Three and a half weeks after Iran launched a missile barrage against Israeli military targets – an attack that reportedly breached Israeli, US, and UK air defences – the Israelis have finally struck back, targeting several military sites in Iran.
Reports suggest that the attack was limited in scope, notably more restrained than what the Israelis had initially projected and what many analysts had anticipated. These expectations were grounded in repeated Israeli statements portraying Iran as the “head of the octopus” of their regional enemies – specifically Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and the Houthis in Yemen.
The Israelis also consider the advancement of Iran’s nuclear programme an imminent and existential threat. It seemed likely, therefore, that they might seize this opportunity to target a broad range of Iranian assets, possibly including nuclear sites, energy facilities, and even leadership figures with a decapitation strike, similar to previous actions against Hezbollah. However, that scenario did not unfold.
Two main factors likely contributed to Israel’s restraint. First, Iran possesses substantial retaliatory capabilities. The Israelis would face significant challenges in executing a broad offensive against Iranian nuclear and energy sites, or their leadership, without considerable US participation – both defensively and offensively.
This leads to the second and perhaps more decisive factor: the upcoming US election. The Biden administration may have realised, even at this late stage, that allowing a regional war to erupt 12 days before the presidential election would almost certainly harm Vice-President Kamala Harris in her closely contested race.
Such an escalation would hand Trump a strong argument, allowing him to contrast his own administration’s record of avoiding new wars with the current administration’s handling of conflicts under Biden.
The result is the current situation where the Israelis have apparently agreed – for the moment – to restrain themselves and the Iranians have contented themselves with claiming that there was very limited damage and their air defenses worked well. On balance, however, the Israelis come out on top after this round.
By opting not to launch an extensive attack, they avoid accusations of overtly influencing the US election. Simultaneously, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his right-wing government provide Trump, their preferred candidate, with a narrative to criticize the Biden-Harris administration for what they might characterize as weak, unwise leadership in the face of a long-time American adversary.
A waiting game now benefits Israel. If they remain patient until 5 November, more options may open up. Should Trump win, his support for a comprehensive Israeli strike, even on Iranian nuclear facilities, is well-documented, and he would likely endorse such an action before he assumes office in January 2025.
If Harris ekes out a narrow victory, the US political landscape will likely experience turbulence, potentially delaying any American response to an Israeli escalation against Iran.
This situation gives the Israelis much wider latitude to decide if and when they want to go forward with a large scale strike on the Iranians, particularly after 5 November.
Given bipartisan US support for Israel over the past year, a Biden-Harris administration embroiled in electoral challenges would struggle to mount any substantial opposition to an Israeli operation.
At that point, key members of the Biden administration who have said they support a “transformational” escalation in the Middle East may even gain the upper hand and convince the outgoing president to actively join the Israeli attack on Iran rather than wait for the Iranian response to commit US forces in defense of regional allies.
Thus, while the outcome of the US election remains uncertain, one outcome seems clear: Israel will likely retain considerable freedom with American support to act in accordance with their perceived national security interests, particularly concerning an attack on Iran, following 5 November.
