1.

Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society must be interpreted as meaning that the operator of a video-sharing platform or a file-hosting and -sharing platform, on which users can illegally make protected content available to the public, does not make a ‘communication to the public’ of that content, within the meaning of that provision, unless it contributes, beyond merely making that platform available, to giving access to such content to the public in breach of copyright. That is the case, inter alia, where that operator has specific knowledge that protected content is available illegally on its platform and refrains from expeditiously deleting it or blocking access to it, or where that operator, despite the fact that it knows or ought to know, in a general sense, that users of its platform are making protected content available to the public illegally via its platform, refrains from putting in place the appropriate technological measures that can be expected from a reasonably diligent operator in its situation in order to counter credibly and effectively copyright infringements on that platform, or where that operator participates in selecting protected content illegally communicated to the public, provides tools on its platform specifically intended for the illegal sharing of such content or knowingly promotes such sharing, which may be attested by the fact that that operator has adopted a financial model that encourages users of its platform illegally to communicate protected content to the public via that platform.

2.

Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) must be interpreted as meaning that the activity of the operator of a video-sharing platform or a file-hosting and -sharing platform falls within the scope of that provision, provided that that operator does not play an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of or control over the content uploaded to its platform.

Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2000/31 must be interpreted as meaning that, for such an operator to be excluded, under that provision, from the exemption from liability provided for in Article 14(1), it must have knowledge of or awareness of specific illegal acts committed by its users relating to protected content that was uploaded to its platform.

3.

Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as not precluding a situation under national law whereby a copyright holder or the holder of a related right may not obtain an injunction against an intermediary whose service has been used by a third party to infringe his or her right, that intermediary having had no knowledge or awareness of that infringement, within the meaning of Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2000/31, unless, before court proceedings are commenced, that infringement has first been notified to that intermediary and the latter has failed to intervene expeditiously in order to remove the content in question or to block access to it and to ensure that such infringements do not recur. It is, however, for the national courts to satisfy themselves, when applying such a condition, that that condition does not result in the actual cessation of the infringement being delayed in such a way as to cause disproportionate damage to the rightholder.

1.

Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), must be interpreted as applying to the processing of personal data relating to penalty points imposed on drivers of vehicles for road traffic offences.

2.

The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in particular Article 5(1), Article 6(1)(e) and Article 10 thereof, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which obliges the public body responsible for the register in which penalty points imposed on drivers of vehicles for road traffic offences are entered to make those data accessible to the public, without the person requesting access having to establish a specific interest in obtaining the data.

3.

The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in particular Article 5(1), Article 6(1)(e) and Article 10 thereof, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which authorises the public body responsible for the register in which penalty points imposed on drivers of vehicles for road traffic offences are entered to disclose those data to economic operators for re-use.

4.

The principle of primacy of EU law must be interpreted as precluding the constitutional court of a Member State, before which a complaint has been brought challenging national legislation that proves, in the light of a preliminary ruling given by the Court of Justice, to be incompatible with EU law, from deciding, in accordance with the principle of legal certainty, that the legal effects of that legislation be maintained until the date of delivery of the judgment by which it rules finally on that constitutional complaint.

1.

Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Directive 1999/70 of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as meaning that it is for the national court to assess, in accordance with all the applicable rules of national law, whether the limitation to three consecutive years, except under specific conditions, of the employment of fixed-term workers under contracts known as ‘fijos de obra’ by the same undertaking at different workplaces located within the same province and the grant to those workers of compensation for termination, assuming that that national court finds that those measures are actually taken in respect of those workers, constitute adequate measures to prevent and, where appropriate, to penalise abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships or ‘equivalent legal measures’ within the meaning of that Clause 5(1). In any event, such national legislation cannot be applied by the authorities of the Member State concerned in such a way that the renewal of successive fixed-term ‘fijos de obra’ employment contracts is considered justified by ‘objective reasons’, within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(a) of that framework agreement, on the sole ground that each of those contracts is generally concluded for a specific construction project, irrespective of its duration, in so far as such national legislation does not prevent, in practice, the employer concerned from covering, by means of such renewal, fixed and permanent staffing needs;

2.

The first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which, in the event of a transfer of employees under public contracts, the rights and obligations of the transferred worker that the incoming undertaking is required to respect are limited exclusively to those arising from the last contract concluded by that worker with the outgoing undertaking, provided that the application of that legislation does not have the effect of placing that worker in a less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer, which it is for the referring court to determine.

1.

Orders that the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations:

2.

Dismisses the remainder of the action;

3.

Orders the European Commission and the Kingdom of Spain to bear their own costs.

1.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 20 September 2019, Venezuela v Council (T-65/18, EU:T:2019:649), in so far as it dismisses the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s action for annulment of Articles 2, 3, 6 and 7 of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 of 13 November 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela;

2.

Refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union for judgment on the merits;

3.

Reserves the costs.

1.

Article 13(1), Article 14(9) and Article 18 (c) of Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 concerning a European rail network for competitive freight, and Article 27(1) and (2) of Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European rail area, read in conjunction with point 3(a) of Annex IV to that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that the infrastructure manager, defined in Article 3(2) of that directive, is the competent authority for adopting, in the context of the national network statement, the applicable rules for submitting applications for infrastructure capacity, including those regarding the exclusive use of a particular electronic booking system, to the one-stop shop provided for in Article 13(1);

2.

The review by a national regulatory body of the rules relating to the procedure for submitting applications for infrastructure capacity to the one-stop shop laid down in the network statement is governed by the provisions of Article 20 of Regulation No 913/2010 and those provisions must be interpreted as meaning that the regulatory body of a Member State cannot object to those rules without complying with the cooperation obligations arising from Article 20 and, in particular, without consulting the regulatory bodies of the other Member States involved in the freight corridor in order to achieve, as far as possible, a uniform approach;

3.

Article 14(1) of Regulation No 913/2010, must be interpreted as meaning that the framework for the allocation of the infrastructure capacity on the freight corridor laid down by the executive board pursuant to that provision does not constitute an act of EU law.

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

2.

Orders WD to bear her own costs relating to the appeal and pay those incurred by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).

1.

Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a dual system of organisation of the market for games of chance on the sole ground that the advertising practices of the holder of the monopoly on lottery products and casino games aim at encouraging active participation in gambling, for example by trivialising gambling, by conferring on it a positive image because revenues derived from it are used for activities in the public interest or by increasing its attractiveness by means of enticing advertising messages holding out the tantalising prospect of major winnings.

2.

The principle of primacy of EU law must be interpreted as requiring a national court of a Member State to disapply a provision of national law which is contrary to Article 56 TFEU, including where a higher court of that Member State has held that that provision was consistent with EU law.

1.

The Court of Justice of the European Union clearly lacks jurisdiction to answer the first and second questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunale di Potenza (District Court, Potenza, Italy).

2.

The third question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunale di Potenza (District Court, Potenza, Italy) is manifestly inadmissible.

1.

Must the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006, (1) be regarded as an act of an institution of the Union, within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, and therefore amenable to interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union? Do the terms, nature and duration of the CVM established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 fall within the scope of the Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, signed by Romania in Luxembourg on 25 April 2005? Are the requirements laid down in the reports prepared in accordance with the CVM binding on the Romanian State?

2.

Can the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, with reference to Article 2 TEU, be interpreted as also applying to procedures for the promotion of judges in office?

3.

Is that principle infringed by the introduction of a system for promotion to a higher court which is based solely on a brief assessment of activities and conduct that is carried out by a board composed of the President of the court responsible for judicial review and of the judges of that court which, in addition to the periodic assessment of judges, separately carries out both assessments of judges for promotion purposes and the judicial review of judgments delivered by those judges?

4.

Is the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, with reference to Article 2 TEU, infringed if the Romanian State undermines the foreseeability and legal certainty of EU law by accepting the CVM and reports prepared in accordance with that mechanism and adhering to them for more than 10 years and then, with no forewarning, changing the procedure for the promotion of judges to executive positions, contrary to CVM recommendations?

—

confirm points 24 to 48 of the contested order fully rejecting the Commission's objection of inadmissibility;

—

for the rest, fully set aside the contested order;

—

annul pursuant to Article 263 TFEU the Commission’s decision contained in an undated letter received on 2 April 2018 rejecting the joint tender submitted by the Appellant for a follow-up study on trade union practices on non-discrimination and diversity in the workplace (call for tenders JUST/2017/RDIS/FW/EQUA/0042; OJ/S S215 — 09/11/2017 — 2017/S 215-446067);

—

order the Commission to pay damages in the amount of EUR 1;

—

alternatively, refer the case back to the General Court; and in any event

—

order the Commission to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.

1.

If the answer to Question 1 is yes:

2.

3.

Can an undertaking, such as Facebook Ireland, which operates a digital social network funded by advertising and offers personalised content and advertising, network security, product improvement and continuous, seamless use of all of its group products in its terms of service, justify collecting data for these purposes from other group services and third-party websites and apps via integrated interfaces such as Facebook Business Tools, or via cookies or similar storage technologies placed on the internet user’s computer or mobile device, linking those data with the user’s Facebook.com account and using them, on the ground of necessity for the performance of the contract under Article 6(1)(b) of the GDPR or on the ground of the pursuit of legitimate interests under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR?

4.

In those circumstances, can

5.

In those circumstances, can collecting data from other group services and from third-party websites and apps via integrated interfaces such as Facebook Business Tools, or via cookies or similar storage technologies placed on the internet user’s computer or mobile device, linking those data with the user’s Facebook.com account and using them, or using data already collected and linked by other lawful means, also be justified under Article 6(1)(c), (d) and (e) of the GDPR in individual cases, for example to respond to a legitimate request for certain data (point (c)), to combat harmful behaviour and promote security (point (d)), to research for social good and to promote safety, integrity and security (point (e))?

6.

Can consent within the meaning of Article 6(1)(a) and Article 9(2)(a) of the GDPR be given effectively and, in accordance with Article 4(11) of the GDPR in particular, freely, to a dominant undertaking such as Facebook Ireland?

If the answer to Question 1 is no:

7.

If the answer to Question 7 is yes, Questions 3 to 5 must be answered in relation to data from the use of the group’s Instagram service.

1.

Does the procedure for granting an interlocutory injunction provided for in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 89/665/EEC, (1) as amended by Directive 2014/23/EU, (2) which is also provided for at national level in Austria in proceedings before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court), in which it is also possible to bring about, for example, a temporary prohibition on the conclusion of framework agreements or on the conclusion of supply contracts, constitute a dispute concerning a civil and commercial matter within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (3) (Brussels I Regulation)? Does such a procedure for granting an interlocutory injunction as referred to in the preceding question at least constitute a civil matter pursuant to Article 81(1) TFEU? Is the procedure for granting interlocutory injunctions pursuant to Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, a procedure for granting provisional measures pursuant to Article 35 of the Brussels I Regulation?

2.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the principle of equivalence to be interpreted as conferring subjective rights on individuals against the Member State and as precluding the application of Austrian national rules under which the court must, before disposing of an application for an interlocutory injunction, as provided for in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, determine the type of contract award procedure and the (estimated) contract value as well as the total number of contested, separately contestable decisions from specific award procedures and also, if necessary, the lots from a specific award procedure, in order then to issue, if necessary, an order for regularisation via the presiding judge of the competent chamber of the court for the purpose of recovering fees and, in the event of non-payment of fees, to prescribe — before or no later than at the same time as rejecting an application for an interlocutory injunction due to failure to pay fees subsequently demanded — the procedural fees via the chamber of the court competent to deal with the application for review, failing which a loss of entitlement would ensue, when in (other types of) civil cases in Austria, such as, for example, in the case of actions seeking compensation or injunctions for infringements of competition law, non-payment of fees does not otherwise preclude the disposal of an application for an interlocutory injunction lodged in conjunction with an action, irrespective of the issue of the fees payable for judicial protection, whatever the amount, and, moreover, non-payment of flat-rate fees does not, in principle, preclude the disposal of an application for an interlocutory injunction lodged separately from an action in proceedings before the civil courts; and, by way of further comparison, in Austria, non-payment of appeal fees for bringing appeals against administrative decisions or for appeals or appeals on points of law against decisions of administrative courts to the Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) or the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court) does not lead to the dismissal of an appeal owing to non-payment of fees and, for example, does not lead to applications for the granting of suspensive effect being disposed of only by way of their rejection in such appeals or appeals on points of law?

2.1.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the principle of equivalence to be interpreted as precluding the application of Austrian national rules under which, prior to the disposal of an application for an interlocutory injunction as provided for in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, an order for regularisation of fees is to be made by the presiding judge of the chamber, sitting as a single judge, in the event of insufficient payment of flat-rate fees, and that single judge must reject the application for an interlocutory injunction in the event of non-payment of fees, when otherwise in civil actions in Austria, under the Gerichtsgebührengesetz (Law on court fees), no additional flat-rate court fees are to be paid, in principle, for an application for an interlocutory injunction lodged together with an action, on top of the fees for the action at first instance, and, moreover, with regard to applications for the granting of suspensive effect which are lodged together with an appeal against an administrative decision to an administrative court, an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Administrative Court or an appeal to the Constitutional Court, and which, from a functional point of view, have the same or a similar objective in terms of judicial protection as an application for an interlocutory injunction, no separate fees must be paid for such ancillary applications for the granting of suspensive effect?

3.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the requirement under Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/24/EU, (4) to take, at the earliest opportunity and by way of interlocutory procedures, interim measures with the aim of correcting the alleged infringement or preventing further damage to the interests concerned, to be interpreted as meaning that that requirement to act without undue delay confers a subjective right to have a decision taken without undue delay on an application for an interlocutory injunction and that it precludes the application of Austrian national rules under which, even in the case of contract award procedures conducted in a non-transparent manner, the court must, before disposing of an application for an interlocutory injunction aimed at preventing further procurement by the contracting authority, determine the type of award procedure and the (estimated) contract value as well as the total number of separately contestable decisions contested or to be contested from specific award procedures and also, if necessary, the lots from a specific award procedure, even if those elements do not bear any relevance to the court’s decision, in order then to issue, if necessary, an order for regularisation via the presiding judge of the competent chamber of the court for the purpose of recovering fees and, in the event of non-payment of fees, to prescribe — before or no later than at the same time as rejecting an application for an interlocutory injunction due to failure to pay fees subsequently demanded — the procedural fees via the chamber of the court competent to rule on the application for review, failing which a loss of entitlement vis-à-vis the applicant would ensue?

4.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the right to a fair trial before a court or tribunal under Article 47 of the Charter (5) to be interpreted as conferring subjective rights on individuals and as precluding the application of Austrian national rules under which, even in the case of contract award procedures conducted in a non-transparent manner, the court must, before disposing of an application for an interlocutory injunction aimed at preventing further procurement by the contracting authority, determine the type of award procedure and the (estimated) contract value as well as the total number of contested, separately contestable decisions from specific award procedures and also, if necessary, the lots from a specific award procedure, even if those elements do not bear any relevance to the court’s decision, in order then to issue, if necessary, an order for regularisation via the presiding judge of the competent chamber of the court for the purpose of recovering fees and, in the event of non-payment of fees, to prescribe — before or no later than at the same time as rejecting an application for an interlocutory injunction due to failure to pay fees subsequently demanded — the procedural fees via the chamber of the court competent to rule on the application for review, failing which a loss of entitlement vis-à-vis the applicant would ensue?

5.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the principle of equivalence to be interpreted as conferring on individuals subjective rights against the Member State and as precluding the application of Austrian national rules under which, in the event of non-payment of flat-rate fees for an application for an interlocutory injunction within the meaning of Directive 89/665, as amended, (only) a chamber of an administrative court, as a judicial body, must prescribe flat-rate fees (leading to curtailed possibilities of judicial protection for the party liable to pay the fees) when fees for actions, interlocutory injunctions and appeals in civil court proceedings are otherwise prescribed, in the event of non-payment, by an administrative decision in accordance with the Gerichtliches Einbringungsgesetz (Law on judicial collection) and, in administrative law, appeal fees for appeals to an administrative court or to the Constitutional Court or for appeals on points of law to the Supreme Administrative Court are as a general rule prescribed, in the event of non-payment of those fees, by way of a notice of a tax authority (notice prescribing fees), against which an appeal can always be brought before an administrative court and then, in turn, an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Administrative Court or an appeal before the Constitutional Court?

6.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is Article 1(1) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, to be interpreted as meaning that the conclusion of a framework agreement with a single economic operator pursuant to Article 33(3) of Directive 2014/24 constitutes the conclusion of a contract pursuant to Article 2a(2) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23?

6.1.

Are the words ‘contracts based on that agreement’ in Article 33(3) of Directive 2014/24 to be interpreted as meaning that a contract based on the framework agreement exists where the contracting authority awards an individual contract expressly on the basis of the framework agreement concluded? Or is the cited phrase ‘contracts based on that agreement’ to be interpreted as meaning that if the total quantity covered by the framework agreement within the meaning of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-216/17, (6) paragraph 64, has already been exhausted, there is no longer a contract based on the framework agreement originally concluded?

7.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the right to a fair trial before a court or tribunal under Article 47 of the Charter to be interpreted as precluding the application of a rule under which the contracting authority designated in the procurement dispute must, in the proceedings for the granting of an interlocutory injunction, provide all the information required and produce all the documents required — whereby failure to do so in either respect may lead to a default decision to its detriment — if the officials or employees of that contracting authority who are required to provide that information on behalf of the contracting authority may thereby be exposed to the risk of possibly even having to incriminate themselves under criminal law if they provide the information or produce the documents?

8.

Taking account also of the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter, and having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the requirement under Article 1(1) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/24, that procurement review procedures must, in particular, be conducted effectively, to be interpreted as meaning that those provisions confer subjective rights and preclude the application of national rules under which the party seeking judicial protection by way of an application for an interlocutory injunction is required to specify in his or her application for an interlocutory injunction the specific contract award procedure and the specific decision of a contracting authority, even where, in the case of award procedures without prior publication of a contract notice, that applicant will generally not know how many non-transparent award procedures the contracting authority has conducted and how many award decisions have already been taken in the non-transparent award procedures?

9.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the requirement of a fair trial before a court or tribunal under Article 47 of the Charter to be interpreted as meaning that that provision confers subjective rights and precludes the application of national rules under which the party seeking judicial protection by way of an application for review is required to specify in his or her application for an interlocutory [injunction] the specific contract award procedure and the specific contested, separately contestable decision of a contracting authority, even if, in the case of award procedures without prior publication of a contract notice that are non-transparent for that applicant, he or she cannot generally know how many non-transparent award procedures the contracting authority has conducted and how many award decisions have already been taken in the non-transparent award procedures?

10.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the requirement of a fair trial before a court or tribunal under Article 47 of the Charter to be interpreted as meaning that that provision confers subjective rights and precludes the application of national rules under which the party seeking judicial protection by way of an application for an interlocutory injunction is required to pay flat-rate fees in an amount which he or she cannot ascertain in advance, because, in the case of contract award procedures without prior publication of a contract notice that are non-transparent for that applicant, he or she cannot generally know whether non-transparent award procedures have been conducted by the contracting authority and, if so, the number of such procedures and their estimated contract value and how many separately contestable award decisions have already been taken in the non-transparent award procedures?

1.

Does a review procedure before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court), which takes place in implementation of Directive 89/665/EEC, (1) as amended by Directive 2014/23/EU, (2) constitute a dispute concerning a civil and commercial matter within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (3)? Does such a review procedure as referred to in the preceding question at least constitute a civil matter pursuant to Article 81(1) TFEU?

2.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the principle of equivalence to be interpreted as conferring subjective rights on individuals against the Member State and as precluding the application of Austrian national rules under which the court must, before disposing of an application for review, which must be directed at the annulment of a separately contestable decision of a contracting authority, determine the type of contract award procedure and the (estimated) contract value as well as the total number of contested, separately contestable decisions from specific award procedures and also, if necessary, the lots from a specific award procedure, in order then to issue, if necessary, an order for regularisation via the presiding judge of the competent chamber of the court for the purpose of recovering fees and then, in the event of non-payment of fees, to prescribe — before or no later than at the same time as rejecting an application for review due to failure to pay fees subsequently demanded — the procedural fees via the chamber of the court competent to deal with the application for review, failing which a loss of entitlement would ensue, when in civil cases in Austria, such as, for example, in the case of actions seeking compensation or injunctions for infringements of competition law, non-payment of fees does not otherwise preclude the disposal of an action, irrespective of the issue of the fees payable for judicial protection, whatever the amount, and, by way of further comparison, in Austria, non-payment of appeal fees for bringing appeals against administrative decisions or for appeals or appeals on points of law against decisions of administrative courts to the Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) or the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court) does not lead to the dismissal of an appeal owing to non-payment of fees?

2.1.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the principle of equivalence to be interpreted as precluding the application of Austrian national rules under which, prior to the disposal of an application for an interlocutory injunction as provided for in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, an order for regularisation of fees is to be made by the presiding judge of the chamber, sitting as a single judge, in the event of insufficient payment of flat-rate fees, and that single judge must reject the application for an interlocutory injunction in the event of non-payment of fees, when otherwise in civil actions in Austria, under the Gerichtsgebührengesetz (Law on court fees), no additional flat-rate court fees are to be paid, in principle, for an application for an interlocutory injunction lodged together with an action, on top of the fees for the action at first instance, and, moreover, with regard to applications for the granting of suspensive effect which are lodged together with an appeal against an administrative decision to an administrative court, an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Administrative Court or an appeal to the Constitutional Court, and which, from a functional point of view, have the same or a similar objective in terms of judicial protection as an application for an interlocutory injunction, no separate fees must be paid for such ancillary applications for the granting of suspensive effect?

3.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the requirement under Article 1(1) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, according to which procurement review procedures must, in particular, be conducted as rapidly as possible, to be interpreted as meaning that that requirement of rapidity confers a subjective right to a rapid review procedure and precludes the application of Austrian national rules under which, even in the case of contract award procedures conducted in a non-transparent manner, the court must in every case determine, before disposing of an application for review, which must be directed at the annulment of a separately contestable decision of a contracting authority, the type of award procedure and the (estimated) contract value as well as the total number of contested, separately contestable decisions from specific award procedures and also, if necessary, the lots from a specific award procedure, in order then to issue, if necessary, an order for regularisation via the presiding judge of the chamber of the court for the purpose of recovering fees and, in the event of non-payment of fees, to prescribe — before or no later than at the same time as rejecting an application for review due to failure to pay fees subsequently demanded — the procedural fees via the chamber of the court competent to rule on the application for review, failing which a loss of entitlement would ensue?

4.

Having regard to the principle of transparency under Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU (4) and the other provisions of EU law, is the right to a fair trial before a court or tribunal under Article 47 of the Charter (5) to be interpreted as precluding the application of Austrian national rules under which, even in the case of contract award procedures conducted in a non-transparent manner, the court must in every case, before disposing of an application for review, which must be directed at the annulment of a separately contestable decision of a contracting authority, determine the type of award procedure and the (estimated) contract value as well as the total number of contested, separately contestable decisions from specific award procedures and also, if necessary, the lots from a specific award procedure, in order then to issue, if necessary, an order for regularisation via the presiding judge of the chamber of the court for the purpose of recovering fees and, in the event of non-payment of fees, to prescribe — before or no later than at the same time as rejecting an application for review due to failure to pay fees subsequently demanded — the procedural fees via the chamber of the court competent to deal with the application for review, failing which a loss of entitlement would ensue?

5.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the principle of equivalence to be interpreted as conferring subjective rights on individuals against the Member State and as precluding the application of Austrian national rules under which, in the event of non-payment of flat-rate fees for the lodging of an application for review of decisions of contracting authorities within the meaning of Directive 89/665, as amended (or, as the case may be, also for a finding of illegality in connection with a contract award for the purpose of obtaining compensation), (only) a chamber of an administrative court, as a judicial body, must prescribe flat-rate fees which have not been paid but are payable (leading to curtailed possibilities of judicial protection for the party liable to pay the fees) when fees for actions and appeals in civil court proceedings are otherwise prescribed, in the event of non-payment, by an administrative decision in accordance with the Gerichtliches Einbringungsgesetz (Law on judicial collection) and, moreover, in administrative law, appeal fees for appeals to an administrative court or to the Constitutional Court or for appeals on points of law to the Supreme Administrative Court are as a general rule prescribed, in the event of non-payment of the fees, by way of a notice of an administrative authority (notice prescribing fees), against which an appeal can as a general rule always be brought before an administrative court and then, in turn, an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Administrative Court or an appeal before the Constitutional Court?

6.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is Article 1(1) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, to be interpreted as meaning that the conclusion of a framework agreement with a single economic operator pursuant to Article 33(3) of Directive 2014/24 constitutes the conclusion of a contract pursuant to Article 2a(2) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, and, consequently, the decision of a contracting authority as to the single economic operator pursuant to Article 33(3) of Directive 2014/24 with which that framework agreement is to be concluded constitutes a contract award decision pursuant to Article 2a(1) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23?

6.1.

Are the words ‘contracts based on that agreement’ in Article 33(3) of Directive 2014/24 to be interpreted as meaning that a contract based on the framework agreement exists where the contracting authority awards an individual contract expressly on the basis of the framework agreement concluded? Or is the cited phrase ‘contracts based on that agreement’ to be interpreted as meaning that if the total quantity covered by the framework agreement within the meaning of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-216/17, (6) paragraph 64, has already been exhausted, there is no longer a contract based on the framework agreement originally concluded?

6.2.

If Question 6.1. is answered in the affirmative:

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, are Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2014/24 to be interpreted as meaning that the estimated contract value of an individual contract based on the framework agreement is always the estimated contract value pursuant to Article 5(5) of Directive 2014/24? Or, in the case of a single contract based on a framework agreement, is the estimated contract value pursuant to Article 4 of that directive the contract value derived in application of Article 5 of that directive for the purposes of determining the estimated contract value for a single supply contract based on the framework agreement?

7.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the right to a fair trial before a court or tribunal under Article 47 of the Charter to be interpreted as precluding the application of a rule under which the contracting authority designated in the procurement dispute must provide all the information required and produce all the documents required — whereby failure to do so in either respect may lead to a default decision to its detriment — if the officials or employees of that contracting authority who are required to provide that information on behalf of the contracting authority may thereby be exposed to the risk of possibly having to incriminate themselves under criminal law if they provide the information or produce the documents?

8.

Taking account also of the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter, and having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the requirement under Article 1(1) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/24, that procurement review procedures must, in particular, be conducted effectively, to be interpreted as meaning that those provisions confer subjective rights and preclude the application of national rules under which the party seeking judicial protection by way of an application for review is required to specify in his or her application for review the specific award procedure in each case and the specific separately contestable decision of a contracting authority, even if, in the case of award procedures without prior publication of a contract notice that are non-transparent for that applicant, he or she will generally not know whether the contracting authority has conducted direct award procedures under national law that are non-transparent for the applicant or negotiated procedures without prior publication of a contract notice that are non-transparent for the applicant, or whether one or more non-transparent award procedures with one or more contestable decisions have been conducted?

9.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the requirement of a fair trial before a court or tribunal under Article 47 of the Charter to be interpreted as meaning that that provision confers subjective rights and precludes the application of national rules under which the party seeking judicial protection by way of an application for review is required to specify in his or her application for review the specific contract award procedure and the specific separately contestable decision of a contracting authority, even if, in the case of award procedures without prior publication of a contract notice, that applicant cannot generally know whether the contracting authority has conducted direct award procedures under national law that are non-transparent for the applicant or negotiated procedures without prior publication of a contract notice that are non-transparent for the applicant, or whether one or more award procedures with one or more separately contestable decisions have been conducted?

10.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the requirement of a fair trial before a court or tribunal under Article 47 of the Charter to be interpreted as meaning that that provision confers subjective rights and precludes the application of national rules under which the party seeking judicial protection by way of an application for review is required to pay flat-rate fees in an amount which he or she cannot foresee at the time when the application is lodged, because, in the case of contract award procedures without prior publication of a contract notice that are non-transparent for that applicant, he or she cannot generally know whether the contracting authority has conducted direct award procedures under national law or non-transparent negotiated procedures without prior publication of a contract notice, and how high the estimated contract value is in the case of any negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice that may have been conducted, or how many separately contestable decisions have already been issued?

1.

Is Article 1(2)(b) of Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission (1) to be interpreted as meaning that not only the broadcasting organisation, but also a satellite package provider intervening in the indivisible and single act of broadcasting, carries out an act of use — which in any case requires consent — solely in the State where, under the control and responsibility of the broadcasting organisation, the programme-carrying signals are introduced into an uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite and down towards the earth, with the consequence that the intervention of the satellite package provider in the act of broadcasting cannot lead to an infringement of copyright in the receiving State?

2.

If Question 1 is answered in the negative:

Is the concept of ‘communication to the public’ in Article 1(2)(a) and (c) of Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission and in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the satellite package provider, which intervenes as another operator during a communication to the public by satellite, bundles several encrypted high-definition signals of free-to-air and pay-TV programmes of various broadcasting organisations into a package of its own composition and offers the independent audiovisual product created in this way to its customers in return for payment, requires separate authorisation from the right holders concerned even in respect of the protected content in the free-to-air TV programmes contained in the package of programmes, although in this respect it is merely providing its customers with access to works which are already freely accessible — albeit in poorer standard-definition quality — to everyone in the broadcasting area?

1.

Does the award of compensation under Article 82 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (1) (the GDPR) also require, in addition to infringement of provisions of the GDPR, that an applicant must have suffered harm, or is the infringement of provisions of the GDPR in itself sufficient for the award of compensation?

2.

Does the assessment of the compensation depend on further EU-law requirements in addition to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence?

3.

Is it compatible with EU law to take the view that the award of compensation for non-material damage presupposes the existence of a consequence of the infringement of at least some weight that goes beyond the upset caused by that infringement?

—

set aside the Order under appeal;

—

decide that the Application at first instance is well-founded and annul the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/389 (1) insofar as it applies to the Appellants; and

—

order the Commission to pay the costs of both the appeal proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.

1.

How is the concept of ‘overall protection of temporary agency workers’ in Article 5(3) of Directive 2008/104/EC (1) to be defined, and, in particular, does it encompass more than what is provided for in the mandatory provisions on protection for all workers under national and EU law?

2.

What conditions and criteria must be met for the presumption that arrangements concerning the working and employment conditions of temporary agency workers in a collective agreement which derogate from the principle of equal treatment laid down in Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/104 have been established while respecting the overall protection of temporary agency workers?

3.

Must the national legislature prescribe the conditions and criteria under which the social partners must respect the overall protection of temporary agency workers within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Directive 2008/104 where the national legislature gives the social partners the option of concluding collective agreements which establish arrangements concerning the working and employment conditions of temporary agency workers which derogate from the principle of equal treatment, and the national collective bargaining system provides for requirements which can be presumed to ensure an appropriate balance of interests between the parties to collective agreements (‘presumption of fairness of collective agreements’)?

4.

If the third question is answered in the affirmative:

5.

If the third question is answered in the negative:

In the case of arrangements concerning the working and employment conditions of temporary agency workers which derogate from the principle of equal treatment through collective agreements in accordance with Article 5(3) of Directive 2008/104, may the national courts review such collective agreements without restriction with a view to determining whether the derogations have been established while respecting the overall protection of temporary agency workers, or does Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and/or the reference to the ‘autonomy of the social partners’ in recital 19 of Directive 2008/104 grant the parties to collective agreements a margin of assessment with regard to respect for the overall protection of temporary agency workers that is subject to only limited judicial review and — if so — how far does that margin extend?

1.

Must the second paragraph of Article 63(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, taken on its own and in conjunction with the scope of the principles of European law, namely equality, non-discrimination and transparency in public procurement, be interpreted as meaning that, if the contracting authority ascertains that an entity on whose capacity an economic operator relies does not fulfil the selection criteria, it is obliged to request that entity’s replacement or that it has the option to request such replacement if the economic operator wishes to be selected?

2.

Are there circumstances in which, on the basis of the principles of equality, non-discrimination and transparency, and also depending on the conduct of the award procedure, the contracting authority is not, or is no longer, obliged, or is not, or is no longer, permitted to insist on replacement?

1.

2.

If Question 1 must be answered in the affirmative, must Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, read in the light of recital 19 of that regulation, be interpreted as precluding an applicant for international protection from successfully arguing, in the context of an appeal against a transfer decision, that that transfer cannot proceed because the time limit for a previously agreed transfer between two Member States (in this case, Germany and Italy) has expired?

1.

Must Article 29 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180[, p. 31]) be interpreted as meaning that a current transfer time limit, as referred to in Article 29(1) and (2), restarts at the point at which the foreign national, after having obstructed the transfer by a Member State by absconding, lodges a fresh application for international protection in another (in this case, a third) Member State?

2.

If Question 1 must be answered in the negative, must Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, read in the light of recital 19 of that regulation, be interpreted as precluding an applicant for international protection from successfully arguing, in the context of an appeal against a transfer decision, that that transfer cannot proceed because the time limit for a previously agreed transfer between two Member States (in this case, France and Austria) has expired, with the result that the time limit within which the Netherlands can effect the transfer has expired?

1.

Does the interpretation of Article 45(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1974/2006 (1) laying down detailed rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 permit the assumption that, in a case such as the present one, a holding has been ‘reparcelled’ or has been the subject of ‘land-consolidation measures’ as a result of which the beneficiary is unable to comply with the commitments given by him or her?

2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, does the fact that a Member State has not taken the measures necessary to allow the beneficiary’s commitments to be adapted to the new situation of the holding provide justification for not requiring reimbursement of the funds in respect of the period in which the commitment was effective?

3.

If the first question is answered in the negative, how is Article 31 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (2) of 19 January 2009 to be interpreted in the light of the facts established in the main proceedings and what is the nature of the time limit under Article 75(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 (3) of 30. November 2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009?

1.

Is Article 55 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (‘the CISA’) (1) compatible with Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and does it continue to be valid in so far as it admits, as an exception to the prohibition of double prosecution, that a Contracting Party may, when ratifying, accepting or approving that Convention, declare that it is not bound by Article 54 of the CISA where the acts to which the foreign judgment relates constitute an offence against national security or other equally significant interests of that Contracting Party?

2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:

Do Articles 54 and 55 of the CISA and Articles 50 and 52 of the Charter preclude an interpretation by the German courts of the declaration made by the Federal Republic of Germany when ratifying the CISA in relation to Paragraph 129 of the Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code, Federal Law Gazette 1994, II 631) that the declaration also covers criminal organisations, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which engage exclusively in financial crime and do not, in addition, pursue any political, ideological, religious or world-view objectives and also do not seek to gain influence by dishonest means over politics, the media, the public administration, the judiciary or the economy?

—

set aside the judgment under appeal;

—

order Crédit Lyonnais to pay the costs.

—

exceeded the limits of judicial review by substituting its own assessment of complex economic factors for that of the ECB, in breach of the standard established by EU courts on the matter;

—

breached its duty to state reasons by not allowing the ECB to understand in what way its assessment of the dual guarantee by the State, issued in the context of the regulated savings, could be flawed;

—

distorted the evidence that had been submitted to it in the course of the proceedings by a manifestly incorrect reading, both of the decision contested at first instance (decision ECB-SSM-2019-FRCAG-39 of 3 May 2019), and of the methodology applied by the ECB and against which the request for exemption submitted by Crédit Lyonnais had been examined;

—

infringed Article 4(1)(94) of Regulation 575/2013 (1) by adding to the definition of the risk of excessive leverage the criteria that are not there, and Article 429(14) thereof, concerning the exemption of certain exposures from the calculation of the leverage ratio, thus depriving the ECB of the discretion granted to it by virtue of that article.

1.

Annuls the decision of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 23 July 2014 which closed the procedure for recognition of the occupational origin of BZ’s disease;

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.

Orders the ECB to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders FD to pay the costs.

1.

Annuls the decision of the Court of Auditors of 22 May 2019 dismissing GW’s application to refer the matter to the Invalidity Committee;

2.

Orders the Court of Auditors to pay the costs.

1.

Annuls the decision of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 28 January 2019 in so far as it refuses to grant the household allowance for 2019 to GY;

2.

Orders the ECB to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Ms Joëlle Mélin to pay the costs.

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed;

2.

The costs are reserved.

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed;

2.

The costs shall be reserved.

—

annul the decision of the Commission, concretely, the individual legal act ‘Recovery Order and Debit Note’ issued by the European Commission, DG for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Ref. ARES(2021)1955613, on 18 March 2021;

—

return the financial applications to the European Commission audit process and claim the relevant costs admissible according to the grant agreement ‘Slovak Safer Internet’, No. SI-2010-SIC-1231002;

—

order the Commission to pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the annulment of the defendant’s decision and recovery order Ref. ARES(2021)1955613 due to infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers, particularly improper legal evaluation of facts and findings (breach of right of defence, breach of right to good administration, breach of principle of proportionality, principle of legal certainty, rule of law, principle of legal expectations and non-retroactivity, improper legal evaluation of facts and findings of the Audit 12-INFS-024 and follow-up Audit 15-NR01-044).

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the defendant be ordered to proceed to pay the eligible costs to the applicant as the original beneficiary and the contractual party to the grant agreement No. SI-2010-SIC-123002 — ‘Slovak Safer Internet’, in accordance with the valid and effective grant agreement, based on the fact that the defendant has the competence to deal with issues of project implementation and financial transfers in relation to the valid and effective contract between the defendant and the applicant.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the defendant be ordered to reimburse the costs and expenses of the proceedings. In accordance with the above-mentioned arguments and arbitrary character of the contested decision, the applicant seeks reimbursement of the costs and expenses connected with the proceedings before the General Court of the European Union as well as the costs and expenses spent for the legal assistance in relation to this claim.

—

annul the decision of 15 July 2020 not to renew the applicant’s contract;

—

annul the applicant’s 2019 Appraisal Report;

—

as far as necessary, annul the decision of 11 February 2021 rejecting the complaint;

—

provide compensation for the applicant’s material prejudice, as calculated in this application;

—

provide compensation for the applicant’s moral prejudice, as evaluated ex aequo et bono at EUR 10 000;

—

order the defendant to pay the entire costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the 2019 appraisal report was not duly finalised and the contract renewal report (CRR) relied on a non-finalised appraisal report.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging violation of the principle of impartiality, of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations and of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging violation of the right to be heard and of the duty to state reasons, violation of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations, of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and of paragraphs 6.7, 6.9 and 6.10 of the EIOPA contract renewal procedure.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment, absence of a diligent assessment of all aspects of the case and violation of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, together with violation of Article 4 and 6.5 of the contract renewal procedure.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging discrimination based on gender and family situation — violation of Article 1d of the Staff Regulations and of Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging violation of the duty of care.

—

annul the decision of the European Commission, concretely, the individual legal act ‘Termination of the Action’ adopted by the European Commission, INEA, No. ARES(2021)1953853, issued on 30 March 2021;

—

return the action to the European Commission and INEA and regard the action and grant agreement as valid and not terminated according to grant agreement No. INEA/CEF/ICT/A2015/1154788 for the project ‘Slovak Safer Internet Centre IV’, No. 2015-SK-IA-0038;

—

order the Commission to reimburse the costs and expenses of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the annulment of the European Commission decision ‘Termination of the Action’ Ref. ARES(2021)1953853, due to the infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers, particularly improper legal evaluation of facts and findings (breach of right for good administration, breach of principle of proportionality, principle of legal certainty, rule of law, principle of legal expectations and improper legal evaluation of facts and findings of the request for final payment in the project 2015-SK-IA-0038 Slovak Safer Internet Centre IV).

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the request for final payment in relation to the project ‘Slovak Safer Internet Centre IV’ be returned to the Commission and INEA for its [sic] evaluation and the implementation of the control competence as well as fulfilment of the contractual obligations based on grant agreement No. INEA/CEF/ICT/A2015/1154788 and that the Commission be ordered to proceed to final payment of the eligible costs to the applicant, in accordance with the valid and effective grant agreement, based on the fact that the Commission has the competence to deal with issues of project implementation and financial transfers under the valid and effective contract between the Commission and the applicant.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission be ordered to reimburse the costs and expenses of the proceedings. In accordance with the above-mentioned arguments and arbitrary character of the Commission decision, the applicant requests reimbursement of costs and expenses connected with the proceedings before the General Court of the European Union as well as the costs and expenses spent for the legal assistance in relation to this claim.

—

annul the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament of 16 March 2021;

—

cancel debit note No 7010000523 issued by the European Parliament on 31 March 2021;

—

order the Parliament to pay the applicant’s costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Parliament was, without justification, unreasonably and unfairly late in adopting its decision by failing to observe the principle that action must be taken within a reasonable time in the administrative procedures provided for in Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Because of this, the applicant’s rights of defence were infringed as a result of the late initiation of recovery proceedings brought against him, since the duration of those proceedings deprived him of the opportunity to defend himself effectively against the allegations made and to adduce evidence.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament, upon which the debit note was based, as a legal measure affecting the applicant, was adopted in breach of the principles of impartial and fair procedure, equality of arms and the applicant’s rights of defence:

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Parliament made an error of assessment, in that it failed to assess the evidence adduced by the applicant which confirmed that the matters referred to by the assistant before the General Court on which the Parliament relies, and on the basis of which recovery proceedings have been initiated, are incorrect (confirm that the investigation was initiated without justification) and breach the obligation to give reasons set out in Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Parliament infringed the principle of proportionality and the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU and in Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter, in so far as the amount to be repaid was set at EUR 78 838,21. The sum required to be repaid has not been substantiated in full, and for that reason the contested decision assumes that the Parliamentary assistant never worked for the applicant.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that information of the Parliament which is publicly available confirms that the Parliamentary assistant carried out his functions until no later than 15 December 2015, which indicates that it was unreasonable to initiate the procedure for recovery of the funds, with the result that the decision must be annulled.

—

annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/546 of 29 March 2021, imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitely collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of aluminium extrusions originating in the People’s Republic of China (1);

—

order the Commission to bear the applicant’s legal costs and its own costs in the present proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle of equality of arms and of sound administration, a manifest error of assessment, and a breach of the rights of defence and of disclosure of the applicant.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment by the Commission in the assessment of injury and causation with regard to the methodology, data and procedure applied, and a breach of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (the ‘Basic Regulation’) (2).

3.

Third plea in law, alleging a breach of Articles 1(2) and 5(2) of the Basic Regulation by reason of an incorrect definition of the product concerned.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging a breach of Article 1(2) and of Article 3 of the Basic Regulation as well as a manifest error of assessment concerning the scope of the product concerned as well as concerning the evaluation of imports from the country concerned for the injury analysis and causation purposes (CN Code 7610 90 90).

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging a breach of Article 2(6a) (a) of the Basic Regulation in that the Commission performed a wrong choice of the ‘appropriate representative’ country.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging a breach of Article 2(6a) of the Basic Regulation concerning the legal status of the report by which the Commission establishes the existence of significant market distortions in a certain country or a certain sector in that country. The applicant maintains that there is a violation of Regulation No 1/1958 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community (3) and of its fundamental rights, given that it could not receive the above report in Italian language.

—

annul the rejection decision of 14 April 2021 of the Commission of the European Union, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL), EMPL.B.2/AP/ab; Ref. Ares (2021);

—

oblige the EU Commission to adopt a lawful grant decision;

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the contested rejection decision of 14 April 2021 of the Commission disregards the meaning of Article 197(2)(c) of the EU Financial Regulation (1) in connection with the call for proposals VP/2020/008 and applies those provisions to European works councils in a legally impermissible manner. The requirement for the applicant European works councils to demonstrate that they have their own budget or annual accounts and bank account as evidence of stability and financial capacity would exclude from that support, a priori, the large majority of European works councils whose national rules for transposing Directive 2009/38/EC (2) do not provide for legal personality. That breaches the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination and diametrically contradicts also the purpose of the support programme.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that as the call for proposals does not mention a restriction of the range of eligible applicants and even expressly applies without limit, including to United Kingdom European works councils, among others, the restriction would also breach the fundamental EU principle of transparency.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the interpretation put forward in the rejection decision and its application to European works councils would also unduly favour undertakings, which — as social partners — in principle are called upon to submit suitable support projects in the call for proposals VP/2020/008.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 95(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Article 27(4) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625.

—

annul the decision of the Council of 8 March 2021 concerning the complaint and supplementary complaint made by the applicant under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union against Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1117 of 27 July 2020 appointing the European Prosecutors of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in the part which appoints José Eduardo Moreira Alves d’Oliveira Guerra, one of the three candidates initially nominated by Portugal, as European Prosecutor of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as temporary agent at grade AD 13 for a non-renewable period of three years from 29 July 2020 (OJ 2020 L 244, p. 18);

—

annul Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1117 of 27 July 2020 appointing the European Prosecutors of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in the part which appoints José Eduardo Moreira Alves d’Oliveira Guerra as European Prosecutor of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as temporary agent at grade AD 13 for a non-renewable period of three years from 29 July 2020;

—

order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of both parties.

1.

First plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment, in that the Council considers that it is not the ‘Appointing Authority’ (‘AA’) under Article 1(1) and (2) of the Staff Regulations, read in conjunction with Article 6 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, where it appoints European Prosecutors under Article 96(1) of Regulation 2017/1939.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the rules applicable to the appointment of European Prosecutors, which guarantee the principle of the independence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The applicant claims that the Portuguese Government’s challenge, made by letter of 29 November 2019, to the classification made by the selection panel referred to in Article 14(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of the candidates submitted by the Portuguese Government itself, calls into question the structure of the procedure for the appointment of European Prosecutors.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging manifest error in the premisses of the decision. The applicant claims, in particular, that the letter of 29 November 2019, sent by the Portuguese Government to the Council, contains two serious errors, as acknowledged by the Government itself. These were: (i) the reference to the Portuguese Government’s preferred candidate, made six times, as ‘Deputy Public Prosecutor José Guerra’ and (ii) the assertion that that prosecutor had an investigative and prosecuting role in an important trial relating to offences against the financial interests of the European Union.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging misuse of power. The applicant claims that the objectives at issue — in the light of which powers were conferred on the Council of the European Union in the context of the procedure for the selection and appointment of European Prosecutors — are to ensure the independence of the body and to appoint the best-qualified national candidates whose independence is beyond doubt to the post of European Prosecutor.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging breach of the right to good administration. The applicant claims that, inasmuch as the Council departed from the selection panel’s opinion and, therefore, from the order of priority based on the outcome of that panel’s assessment, a general reasoning in the form of a mere single reference to a ‘different assessment of the candidates’ merits made within the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council’, is tantamount to a complete lack of reasoning, making it impossible for the applicant to know the reasons for that departure.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination. The applicant claims that the Council, by conducting ‘the different assessment of the candidates’ merits made within the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council’, infringed the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination, as far as the applicant is concerned.

—

annul the contested decision in respect of services for which registration has been refused;

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annul the decision of Operations Division dated 17 April 2020 in application procedure No 17 975 929 in respect of services for which registration has been refused;

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refer the case back to EUIPO so it can amend the decision on the substance of the case and register European Union trade mark No 17 975 929 in respect of all the services covered;

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charge EUIPO with the costs of the proceedings before the Operations Division, Board of Appeal and General Court.

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Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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annul the contested decision;

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consequently, rule on the merits confirming the validity of EU trade mark No 2 756 740

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order the other party to the proceedings to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the costs of the proceedings before EUIPO.

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Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Infringement of Article 7(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Incorrect consideration of the evidence submitted by the applicant regarding the distinctive character of the mark acquired through use.

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annul the decision of 9 March 2020 and the decision upon review of 19 August 2020 of the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) Selection Board in respect of competition EPSO/AD/371/19 (AD 7) — 6 — Scientific Research Administrators not to include the applicant’s name on the reserve list;

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in so far as necessary, annul the decision of 15 March 2021 rejecting the complaint;

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request that the applicant’s competition tests and test results, and the results of the next stage, be produced in order to enable a substantive assessment of the results correlating to each irregularity and the significance of the consequences of the stress induced by the irregularities found, pursuant to Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court;

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order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First part, alleging that technical errors occurred in the organisation of the tests for competition EPSO/AD/371/19 (AD 7) — 6 — Scientific Research Administrators, which were acknowledged by the administration and caused the applicant increased stress during the tests.

2.

Second part, alleging that the administration failed to exercise due care and to take action to correct those errors.

3.

Third part, alleging a failure to take account of the errors when assessing the applicant’s performance and the failure to put in place procedures guaranteeing equality between candidates.

4.

Fourth part, alleging a manifest error of assessment of the applicant’s performance.

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annul the decision of the Single Resolution Board of 14 April 2021 on the calculation of the 2021 ex-ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (SRB/ES/2021/22), including the annexes thereto, in any event in so far as that decision, including the annexes thereto, concerns the contribution to be made by the applicant;

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stay the proceedings pursuant to Article 69(c) or (d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court pending final resolution of (joined) Cases C-584/20 P (1) and C-621/20 P, (2) C-663/20 P (3) and C-664/20 P, (4) since the legal issues are largely the same in those proceedings, which have already been pending for some time;

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order the Single Resolution Board to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements due to a lack of full disclosure of the contested decision

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements on account of an inadequate statement of reasons for the contested decision

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements due to the absence of a hearing and the failure to observe the right be heard

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging unlawfulness of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 (5) as a legal basis for the contested decision and unlawfulness of the risk adjustment methodology set out in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging unlawfulness of Directive 2014/59/EU (6) and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (7) as a legal basis for Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 and therefore for the contested decision

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Annul the decision of the Single Resolution Board of 14 April 2021 on the calculation of the ex-ante contributions to the single resolution fund for 2021 (ref: SRB/ESF/2021/22), including the annexes thereto, in any event in so far as that Decision, including the annexes thereto, concerns the contribution to be paid by the applicant;

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stay the present proceedings under Article 69(c) and (d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court until final settlement of (joined) cases C-584/20 P (1) and C-621/20 P, (2) C-663/20 P (3) and C-664/20 P, (4) as the legal questions are largely the same in those pending appeals;

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order the Single Resolution Board to pay the costs of the proceedings.

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annul cancellation decision No 22964C of the Cancellation Division of 4 December 2019 and the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of 20 April 2021 upholding it, including as regards the costs, and reject the application for cancellation of the respondent [before the Board of Appeal];

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in the alternative, annul cancellation decision No 22964C of the Cancellation Division of 4 December 2019 and the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of 20 April 2021 upholding it, including as regards the costs, and reject the application for cancellation of the respondent [before the Board of Appeal], so far as concerns vehicles and vehicle parts, included in Class 12 — namely, land vehicles and vehicle parts for them;

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in the further alternative, annul cancellation decision No 22964C of the Cancellation Division of 4 December 2019 and the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of 20 April 2021 upholding it, including as regards the costs, and reject the application for cancellation of the respondent [before the Board of Appeal], so far as concerns vehicles and vehicle parts, included in Class 12, namely, bicycles and two-wheeled vehicles and vehicle parts for them.

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Infringement of Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Infringement of Article 95 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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annul the defendant’s decision of 14 April 2021 on the calculation of the ex-ante contributions to the single resolution fund for 2021 (ref: SRB/ES/2021/22) in so far as the decision concerns the applicant;

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stay the present proceedings under Article 69(c) and (d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court until a final decision is issued in cases T-413/18, (1) T-481/19, (2) T-339/20 (3) and T-424/20 (4) und C-664/20 P (5) or until those cases are otherwise brought to a conclusion;

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order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea, alleging infringement of Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014, (6) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81 (7) and TFEU through increases in the amounts of the contributions to be paid by the applicant to the Fund.

2.

Second plea, alleging infringement of Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), on the ground that the calculation procedure does not allow for a complete statement of reasons for the contested decision. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 is partially ineffective.

3.

Third plea, alleging infringement of Articles 16 and 20 of the Charter, since, in view of the special situation of the applicant, the contested decision is at variance with the general principle of equality and infringes the principle of freedom to conduct a business.

4.

Fourth plea, alleging infringement of the essential formal requirements and possibly of Article 5(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81, as it is unclear whether the SRB Decision was authenticated. In addition, the defendant failed to clarify the situation sufficiently, did not grant the applicant a hearing before the adoption of the SRB decision and did not give sufficient reasons for its decision.

5.

Fifth plea, alleging, in the alternative, infringement of Article 69(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 due to an excessive target level, since the defendant may have set the target level at no more than EUR 55.000.000.000.

6.

Sixth plea, alleging, in the alternative, infringement of Article 70(2) of Regulation No 806/2014 in conjunction with Article 103(7) of Directive 2014/59/EU, since the defendant, in calculating the amount of the contribution, should have excluded risk-free liabilities from the relevant liabilities.

7.

Seventh plea, alleging, in the alternative, infringement of Article 70(6) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 in conjunction with Article 5(3) and (4) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63, since the defendant wrongly calculated the applicant’s contribution on the basis of a gross approach with regard to derivative contracts.

8.

Eighth plea, alleging, in the alternative, infringement of Article 70(6) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 in conjunction with Article 6(8)(a) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63, since the defendant wrongly regarded the applicant as an institution undergoing reorganisation.

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annul the contested decision in so far as it refuses the application;

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vary the contested decision by granting the appeal against the examiner’s decision not to grant the application in respect of the goods in Class 16; and

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order EUIPO to pay the applicant’s costs incurred in the proceedings before both the General Court and EUIPO.

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order EUIPO to pay the applicant’s costs incurred before the General Court.

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Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Infringement of Article 165(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 and Article 36(1)(g) and 36(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625.