To govern is to choose between disadvantages, as the wily General de Gaulle diagnosed. Keir Starmer is less categoric. At the Lord Mayor’s white-tie dinner on Monday, the Prime Minister rejected the idea that the UK must choose between closer ties with the US or the European Union when Donald Trump re-emerges at the helm of the US in January.
The UK is in an awkward position as a post-Brexit European power. It is reliant on smooth relations with its continental neighbours, yet is still an Atlanticist power which has long prided itself on a closer affinity with the US and a more “Anglosphere” vibe in its leanings and culture.
In truth, “Trump-proofing” Britain as far as possible has been the not-so-secret business of the UK’s diplomats and securocrats since the ex-President returned to the electoral fray.
This covers a multitude of concerns – from how to maintain the operational closeness of the security and defence alliance to ensuring that Britain’s relatively sound record on Nato contributions exempts us from Trump’s frustration with allies who do not pay their way.
There is also a danger in being too afraid of Trump. To start with the good news, the end of the Biden presidency also ends a period of chill in trade relations between the UK and the US.
Where Trump operates on self-interest, Biden has operated ideologically. His focus on the impact of Brexit on the Northern Ireland peace process did not make much material difference to events in Ulster, but it did hold back any development on even a rudimentary trade agreement, to the frustration of his own ambassador in London.
Trump had not seriously busied himself with this in his first term either. Trump’s new pick for ambassador to the UK – Warren Stephens, a prominent investment banker from Arkansas who in 2016 was an avowed “never Trumper” – is a benign one for the UK. “It could have been a whole lot worse,” says one diplomat in DC.
Stephens is not a copycat Maga man, but a philanthropist with an interest in the arts. His appointment signals that there could well be more innovative partnerships to be hatched. Financial services are already a major UK export, which creates a hopeful opening with an emissary steeped in City deal-making.
In many ways, it is harder to see Starmer’s rapprochement with Europe bearing fruit soon: Olaf Scholz, his closest personal ally, is unlikely to lead Germany after February’s elections and the French government, headed by another centre-leftist in Emmanuel Macron, is preoccupied with its near-death experiences, under pressure from the far right.
True, we have strong defence alliances to bring post-Brexit UK militarily closer to the Continent at a perilous moment, with Nato deepening its “enhanced forward presence” in the Baltics. That, though, is more about strategy and responsibility than bringing home the bacon in terms of direct utility to UK Plc and the Starmer-Reeves growth quest (not least because Europe is also undergoing economic stress).
Starmer’s insistence that Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee did not “make choices” between the two continents is not quite right either. Churchill didn’t really “choose” during the Second World War; he knew he needed the Americans and was an ally of France in the face of the Nazi invasion, which were pretty specific circumstances.
Post-war, Labour’s beloved PM Attlee merely sent a Treasury civil servant to the process that led to the founding of the European Community and supported the US in Korea – with huge fallout and senior Cabinet resignations (including Harold Wilson’s, whom Starmer greatly admires).
“The national interest demands that we work with both,” added Starmer. Well, no one seriously doubts that. But this elides the more difficult questions which will arise, not least in the pivot the UK has made towards a better trade and diplomatic relationship with China, which it hopes will position the country more advantageously than an increasingly hard turn in the EU on tariffs against Beijing – notably in electric vehicles, where Britain’s market remains open to imports less heavily taxed than in the EU.
A hurried deal to hand over the strategic Chagos Islands to Mauritius, which has close ties to Beijing, has irritated China hawks close to Trump. The odds on a row with Washington over the UK’s China policy are shortening.
In some cases, London will simply beg to differ. Starmer will also have to be firm on matters where London sees the world very differently to Trump’s Washington. Especially so on Russia, where the UK has assessed that experiences of recent years – from poisonings on UK soil to exploiting Western indecision on Ukraine and undermining the pro-democracy movements from Georgia to the Balkans and Moldova – make the “deal-making” mentality of Team Trump more dangerous than promising.
To give credit, Starmer is right to enter his first full year as PM from January in a spirit of openness for the UK. A more testing truth is that the Government will have to make not just one choice – US or Europe – but many choices in the years ahead. Some will annoy continental allies, themselves buffeted by populist forces. Others will receive a chilly reception from a sensitive and reactive figure in the White House.
Success or failure will be measured by getting the best overall outcomes for the UK and agility in decision-making, as well as weaving cordial relations across the Atlantic and the Channel.
But when someone tells you insistently that they don’t need to make a decision, it is usually because they don’t yet know what the answer is.
Liz Truss needs to take her own advice, and cease and desist