suspended on 29 October 2010.

(13)

Portugal informed that following serious concerns about the safety of operation and the continuing airworthiness of aircraft operated by two Portuguese air carriers – Luzair and White and consultations with the Commission held on 25 October 2010, they decided to increase the continuing oversight of these carriers to ensure adequate corrective action plan are timely implemented by these. Portugal informed the Air Safety Committee about some improvement of the performance of the air carrier White. The Commission took note of the announced measures. A standardisation inspection will be carried out in Portugal by EASA in the framework of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. The Air Safety Committee will be informed as appropriate about the results of this visit at its next meeting.

(14)

There is verified evidence of safety deficiencies on the part of Kam Air certified in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. On 11 August 2010 a Kam Air aircraft of type DC8, registration YA-VIC, struck its tail on the runway and the grass surface beyond the runway before becoming airborne during take-off from Manston Airport (United Kingdom). Investigations of this serious incident by the United Kingdom concluded that there were serious deficiencies with the operational control of the DC8 fleet of Kam Air. The United Kingdom therefore imposed a national ban on Kam Air DC 8 operations as of 2 September 2010.

(15)

Furthermore, the Competent Authorities of Austria detected a significant number of serious safety deficiencies during a SAFA ramp inspection of a Kam Air aircraft of type Boeing B767, registration number YA-KAM, on 16 September 2010 (4). The results of this SAFA ramp inspection lead Austria to conclude that there were serious failures on the part of Kam Air in the areas of operational procedures, equipment, system handling and cargo loading. In view of the deficiencies identified during the investigation in the United Kingdom and the convergence of these deficiencies with those detected during the SAFA ramp inspection performed at Vienna airport, Austria imposed a national ban on all Kam Air operations as from 17 September 2010.

(16)

Pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation No 2111/2005 the Air Safety Committee was informed of the measures decided by the two Member States.

(17)

On 6 October 2010 the Competent Authorities of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (MoTCA) and representatives from Kam Air met with the Commission and representatives from Member States to discuss the circumstances surrounding the Manston incident and the SAFA inspection in Austria.

(18)

At the meeting the air carrier was unable to demonstrate that it is capable of complying with the relevant international safety standards. As regards the aircraft of type DC8, it had been introduced into service in March 2010 without adequate management oversight and without any adequate training given to the crews recruited to operate the aircraft. Furthermore, these crews had yet to complete the relevant training even though the aircraft continued to be used for international commercial flights. In addition, the air carrier did not provide any evidence that the flight crew were current in their flying duties at the time of the serious incident in the United Kingdom. As regards the aircraft of type Boeing B-767, Kam Air explained that the aircraft with registration mark YA-KAM which was subject to the ramp inspection in Austria, was on its first flight after having been parked for a long period, and had not been adequately prepared for operation before being employed on the flight to Vienna. Furthermore, the air carrier explained that, because of the introduction of the DC8, their management resources had been overstretched and had been unable to ensure the correct safety activities were conducted prior to the dispatch of the aircraft.

(19)

The air carrier Kam Air requested to be heard by the Air Safety Committee and made a presentation on 9 November 2010. Kam Air informed the Committee that it no longer operated the aircraft of type DC 8. Also, whilst Kam Air had reviewed the events leading to the bans by the United Kingdom and Austria, it failed to identify any systemic deficiencies within the air carrier which would explain the identified non-compliances with ICAO Standards.

(20)

At the meeting on 6 October 2010, the MoTCA were unable to explain the existence of two different Operations Specifications for Kam Air signed on the same day (29 September 2010) one of which showed the DC8 and the other which had the DC8 removed. It was therefore unclear whether Kam Air was approved to conduct operations with aircraft of type DC8 from that date. Furthermore, MoTCA was not able to demonstrate the results of any certification and surveillance activities carried out on Kam Air.

(21)

In view of these findings, on the basis of the common criteria it is assessed that the air carrier Kam Air does not comply with the common criteria and should be therefore placed on Annex A.

(22)

There is verified evidence that the competent authorities of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are currently not capable to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards and to oversee the aircraft used by the air carriers under its regulatory authority in accordance with its obligations under the Chicago Convention. As presented by MoTCA on 6 October 2010, the authority has currently considerable difficulties to comply with its international obligations in all critical elements of a safety system. It is currently totally reliant on the expertise provided by ICAO to conduct inspections, and stated that, because of that lack of qualified staff, it had issued Certificates of Airworthiness to some aircraft without conducting the relevant inspections. In addition, primary legislation concerning aircraft operations was outdated (1972); a draft law had been submitted to the Government for approval without any indication of date of adoption. Furthermore operational regulations had only non-binding nature (advisory circulars).

(23)

The MoTCA requested to be heard by the Air Safety Committee and made a presentation on 9 November 2010. They accepted that their oversight to date had not adequately ensured that ICAO Standards were met by the air carriers certified in Afghanistan. However, the MoTCA informed the Committee that they had decided to refrain from issuing any further Air Operator Certificates, that they had changed the management structure within the MoTCA and that they had banned the operation of aircraft of type AN 24. In addition, a new set of Aviation Regulations had just been introduced into law and MoTCA were preparing to re-certify all air carriers in Afghanistan to these new Regulations.

(24)

The Commission noted the extremely difficult conditions that the MoTCA were operating under, and welcomed the commitment by the competent authority to improve the situation in the future. However, the Commission noted that, at present, the MoTCA is unable to discharge correctly its responsibilities as certification authority and to ensure that their international carriers comply with the international safety standards.

(25)

In view of these findings, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that all air carriers certified in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan should be placed in Annex A.

(26)

Following the measures imposed by Regulation (EU) No 791/2010 of 6 September 2010 (5) on two air carriers certified in Ghana – Meridian Airways and Airlift International (GH) Ltd, the competent authorities of the Republic of Ghana (GCAA) requested to be heard at the Air Safety Committee and did so on 10 November 2010.

(27)

During their presentation, the GCAA detailed the actions taken to date to address the shortcomings identified with Meridian Airways, Air Charter Express and Airlift International, and described the improvements they were putting in place to the oversight regime in Ghana, including the requirement that all air carriers certified in Ghana should conduct their activities in Ghana. The GCAA also informed the Committee that it had conducted an inspection of aircraft of type DC 8, registration 9G-RAC operated by Airlift International and confirmed that the non-compliances identified by the United Kingdom had been addressed.

(28)

The Commission noted the willingness of the GCAA to address the shortcomings in their oversight by the investment in additional resources, and welcomed the decision to require air carriers certified in Ghana to relocate to Ghana and to maintain their principal place of business in Ghana to enable the CAA to ensure proper oversight. In an effort to support the work of the GCAA in achieving improvements to their oversight system, the Commission has requested the European Aviation Safety Agency to provide technical assistance by means of a visit during the early part of 2011.

(29)

The air carrier Airlift International (GH) Ltd requested to be heard by the Air Safety Committee and made a presentation on 10 November 2010. The air carrier presented the improvements made in their organisational structure, policy and procedures, resources and regulatory compliance. The air carrier confirmed that aircraft 9G-SIM and 9G-FAB remain in storage awaiting decisions on maintenance action to restore their airworthiness before resuming operations. The air carrier concurred with the GCAA view that they had adequately addressed the faults previously identified with 9G-RAC.

(30)

The Commission noted the progress made by the air carrier in addressing identified safety concerns. In view of these findings, based on the common criteria, it is assessed that the aircraft of type DC8 with registration marks 9G-RAC, should be removed from Annex B and allowed to operate into the Union.

(31)

Member States will continue to verify the effective compliance of Airlift International with the relevant safety standards through the prioritisation of ramp inspections to be carried out on aircraft of this air carrier pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 351/2008 and the Commission will continue to closely monitor the actions taken by Airlift International.

(32)

There is verified evidence of safety deficiencies on the part of Air Charter Express certified in Ghana. These deficiencies have been identified by Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme (6).

(33)

The air carrier met with the Commission and Member States on 9 June 2010 to discuss concerns resulting from SAFA inspections and the air carrier agreed to provide a corrective action plan to address the identified deficiencies.

(34)

The air carrier Air Charter Express requested to be heard by the Air Safety Committee and made a presentation on 10 November 2010. The air carrier described the actions taken as part of their corrective action plan to date, in particular in the areas of procedures, operational control, maintenance and training, and confirmed that work on remedial actions was ongoing.

(35)

The Commission noted the progress the air carrier was making and emphasised the need to ensure that any remedial and preventive actions taken by Air Charter Express were effectively implemented to avoid recurrence of any safety deficiencies raised before during ramp inspections of its aircraft. Member States will continue to verify the effective compliance of Air Charter Express with the relevant safety standards through the prioritisation of ramp inspections to be carried out on aircraft of this carrier pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 351/2008 and the Commission will continue to closely monitor the actions taken by Air Charter Express.

(36)

As provided in Regulation (EC) No 1144/2009 the Commission actively continued the consultations with the competent authorities of Kazakhstan with a view to following-up progress of these authorities in the implementation of the corrective action plan established by the State to remedy the deficiencies identified by ICAO during its comprehensive safety audit carried out in April 2009 in the framework of its Universal Safety oversight Audit Programme, and in particular the significant safety concerns notified by ICAO to all States Party to the Chicago Convention.

(37)

Following to consultations with the Commission held on 27 September 2010, the competent authorities of Kazakhstan (CAC) were heard by the Air Safety Committee on 10 November 2010. They informed that they further progressed in the implementation of their corrective action. In particular, a new aviation law was adopted by Kazakhstan on 15 July 2010 and work is in progress on more than 100 acts of secondary legislation which need to be enacted for the implementation of the aviation law in the coming months.

(38)

On 18 October 2010 a first package of such legislation pertaining to aerial work was adopted and on the same day the competent authorities of Kazakhstan revoked the AOC of 15 companies – KazAirWest, IJT Aviation, Euro Asia Air International, Berkut ZK, Tyan Shan, Kazavia, Navigator, Salem, Orlan 2000, Fenix, Association of amateur pilots of Kazakhstan, Burundayavia, Sky Service, Aeroprakt KZ, Asia Continental Avialines.

(39)

The competent authorities of Kazakhstan informed that two of these carriers, Burundayavia and Euro Asia Air International had requested on 28 October 2010 the reinstatement of their AOC. At the meeting of the Air Safety Committee the competent authorities of Kazakhstan failed to clarify the status of operations of these two companies. Consequently, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Burundayavia and Euro Asia Air International should remain in Annex A.

(40)

The submissions and presentations made by the competent authorities of Kazakhstan (CAC) regarding the companies: Asia Continental Avialines, KazAirWest, Kazavia, Orlan 2000, do not include sufficient information to demonstrate that these companies have ceased commercial air transport activities. The CAC failed to provide complete documentation regarding the certificates and approvals held by these companies following the revocation of their AOCs. In particular, for these companies there is information indicating that they have been operating large transport aircraft. Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that at this stage these four companies should remain in Annex A.

(41)

The competent authorities of Kazakhstan stated and provided evidence showing that the Association of Amateur Pilots of Kazakhstan, Aeroprakt KZ, Berkut ZK, IJT Aviation, Navigator, Fenix, Salem, Sky Service, Tyan Shan Flight Center, are not any more engaged in commercial air transportation and do not hold any more a valid operating licence. Therefore they are not considered any more as air carriers within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005. In view of this, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that these nine companies should be removed from Annex A

(42)

The Commission supports the ambitious reform of the Civil aviation system undertaken by the authorities of Kazakhstan and invites these authorities to continue with determination their efforts to implement the corrective actions plan agreed with ICAO, focusing in priority on the unresolved significant safety concerns and the recertification of all operators under their responsibility. The Commission is ready to organise in due time, with the assistance of the European Aviation Safety Agency and the support of Member States, an on-site assessment to verify the progress achieved in the implementation of the action plan.

(43)

There is verified evidence of lack of ability of the authorities responsible for the oversight of air carriers licensed in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to address effectively safety deficiencies and to resolve safety concerns, as demonstrated by the results of the audit of Mauritania carried out by ICAO in the framework of its Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) in April 2008. The final report made available in March 2009 reported a large number of significant deficiencies with regard to the capability of the civil aviation authorities to discharge their air safety oversight responsibilities. At the time of the completion of the ICAO audit, more than 67 % of ICAO standards were not effectively implemented. In the critical element pertaining to the resolution of the identified safety concerns, ICAO reported that more than 93 % of ICAO standards were not implemented.

(44)

There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of the air carrier Mauritania Airways certified in Mauritania. These deficiencies have been identified by France and Spain during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme (7). Mauritania Airways did not respond adequately to the authorities which carried out the inspections and has not demonstrated that these deficiencies have been rectified in a sustainable manner.

(45)

The Commission initiated consultations with the competent authorities of Mauritania in February 2010, expressing serious concerns about the safety of the operations of air carriers licensed in this country and requesting clarifications regarding the actions undertaken by the competent authorities of Mauritania to respond to ICAO findings and to the SAFA findings. These consultations were followed by correspondence in March and October 2010 on the same issues. The competent authorities of Mauritania were also heard by the Air Safety Committee on 9 November 2010.

(46)

There is insufficient ability of the competent authorities of Mauritania (ANAC) to remedy effectively the non-compliance findings made by ICAO, as demonstrated by the fact that the implementation of the action plan aimed at addressing the findings made by ICAO is delayed. ANAC did not provide evidence of satisfactory closure of those findings reported as closed. For instance, the civil aviation act of 1972 has not yet been revised nor the related secondary specific aviation legislation. Consequently, the legal basis for the certification and continuing oversight of all air carriers licensed in Mauritania is not in compliance with the applicable international safety standards.

(47)

ANAC informed that Mauritania Airways is currently the only air carrier certified in Mauritania and that the AOC of this carrier was renewed on 8 July 2010 for a limited period of 6 months, expiring on 31 December 2010. ANAC, however, failed to provide evidence of the verifications made before the renewal together with details of any action plans mandated to ensure the safety deficiencies identified are being effectively remedied in a sustainable manner. In particular, no evidence of approval of the operator’s operations manual, the operator’s minimum equipment list, the operator’s maintenance management exposition and maintenance organisation exposition was provided.

(48)

Mauritania Airways was heard by the Air Safety Committee on 9 November 2010 and informed that the air carrier initiated a series of corrective actions to address the deficiencies identified in the course of the SAFA ramp inspections as well as the internal investigation following the accident of their aircraft in July 2010. However, Mauritania Airways failed to demonstrate that these actions have produced results so far. In addition, the failed to demonstrate that the company holds the necessary approvals previously referred to.

(49)

Mauritania Airways confirmed that an aircraft of type Boeing B737-700 with registration mark TS-IEA operated by Mauritania Airways was involved in an accident on 27 July 2010 which caused several injuries and substantial damage to the aircraft that has been since that time under repair. Preliminary information from the air carrier revealed several deficiencies, in particular an anomaly in the extension of slats as well as a non-stabilised approach.

(50)

The competent authorities of Mauritania (ANAC) have not demonstrated that they are in a position to effectively discharge their responsibilities regarding safety oversight of air carriers certified in Mauritania. In view of these findings, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that all air carriers certified in Mauritania should be included in Annex A.

(51)

The Commission encourages the competent authorities of Mauritania (ANAC) to pursue actively the implementation of the corrective action plan submitted to ICAO and is ready to provide support if necessary. The Commission is in particular ready to organise, with the assistance of the European Aviation Safety Agency and the support of Member States, an on-site assessment to verify the progress achieved in the implementation of the action plan.

(52)

Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines certified in Ukraine requested to be heard by the Air Safety Committee and did so on 9 November 2010. The carrier informed that it is currently renewing its fleet and that the DC-9 aircraft are not operated anymore. However Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines did not provide the complete and current operational specifications attached to the current Air Operator Certificate and failed to clarify at the hearing the fleet currently operated. Furthermore, it was confirmed that the competent authorities of Ukraine are conducting an audit of Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines as part of the renewal process of its Air Operator Certificate, expiring on 28 November 2010, and that this process is not completed yet. Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines should remain in Annex B.

(53)

Submissions made after the hearing of the air carrier will be examined by the Commission and the Air Safety Committee at the next meeting of the Air Safety Committee.

(54)

Following the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 590/2010 (8), the air carrier Air Algérie has performed numerous inspections on its aircraft before departure for destinations in the Union. The competent authorities of Algeria also put in place in September 2010 teams of technicians to perform inspections (called SANAA inspections), on the basis of the SAFA methodology, on aircraft operated by the company Air Algérie, notably those which are operated on routes to the Union. These concerted efforts should enable them to discover and solve a number of deficiencies before aircraft departure. However, the results of these inspections raise some questions about the quality of the maintenance activities of the air carrier.

(55)

As requested by Regulation (EU) No 590/2010 and until the meeting of the Air Safety Committee on 10 November 2010, the civil aviation authorities of Algeria submitted four monthly reports covering June, July, August and September 2010. These reports focused on the results of safety oversight conducted on the activities of Air Algérie and were supplemented with the findings discovered during the inspections carried out by inspectors of Air Algérie on aircraft of the air carrier. These reports however, do not provide the information of risk assessment being carried out by the competent authorities of Algeria and how the results of such risk assessment are considered in the oversight process and planning.

(56)

In view of the persistence of findings in the areas of continuing airworthiness, maintenance, operations, as well as the safety of cargo on board, discovered during SAFA, SANAA and the internal Air Algérie inspections and in order to obtain clarifications on the monthly reports, consultations with the competent authority and the air carrier were held on 11 October 2010 with the participation of the European Aviation Safety Agency and a Member State. At this meeting the Commission took note of the commitment made by the competent authorities of Algeria to carry out a comprehensive root cause analysis and to present a solid corrective action plan as well as all relevant information showing the actions taken by both the competent authorities of Algeria and of Air Algérie to bring a sustainable solution. A corrective action plan approved by the competent authorities of Algeria was submitted to the Commission on 20 October 2010.

(57)

Air Algérie presented a further enhanced corrective action plan to the Air Safety Committee on 10 November 2010. The Committee acknowledged the efforts made by the air carrier towards resolving the detected safety deficiencies and urged the competent authorities of Algeria to enhance its oversight activities with a view to ensuring that the relevant safety standards are respected. During the meeting of the Air Safety Committee the competent authorities of Algeria indicated their wish to further strengthen their capabilities through a twinning project. With a view to supporting the competent authorities of Algeria in further enhancing their efforts to reinforce their capacity to discharge their responsibilities, a technical assistance mission lead by the European Aviation Safety Agency will be carried out in February 2011.

(58)

In the meantime, the Member States shall continue to closely monitor the performance of Air Algérie in the framework of Regulation (EC) No 351/2006 in order to provide the basis for a new assessment of this case at the next meeting of the Air Safety Committee.

(59)

Pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1144/2009 (9) all air carriers certified in the Republic of Congo are subject to an operational ban within the Union and listed in Annex A.

(60)

The Commission informed the Air Safety Committee on the results of a technical assistance mission carried out in February 2010 by the European Aviation Safety Agency to the Republic of Congo following the ICAO USOAP audit, conducted in November 2008. The ICAO USOAP Audit resulted in a Significant Safety Concern regarding aircraft operations, certification and supervision exercised by the Civil Aviation Authority of the Republic of Congo (ANAC) along with a very high rate of lack of implementation of safety standards (76,89 %); the Significant Safety Concern is currently unresolved. During the technical assistance mission it was noted that ANAC had made clear efforts at every level to implement a corrective action plan and had demonstrated a strong commitment to overcome the safety issues highlighted by the ICAO audit. The Commission welcomes these encouraging moves and will continue to closely monitor the progress of the ANAC towards effective implementation of their corrective action plan to ensure that the current safety deficiencies are addressed without undue delay.

(61)

The air carrier Equaflight Service certified by ANAC requested to be heard by the Air Safety Committee and did so on 10 November 2010. The air carrier presented its activity and informed about the progress in the implementation of its action plan.

(62)

The air carrier Trans Air Congo certified by ANAC requested to be heard by the Air Safety Committee and did so on 10 November 2010. The air carrier presented its activity and informed about the progress in the implementation of its action plan.

(63)

The Air Safety Committee took note of the progress report. However, the presentations by the air carriers did not allow ascertaining that they meet at this stage the applicable ICAO safety standards. In addition, on the basis of the common criteria, pending the effective implementation of adequate corrective actions to resolve the ICAO significant safety concern and in the absence of significant progress in the closure of the findings raised during the ICAO audit, it is assessed that the competent authorities of the Republic of Congo are, at this stage, not able to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards on all carriers under their regulatory control. Therefore, all air carriers certified by these authorities should remain in Annex A.

(64)

The Commission will actively continue the consultations with the competent authorities of the Republic of Congo on the actions undertaken by them to improve aviation safety and is willing to engage a second mission of technical assistance in 2011 aiming at building up their administrative and technical capacity in civil aviation.

(65)

The competent authorities of Kyrgyzstan requested to be heard by the Air Safety Committee and did so on 10 November 2010. They informed that they are progressing in an ambitious reform of the aviation sector undertaken since 2006 with a view to enhancing air safety. The competent authorities are in particular progressing in their capacity building with the recruitment of additional qualified inspectors, to be continued in the coming months. The State aviation legislation is being revised with a view to ensuring compliance with international safety standards by November 2011.

(66)

The competent authorities of Kyrgyzstan informed that they have issued a new AOC to the air carrier CAAS. On the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that CAAS should be included in Annex A.

(67)

The competent authorities of Kyrgyzstan also informed that they had suspended the AOCs of three air carriers – Itek Air, TransAero and Asian Air. Additionally, they informed that they have undertaken enforcement actions regarding the following carriers: Golden Rules Airlines, Kyrgyzstan Airline, Max Avia, Tenir Airlines. However, they failed to demonstrate that the license or the AOC of these carriers was revoked. Consequently, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that these carriers should remain in Annex A.

(68)

Given that no evidence of full implementation of appropriate remedial actions by the air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan and by the authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of these air carriers has been communicated to the Commission so far, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that these air carriers should remain in Annex A.

(69)

The Commission encourages the competent authorities of Kyrgyzstan to continue their efforts towards resolution of all non-compliance findings identified during the audit carried out by ICAO in April 2009 as part of its Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP). The European Commission, assisted by the European Aviation Safety Agency and with the support of the Member States, is ready to carry out an assessment on site once the implementation of the action plan submitted to ICAO has sufficiently advanced; The objective of this visit would be to verify the implementation of the applicable safety requirements by the competent authorities and by the undertakings under its oversight..

(70)

The competent authorities of Gabon (ANAC) held consultations on 26 October 2010 with the Commission, the European Aviation Safety Agency and the competent authorities of France to present the progress made to date. ANAC informed that the legislative framework is currently being revised, with a reform of the civil aviation code, entailing the following actions: (a) a reorganisation of ANAC, the adoption of which is expected by 31 December 2010; (b) the progressive establishment of a comprehensive set of Gabonese aeronautical regulations (RAG), which will enter into force in a phased approach by 2011. ANAC reported further progress in its capacity-building, with the recruitment of additional inspectors. ANAC also reported progress in the oversight of the air carriers and the enforcement of the current safety regulations (RACAM), as demonstrated by the suspension of the AOC of the air carrier Air Services on 30 July 2010, and the temporary suspension of the AOC of the air carrier Allegiance between 22 August and 2 September 2010.

(71)

However, ANAC did not demonstrate that appropriate remedial actions had been implemented before the air carrier Allegiance had its AOC reinstated. Furthermore, the number and the nature of some of the deficiencies identified reveal that further enforcement actions may be necessary, should air carriers certified in Gabon fail to implement the applicable safety standards.

(72)

Given that no evidence of the full implementation of appropriate corrective and preventive actions by the air carriers included in the Community list and by the authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of these air carriers has been communicated to the Commission so far, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that these air carriers should continue to be subject to an operating ban (Annex A) or operating restrictions (Annex B), as the case may be.

(73)

ANAC informed of the issuance of a new AOC to the air carrier Afric Aviation on 25 September 2010 without demonstrating that the certification and oversight of this air carrier complies fully with applicable international safety standards. Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Afric Aviation should be included in Annex A.

(74)

Member States will continue to monitor the performance of air carriers certified in Gabon through focused ramp inspections carried out in the framework of the SAFA programme with a view to monitoring sustainable compliance of their operations and maintenance with the applicable safety standards. Should ramp inspections identify safety concerns, the Commission will be compelled to reconsider the measures applicable to these carriers at the next meeting of the Air Safety Committee.

(75)

The Commission, assisted by the European Aviation Safety Agency and the competent authorities of Germany and Spain carried out a safety assessment visit to the Philippines in October 2010 in order to assess the progress achieved by the competent authorities of the Philippines (CAAP) and certain air carriers under its supervision, in the implementation of the measures undertaken to address the safety concerns described in Regulation (EU) No 273/2010.

(76)

The report resulting from this assessment confirms that, under the leadership of its new Director General, the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines has undertaken since April 2010 a series of ambitious reforms of the civil aviation oversight system in place in the Republic of the Philippines. The actions undertaken go clearly into the right direction and are deemed to allow, once effectively and sustainably implemented, for significant improvements towards compliance with the safety standards set forth by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). These actions entail in particular (a) a recast of the existing implementing rules and regulation to the basic Civil Aviation Act; (b) a complete revision of the existing Civil Aviation Regulations; (c) the appointment of a significant amount of personnel in accordance with enhanced qualification criteria; (d) the continuation of extensive training programmes for the staff recruited; (e) the modernisation of the facilities and the provision of adequate information systems to allow the control of approvals and licenses; (f) the certification of those air carriers which, although they continue commercial activities, are not certified yet in accordance with the civil aviation regulation in force; (g) the development of comprehensive surveillance plans including all aspects of the operations; and (h) the resolution of those safety concerns which may have been encountered.

(77)

The report also underlines that, in spite of the commitments of the CAAP and the energy invested since April 2010, these ambitious reforms could not be completed within a few months, in particular due the length of the recruitment and appointment process in the Philippines beyond the control of the CAAP and the corresponding lack of appropriate resources. More time appears necessary to allow the progress to be sustainable and for achievements to be recognised. Although the CAAP has undertaken actions to address the significant safety concern notified by ICAO to all Contracting States in 2009, progress to date has not been sufficient to close the significant safety concern. Equally, despite actions undertaken by the CAAP to address the non-compliance findings reported by the FAA in 2007, progress to date has not been sufficient to be recognised by the US FAA as compliant with international safety standards (category 1). In view of these findings, it is assessed that at this stage, all air carriers certified in the Republic of the Philippines should remain on Annex A.

(78)

The Commission invites the Philippines to respect the timetable of implementation of its commitments towards the international community, in particular with regard to the resolution of the significant safety concern notified by ICAO. To achieve this, it is essential that the CAAP continues to act with the necessary independence and ensures the appointment of sufficient staff meeting the qualification criteria to be in a position to effectively discharge its responsibilities towards the international community and ensure a robust oversight in compliance with the applicable safety standards. Support from the government of the Philippines to the CAAP is essential towards such goals.

(79)

Following the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 590/2010 the Commission received information from the competent authorities of the Russian Federation that all operating restrictions previously applicable on the air carrier YAK Service had been removed on 11 August 2010 following satisfactory results of oversight activities performed by these authorities. However, the Commission did not receive the requested results of all surveillance activities regarding the verification of correct implementation of remedial actions as well as of the certification of the equipment in accordance with ICAO standards installed on the aircraft of the air carrier used to operate international flights.

(80)

Furthermore, as part of the continuous monitoring of the performance of air carriers flying into the Union on the basis of the results of ramp inspections carried out on aircraft of such air carriers, on 11 October 2010 the Commission informed the competent authorities of the Russian Federation of the results of such inspections carried out on Russian air carriers during the previous twelve months.

(81)

These results indicated that for certain Russian air carriers, albeit from a limited number of inspections, there is a persistent rate of findings equivalent to over two significant and/or major findings per inspection during the last 2 years. These results show that there is need for improvement if these air carriers are to be fully compliant with international safety standards. Consultations between the Commission and the competent authorities of the Russian Federation on the safety performance of Russian air carriers were held on 18 October 2010 in Moscow. At this meeting the competent authorities of the Russian Federation agreed to provide the Commission with the following information: (a) documentation that was requested on 2 September 2010 for Yak Service (transmission in English of the results of all surveillance activities regarding the verification of correct implementation of remedial actions as well as of the certification of the equipment in accordance with ICAO standards that is now installed on the aircraft of the company used to operate international flights; the new AOC of the company issued following the removal of the restrictions along with the operating specifications); (b) the results of surveillance activities of Russian authorities on Russian air carriers for which SAFA ramp inspections reports and analysis have been transmitted by the Commission. Furthermore, at this meeting the competent authorities of the Russian Federation announced that they would also transmit to the Commission the reports and analysis of the performance (incidents, methodology of calculation of ratios etc.) for the ramp checks performed on aircraft of EU carriers flying into the Russian Federation.

(82)

Following this meeting the competent authorities of the Russian Federation transmitted on 25 October correspondence regarding Yak Service showing that certain equipment fitted on aircraft operated by YAK Service had been recertified by the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK). However, at the meeting of the Air Safety Committee on 10 November 2010 the competent authorities of the Russian Federation did not provide evidence that all aircraft operated by YAK Service are fitted with serviceable ICAO mandatory equipment necessary for international commercial air transport. Therefore, two aircraft on the AOC of this air carrier with registration RA-87648 and RA-88308 should not be operated into the European Union. Member States will continue to verify the effective compliance of Yak Service with the relevant safety standards through the prioritisation of ramp inspections to be carried out on aircraft of this carrier pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 351/2008.

(83)

At the meeting of the Air Safety Committee the competent authorities of the Russian Federation did not provide any evidence of the results of their oversight activities on various air carriers certified in the Russian Federation as requested by the Commission.

(84)

At the meeting of the Air Safety Committee the competent authorities of the Russian Federation also confirmed that the following aircraft continue to be excluded for international commercial air transport as they are not fitted with ICAO mandatory equipment.

(85)

The Commission and the Air Safety Committee took note of the presentation and the submissions by the competent authority of the Russian Federation and will pursue the sustainable resolution of safety non-compliance detected during SAFA ramp inspections through further technical consultations with the competent authority of the Russian Federation. In the meantime, Member States will continue to verify the effective compliance of Russian air carriers with the relevant safety standards through the prioritisation of ramp inspections to be carried out on aircraft of these carriers pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 351/2008 and the Commission will continue to closely monitor the actions taken by them.

(86)

No evidence of the full implementation of appropriate remedial actions by the other air carriers included in the Community list updated on 6 September 2010 and by the authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of these air carriers has been communicated to the Commission so far in spite of specific requests submitted by the latter. Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that these air carriers should continue to be subject to an operating ban (Annex A) or operating restrictions (Annex B), as the case may be.

(87)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Air Safety Committee,