(1)

By Regulation (EC) No 1601/2001 (2) the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel ropes and cables (SWR) originating in the Russian Federation, Turkey, Thailand, and the Czech Republic. Those measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original measures’ and the investigation that led to those measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.

(2)

The Commission had accepted in August 2001 a price undertaking offer by a Russian producer (JSC Severstal-Metiz). That undertaking agreement was repealed in October 2007 (3) because it was considered unworkable due to difficulties in the proper classification of the large number of product types exported by the company.

(3)

By Regulation (EC) No 1279/2007 (4) the Council, following partial interim and expiry reviews, maintained the original measures for the Russian Federation in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. Those measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the measures in force’ and the expiry review investigation will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the last investigation’. Regulation (EC) No 1279/2007 also terminated the measures concerning imports of steel ropes and cables originating in Turkey and Thailand.

(4)

Currently (5), there are also measures in force against SWR from Ukraine and the People’s Republic of China, which were extended to imports of SWR consigned from Morocco, Moldova and the Republic of Korea.

(5)

On 27 October 2012, the Commission announced by a notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union the initiation of an expiry review (‘notice of initiation’) (6) of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of SWR originating in the Russian Federation pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

(6)

The review was initiated following a substantiated request lodged by the Liaison Committee of European Union Wire Rope Industries (hereafter referred to as ‘EWRIS’ or ‘the applicant’) on behalf of Union producers representing more than 50 % of the total Union production of certain iron or steel ropes and cables. The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union Industry (‘UI’).

(7)

The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 October 2011 to 30 September 2012 (the ‘RIP’). The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of a likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2009 until the end of the RIP (period considered).

(8)

The Commission officially advised the exporting producers, Union producers, importers and users known to it, as well as the applicant and the authorities of the exporting country. Interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known in writing and to request a hearing within the time limit set out in the notice of initiation.

(9)

In view of the potentially large number of exporting producers in the Russian Federation involved in the investigation, sampling was initially envisaged in the notice of initiation in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling would indeed be necessary and, if so, to select a sample, exporting producers from the Russian Federation were requested to make themselves known within 15 days from the initiation of the proceeding and to provide the Commission with the information requested in the notice of initiation.

(10)

Given that only two exporting producers in the Russian Federation provided the information requested in the notice of initiation and expressed their willingness to further cooperate with the Commission, it was decided not to apply sampling for exporting producers.

(11)

The Commission announced in the notice of initiation that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers and invited interested parties to comment thereupon within a deadline provided for in the notice of initiation. The provisional sample consisted of five Union producers that were found to be representative of the Union industry in terms of volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union.

(12)

In the absence of any comments, the proposed companies were selected to be included in the final sample and interested parties were accordingly informed. However, one of the finally selected companies subsequently withdrew from the sample. The Commission therefore decided to reduce the sample to the four remaining companies, which were still found to be representative of the Union industry in terms of volume of production (29,3 %) and sales (20,9 %) of the like product in the Union.

(13)

Although sampling was envisaged in the notice of initiation of unrelated importers, neither any unrelated importer nor any user came forward. Therefore, sampling was not applied to unrelated importers.

(14)

Questionnaires were sent to the four sampled Union producers, the two exporting producers in the Russian Federation, and the related importer.

(15)

Replies to the questionnaires were received from the four sampled Union producers, from the related importer and from one exporting producer from the Russian Federation.

(16)

Although two exporting producers from the Russian Federation had originally come forward, only one of them provided a reply to the questionnaire and is considered to be cooperating in the investigation. The cooperating exporting producer has a wholly owned subsidiary based in Italy, which also produces SWR and imports the product concerned from the Russian Federation. The other exporting producer provided a submission at the time of the initiation of the investigation and although it was invited to fill in a questionnaire, failed to do so. It is therefore considered that the second exporting producer did not cooperate in the investigation.

(17)

The Commission sought and verified all information it deemed necessary for the purpose of determining the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and resulting injury and of the Union interest. Verification visits were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

(18)

The product concerned is the same as that in the original investigation and in the last investigation, which led to the imposition of measures currently in force, i.e. iron and steel ropes and cables, including locked coil ropes, excluding ropes and cables of stainless steel, with a maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeding 3 mm, with fittings attached or not (in industry terminology often referred to as ‘SWR’), currently falling within CN codes ex 7312 10 81, ex 7312 10 83, ex 7312 10 85, ex 7312 10 89 and ex 7312 10 98 (the ‘product concerned’).

(19)

The current expiry review investigation confirmed that SWR produced in the Russian Federation and exported to the Union, and SWR produced and sold in the Union by the Union producers have the same basic physical and technical characteristics and end uses and are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(20)

In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, it was examined whether dumping was currently taking place and whether the expiry of the existing measures would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping.

(21)

As explained above in recital 10, it was not necessary to select a sample of exporting producers in the Russian Federation. The cooperating exporting producer accounted for 99 % of the exports of the product concerned from the Russian Federation to the Union during the RIP. On this basis, it was concluded that cooperation was high.

(22)

Since two other known producers in the Russian Federation did not cooperate in the investigation, the findings on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping set out below had to be based on the best available facts including Eurostat data, the Russian official statistics and limited data obtained from a second producer.

(23)

According to the request for review, the exports from the Russian Federation into the Union were allegedly dumped at an average margin of 130,8 %. As mentioned in the notice of initiation (paragraph 4.1), the applicant compared the export prices from the Russian Federation to the Union (at ex-works level) with the domestic prices in the Russian Federation.

(24)

In accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation, it was first established for the cooperating exporting producer whether its total domestic sales of the like product to independent customers in the Russian domestic market were representative, i.e. whether the total volume of such sales was equal to at least 5 % of the total volume of the corresponding export sales to the Union. The domestic sales of the like product by the cooperating exporting producer were found to be overall representative.

(25)

Subsequently, the Commission identified those types of the like product sold domestically by the exporting producer which were identical or directly comparable to the types sold for export to the Union.

(26)

It was further examined whether the domestic sales of the cooperating exporting producer were representative for each product type, i.e. whether domestic sales of each product type constituted at least 5 % of the sales volume of the same product type to the Union. For the product types sold in representative quantities it was then examined whether such sales were made in the ordinary course of trade (‘OCOT’), in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation.

(27)

The examination as to whether the domestic sales of each product type, sold domestically in representative quantities, could be regarded as having been made in the OCOT was made by establishing the proportion of the profitable sales to independent customers of the type in question. In all cases where the domestic sales of the particular product type were made in sufficient quantities and in the OCOT, normal value was based on the actual domestic price, calculated as a weighted average of all the domestic sales of that type made during the RIP.

(28)

For the remaining product types where domestic sales were not representative or not sold in the OCOT, normal value was constructed in accordance with Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation. Normal value was constructed by adding to the manufacturing costs of the exported types, adjusted where necessary, a reasonable percentage for selling, general and administrative expenses and a reasonable margin for profit, on the basis of actual data pertaining to the production and sales of the like product in the OCOT, in accordance with the first sentence of Article 2(6) of the basic Regulation.

(29)

For export sales to the Union market of the cooperating Russian exporting producer made directly to the independent customers, the export price was established on the basis of the prices actually paid or payable for the product concerned in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

(30)

For the export transaction where the export to the Union was made through a related trading company, the export price was established on the basis of the first resale price of the related trader to independent customers in the Union, pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made to take account of all the costs incurred between the importation and resale, and for profit, to establish a reliable export price. In the absence of information from independent importers concerning the level of profits accrued during the RIP, an average profit margin of 5 % was used.

(31)

The comparison between the weighted average normal value and the weighted average export price was made on an ex-works basis and at the same level of trade.

(32)

In order to ensure a fair comparison between normal value and the export price, account was taken, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation, of differences in factors which were demonstrated to affect prices and price comparability. For this purpose, due allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences in transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs, financial costs, packing costs, commissions and rebates where applicable and justified.

(33)

As provided for under Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation, the weighted average normal value by type was compared with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned. This comparison showed the existence of dumping which amounted to 4,7 % for the exporting producer.

(34)

Further to the analysis of the existence of dumping during the RIP, the likelihood of the continuation of dumping should measures be repealed was also investigated. In this respect the following elements were analysed: the volume and prices of dumped imports from the Russian Federation, the attractiveness of the Union market and other third country markets, production capacity and excess capacity for exports in the Russian Federation.

(35)

According to Eurostat, during the period considered, the imports from the Russian Federation increased from 2 005 tonnes in 2009 to 2 343 tonnes in the RIP representing around 1 % of the Union consumption in the RIP and in the period considered. As mentioned above in recital 33, the imports from the cooperating exporting producer were made at dumped prices (4,7 %) despite the anti-dumping duty in force.

(36)

The exports to the Union constituted 3 % of the total sales of the cooperating producer, while the majority of the sales (85 %) were made on the Russian domestic market. The domestic market grew by 38 % in the period considered (7) and may further grow should the GDP of the Russian Federation continue to grow, as forecasted by publically available sources specialising on economic analysis. Moreover, the information gathered during the investigation revealed that the cooperating producer does not produce all types of the product concerned and therefore its competitive pressure on the Union producers is limited. This is likely to be the case also for the two other producers in view of no available information on the investments in new machinery, which could for instance allow the production of the product concerned of a bigger diameter. Furthermore, the limited competitive pressure of the exporting producers from the Russian Federation seems also to be confirmed by the presence of the Union producers on the Russian market. According to the official Russian customs statistics the Union producers’ exports of the like product to the Russian Federation represented 30 % of all imports of the like product to the Russian market in RIP, making of the Union producers the largest exporter on the Russian market.

(37)

In reply to the final disclosure the applicant argued that the projected GDP growth of Russia (in the range of 3 %) is rather moderate and will not allow for further development of the Russian SWR market. Consequently, the Russian market might not be able to absorb additional volumes of the like product. In this respect it is noted that the Russian GDP growth during the period considered, i.e. from 2009 to the end of the IP, was lower than the forecasted growth for the year 2014 and nevertheless allowed for the growth of the SWR market in Russia by 38 %. Therefore the argument has been rejected.

(38)

The same party also pointed to the new types of products that the cooperating exporting producer has recently developed (in cooperation with its subsidiary based in the Union) and claimed that this confirms the investments made by this producer in the period considered. This fact however does not contradict the finding on the cooperating producer’s inability to produce all type of ropes (especially SWR in the high end of the market). Therefore the argument has been rejected.

(39)

The attractiveness of the Union market should also be seen in the context of some acquisitions of Union producers by the Russians exporting producers. Indeed, two Russian producers currently own subsidiaries based in the Union. The verification visit to the EU based subsidiary of the cooperating exporter revealed that its sales were concluded mainly on the European market and that the related sales between the cooperating producer and this subsidiary remained limited in RIP.

(40)

On the basis of the data of the cooperating exporter, it has to be noted that the Russian export volume of the product concerned to third countries exceeded four times the export volume to the Union in RIP. The export prices of the cooperating exporting producer to third countries were found to be on average lower than its domestic sales price in the Russian Federation, but on average at higher levels than the export prices to the Union market. This allows a conclusion that the export sales to third countries’ markets are more attractive than the sales to the Union market. In this context, the existence of long established sales channels with the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) markets is also noted.

(41)

In reply to the final disclosure the applicant argued that the export prices of the Russian producers to the third markets are in fact lower than the export prices to the Union. A comparison between average export prices to Ukraine and some European countries based allegedly on the Russian customs statistics was evoked. No original data underlying the comparison was submitted. In this respect it is noted that the comparison of the price difference between Russian export prices to the Union and to third markets carried out in the investigation was based on the verified questionnaire data of the cooperating exporting producer. Such price comparison was made at ex-works level taking into account the differences between the product types and the level of trade. The average prices submitted by the applicant do not reflect the complexity of the price components and ranges existing in the SWR market and resulting from a significant number of different products and different level of trade. Therefore the argument has been rejected.

(42)

The same party argued that the level of export volume of the Union industry to the Russian Federation is irrelevant in this case and rather pointed to the increased imports from the People’s Republic of China to the Russian Federation and the need to take them into consideration in the analysis as they constitute a competitive threat to the presence of the Russian producers on the Russian and CIS markets. In this regard the fact that the Union producers remain the export leaders on the Russian market is relevant as it confirms, inter alia, the fact that the Russian producers are unable to produce all types of SWR for which demand exists on the Russian market. As regards the Chinese exports to the Russian Federation, it is noted that they grew in parallel to the rapid growth of the demand of the Russian market. No information was provided, e.g. regarding Chinese export price levels to the Russian Federation or CIS countries or the characteristics of the imported product under investigation to allow for a further analysis. Finally, it is noted that according to the Russian customs statistics the Russian producers of the product concerned remained the leader on their SWR domestic market in the RIP and the total imports to this market accounted for only about 15 % of the Russian SWR market. Therefore the argument has been rejected.

(43)

According to the request for review, the production capacity of all Russian exporting producers was 115 000 tonnes. During the investigation the applicant reassessed the Russian production capacity to be in a range between 220 000 and 250 000 tonnes, which was however not supported by any evidence. On the basis of the verified data of the cooperating exporter, the data submitted by a second known producer and the data contained in the request on the third producer, the production capacity of all Russian producers of the product concerned was established at the level of around 158 000 tonnes. In this context, it is noted that the production capacity of the cooperating exporting producer underwent structural adjustments in the period considered, as a result of which one production workshop was closed.

(44)

In reply to the final disclosure one party argued that some machinery from the closed production workshop was transferred to another production site of the cooperating producer. However, no evidence was provided to support this claim. In this respect it is confirmed that the evidence gathered during the investigation confirms that the cooperating producer underwent structural adjustments in the period considered, which included scrapping of some machinery in all three production sites and closure of one production workshop. At the same time it cannot be excluded that certain machinery from the closed production workshop was transferred to the remaining ones. In any event, this does not change the estimation of the production capacity of this producer and of Russia in total, which the party did not contest. Therefore the argument has been rejected.

(45)

Regarding the question of capacity utilisation and excess capacity, further to the data of two producers, in the absence of any precise information on the capacity utilisation of the third producer it was assumed that its capacity utilisation was in the range of the two other producers, i.e. 90 % in RIP. Considering the above, it was concluded that the total spare capacity in the Russian Federation is in the range of 17 000 tonnes. This corresponded to about 8 % of the Union consumption in RIP.

(46)

In view of the findings that exports from the Russian Federation are still being dumped during the RIP, there is a likelihood of continuation of dumping on the Union market in case the current anti-dumping measures are removed.

(47)

However, the following points should be highlighted. Firstly, there is a limited spare capacity available in the Russian Federation, which may be absorbed by the fast growing demand on the domestic market. Secondly, the Russian producers do not possess capacities to deliver all types of ropes and therefore their competitive pressure on the Union market is limited. Thirdly, two of three known exporting producers have their fully owned subsidiaries in the Union producing the like product. Based on the information received from the subsidiary of the cooperating exporting producer, it can be seen that the like product produced by the subsidiary is sold primarily on the Union market, while the exporting producer produces and sells the like product mostly for the Russian market. In addition, the Russian exporting producers have strong commercial links with the third country markets, in particular the CIS markets, which are more attractive for the Russian exporters because on average the prices charged in those markets are higher than prices charged in the Union. On this basis it was concluded that the imports of the product concerned from the Russian Federation are unlikely to grow substantially should the measures be allowed to lapse.

(48)

During the RIP, SWR are manufactured by over 30 Union producers. The output of those producers (established on the basis of the information collected from the cooperating producers and for the other Union producers on the data from the applicant) is therefore deemed to constitute the Union production within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

(49)

As explained in recital 12, due to the large number of Union producers, a sample was selected. For the purpose of the injury analysis, the injury indicators have been established at the following two levels:

(50)

Union consumption increased by 8 % from 195 426 tonnes to 211 380 tonnes between 2009 and the RIP.

(51)

According to Eurostat data, the volume of imports of the product concerned originating in the Russian Federation increased from 2 005 tonnes to 2 343 tonnes between 2009 and the RIP. Despite this increase, these volumes are lower than the imports from the Russian Federation during the last investigation, where the imports were 2 908 tonnes for 2005 and 3 323 tonnes for the period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 (last RIP). Moreover, since the end of the RIP, imports from Russia show a decreasing trend (down by 20 %).

(52)

The market share of the Russian imports was 1,03 % in 2009 and 1,11 % in the RIP.

(53)

As far as import prices are concerned, they have increased steadily by 12 % over the period considered.

(54)

Price undercutting was established using the export prices of the cooperating Russian producer, without anti-dumping duty, and was found to range from 54,7 % to 69,0 % depending on the product types with a weighted average undercutting margin of 63,4 %. However, in view of the low import volumes from the Russian Federation and the numerous different types of SWR that exists, the price undercutting could only be established on the basis of very few identical product types with low volumes (19,9 tonnes). Therefore, the undercutting margin may only be considered to be indicative.

(55)

Imports from countries other than the Russian Federation have increased by 10,6 % over the period considered, which is higher than the increase in consumption on the Union market (+ 8 %). Despite the gain of Union market share by countries other than the Russian Federation, the respective market shares can be considered as being stable.

(56)

The main exporting countries during the RIP were South Korea with 16 % market share followed by the PRC (1,78 %), Thailand with about 1,65 % market share, and the Russian Federation (see above, 1,11 % market share) while the Union industry market share was close to 60 %.

(57)

The overall average prices of imports of the like product from other countries remained stable and unchanged during the period considered and undercut Union industry prices on average by 57 %.

(58)

Pursuant to Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry.

(59)

In view of the fact that sampling was used with regard to the Union industry, the injury was assessed on the basis of information collected at the level of the entire Union industry (‘UI’) (macroeconomic elements as defined in recital 49) and on the basis of information collected at the level of the sampled Union producers (microeconomic elements as defined in recital 49).

(60)

The UI’s production increased by 6 % between 2009 and the RIP, i.e. from 214 475 tonnes to 228 368 tonnes. In a context of increased consumption (+ 8 %), as mentioned in recital 52, the Union Industry increased its production volume by 6 %.

(61)

The increase in Union consumption (+ 8 %) also triggered an increase in production by the Union Industry by 6 %.

(62)

The sales by the UI on the Union market increased by 7 % between 2009 and the RIP.

(63)

The UI managed to keep its market share relatively stable during the period considered, i.e. at 60 % in 2009 and at 59 % during the RIP.

(64)

Between 2009 and the RIP, when the Union consumption increased by 8 %, the sales volume of the UI increased as well by 7 %. The market share of the UI can therefore be considered as being stable, though it slightly lost market share, whereas the imports from the Russian Federation did slightly increase.

(65)

While the sampled Union producers showed an increase of 5 % during the period considered, the estimation by the applicant of the level of employment of the entire UI is different and shows a negative trend, being a decrease by 6 % between 2009 and the RIP.

(66)

As concerns the impact on the UI of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping found (4,7 %), given the low overall volume of the imports from the Russian Federation and the relatively low dumping margin, this impact cannot be considered to be significant.

(67)

The level of closing stocks of the UI decreased between 2009 and the RIP.

(68)

Unit sales prices of the UI increased by 8 % between 2009 and the RIP. This price development is linked to the fact that the UI was able to pass on the increase in the cost of production (by 8 %) onto users. It is also linked to the progressive migration of the UI towards larger diameter SWR and a higher focus on special purpose ropes.

(69)

Between 2009 and the RIP, the average wage per full time equivalent (FTE) increased by 20 % during the period considered. Following the restructuring of some sampled companies, the proportion of white collar versus blue collar employees increased during the period considered, which is reflected in the increased average salary cost per employee.

(70)

Productivity of the UI’s workforce, measured as output per FTE employed per year, was volatile over the period considered as it decreased in 2010 before going up again in 2011 and in the RIP.

(71)

Investments in SWR increased by 271 % over the period considered, were significant and amounted to almost EUR 16 million during the RIP. The sampled producers did not face difficulty to raise capital over the period considered. Moreover, a large proportion of the investments could be financed by own generated cash flows.

(72)

The sampled producers managed to achieve profits over the whole period considered. The profits achieved from 2009 to the RIP — despite the drop compared to 2009 — were well above the target profit of 5 % set in the original investigation.

(73)

The return on investments (ROI), expressed as the total profit generated by the SWR activity in per cent of the net book value of assets directly and indirectly related to the production of SWR, broadly followed the above profitability trends over the whole period considered. Despite the drop, this indicator remains quite high.

(74)

The cash-flow situation remains overall very positive, despite some deterioration between 2009 and the RIP: it follows to a certain extent the profitability trends over the whole period considered.

(75)

The majority of the indicators show that the UI adapted its production equipment to better face the new economic environment and be able to seize opportunities on Union and non-Union markets in segments where high margins can be achieved. The improvement in the economic and financial situation of the UI, further to the imposition of anti-dumping measures in 2001, evidence that the measures are effective and that the UI has recovered from the effects of past dumping practices.

(76)

During the period considered the UI managed more or less to maintain its market share, prices increased by 8 %, stocks remained at a reasonable level while production volume and consumption increased. The UI was profitable throughout the period considered, although profits were at a lower level in the RIP than in 2009. Considering the above, it can be concluded that the UI did not suffer material injury over the period considered.

(77)

It has also been examined whether the recurrence of material injury would be likely if the measures were allowed to lapse. It is assessed that this is not likely to happen for the reasons as explained below.

(78)

As highlighted in recital 54 prices of imports from the Russian Federation were found to undercut EU prices. However, given the low volumes of matching product types, the present undercutting margin may only be considered to be indicative.

(79)

As explained in recital 51, the volume of imports of the product concerned originating in the Russian Federation was 2 005 tonnes in 2009 and 2 343 tonnes during the RIP, representing a market share of respectively 1,03 % and 1,11 %.

(80)

As explained in recitals 43 and 45, the total Russian capacity is estimated to be about 158 000 tonnes, whereas during the last investigation this was estimated to be approximately at the level of the total EU consumption, namely 220 000 tonnes. Furthermore, the spare capacities appear currently to be limited.

(81)

During the last investigation, the Russian market was assessed as not able to absorb the level of supply. Currently, as explained in recital 36, the domestic consumption of SWR in Russia experienced a considerable growth by 38 % in the period considered. In addition, publicly available economic forecasts estimate a strong GDP growth in the Russian Federation in the coming years. The Russian spare capacity, as mentioned in recital 45, is therefore likely to be absorbed by the growing Russian market as Russian prices are around 11 % higher than export prices to the EU. In addition, Russian export prices to other markets, notably the CIS countries are on average 5,6 % higher than the export prices to the EU. It is therefore unlikely that substantial quantities of either the spare capacity or their current sales on the more beneficial domestic market and/or in CIS country markets will be redirected to the Union market.

(82)

In the light of the above, it is concluded that the repeal of the measures on imports originating in the Russian Federation would in all likelihood not result in the recurrence of material injury to the UI as whole.

(83)

In the light of the above, the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of SWR from the Russian Federation should be repealed and the present proceeding terminated in accordance with Articles 9(2) and 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

(84)

All parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it is intended to recommend that the existing measures be terminated with regard to imports originating in the Russian Federation. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. Comments were received by one interested party which also requested and was granted a hearing in the presence of the hearing officer,

(1)

Council Regulation (EC) No 1184/2007 (2) imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of persulphates originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the PRC’), Taiwan and the United States of America (‘the original investigation’ and ‘the original measures’). The measures with regard to the PRC took the form of an ad valorem duty of 71,8 % for all companies except two Chinese exporting producers to whom individual duties were granted.

(2)

On 10 October 2012, the Commission announced by a notice (‘Notice of initiation’) (3), published in the Official Journal of the European Union, the initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of persulphates originating in the PRC.

(3)

The review was initiated following a substantiated request lodged by two European producers, RheinPerChemie GmbH & Co. KG and United Initiators GmbH & Co. KG (‘the applicants’), representing 100 % of the total Union production of persulphates.

(4)

The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in a recurrence of dumping and injury to the Union industry.

(5)

The investigation of a continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 October 2011 to 30 September 2012 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2009 to the end of the RIP (‘the period considered’).

(6)

The Commission officially advised the applicants, exporting producers in the PRC, unrelated importers and users known to be concerned, producers in the potential analogue countries and the representatives of the PRC of the initiation of the expiry review. Interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known in writing and to request a hearing within the time limit set out in the Notice of initiation.

(7)

In view of the potentially large number of exporting producers in the PRC and unrelated importers in the Union involved in the investigation, sampling was envisaged in the Notice of Initiation, in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling would be necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the above parties were invited, under Article 17 of the basic Regulation, to make themselves known within 15 days of the publication of the notice of initiation and to provide the Commission with the information requested in the Notice of initiation.

(8)

None of the importers made itself known.

(9)

Only one exporting producer from the PRC replied to the questionnaire. Therefore, it was not necessary to select a sample of exporting producers.

(10)

The Commission sent questionnaires to all parties known to be concerned and to those who made themselves known within the deadlines set in the Notice of initiation. Replies were received from two Union producers, one exporting producer in the PRC and one producer in Turkey, considered as a potential analogue country.

(11)

The Commission sought and verified all the information it deemed necessary for the determination of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of dumping and resulting injury and of the Union interest. Verification visits were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

United Initiators (Shanghai) Co. Ltd, Shanghai (4)

(12)

The product concerned is the same as that covered by the original investigation, namely peroxosulphates (persulphates), including potassium peroxymonosulphate sulphate (‘product concerned’), currently falling within CN codes 2833 40 00 and ex 2842 90 80.

(13)

The product concerned is used as an initiator or as an oxidising agent in a number of applications. Some examples include its use as polymerisation initiator in the production of polymers, as an etching agent in the production of printed circuit boards, in hair cosmetics, in textile desizing, in paper manufacturing as a denture cleanser and as a disinfectant.

(14)

The investigation confirmed that, as in the original investigation, the product concerned and that manufactured and sold on the domestic market of the PRC, as well as that produced and sold by the Union industry on the Union market have the same basic physical and technical characteristics and the same basic uses and are therefore considered to be alike within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(15)

In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, it was examined whether dumping was currently taking place and whether dumping was likely to continue or recur upon a possible expiry of the measures in force on certain imports from the PRC.

(16)

As explained in recital 9, only one Chinese exporting producer cooperated in the investigation and it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the RIP. As mentioned below in recital 22 and as explained in detail in recitals 51 to 53, the investigation showed that basically all imports from the PRC during the RIP were made by one exporter which was found not to be dumping in the original investigation, and which is not subject to the current review. Hence, no dumping analysis could be done in this case.

(17)

In order to assess the likelihood of recurrence of dumping, the information provided by the cooperating Chinese exporting producer, the information collected in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation and facts available with regard to the non-cooperating exporting producers were taken into account. The facts available were found in the request for the expiry review, in the information published in the framework of an expiry review initiated in March 2013 by the United States of America (USA) (5), in the statistics available to the Commission, i.e. the monthly data transmitted by Member States under Article 14(6) of the basic Regulation (‘the 14.6 database’) and in the Eurostat import data.

(18)

The data available in the investigation showed that basically all imports from the PRC during the RIP were made by one Chinese exporter which was not found to be dumping in the original investigation (6). Those imports are thus not subject to anti-dumping measures. The prices of those imports remained below the Union industry prices during that period.

(19)

Despite the fact that Chinese import prices into the Union increased by 29 % in the period considered, they were still low and were undercutting the price of the Union industry during the RIP. The sales prices of the Union industry in the Union market also increased but at a less pronounced rate of 7 %.

(20)

The sole cooperating Chinese exporter which is subject to the current anti-dumping measures was not exporting the product concerned to the Union during the RIP. However, the investigation showed that it was exporting at dumped prices to third country markets and that its prices were even lower than those of the current imports from the PRC in the Union market. This is an indication that exporters in Chinaare continuing to practice dumping and that their prices are low.

(21)

The Union market roughly consists of imports from three countries: China, Turkey and the USA, each representing between 8 % and 10 % of market share and two Union producers with a market share of around 65 to 75 %. The investigation showed that the USAcontinued to be present on the Union market and represented around one third of total imports during the RIP. The USimport prices were on average 10 % above the import prices from the PRC. This finding, combined with the observed undercutting of the Union industry’s prices, indicates that the Chinese imports continued to exercise a downward pressure on the sales prices in the Union.

(22)

As mentioned above in recital 18, Chinese imports during the RIP were made by one exporter which was found not to be dumping in the original investigation. Between 2009 and the RIP, the volume of those imports increased by 24 % and the corresponding market share increased from 8 % to 9,6 % of total Union consumption in the same period.

(23)

It is noteworthy to recall that in the years 1995 to 2001 anti-dumping measures were imposed against persulphates from the PRC. As these measures were repealed, import volume from the PRC increased from less than 200 tonnes in 2001 to more than 4 000 tonnes in 2003 and more than doubled to almost 9 000 tonnes in 2006. In other words, Chinese imports took more than 20 % of the Union market in few years. Over the period 2003-2006, whilst consumption increased by 7 %, Chinese market share doubled. This shows that Chinese exporters are able to take considerable market share in the Union market in the absence of anti-dumping measures.

(24)

In view of the above facts and considerations, in particular the Chinese reaction to the repeal of the measures in the Union market in 2001, the level of Chinese prices during the RIP and the continued dumping practices in third country markets, it is considered that there is a likelihood that in the short term low-priced Chinese imports would resume in large quantities into the Union market should the current measures be repealed.

(25)

As mentioned in recital 16 above, the cooperating Chinese company did not export to the Union during the RIP, and it was not possible to compare its normal values on the domestic market with export prices to the Union. It was however assessed, as mentioned in recital 24 above, whether the company’s exports to third countries were made at dumped prices during the RIP. Since the company was granted MET in the original investigation, normal values were established based on its own data.

(26)

For the three types of the product concerned for which domestic sales were representative and made in the ordinary course of trade, average normal values were established on the basis of the prices paid by independent customers in the domestic market. For one type, normal value had to be constructed based on the cost of production, in accordance with Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation. The company’s cost of manufacturing, selling, general and administrative costs (SG&A) and profit achieved on the domestic sales made in the ordinary course of trade in accordance with Article 2(6) of the basic Regulation were used to establish the normal value of that type.

(27)

The comparison between the normal weighted average value and the weighted average export price, on an ex-works basis to third countries established on the basis of the reported and verified data, showed a weighted average dumping margin of 9,4 %.

(28)

With regard to pricing behaviour, the existence of the anti-dumping measures in India and in the USAis also a clear indication of dumping practices by Chinese exporting producers on other markets.

(29)

The investigation showed that the cooperating Chinese company exported to a wide variety of third countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates. The exports prices of the cooperating Chinese company to third markets were thus compared to the level of Union industry sales prices and the import price for the PRC during the RIP in the Union market. This comparison showed that the cooperating Chinese exporter was significantly undercutting, up to 40 %, the prices of the Union industry during the RIP.

(30)

This analysis shows on the one hand, that prices in the Union market are higher and thus very attractive, and, on the other, that prices offered by other Chinese exporter are lower than the current Chinese import price in the Union market.

(31)

It is also noteworthy that the normal values of the cooperating company during the RIP were generally lower than Union industry sales prices. This confirms the attractiveness of the Union market as it would clearly generate higher profits for Chinese producers. The low price level in Chinadoes not seem to be based on any other ground than the abundant capacity and offer of the product concerned.

(32)

As mentioned above in recital 28, certain third country markets, such as the USA and India, have become less attractive for Chinese exporters due to the existence of anti-dumping measures. Additionally, in relative terms, the other third country markets were found to operate at lower price levels than in the Union market. With regard to other third country markets, not under measures, they are already supplied by companies that are present in those markets, thus any spare capacity in the PRC would likely be used for exports to the Union market.

(33)

Based on the above, it is expected that Chinese imports would resume in larger volumes and exercise more price pressure on the Union market should the current measures be lifted.

(34)

In accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, in the absence of other information available, the analysis of the spare capacity in the PRC was based on the facts available, namely the limited information provided by the cooperating Chinese exporting producer on the market situation in the PRC, by the Union industry and from publicly available information at the level of five main producers identified in the PRC and data collected at initiation stage. The information delivered by these sources was found to be consistent.

(35)

Based on this information, it is assumed that more than 100 thousand tonnes of production capacity is available in the PRC, which represents around three times the volume of Union consumption during the RIP.

(36)

Based on the capacity utilisation rate of the cooperating producer, it was concluded that there are potentially significant capacities available in the PRC which could be used to increase production and re-directed it to the Union market in case the anti-dumping measures would be allowed to lapse.

(37)

In view of the above, it was considered that there is a likelihood that dumping would recur if the current measures were allowed to lapse. In particular the level of the normal values established in China, the dumping behaviour of the cooperating producer in third country markets, the existence of anti-dumping measures against Chinese exporters in India and the USA, the attractiveness of the Union market compared to other markets and the availability of significant production capacity in the PRC point to a likelihood of recurrence of dumping in case the current measures are repealed.

(38)

The current investigation confirmed that persulphates are manufactured only by two producers in the Union. They constitute 100 % of total Union production during the RIP. Both producers supported the review request and cooperated with the investigation.

(39)

Those two companies thus constitute the Union industry within the meaning of Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the basic Regulation, and will hereafter be referred to as the ‘Union industry’.

(40)

To protect confidentiality under Article 19 of the basic Regulation the data relating to the two Union producers is presented in indexed form or in ranges.

(41)

Information on imports have been analysed at CN code level for the three main types of the like product, ammonium persulphate, sodium persulphate, potassium persulphate, on TARIC code level for the fourth type, potassium peroxymonosulphate. The analysis of imports was supplemented by data collected under Article 14(6) of the basic Regulation.

(42)

Union consumption was established on the basis of the sales volume of the Union industry on the Union market, and import data from Eurostat, at CN code and TARIC code level.

(43)

Union consumption in the RIP was slightly higher than at the beginning of the period considered. There was an increase of 22 % noted between 2009 and 2010 but further on the consumption steadily decreased by around 18 %.

Table 1

Consumption

(44)

The volumes and market shares of imports from the PRC were analysed on the basis of Eurostat and the data collected in accordance with Article 14(6) of the basic Regulation.

(45)

Comparison of the above mentioned databases indicates that all imports from the PRC originate from the one company which was found not to be dumping in the original investigation. As a consequence the market share of the dumped imports from the PRC and its prices evolution cannot be analysed.

(46)

Furthermore, since the Chinese exporting producers under anti-dumping measures did not export the product concerned to the Union during the RIP, it was not possible to calculate price undercutting for the PRC.

(47)

The volume of imports and prices and market share from other countries during the period considered is shown in the table below. They were established on the basis of statistical information provided at CN code and TARIC code level. Due to confidentiality as explained in recital 40 above the market share figures are disclosed in an indexed form.

Table 2

Imports from other third countries

(48)

Import volumes from other third countries into the Union market decreased by around 12 % during the period considered, and the average price increased by 6 % over the same period. The market share lost by other third countries was taken over partly by the Chinese imports and the Union industry. During the same period the Union industry increased its prices on average by 7 % as stated in recital 64 below.

(49)

Pursuant to Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined all economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry.

(50)

The Union industry’s production increased significantly during the period considered. This increase was the most pronounced between 2009 and 2010 when production increased by 32 percentage points. It remained stable afterwards, decreasing slightly between 2011 and the RIP.

Table 3

Total Union production

(51)

Production capacity remained stable during the period considered. As production increased in the period 2009-2011, capacity utilisation showed an overall increase of 34 %. This trend changed in the RIP because the decrease in production also resulted in a decrease in capacity utilisation by six percentage points as shown below:

Table 4

Production capacity and capacity utilisation

(52)

Although the level of closing stocks of the Union industry increased substantially between 2009 and the RIP its level remains relatively low with regard to production level.

Table 5

Closing stock

(53)

The sales volume of the Union industry on the Union market to unrelated customers followed the trend of consumption with a peak in 2010 and then a decreasing trend in the following years, until the end of the RIP. Over the period considered it increased by 6 %.

Table 6

Sales to unrelated customers

(54)

As sales volumes to the Union followed the trend of consumption, the Union industry market share remained relatively stable in the period considered.

Table 7

Union market share

(55)

As explained above, the growth in consumption in the Union was limited to 3 percentage points during the period considered. The Union industry managed to slightly increase its sales volumes and market share during the same period.

(56)

The level of employment of the Union industry remained stable between 2009 and the RIP. However, the productivity per employee, measured as output in tonne per employee, increased visibly in this period in line with production trend. Detailed data is shown below:

Table 8

Total Union employment and productivity

(57)

Unit sales prices of the Union industry to unrelated customers in the Union increased by 7 % between 2009 and the RIP. This 7 % increase in the average sales price of the Union industry can be explained by the change in the product mix they were selling during the period considered. This price, even taking into account the potential difference in the product mix, was significantly higher than the price charged by the cooperating Chinese producer for export to third countries.

Table 9

Unit price of Union sales

(58)

In 2009, profitability of the Union industry was close to breakeven. Subsequently, in the period 2010 — RIP, profitability remained above 10 %. The sudden jump in the profitability index between 2009 and 2010 thus results from very low base level in 2009 which was a critical year for the Union industry. In 2011 the high profitability resulted from an extraordinary cost saving event, which will not repeat itself in the future. This is already reflected in the decreased profitability in the RIP, which continues to be the trend.

Table 10

Profitability

(59)

The investigation showed that the Union industry was able to keep high level of investments in all the period considered.

(60)

Return on investment followed closely the profitability trend in 2009 and 2011 being not representative as explained in recital 58 above.

Table 11

Investments and Return on Investment

(61)

The cash-flow, which affects the ability of the industry to self-finance its activities, expressed as a percentage of the turnover of the product concerned, followed a trend similar to that of profitability. It significantly improved up to 2011 and decreased during the RIP.

Table 12

Cash flow

(62)

Whilst the number of people employed by the Union industry remained stable, their wages increased by 12 % during the period considered.

(63)

As explained above there were no dumped imports from the PRC during the period considered, therefore the magnitude of dumping margin could not be assessed.

(64)

Taking into account the absence of low-priced dumped imports from the PRC, the relatively high capacity utilisation and the gain in market share achieved by the Union industry, its level of profitability and the positive development of certain financial indicators, it is concluded that the Union industry recovered from the effects of past dumping during the period considered. The recovery is however recent and a certain decline in various injury indicators such as profitability, cash flow, return on investment and investment was observed in the Union market during the RIP.

(65)

The investigation showed that the imports of low-prices dumped products from the PRC ceased on the Union market right after the imposition of the original measures in 2007 and they were not present during the period considered or the RIP. The imports from the PRC present on the Union market originate from the sole Chinese producer found not to be dumping in the original investigation. This allowed the Union industry to achieve high level of production, increase its sales volume, average sales price, market share and profitability and to improve its overall financial situation.

(66)

It is therefore concluded that the Union industry did not suffer material injury during the RIP. Given the decline in consumption and the deterioration in certain injury indicators as described above during the RIP, the situation of the Union industry is still vulnerable.

(67)

To assess the likelihood of recurrence of injury if the measures were allowed to lapse, the potential impact of the Chinese imports on the Union market and the Union industry was analysed in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

(68)

The analysis focused on the spare capacity in the PRC and the behaviour of the Chinese exporters in the third country markets and in the Union market.

(69)

According to the information collected and verified during the investigation, it is estimated that around 100 thousand tonnes of production capacity for the product concerned is available in China. Furthermore, there are several small producers dispersed in the country which make this figure even higher.

(70)

Due to the lack of cooperation from Chinese exporters there is no data available indicating the precise percentage of this capacity which is spare and which could be used for exporting the product concerned to the Union market. However, the investigation showed that the sole Chinese cooperating producer has a spare capacity of around 30 %. Extrapolating this information to all Chinese companies would mean that a spare capacity of more than 30 thousand tonnes currently exists in the PRC.

(71)

Based on the above, even if the Chinese companies would not work at their full capacity, 20-25 thousand tonnes of the product concerned would be available for export in the PRC. Given the findings made and the conclusions reached in recitals 22 to 44 above, it is clear that in case the measures would not be extended, the available spare capacity in China will be intended to be exported to the Union market. This potential additional export volume should be seen in the context of a Union consumption of around 25 000-35 000 tonnes in the RIP.

(72)

As mentioned in recital 20 above, the investigation showed that Chinese exports to third countries were made at dumped prices. Furthermore, the results of expiry reviews conducted by the relevant authorities in the USA and in Indialed to the recommendation that the anti-dumping measures in force on persulphates from the PRC should be extended. In this situation it is expected that free production capacity of the Chinese exporters will be mainly used to produce for export to the Union market if the measures are allowed to lapse. As explained in recital 32 above, given that the supply to other third country markets, not under measures, is already ensured by companies that are present in those markets, any spare capacity available in the PRC would likely be used to export the product concerned to the Union market.

(73)

Taking into account past dumping practice of Chinese exporters that led to the imposition of the measures in force and their current dumping behaviour in third countries, it can be concluded that these volumes of exports to the Union would be made at dumped prices.

(74)

Moreover, as mentioned in recital 23 above, it is recalled that in the years 1995 to 2001 anti-dumping measures were imposed against export of persulphates from the PRC. As these measures were not extended, imports from the PRC increased from less than 200 tonnes in 2001 to almost 10 thousand tonnes in 2006, and thus took more than 20 % of the Union market.

(75)

In view of the findings of the investigation, namely the spare capacity available in the PRC, the continuation of Chinese dumping to the third countries, the limited ability of the Chinese exporters to sell in other main third countries markets and their proven ability to redirect export volumes to the Union market, it is considered that the repeal of the measures would weaken the position of the Union industry in their core market and the injury suffered would recur due to likely Chinese imports at dumped prices. There are no reasons to believe that the improvement of the performance of the Union industry due to the measures in force would remain or strengthen if the measures were repealed. On the contrary, there are favourable conditions for a likely shift of the Chinese imports to the Union market at dumped prices and in considerable volumes and that would likely undermine the positive developments in the Union market reached over the period considered. The likely Chinese dumped imports would be able to exercise pressure on the Union industry’s sales prices and make it lose market share and as a consequence would negatively impact the Union industry’s financial performance which is still vulnerable as explained in recital 66 above.

(76)

In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, it was examined whether the maintenance of the existing measures would be against the Union interest as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of the various interests involved, i.e. those of the Union industry, of importers and of users. The interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.

(77)

As this investigation is a review of the existing measures, it allowed for assessment of any undue negative impact of the existing anti-dumping measures on the interested parties.

(78)

It was concluded in recital 70 above that the Union industry would be likely to experience a serious deterioration of its situation in case the anti-dumping measures were allowed to lapse. Therefore, the continuation of measures would benefit the Union industry because the Union producers should be able to maintain its sales volumes, market share, profitability and its overall positive economic situation. By contrast, the discontinuation of the measures would seriously threaten the viability of the Union industry because there are reasons to expect a shift of the Chinese imports to the Union market at dumped prices and in considerable volumes that would cause recurrence of injury.

(79)

None of the 44 contacted users replied to the questionnaire or cooperated. Users did not cooperate in the original investigation either. In absence of interest from users, it was concluded that measures would not be against the users’ interest to maintain them. In addition, the investigation revealed that the impact of the product concerned on the costs of downstream products is rather marginal and the maintenance of the measures would not adversely impact the user industry. The investigation also revealed that due to the nature of the product as well as the several sources of supplies available on the market users can easily switch suppliers.

(80)

None of the 14 contacted importers replied to the questionnaire or cooperated. Importers did not cooperate in the original investigation either. In absence of interest from importers, it was concluded that it would not be against their interest to maintain measures. The investigation revealed that importers can easily buy from different sources that are currently available on the market, in particular from the Union industry, US exporters and Chinese exporters selling at non-dumped prices.

(81)

In view of the above, it is concluded that there are no compelling reasons of Union interest against the maintenance of the current anti-dumping measures.

(82)

All parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They were also granted a period to submit comments subsequent to that disclosure. The submissions and comments were duly taken into consideration where warranted.

(83)

It follows from the above that, as provided for by Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain peroxosulphates (persulphates) originating in the PRC, imposed by Regulation (EC) No 1184/2007 should be maintained.

(84)

In order to minimise the risk of circumvention due to the high difference in the duty rates, it is considered that special measures are needed in this case to ensure the proper application of the anti-dumping duties. These special measures, which only apply to companies for which an individual duty rate is introduced, include the following: the presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice, which shall conform to the requirements set out in the Annex to this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by such an invoice shall be made subject to the residual anti-dumping duty applicable to all other producers,