



## IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IN UZBEKISTAN

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Uzbekistan became independent of the Soviet Union in 1991. Before this independence, the nuclear activities in Uzbekistan had been part of a nuclear programme of the former Soviet Union. Uzbekistan acceded to the NPT in 1992 and joined the IAEA the same year. The safeguards agreement entered into force in October 1994.

Uzbekistan signed and ratified the Additional Protocol with its entry into force in December 1998. This paper will describe the activities involved in the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Uzbekistan such as evaluation of the Declaration; visits and complementary accesses as well as evaluation thereof; and the Safeguards Conclusions.

There is no declared uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing activities in Uzbekistan, but there is a significant uranium mining and milling industry.

### APPROACH FOR THE SELECTION OF LOCATION FOR COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS

Articles 4 and 5 of the Protocol (INFCIRC/540) list and describe the condition and location in connection with the implementation of complementary access; in the particular case of Uzbekistan the following objectives were pursued:

- i) Assure the correctness and completeness of information submitted by the State and to resolve inconsistencies, if any, contained in the State declarations;
- ii) Assure the absence of clandestine nuclear materials and activities of the State nuclear sites in the Institute of Nuclear Physics and "Photon" Centre; and
- iii) Access uranium mines and concentration plants in order to assure the absence of undeclared uranium processing activities.

### COMPLEMENTARY ACCESSES AND TECHNICAL VISITS PERFORMED UNDER THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

Upon receipt of the State Initial Declaration, our primary goal was to perform an authentication of the site maps and plans submitted by the State. Based on information contained in the State Declaration, as well as on information gathered by inspectors through observations, several buildings were selected for complementary access in the Institute of Nuclear Physics and in the "Photon" Centre.

Regarding complementary access in connection with the uranium mines and concentration plants, the information about the country mining and milling industry contained in the initial

declaration and that gathered from open sources, was subject to a comprehensive analysis before the selection of the location for complementary access.

Since June 1999, four technical visits and six complementary accesses have been performed. The main objectives were to:

- verify correctness and completeness of the State Declaration;
- confirm the absence of undeclared uranium processing activities;
- confirm the non-production of uranium of composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment;
- confirm the absence of undeclared reprocessing activities and nuclear material on a site;
- confirm the absence of undeclared uranium enrichment activities on a site;
- confirm the absence of undeclared heavy water production;
- verify the available information about the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions on the territory of Uzbekistan, and to determine any possible indicators supporting the statement that these were not related to nuclear weapons tests; and
- confirm the absence of special equipment and material and of undeclared nuclear material.

The main activities performed were:

- observation of the sites;
- observation of equipment, industrial methods, plant capacities and activities on site and in the selected buildings;
- taking of environmental samples, DA samples and soil samples;
- photographing of the sites and buildings visited;
- measurements of radioactive doses, and
- GPS measurements to assess co-ordinates of a site.

The implementation of the Additional Protocol has allowed the Agency to obtain a profound analysis and understanding of Uzbekistan's nuclear programme. Verification carried out under the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, enabled the Agency to draw conclusions of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Uzbekistan.