25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/1

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1484/95 (3) lays down detailed rules for implementing the system of additional import duties and fixes representative prices in the poultrymeat and egg sectors and for egg albumin.

(2)

Regular monitoring of the data used to determine representative prices for poultrymeat and egg products and for egg albumin shows that the representative import prices for certain products should be amended to take account of variations in price according to origin.

(3)

Regulation (EC) No 1484/95 should be amended accordingly.

(4)

Given the need to ensure that this measure applies as soon as possible after the updated data have been made available, this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication,

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/4

(1)

Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 together with the Specific Regulations referred to in Article 2(a) of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014, constitute a framework for Union funding to support the development of the area of freedom, security and justice.

(2)

Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 requires Member States to submit an annual implementation report to the Commission for each national programme. Member States must also submit a final report on the implementation of their national programmes by the end of 2023. To ensure that the information provided to the Commission is consistent and comparable, it is necessary to establish a model for the annual and final implementation reports.

(3)

In order to allow for the prompt application of the measures provided for in this Regulation and not delay the approval of the national programmes, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(4)

The United Kingdom and Ireland are bound by Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 and are as a consequence bound by this Regulation.

(5)

Denmark is not bound by Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 nor by this Regulation.

(6)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the ‘Asylum, Migration and Integration and Internal Security Funds’ Committee.

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/10

(1)

Pursuant to Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014, Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 of the European Parliament of the Council (2) is applicable to the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa. Therefore any Commission delegated and implementing Regulations adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 is applicable to the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa.

(2)

Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) No 802/2014 (3) and (EU) No 799/2014 (4) in particular set out conditions and terms of the electronic data exchange system between the Commission and Member States, models for national programmes and models for annual and final implementation reports.

(3)

Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 allows Member States to allocate up to 40 % of the amount granted under the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa to finance operating support to the public authorities responsible for accomplishing the tasks and services which constitutes a public service for the Union. Before the approval of the national programme, the Member State that wishes to finance operating support under its national programme should be required to provide specific information notably in order to enable the Commission to assess the conditions laid down in Article 10(2) of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014. Likewise additional reporting requirements in respect of operating support should be laid down.

(4)

Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 allocates resources to Lithuania as additional specific operating support in the context of the Special Transit Scheme between Lithuania and the Commission. Lithuania should be required to provide specific information in that regard notably in order to enable the Commission to assess the eligibility of the costs referred to in Article 11(3) of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 that Lithuania plans to charge under the instrument. Likewise additional reporting requirements regarding operating support for the Special Transit Scheme should be laid down.

(5)

In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Regulation builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark shall, in accordance with Article 4 of that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Regulation whether it will implement this Regulation in its national law.

(6)

As regards Iceland and Norway, this Regulation constitutes a development of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters' association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis  (5)which falls within the areas referred to in Article 1, Points A and B of Council Decision 1999/437/EC (6).

(7)

As regards Switzerland, this Regulation constitutes a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis  (7) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, Points A and B of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC (8).

(8)

As regards Liechtenstein, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis  (9) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, Points A and B of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU (10).

(9)

In order to allow for the prompt application of the measures provided for in this Regulation and not delay the approval of the national programmes, the Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(10)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the ‘Asylum, Migration and Integration and Internal Security Funds’ Committee.

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/19

(1)

In addition to the amounts allocated pursuant to Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 516/2014, Member States receive an additional amount, every two years, for each resettled person.

(2)

The periods to be taken into account for the calculation of the additional amount should be specified. It is appropriate to establish three resettlement periods, in respect of each of which an additional amount may be allocated to a Member State.

(3)

If, in 2017, it appears necessary to provide for a revision in 2019 of the common Union resettlement priorities referred to in Article 17(2) of Regulation (EU) No 516/2014, the third resettlement period, covering the years 2018 to 2020, may be limited to the years 2018 and 2019. If so, this Regulation will be amended to provide for an additional resettlement period for the year 2020.

(4)

In order for the Commission to establish the additional amount to be allocated in respect of resettlement in any given resettlement period, each Member State should submit to the Commission an estimate of the number of persons it plans to resettle during that period. The estimate should be submitted via the electronic data exchange system established by Article 2 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 802/2014 (3).

(5)

Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 provides that the additional amounts for resettlement are to be allocated to the Member States for the first time in the individual financing decisions approving the national programmes referred to in Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014. For the resettlement period covering the years 2014 and 2015, the national programmes to be submitted to the Commission should therefore contain an estimate of the number of persons the Member State plans to resettle during that period. For the other resettlement periods, each Member State should submit an estimate by 15 September of the year preceding the resettlement period concerned.

(6)

The additional amount for resettlement allocated to each Member State is based on an estimate of the number of persons it plans to resettle. To qualify for payment of the additional amount, the persons concerned should have been effectively resettled from the beginning of the period concerned and up to six months following the end of that period.

(7)

In order to be paid the additional amount, which is based on a lump sum for each resettled person, Member States should report to the Commission the number of persons qualifying for payment. They should keep the evidence of these persons qualifying for payment.

(8)

The United Kingdom and Ireland are bound by Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 and are as a consequence bound by this Regulation.

(9)

Denmark is not bound by Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 nor by this Regulation.

(10)

In order to allow for the prompt application of the measures provided for in this Regulation and not delay the approval of the national programmes, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

(a)

the years 2014 and 2015;

(b)

the years 2016 and 2017;

(c)

the years 2018, 2019 and 2020.

(a)

the estimate for the years 2014 and 2015 shall be included in the Member State's national programme submitted in accordance with Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014;

(b)

the estimate for the years 2016 and 2017 shall be submitted by 15 September 2015;

(c)

the estimate for the years 2018 to 2020 shall be submitted by 15 September 2017.

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/22

(1)

Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 together with the Specific Regulations referred to in Article 2(a) of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014, constitute a framework for Union funding to support the development of the area of freedom, security and justice.

(2)

Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 requires each Member State to propose a multiannual national programme. To ensure that the information provided to the Commission is consistent and comparable, it is necessary to establish a model which the national programme should follow.

(3)

Pursuant to Article 24(5) of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 all official exchanges of information between Member States and the Commission are to be carried out using an electronic data exchange system. It is therefore necessary to establish the terms and conditions with which that electronic data exchange system should comply. In order to be cost-effective and ensure overall coherence with all Union shared management Funds, the terms and conditions of the electronic data exchange system are the same, to the extent possible, as those provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 184/2014 (2).

(4)

In order to improve the quality of information exchanged, and to render the information exchange system simpler and more useful, it is necessary to lay down basic requirements regarding the form and scope of the information to be exchanged.

(5)

Principles and rules should be laid down regarding the identification of the party responsible for uploading documents into the electronic data exchange system and updating those documents

(6)

Technical characteristics for an efficient electronic exchange system should be established in order to reduce the administrative burden for Member States and the Commission.

(7)

To ensure that both Member States and the Commission can continue to exchange information in cases of force majeure that hinder the use of electronic data exchange system, alternative means to encode and transfer data need to be specified.

(8)

Member States and the Commission should ensure that transfer of data through the electronic data exchange system is performed in a secured manner allowing for availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and non-repudiation of information. Therefore rules on security should be set out.

(9)

This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and notably the right to protection of personal data. This Regulation should therefore be applied in accordance with these rights and principles. Concerning personal data processed by Member States, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) applies. Concerning the processing of personal data by the Union institutions and bodies and the free movement of such data, Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) applies.

(10)

In order to allow for the prompt application of the measures provided for in this Regulation and not delay the approval of the national programmes, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(11)

The United Kingdom and Ireland are bound by Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 and are as a consequence bound by this Regulation.

(12)

Denmark is not bound by Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 nor by this Regulation.

(13)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the ‘Asylum, Migration and Integration and Internal Security Funds’ Committee.

(a)

identifying users requesting access, making sure those users are employed by the organisation;

(b)

informing users about their obligations to preserve the security of the system;

(c)

verifying the entitlement of users to the required privilege level in relation to their tasks and their hierarchical position;

(d)

requesting the termination of access rights when those access rights are no longer needed or justified;

(e)

promptly reporting suspicious events that may undermine the security of the system;

(f)

ensuring the continued accuracy of user identification data by reporting any changes;

(g)

taking the necessary data protection and commercial confidentiality precautions in accordance with applicable Union and national rules; and

(h)

informing the Commission of any changes affecting the capacity of the Member State authorities or users of SFC2014 to carry out the responsibilities referred to in paragraph 1 or their personal capacity to carry out the responsibilities referred to in points (a) to (g).

(a)

interactive forms or forms pre-filled by the system on the basis of data already previously recorded in the system;

(b)

automatic calculations, where they reduce the encoding effort of users;

(c)

automatic embedded controls to verify internal consistency of transmitted data and consistency of this data with applicable rules;

(d)

system-generated alerts warning SFC2014 users that certain actions can or cannot be performed;

(e)

online status tracking of the treatment of information entered into the system; and

(f)

availability of historical data in respect of all information entered for a national programme.

(a)

the IT security aspects of the work performed by the person or persons responsible for managing the access rights referred to in Article 4(3) of this Regulation when working directly in SFC2014; and

(b)

the IT security measures for those national, regional or local computer systems connected to SFC2014 through a technical interface referred to in Article 6(1) of this Regulation.

For the purposes of point (b) of the first subparagraph, the following aspects of IT security shall be covered, as appropriate:

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/33

(1)

On 13 May 2013 the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Union of ceramic tableware and kitchenware (‘tableware’) originating in the People's Republic of China (‘the PRC’) with Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013.

(2)

In the original investigation a large number of exporting producers from the PRC made themselves known. As a result the Commission selected a sample of Chinese exporting producers to be investigated.

(3)

The Council imposed individual duty rates on imports of tableware ranging from 13,1 % to 23,4 % on the sampled companies, and 17,9 % on other cooperating companies not included in the sample.

(4)

The Council also imposed a duty rate of 36,1 % on imports of tableware from Chinese companies which either did not make themselves known or did not cooperate with the investigation.

(5)

Article 3 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013 states that where any new exporting producer of tableware in the PRC provides sufficient evidence to the Commission that:

then Article 1(2) of that Regulation can be amended by granting the new exporting producer the duty rate applicable to the cooperating companies not included in the sample, namely the weighted average duty rate of 17,9 %.

(6)

Four companies came forward after the publication of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013 claiming that they met all three criteria set out above in recital (5) and providing evidence.

(7)

All four companies are manufacturers and exporters of the product concerned.

(8)

Three of them were in existence during the original investigation but they did not export to the Union during the original investigation period.

(9)

The fourth company did not exist during the original investigation and therefore could not have exported during the investigation period.

(10)

The Commission analysed the evidence submitted by all four companies and it found that each of the four companies meet the three criteria to be considered as New Exporting Producers. Consequently, their names can be added to the cooperating companies not included in the sample as listed in Annex I of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013.

(11)

The four companies and the Union industry were informed of the findings of this investigation and were given an opportunity to comment. No comments were received.

(12)

This Regulation is in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation,

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/35

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 (2) provides, in its Article 23(1) and Article 24, for reductions to be applied in the case of late submission of a single application as well as of documents, contracts and declarations which are constitutive for the eligibility of the aid, and of an application for allocation of payment entitlements.

(2)

In accordance with Article 11(2) and Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009, Italy has fixed 15 May 2014 as the latest day until which single applications and applications for allocation of payment entitlements for 2014 can be submitted.

(3)

On 3 May 2014 certain parts of the Italian region of Marche were subject to exceptional rainfall leading to flooding, damages to infrastructure, landslides, evacuation of citizens, as well as damages to agricultural holdings and crops.

(4)

This situation has affected the ability of applicants to submit single applications and applications for allocation of payment entitlements relating to agricultural parcels in the affected municipalities within the time limits provided for in Article 11(2) and Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009.

(5)

By way of derogation from Article 23(1) and Article 24 of Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 it is therefore appropriate not to apply reductions on grounds of late submission of single applications and applications for allocation of payment entitlements in respect of those farmers who submitted their applications relating to at least one agricultural parcel within the municipalities defined by Italy as having been subject to severe flooding in the region of Marche by 9 June 2014 at the latest.

(6)

Since the derogations should cover the single applications and applications for allocation of payment entitlements for aid year 2014, it is appropriate that this Regulation applies retroactively.

(7)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Direct Payments,

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/37

(1)

Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto.

(2)

The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/40

(1)

Council Directive 2011/96/EU (3) exempts dividends and other profit distributions paid by subsidiary companies to their parent companies from withholding taxes and eliminates double taxation of such income at the level of the parent company.

(2)

The benefits of Directive 2011/96/EU should not lead to situations of double non-taxation and, therefore, generate unintended tax benefits for groups of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States when compared to groups of companies of the same Member State.

(3)

For the purpose of avoiding situations of double non-taxation deriving from mismatches in the tax treatment of profit distributions between Member States, the Member State of the parent company and the Member State of its permanent establishment should not allow those companies to benefit from the tax exemption applied to received distributed profits, to the extent that such profits are deductible by the subsidiary of the parent company.

(4)

It is appropriate to update Part A of Annex I to Directive 2011/96/EU to include other forms of companies made subject to corporation tax in Poland and other forms of companies which have been introduced in the company law of Romania.

(5)

Directive 2011/96/EU should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

in Article 4(1), point (a) is replaced by the following:

(2)

in Annex I, part A, point (u) is replaced by the following:

(3)

in Annex I, part A, point (w) is replaced by the following:

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/42

(1)

Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom (3) establishes uniform basic safety standards for the protection of the health of individuals subject to occupational, medical and public exposures against the dangers arising from ionising radiation.

(2)

Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom (4) imposes obligations on the Member States to establish and maintain a national framework for nuclear safety. That Directive reflects the provisions of the main international instruments in the field of nuclear safety, namely the Convention on Nuclear Safety (5), as well as the Safety Fundamentals (6) established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (‘IAEA’).

(3)

Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom (7) imposes obligations on the Member States to establish and maintain a national framework for spent fuel and radioactive waste management.

(4)

Council Conclusions of 8 May 2007 on nuclear safety and safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste highlighted that ‘nuclear safety is a national responsibility exercised where appropriate in an EU-framework. Decisions concerning safety actions and the supervision of nuclear installations remain solely with the operators and national authorities’.

(5)

The Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in 2011 renewed attention worldwide on the measures needed to minimise risk and ensure the most robust levels of nuclear safety. Based on the European Council conclusions of 24-25 March 2011, the national competent regulatory authorities, together with the Commission in the framework of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), established by Commission Decision 2007/530/Euratom (8), carried out Community-wide comprehensive risk and safety assessments of nuclear power plants (‘stress tests’). The results identified a number of improvements which could be implemented in nuclear safety approaches and industry practices in the participating countries.

Moreover, the European Council also called on the Commission to review, as appropriate, the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations and propose any improvements that may be necessary. The European Council also stressed that the highest standards for nuclear safety should be implemented and continuously improved in the Union.

(6)

A strong competent regulatory authority with effective independence in regulatory decision-making is a fundamental requirement of the Community nuclear safety regulatory framework. It is of utmost importance that the competent regulatory authority has the ability to exercise its powers impartially, transparently and free from undue influence in its regulatory decision-making to ensure a high level of nuclear safety. Regulatory decisions and enforcement actions in the field of nuclear safety should be based on objective safety-related technical considerations and should be established without any undue external influence that might compromise safety, such as undue influence associated with changing political, economic or societal conditions.

The provisions of Directive 2009/71/Euratom on functional separation of competent regulatory authorities should be strengthened to ensure the regulatory authorities' effective independence from undue influence in their regulatory decision-making and to guarantee that they are provided with the appropriate means and competencies to properly carry out the responsibilities assigned to them. In particular, the regulatory authority should have sufficient legal powers, sufficient staffing and sufficient financial resources for the proper discharge of its assigned responsibilities.

The strengthened requirements should be however without prejudice to close cooperation, as appropriate, with other relevant national authorities or to general policy guidelines issued by Member States.

(7)

The regulatory decision-making process should take into account competences and expertise, which may be provided by technical support organisations. This expertise should be based on state-of-the-art scientific and technical knowledge, including from operational experience and safety-related research, knowledge management, and adequate technical resources.

(8)

In accordance with Part 1 of the IAEA General Safety Requirements, the role of the Member States in establishing the framework for nuclear safety, and the role of the regulator in implementing that framework, should both be respected.

(9)

Given the specialised nature of the nuclear industry and the limited availability of staff with the required expertise and competence, resulting in the possible rotation of staff with executive responsibility between the nuclear industry and the regulators, special attention should be given to avoiding conflicts of interest. Moreover, arrangements should be made to ensure that there is no conflict of interest for those organisations that provide the competent regulatory authority with advice or services.

(10)

The consequences of a nuclear accident can go beyond national borders, therefore close cooperation, coordination and information exchange between competent regulatory authorities of Member States in the vicinity of a nuclear installation, irrespective of whether those Member States operate nuclear installations or not, should be encouraged. In this respect, Member States should ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place to facilitate such cooperation on nuclear safety matters with cross-border impacts.

(11)

In order to ensure that the proper skills are acquired and that adequate levels of competence are achieved and maintained, all parties should ensure that all staff having responsibilities relating to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and to on-site emergency preparedness and response arrangements, undergo a continuous learning process. That can be achieved through the establishment of training programmes and training plans, procedures for periodic review and updating of the training programmes as well as appropriate budgetary provisions for training.

(12)

Another key lesson learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident is the importance of enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters. Transparency is also an important means of promoting independence in regulatory decision-making. Therefore, the current provisions of Directive 2009/71/Euratom on the information to be provided to the general public should be made more specific as to the type of information be provided. In addition, the general public should be given opportunities to participate in the relevant phases of the decision-making process related to nuclear installations in accordance with the national framework for nuclear safety, taking into account the different national systems. Decisions on licensing remain the responsibility of national competent authorities.

(13)

The requirements of this Directive on transparency are complementary to those of the existing Euratom legislation. Council Decision 87/600/Euratom (9) imposes obligations on Member States to notify and provide information to the Commission and to other Member States in case of a radiological emergency on their territory, whilst Directive 2013/59/Euratom includes requirements on Member States to inform the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, and to provide at regular intervals updated information to the population likely to be affected in the event of such an emergency.

(14)

During their 6th Review Meeting, the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety reiterated their commitment to the findings of the 2nd Extraordinary Meeting which took place after the Fukushima accident. In particular, they stressed that ‘nuclear power plants should be designed, constructed and operated with the objectives of preventing accidents and, should an accident occur, mitigating its effects and avoiding off-site contamination’, and that ‘regulatory authorities should ensure that these objectives are applied in order to identify and implement appropriate safety improvements at existing plants’.

(15)

In view of the technical progress achieved through the provisions of the IAEA and by the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (‘WENRA’) and responding to the lessons learnt from the stress tests and the Fukushima nuclear accident investigations, Directive 2009/71/Euratom should be amended to include a high level Community nuclear safety objective covering all stages of the lifecycle of nuclear installations (siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning). In particular, this objective calls for significant safety enhancements in the design of new reactors for which the state of the art knowledge and technology should be used, taking into account the latest international safety requirements.

(16)

That objective should notably be reached through nuclear safety assessments, which fall under the scope of this Directive. They should be carried out by the licence holders under the control of the national competent regulatory authority and may be used for the assessment of the risk of a major accident, as covered by Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (10), provided that the requirements of this Directive are met.

(17)

The concept of defence-in-depth is fundamental to the safety of nuclear installations and is the basis for implementing high level nuclear safety objectives. Application of the defence-in-depth principles, as recognised in international standards and guidance and by WENRA, ensures that safety activities are subject to, as far as reasonably practicable, independent layers of provisions, so that in the event that a failure were to occur, it would be detected, compensated or corrected by appropriate measures. The effectiveness of each of the different layers is an essential element of defence-in-depth to prevent accidents and mitigate the consequences should they occur. Defence-in-depth is generally structured in five levels. Should one level fail, the subsequent level comes into play. The objective of the first level of protection is the prevention of abnormal operation and system failures. If the first level fails, abnormal operation is controlled or failures are detected by the second level of protection. Should the second level fail, the third level ensures that safety functions are further performed by activating specific safety systems and other safety features. Should the third level fail, the fourth level limits accident progression through accident management, so as to prevent or mitigate severe accident conditions with external releases of radioactive materials. The last objective (the fifth level of protection) is the mitigation of the radiological consequences of significant external releases through the off-site emergency response.

(18)

Together with defence-in-depth, an effective nuclear safety culture is regarded as a fundamental factor in achieving a high level of nuclear safety and its continuous improvement. Indicators for an effective nuclear safety culture include, in particular: the commitment at all levels of staff and management within an organisation to nuclear safety and its continuous improvement; the promotion of the ability of staff at all levels to question the delivery of relevant safety principles and practices to continuously improve nuclear safety; the ability of staff to report safety issues in a timely manner; the identification of the lessons learnt from operational experience; and the systematic reporting of any deviation from normal operating conditions or arrangements relevant to accident management that have the potential to have an impact on nuclear safety. Important elements which help to achieve a strong nuclear safety culture include, in particular, effective management systems, appropriate education and training and arrangements by the licence holder to register, evaluate and document internal and external safety significant operating experience and effective resolution of issues that have been raised.

(19)

Where ‘reasonably practicable’ is used in this Directive it should be applied in accordance with established definitions, in particular the WENRA and IAEA definitions.

(20)

Following the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the Fukushima nuclear accident highlighted once again the critical importance of the containment function, which is the last barrier to protect people and the environment against radioactive releases resulting from an accident. Therefore the applicant for a licence for the construction of a new power or research reactor should demonstrate that the design limits the effects of a reactor core damage to within the containment, i.e. the applicant should prove that a large or unauthorised radioactive release outside the containment is extremely unlikely, and that applicant should be able to demonstrate with a high degree of confidence that such a release will not occur.

(21)

More specific arrangements for accident management and on-site emergency response should be required to address the prevention and mitigation of accidents. Those should be in accordance and without prejudice to the relevant provisions of the Directive 2013/59/Euratom. The licence holder should provide for procedures, guidelines and arrangements that address accidents including severe accidents, that could occur in all operational modes, including full power, shutdown and transitional states, ensuring consistency and continuity between all such procedures and arrangements, and ensuring that they are exercised, reviewed and updated. Those arrangements should also provide for sufficient staff, equipment and other necessary resources. An organisational structure with clear allocation of responsibilities, and coordination amongst response bodies should be provided.

(22)

The stress tests demonstrated the key role of enhanced cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties that have responsibilities for nuclear safety. The peer-reviews have proved to be a good means of building confidence, with the aim of developing and exchanging experience and ensuring the common application of high nuclear safety standards.

(23)

Cooperation on nuclear safety between Members States is well established and can give added value in terms of nuclear safety, transparency and openness towards stakeholders at the European and international level.

Member States, through their competent regulatory authorities making relevant use of ENSREG, and building on the expertise of the WENRA, should every six years define a methodology, Terms of Reference and a time frame for Peer Reviews on a common specific technical topic related to the nuclear safety of their nuclear installations. The common specific technical topic to be considered should be identified among the WENRA safety reference levels or on the basis of operating experience feed-back, incidents and accidents and technological and scientific developments. Member States should perform a national self-assessment and make arrangements for common peer reviews by other Member States' competent regulatory authorities of their national self-assessment.

Reports on the findings of those peer reviews should be produced. Member States should establish national action plans for addressing any relevant findings and their own national assessment, taking into account the results of those peer review reports. The peer review reports should also form the basis of any summary report of the outcome of the Union-wide topical peer review exercise prepared collectively by the competent regulatory authorities of the Member States. The summary report should not aim to rank the safety of nuclear installations but rather focus on the process and technical findings of the topical peer review so that the knowledge gained from the exercise can be shared.

Reciprocal trust should prevail in peer reviews, and it would therefore be appropriate for the Commission, whenever practicable, to inform Member States when it intends to use the results of peer review reports in its policy documents.

(24)

The obligations of the Member States to report on the implementation of this Directive and the obligation of the Commission to draw up a report on the basis of the national reports should provide an opportunity to take stock of, and evaluate, the various aspects of the implementation of this Directive as well as its effectiveness. A number of relevant reporting obligations, such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety reports, exist at international level, the results of which might be used for the evaluation of the implementation of this Directive. Moreover, additional reporting requirements should be established under this Directive in relation to the findings of the topical peer reviews of nuclear installations. Consequently, with a view to simplifying the legislation and reducing the administrative burden, the reporting obligation for the Member States should be made less onerous both as regards the frequency of reporting and the content of the reports.

(25)

In line with a graded approach, the implementation of the provisions of this Directive depends on the types of nuclear installations on the territory of a Member State. Therefore, when implementing these provisions in national law, Member States should take into account the potential magnitude and nature of risks posed by the nuclear installations that they plan or operate. In particular, the graded approach should concern those Member States that keep only a small inventory of nuclear and radioactive materials, e.g. those linked to the operation of smaller research reactor facilities, which in case of a severe accident would not engender consequences comparable to those generated by nuclear power plants.

(26)

The provisions of this Directive which are intrinsically linked to the existence of nuclear installations, namely those concerning the licence holder's obligations, the new specific requirements for nuclear installations and the provisions concerning on-site emergency preparedness and response should not be applicable to Member States without nuclear installations. The provisions of this Directive should be transposed and implemented in a proportionate manner in accordance with national circumstances and taking into account the fact that those Member States do not have nuclear installations, whilst ensuring that nuclear safety receives appropriate attention by the government or by the competent authorities.

(27)

According to Directive 2009/71/Euratom, the Member States have to establish and maintain a national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. The decision as to how the provisions of the national framework are adopted and through which instrument they are applied rests with the competence of the Member States.

(28)

In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents, Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the provisions of a directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments. With regard to this Directive the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified.

(29)

Directive 2009/71/Euratom should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

the heading of Chapter 1 is replaced by the following:

‘OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS’.

(2)

Article 2 is amended as follows:

(3)

Article 3 is amended as follows:

(4)

In Chapter 2, the following title is inserted after the heading ‘OBLIGATIONS’:

‘SECTION 1

General obligations’.

(5)

Article 4(1) is replaced by the following:

‘1.   Member States shall establish and maintain a national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework (“national framework”) for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. The national framework shall provide in particular for:

The determination on how national nuclear safety requirements referred to in point (b) are adopted and through which instrument they are applied remains within the competences of the Member States;’.

(6)

In Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3 are replaced by the following:

‘2.   Member States shall ensure the effective independence from undue influence of the competent regulatory authority in its regulatory decision-making. For this purpose, Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the competent regulatory authority:

3.   Member States shall ensure that the competent regulatory authority is given the legal powers necessary to fulfil its obligations in connection with the national framework described in Article 4(1). For this purpose, Member States shall ensure that the national framework entrusts the competent regulatory authorities with the following main regulatory tasks, to:

(7)

Articles 6, 7 and 8 are replaced by the following:

‘Article 6

Licence holders

Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that:

Article 7

Expertise and skills in nuclear safety

Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires all parties to make arrangements for the education and training for their staff having responsibilities related to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations so as to obtain, maintain and to further develop expertise and skills in nuclear safety and on-site emergency preparedness.

Article 8

Transparency

1.   Member States shall ensure that necessary information in relation to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and its regulation is made available to workers and the general public, with specific consideration to local authorities, population and stakeholders in the vicinity of a nuclear installation. That obligation includes ensuring that the competent regulatory authority and the licence holders, within their fields of responsibility, provide in the framework of their communication policy:

2.   Information shall be made available to the public in accordance with relevant legislation and international instruments, provided that this does not jeopardise other overriding interests, such as security, which are recognised in relevant legislation or international instruments.

3.   Member States shall, without prejudice to Article 5(2), ensure that the competent regulatory authority engages, as appropriate, in cooperation activities on the nuclear safety of nuclear installations with competent regulatory authorities of other Member States in the vicinity of a nuclear installation, inter alia, via the exchange and/or sharing of information.

4.   Member States shall ensure that the general public is given the appropriate opportunities to participate effectively in the decision-making process relating to the licensing of nuclear installations, in accordance with relevant legislation and international instruments.’.

(8)

The following Section is inserted after Article 8:

‘SECTION 2

Specific obligations

Article 8a

Nuclear safety objective for nuclear installations

1.   Member States shall ensure that the national nuclear safety framework requires that nuclear installations are designed, sited, constructed, commissioned, operated and decommissioned with the objective of preventing accidents and, should an accident occur, mitigating its consequences and avoiding:

2.   Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the objective set out in paragraph 1:

Article 8b

Implementation of the nuclear safety objective for nuclear installations

1.   In order to achieve the nuclear safety objective set out in Article 8a, Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that where defence-in-depth applies, it shall be applied to ensure that:

2.   In order to achieve the nuclear safety objective set out in Article 8a, Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the competent regulatory authority and the licence holder take measures to promote and enhance an effective nuclear safety culture. Those measures include in particular:

Article 8c

Initial assessment and periodic safety reviews

Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that:

Article 8d

On-site emergency preparedness and response

1.   Without prejudice to the provisions of the Directive 2013/59/Euratom, Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that an organisational structure for on-site emergency preparedness and response is established with a clear allocation of responsibilities and coordination between the licence holder, and competent authorities and organisations, taking into account all phases of an emergency.

2.   Member States shall ensure that there is consistency and continuity between the on-site emergency preparedness and response arrangements required by the national framework and other emergency preparedness and response arrangements required under Directive 2013/59/Euratom.’.

(9)

The following Chapter is inserted after Article 8d:

‘CHAPTER 2a

PEER REVIEWS AND REPORTING

Article 8e

Peer reviews

1.   Member States shall, at least once every 10 years, arrange for periodic self-assessments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities and invite an international peer review of relevant segments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety. Outcomes of such peer reviews shall be reported to the Member States and the Commission, when available.

2.   Member States shall ensure that, on a coordinated basis:

3.   Member States shall ensure that arrangements are in place to allow for the first topical peer review to start in 2017, and for subsequent topical peer reviews to take place at least every six years thereafter.

4.   In case of an accident leading to situations that would require off-site emergency measures or protective measures for the general public, the Member State concerned shall ensure that an international peer review is invited without undue delay.’.

(10)

Article 9 is amended as follows:

(11)

In Article 10, the following paragraph is inserted after paragraph 1:

‘1a.   The obligations of transposition and implementation of Articles 6, 8a, 8b, 8c and 8d shall not apply to Member States without nuclear installations, unless they decide to develop any activity related to nuclear installations subject to a licence under their jurisdiction.’.

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/53

(1)

In view, in particular, of its strategic dimension, regional and global coverage and multiple usage, the European Global Navigation Satellite System (‘GNSS’) constitutes sensitive infrastructure the deployment and usage of which are susceptible to affect the security of the European Union and its Member States.

(2)

Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union and where the operation of the GNSS could affect the security of the European Union or its Member States, or in the event of a threat to the operation of the system, the Council should decide on the necessary measures to be taken.

(3)

For this reason, the Council adopted on 12 July 2004 Joint Action 2004/552/CFSP (1).

(4)

Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the tasks and responsibilities formerly exercised by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative should now be exercised by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the HR’).

(5)

The progress of the development, the commencement of the deployment and the forthcoming start of the usage of the system established under the Galileo programme require that the procedure as foreseen in Joint Action 2004/552/CFSP be adapted.

(6)

The information and the expertise concerning whether an event related to the system constitutes a threat to the Union, to the Member States or to the GNSS as such should be provided to the Council and the HR by the European Global Navigation Satellite System Agency (‘the GSA’), the Member States, and the Commission. In addition, third States may also provide such information.

(7)

The respective roles of the Council, the HR, the GSA as operator of the Galileo Security Monitoring Centre (‘GSMC’) and the Member States should be clarified within the chain of operational responsibilities to be set up in order to react to a threat to the Union, to the Member States or to the GNSS.

(8)

In this regard, the basic references to threats are contained in the System-Specific Security Requirement Statement which contains the main generic threats to be handled by the GNSS as a whole, and the System Security Plan which includes the security risk register set up in the security accreditation process. These will serve as references to identify the threats specifically to be dealt with by this Decision and to complete the operational procedures for the implementation of this Decision.

(9)

Decisions in cases of urgency may have to be taken within very few hours of the arrival of the information concerning the threat.

(10)

In the event that the circumstances do not allow for the Council to take a decision to avert a threat or to mitigate serious harm to the essential interests of the Union or of one or more of its Member States, the HR should be empowered to take the necessary provisional measures.

(11)

Regulation (EU) No 683/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council (2) and Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) modified the governance of the European GNSS. In particular, Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 provides that the GSA is to ensure the operation of the GSMC.

(12)

Regulation (EU) No 512/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) assigns to the GSA Executive Director the responsibility to ensure that the GSA, as the operator of the GSMC is able to respond to instructions provided under Joint Action 2004/552/CFSP, as replaced by this Decision. In addition, Decision No 1104/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) lays down the rules under which the Member States, the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service, Union agencies, third States and international organisations may access the public regulated service (‘PRS’) provided by the global navigation satellite system established under the Galileo programme. In particular, Article 6 of Decision 1104/2011/EU defines the GSMC as the operational interface between the competent PRS authorities, the Council and the HR and the control centres,

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/56

(1)

The Commission adopted Implementing Decision 2014/87/EU (2) as regards measures to prevent the spread within the Union of Xylella fastidiosa (Well and Raju) (hereinafter ‘the specified organism’).

(2)

Since the adoption of that Decision, the Italian authorities have carried out investigations in the infected areas and the areas surrounding them concerning the presence and nature of the specified organism. Those investigations have produced preliminary results which are sufficient to allow the adoption of more precise measures.

(3)

The investigations of the Italian authorities, as well as the available scientific and technical evidence, have confirmed that plants of Catharanthus G. Don, Nerium L., Olea L., Prunus L., and Vinca L. are host plants of the specified organism. Taking into account the evidence available, it is likely that plants of Malva L., Portulaca L., Quercus L. and Sorghum L. may also be host plants of that organism. Therefore, the measures should apply to plants for planting, other than seeds, of Catharanthus G. Don, Nerium L., Olea L., Prunus L., Vinca L., Malva L., Portulaca L., Quercus L. and Sorghum L. (hereinafter ‘specified plants’).

(4)

It is appropriate to establish conditions for the introduction into the Union of specified plants from third countries where the specified organism is known to be present. Specific requirements should be adopted concerning the registration, supervision and status of production sites, as well as for the inspections, sampling, testing and transport of the specified plants, to ensure that plants which are introduced into the Union are free from the specified organism.

(5)

Specified plants which have been grown for at least part of their life in a demarcated area, or which have been moved through such an area, are more likely than other plants to have been infected with the specified organism. Their movement should therefore be subject to specific requirements. Those requirements should be similar to the requirements for specified plants introduced from third countries where the specified organism is known to be present.

(6)

Member States should carry out annual surveys for the presence of the specified organism in their territories in order to prevent its introduction and spread.

(7)

In order to ensure the earliest possible action against the potential presence of the specified organism, anyone who might be aware of the presence of that organism should inform the Member States thereof. Moreover, and in order to ensure appropriate action by stakeholders, Member States should inform professional operators concerned about the potential presence of the specified organism in their territories and the measures to be taken.

(8)

To eradicate the specified organism and prevent its spread, Member States should establish demarcated areas and take the necessary measures. Those demarcated areas should consist of an infected zone and a buffer zone. The width of the buffer zone should be calculated in view of the risk of the specified organism spreading to other areas.

(9)

Where the establishment of a demarcated area does not seem necessary to eliminate the specified organism, the Member State concerned should have the possibility not to establish a demarcated area immediately. In that case, it should eliminate the specified organism on the plants where it was first found to be present and carry out a survey to determine whether any further plants have been infected.

(10)

Specific measures should be established to ensure the eradication of the specified organism where it has been found to be present.

(11)

In the interest of clarity, Implementing Decision 2014/87/EU should be repealed.

(12)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plant Health,

(a)

‘specified plants’ means all plants for planting, other than seeds, of Catharanthus G. Don, Nerium L., Olea L., Prunus L., Vinca L., Malva L., Portulaca L., Quercus L. and Sorghum L.;

(b)

‘specified organism’ means Xylella fastidiosa (Well and Raju).

(a)

they comply with the specific requirements for introduction, as set out in Section 1 of Annex I;

(b)

on introduction into the Union they have been inspected by the responsible official body in accordance with Section 2 of Annex I for the presence of the specified organism;

(c)

neither presence nor symptoms of the specified organism have been found when they were inspected in accordance with Section 2 of Annex I.

(a)

there is evidence that the specified organism has been recently introduced into the area with the plants on which it was found;

(b)

there is an indication that those plants were infected before their introduction into the area concerned;

(c)

no relevant vectors have been detected in the vicinity of these plants providing evidence that no further spread of the specified organism has occurred.

(a)

information on the location of the demarcated area, and description of its characteristics which may be relevant for the eradication and prevention of the spread of the specified organism;

(b)

a map showing the delimitation of the demarcated area;

(c)

information on the presence of the specified organism and its vectors;

(d)

measures to comply with the requirements concerning the movement of specified plants within the Union as set out in Article 3.

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/65

25.7.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 219/66