

Investigation of Classification and Design Requirements for Digital Software for Advanced Research Reactors

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

2005 ""

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
Summary

As the digital technology is being developed drastically, it is being applied to various industrial instrumentation and control (I&C) fields. In the nuclear power plants, I&C systems are also being installed by digital systems replacing their corresponding analog systems installed previously. There had been I&C systems constructed by analog technology especially for the reactor protection system in the research reactor HANNARO. Parallel to the pace of the current trend for digital technology, it is desirable that all I&C systems including the safety critical and non-safety systems in an advanced research reactor is to be installed based on the computer based system.


There are many attractable features in using digital systems against existing analog systems in that the digital system has a superior performance for a function and it is more flexible than the analog system. And any fruit gained from the newly developed digital technology can be easily incorporated into the existing digital system and hence, the performance improvement of a computer based system can be implemented conveniently and promptly. Moreover, the capability of high integrity in electronic circuits reduces the electronic components needed to construct the processing device and makes the electronic board simple, and this fact reveals that the hardware failure itself are unlikely to occur in the electronic device other than some electric problems. Balanced the fact mentioned above are the roles and related issues of the software loaded on the digital integrated hardware. Some defects in the course of software development might induce a severe damage on the computer system and plant systems and therefore it is obvious that comprehensive and deep considerations are to be placed on the development of the software in the design of I&C system for use in an advanced research reactor. The work investigates the domestic and international standards on the classifications of digital software for use in I&C systems in nuclear power plants and describes the requirements for software development recommended by international standard.

2.				9
	2.1	(IAF	EA)	9
	2.2	(IEC)	•••	20
	2.3			30
3.				40
	3.1			40
	3.2			41
	3.3	가		48
	3.4			51
4.				57
	4.1			57
	4.2			60
	4.3			64
	4.4			67
	4.5	X		70
	4.6			75
	4.7			78
	4.8			80
	4.9			84
	4.10			88
	4.11		<u></u>	90
	4.12			91
	4.13			93
	4.14			94
	4.15			96
5	4.13			99

2-3-1.	34
3-1.	42




2-1-1.	15
2-2-1.	25
2-3-1.	3
2-3-2.	32
3-1.	40
4-1.	58
4-2.	



1.

가



, 가 . 가 -

.

2.

,

(IAEA)

2.1 (IAEA)

IAEA No. NS-G-1.3 (2002): Instrumentation and Control Systems

Important to Safety in Nuclear Power Plants [2-1-1].

. 2.1.4 2.1.5

2.1.1

• (Reactor Protection Systems)

• (Reactor Control Systems)

•

• (Containment Isolation Systems)

가 .

2.1.2

. [2-1-2].

7}

-- 가

- 가

10

- (heat sink)

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(1) 가

(2) 가 · 가

(3) . 가

(4)

가

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- 가 .

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2.1.3

IAEA , ,

- 가

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- 가 (: , , ; :

- 가 가 가 가 (,

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), 가
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              ) 가
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                                  ( , 12
 , , 12
                                   ( /
 , 30 /
                                    ( , 12
       , 12
               )
                   2-1-1
가
(1)
(2)
```

14

```
가
                    가
                           가
            가
                                                 Plant Equipment
                    Items important to safety
                                                                                   Items not important to safety
                 Safety Systems
                                                                            Safety Related Systems
                                Safety Actuation Systems
                                                                 Safety System Support
    Protection Systems
                                                                        Features
Initiation I&C for:
                                Actuation I&C for:
                                                                I&C for:
Reactor trip
Emergency Core Cooling
                               Reactor trip
Emergency Core Cooling
                                                                Emergency Power Supply
                               Decay Heat Removal
Containment Isolation
Decay Heat Removal
                                                                          Reactor Control System
Containment Isolation
                                                                         Plant Control System
                               Containment Spray
Containment Heat Removal
Containment Spray
Containment Heat Removal
                                                                         Control Room I&C
                                                                         Fire Detection & Extinguishing I&C
                                                                         Radiation Monitoring
Communication Equipment
                                                                          Fuel Handling & Storage I&C
                                                                         I&C for Operation of Safety Systems
                                                                         I&C for Monitoring the State of Safety Systems
                                                                         Access Control Systems
```

2-1-1.

2.1.4

•	(Accident Conditions)
•	(Actuated Equipment)
•	. (Actuated Device)
	(Anticipated Operational Occurrences)
• 가	(Availability)
•	(Bypass)
•	(Maintenance Bypass)
•	(Operational Bypass)
	(Channel) 가
•	(Coincidence)
-	(Common Cause Failure)
•	. (Component)
•	(Dependability)

가 , 가 , (Design Basis Accident) 가 (Diversity) 가 가 (Driven Equipment) (Functional Isolation) (Item Important to Safety) (Normal Operation) (Nuclear Safety) (Operational States) (Physical Isolation) 가 • 가 (Postulated Initiating Event) (Prime Mover)

(Protection System)

(Protective Action)

```
(Protective Task)
     가
                                               가
        (Quality Assurance)
                           가
                                  가
        (Quality Control)
     (Redundancy)
     (Reliability)
        (Response Time)
     가
        (Safety Action)
              (Safety Actuation System)
        (Safety Function)
        (Safety Group)
           가
                            가
           (Safety Limits)
가
         가
                         (Safety Related I&C System)
```

(Safety System)

(Safety System Support Features)

■ (Safety Task)

가

,

• (Single Failure)

가

■ (System Life-Cycle)

2.1.5

- [2-1-1] International Atomic Energy Agency, Instrumentation and Control Systems Important to Safety in Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Guide Series No.NS-G-1.3, IAEA, Vienna, 2002.
- [2-1-2] International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, Safety Standards Series No.NS-R-1, IAEA, Vienna, 2000.

2.2 (IEC)

(IEC: International Electrotechnical Commission) (IAEA) (IEC 1993 61226) [2-2-1] [2-2-1] IEC 61226: Nuclear Power Plants - Instrumentation and Control Systems Important for Safety -Classification IAEA [2-2-2] [2-2-3] NS-R-1 NS-G-1.3 **IAEA** 2.2.6 2.2.7 2.2.1 **IAEA**

IAEA NS-G-1.3 [2-2-3]

(A, B, C)

A B C В 2.2.2 가 가 가 가 가) A, B, C (가, 가 (1) A (Category A) 가 A A A 가 A 가 가 (2) B (Category B) В A В 가 В A

В

A

가 В A가 В A 가 가 В (3) C (Category C) C C A В 2.2.3 (NC) (1) A 가 a) 가 b) A c) 가 (2) В A В 가

a)

가 b) A c) d) 가 e) A (3) C В C 가 a) A 가 b) В c) A 가 d) A e) 가 f) A В (,) g) h) (,) i)

(Accident Management

j)

Strategy)

k)

1)


2.2.4

2-2-1 .

2.2.4.1

(PWR, BWR,), 7, /

가



2.2.4.2

.

IEC 60964 [2-2-4] .

,

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.

-- 가 1. Identification of design basis - major plant characteristics (architecture of plant systems and their redundancy) - plant operating mode - list of PIEs and their likely frequency of occurrence - list of preventing and mitigating functions 2. Initial list of functions including functional requirements 3. Assignment of category A, B, C or unclassified 4. Development of detailed systems requirements 5. Identification of detailed I&C subsystems and equipment items 6. Refinement of assignments, repeating steps 3 to 6 as necessary 7. Final list of functions and assigned categories 2-2-1. 가 . 가 가 가

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.

2.2.5

가 .

2.2.5.1 A

(1) --

(2) ----

2.2.5.2 B

(1)

--- 1 2 가

-.

(2)

2.2.5.3 C (1) 가 가) (2) 2.2.6 (AOO: Anticipated Operational Occurrence) (CCF: Common Cause Failure)

(residual heat)

(heat sink)

(DBA: Design Basis Accident)

가

(DBE:	Design Basis Event)				
(Diversity)				•	
•					•
(Equipment)					
(Equipment)					(single)
(· 가 가)				(58.0)
(Function)		1			
(T. 4: 1:4.)			가		•
(Functionality)					
	(I&C Systems Im	portant 1	to Safety)		
/					
		.			
(Plant Stat	e)	7		1	
(Operational States)		_/_		t Condition	ns)
(Normal		(DBE)			Beyond DBAs)
i uvoimal	(AOO)	a)	(DBA)	b)	
Operation)	(AOO)				
Operation)	which are not explicitly			(Accid	lent Manageme

(Performance)

■ 가 (PIE: Postulated Initiating Events)

■ (Redundancy)

, , 가

[2-2-1] International Electrotechnical Commission, Instrumentation and Control Systems Important to Safety - Classification, Standard No.61226, IEC, Geneva, 2004.

2.2.7

- [2-2-2] International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, Safety Standard Series No.NS-R-1, IAEA, Vienna, 2000.
- [2-2-3] International Atomic Energy Agency, Instrumentation and Control Systems Important to Safety in Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Guide Series No.NS-G-1.3, IAEA, Vienna, 2002.
- [2-2-4] International Electrotechnical Commission, Design for Control Rooms of Nuclear Power Plants, Standard No.60964, IEC, Geneva.

2.3

2.3.1

,

가

가 , (Defense-in-Depth) 가 가

1E 1E

가

가 . (Common Mode Failure)
, , ,

가

(KINS) [2-3-1].

[2-3-1]

2.3.2

2-3-1

(DBE: Design Basis Event) , (ATWS: Anticipated Transient Without Scram)

.

2-3-1

(I&C Systems Important to Safety):

(I&C Systems not Important to Safety):

(Safety-Related I&C

Systems)

(Non-Safety-Related I&C Systems)

가 2-3-2 IC-1, IC-2 IC-3

Non-IC


IC-1 IC-2

> (, ATWS) IC-3

> > (Non-IC)

(AOO: Anticipated Operational Occurrences)

(Design Basis Events) (Special Events) (Normal Operation) (ATWS) (CMF) 2-3-1.



가 가 가 2.3.3.3 IC-3 IC-3 Non-IC 2.3.3.4 Non-IC 2.3.4 3 2.3.4.1 (Safety-Critical Software)

IC-2

가

(PAMI B, C, D),

IC-1

가 가 가 2.3.4.2 (Safety-Related Software) IC-2 IC-3 , 가 가 (Non-Safety Software) 2.3.4.3 Non-IC 가 가 (loading) 2.3.5 2-3-1 2-3-1 2-3-1. IC-1 IC-2 IC-3 Non-IC 1 3 1 2

/

(*)			
1	2		
1E	1E/		
-	-	-	
(*)			
·			
3.5.1			
IC-1		\	[2-3-2
2 "	," 4 "	[2-3-3]	
IC-2		[2 6 6]	[2-3-2
2 "" 1	," 4 "		
IC-3		2	·
No. 10			
Non-IC		3,	
		/	
3.5.2 IC-1			
-			
•	[2-3-1] () 5,	,,
	L - J (, -,	
IC-2			
(
(,)			14 [2-3-1

35

IC-3

가 .

	가 (availability)		
	Non-IC 가		가
2.3.5.3			
	IC-1 " 9 "	8 [2-3-1], "	
	" 9, " IC-2	•	
,,	9, "	8, "	
	IC-3		
	9, "	8, "	,
	Non-IC		•
가			
2.3.5.4	IC-1		
	IC-2		2
	IC-3	가	
가	Non-IC	가 .	
7 f		71 .	
2.3.5.5	TC 1	1E	
	IC-1	1E	
	IC-2		
		1E	,

1E IC-3 가 . 가 Non-IC 1E 2.3.5.6 12 [2-3-1], " 가 IC-2 IC-3 가 Non-IC 가 2.3.5.7 6 [2-3-1], " 2.3.6 2.3.1)가 가 가 가 1E Non-1E

37

2.3.7

■ 가	(Availability)	
		가
•	I (Seismic Cl	assification I)
	(SSE)	
	1E(Class 1E)	, ,
	,	,
	,	
•	-	(Safety-Critical Software)
	A	
	A	71
	/	
		가
	В	
	В	
		(
) .	
•	C C	(barrier)
	C	가
•	D	
	D	
		. 가

38

• **E** E / 가

• (Verification and Validation)

가

2.3.8

[2-3-1] , , , (), 2001.


[2-3-2] , 16 ,

, 2000 4 18 .

[2-3-3] KINS-G-002(1), , 1997 10 ,

3.

3.1



```
10 CFR 50 & 52, NUREG-0800 SRP(Standard
Review Plan) Chapter 7 [3-2], Branch technical Position(BTP)-14, IEEE Std 603-1991 [3-3],
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993 [3-4]
                                                                  (Supplier)
    가
                           가
3.2
3.2.1
   10 CFR 50, SRP Chapter 7, BTP-14, IEEE Std 603-1998, IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993
                                                                      가
              3-1
                                         3-1
    가
                       3-1
      (SWLC: Software Life Cycle)
(Tools)
                                                                 가
             (Defense-in-Depth)
                                         (Diversity)
                                          IEEE Std 352-1987[3-5]
                 가
                                 , NUREG/CR-5930, " -
                                                               (High Integrity)
                                                                                가 가
                         (Software Risk Analysis)
                                              (Common Cause Failures)
  . IEC 60880-2000, Part 2[3-6]
                     (pre-developed)
                              ITAAC(Inspection, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria)
                                                      (Design Issues)
```

. 1

3-1.

7.0-1		II.	7.1	IEEE Std 603-1991	IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993	
		:	가			
	.3.3	(&)		В	SECY-93-087 7-16 (&)
.3.1	.3.4, 6,7		SW HW/SW		§ 5.3 § 5.3.1 SW	7-13 ()
&	SWLC ,		SW	§ 5.3	§ 5.3.2 SW,	7-15(PLC), EPRI-TR-106439
	,		SW		§ 5.3.3 SW Tools	EPRI-TR-106439
			&		§ 5.3.4 , E	7-13
.3.2					§ 5.3.5	7-13
	.3.5		(EQ)		§ 5.4 ,	IEEE 323, 344
	.3.3		(EMI/EMC)		С	EPRI TR-102323
	5		-0	§ 5.5	§ 5.5.1	7-17
			\		§ 5.5.2	7-14
		(-)	§ 5.6	§ 5.6 , G	7.9
			,	§ 5.15	§ 5.15 , H R.G 1.152 A-H 7h	7-13 (SW)
		New SW	,)	- SRP 7.1 II -	77}	가

(a) (SQAP: Software Quality Assurance Plan):
. SQAP

.

```
(b)
                              (Software Management Plan):
(c)
                                 (Software Configuration Management Plan):
(d)
                              (Software Development Plan):
                                       (Software Verification & Validation Plan):
(e)
                              (Software Safety Plan):
(f)
                                           (Software Operation & Management Plan):
(g)
            가
           1
                                                                                      (1
        )가
                                                                 , System 80+
(DIAS),
                         (DPS),
                                                                        (P-CCS)
            ITAAC
                                                            [3-7].
  (KINS)
                         10 CFR 50,
                                           A [3-8]
                                                            B [3-9], IEEE Std. 603-1991,
IEEE Std.-1971, 279, SRP,
                                   IAEA
                                              [3-10].
                    (Safety Categorization):
                                                      IC-1
(a)
            (Safety-Critical),
                                        IC-2
                                                 IC-3
       (Safety-Related)
                                                              (Non-IC)
(b)
          :
```

가 (c) 가 가) ((d) : 가 (e) (Defense-in-Depth & Diversity): (f) (Safety Hazards Analysis): (g) 가 가 (h) (Control of Access): 3.2.2 IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993 (IEC: International Electro-Technical Commission)가 IEC 60880(1986, 2000) . IEC 60880-1986

44

3.2.2.1 (SLCP: Software Life Cycle Process) (1) : NRC Reg. Guide 1.173[3-11] : IEEE Std 1074[3-12] (2) SLCP (mapping)((SLCM)), 3.2.2.2 (1) : NRC IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993, Reg. Guide 1.169[3-13] : IEEE Std 1058.1[3-14] (PMP), IEEE Std (2) 730.1[3-15] (SQAP), IEEE Std 1228-1993[3-16] (SSP), IEEE Std 828-1998[3-17] (SCMP), IEEE Std 1012-1986[3-18] (SVVP) (3) .) 3.2.2.3 (SRS: Software Requirements Specifications) 가 (Formal Method)

,	(test	case)	가 .	
(1) : NRC Reg. Guide	e 1.172[3-19]			
(2) :		IEEE Std 830-1993[2	3-20]	
(3) :	(Formalism)			
·				
3.2.2.4				
(1) : IEEE Std 1	1016-1987[3-20]	(SDD: Software	
Design Description) SD		(organization)	. SDD	
(design enti	ty)	(design entity attribute)		
(entity) ,	(subsystem),	(data stores),	, ,	
	, /	, , (fu	inction)	
. , ,		1		
, (type)	(entity)	(partition) 가가	. SDD	
		(decomposition	on) ,	
(dependency) ,	, (detail)		(scope),	
(use), (presentation) . IEEE/EIA 12207.1-1997				
. IEEE	Std 1016-1987			
, , ,				
(paper documents),	(automate	ed databases),	(design	
description language),		+)		
(2) :			,	
(Structured Design Me	thod)	(Object-O	riented Design	
Method) .				
가	,			
3.2.2.5				
$(1) \qquad : \qquad \qquad (source c$	ode)	•		
(2) : NUREG/CR-	5463[3-22]	가		
- (high-inte	egrity software)		. NUREG/CR-	
6463			,	
(code reuse), (r	resource requirement	rs)	(response	
time)		•	(Ada83,	

C/C++, PLC Ladder Logic, IEC Std 1131-3 Sequential Function Charts, Pascal, PL/M, Ada95, IEC Standard 1131-3 Structured Text, IEC 1131-3 Function Block Diagrams)

```
3
                   (Reliability),
                                                     (Robustness),
                                                                         (Traceability),
            (Maintainability)
                                                   . NUREG/CR-6463
          )
                                                             (requirements),
(V&V),
                                                               IEEE 7-4.3.2-1993, IEC
60880, NUREG/CR-5930, NUREG/CR-6263, NUREG/CR-6293
   N4
              Ada
                       가
                                                               N-Version Programming
   Recovery Block
             : (a)
   (3)
                                       (Qualification):
                                                                         , CASE
                                   (b)N-Version Programming
                                                                Recovery Block
                      가
3.2.2.6
                     Reg. Guide 1.168[3-23], Reg. Guide 1.170[3-24], Reg. Guide 1.171[3-
   (1)
           : NRC
25]
                                       KINS
                                                               [3-10]
                                                                                  7
                               7
              NUREG/CR-6421[3-26]
                                                                          (Commercial
Off-The-Shelf, COTS)
                 [3-10]
                                    6,
                : IEEE Std 1008-1987[3-27]
   (2)
                                                        가
```

```
. IEEE Std 829-1983[3-28]
                                         (Test-case) ,
            . IEEE Std 1028-1994[3-29]
            . IEEE Std 1074-1997[3-12]
   , EPRI TR-106439-1988[3-30]
                                           4가
                                                               가
                                                가 . (b)
  (3) : (a)
       ( - )
3.2.2.7
  (1)
              (anomaly report),
                                                      가
 (2)
     : (a)
3.2.2.8
  (1) : NRC EPRI NP-5652[3-31]
                                         가
                                               가
  (GL 89-02, GL 91-05, GL 95-02)
                                        가
                                                         EPRI TR-
106439-1988[3-30] . KINS
 (2) : EPRI
                                       가
                                                     (EPRI NP-5652)
     10
            (USNRC )
                                                        . EPRI NP-
5652[3-31]
                                            EPRI NP-106439[3-30]
         , ASIC (firmware)
3.3 가
3.3.1
```

48

[3-10]

()" (), 가 **ITAAC** 1 3.3.2 가 SRP NUREG-0800-1997 (Rev.4) (Control, Instrumentation, and Human Factors Branch)가 Oak Ridge National Laboratory(ORNL), Laurence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Nuplex 80+ 가 **ITAAC** . NRC Design Acceptance Criteria(DAC)-Level of Detail ITAAC ITAAC ITAAC (Microprocessor-Based 가 System) (Hard-wired redundant) (Diversity) NRC 가 3.3.3

```
(upgrade)
                                         10
                                          7가
                                                                            가
                           가
                                                        15
                                    가
                       (utility)
                    (WH-CENP)
                                      Eagle 21
                                                      Sizewell B
                                                                         Digital
                                                                  (Teamwork)
Protection System
                                      , W-ISCO
                                                        CASE
Customizing
                          . Nuplex 80+
          IEEE-7-4.3.2-1982
                                                      가
                NRC
                                                    . Nuplex 80+가
                                                            ITAAC
                                                                    (protocol)
                       "Nuplex 80+ Software Program Manual"
                                                            "Nuplex 80+ Software
Safety Plan Description"
                    N4
     Merlin-Gerin
                            SAGA OST CASE
                                                  CASE (Computer-Aided Software
Engineering)
                             . SAGA
                                                           (code)
          OST
        . CASE
                           (IA: Integrated Approach)
          AECL
                                                                        Rational
Design Process (RDP)
                                                    . AECL
                                  가
                                                            . AECL
IEC-60880-1986
                             , 15가
                        , CANDU-3
           Siemens AG KWU
                                                               (Teleperm XS)
                                                       , OPAL 121
                   CASE
                                 SPACE
                               , APR1400
                          (
                                               )
```

5 6 3.4 3.4.1 (Accuracy) 가 (Activity) (Anticipated Operational Occurrences) ■ 가 (Availability) 가 1E (Class 1E) (Common Mode Failures)

(Configuration Management)
, , , ,

■ (Defense-in-Depth)

•	(DAC: D	Design Acceptance Criteria)	,
•	(DBA: Des	sign Basis Accidents)	
	(DBE: Desi	ign Basis Event)	
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
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
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
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4.2.1.2 (Safety Culture)

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4.2.1.3 (Safety Classification Scheme)

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4.2.1.5 (Defense in Depth)

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4.2.1.6 (Redundancy) (voting)

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4.2.1.8 (Diversity)

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4.2.1.10 (Security)

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4.2.1.11 (Maintainability)

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4.2.1.12 (Operating Modes)

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4.2.1.14 가 (Demonstrable Dependability)

4.2.1.15 (Testability)

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4.2.2.1 (Process Controlled Step by Step)

4.2.2.2 (Reviewability)

4.2.2.3 (Comprehensive Testing)

4.2.2.6 (Compliance with Standards)

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4.2.3

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
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4.3.1 (Development Plan)

4.3.1.1 (Phases)



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
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
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
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4.7.1.5 (deterministic) . フト

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4.7.1.6

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4.7.2.2

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4.8.1.10 (Coding Rules)

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4.8.1.12 (Operating Systems)

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4.8.2 (contextual)

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
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
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Project Manager and Department		Gee Yong Park / Advanced Reactor Technology Development						
Researcher and Department		H. S. Jung, J. S. Ryu, and C. Park / HANARO Management Div.						
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Abstract (15-20	Lines)		/ / /					

As the digital technology is being developed drastically, it is being applied to various industrial instrumentation and control (I&C) fields. In the nuclear power plants, I&C systems are also being installed by digital systems replacing their corresponding analog systems installed previously. There had been I&C systems constructed by analog technology especially for the reactor protection system in the research reactor HANNARO. Parallel to the pace of the current trend for digital technology, it is desirable that all I&C systems including the safety critical and non-safety systems in an advanced research reactor is to be installed based on the computer based system.

There are many attractable features in using digital systems against existing analog systems in that the digital system has a superior performance for a function and it is more flexible than the analog system. And any fruit gained from the newly developed digital technology can be easily incorporated into the existing digital system and hence, the performance improvement of a computer based system can be implemented conveniently and promptly. Moreover, the capability of high integrity in electronic circuits reduces the electronic components needed to construct the processing device and makes the electronic board simple, and this fact reveals that the hardware failure itself are unlikely to occur in the electronic device other than some electric problems. Balanced the fact mentioned above are the roles and related issues of the software loaded on the digital integrated hardware. Some defects in the course of software development might induce a severe damage on the computer system and plant systems and therefore it is obvious that comprehensive and deep considerations are to be placed on the development of the software in the design of I&C system for use in an advanced research reactor. The work investigates the domestic and international standards on the classifications of digital software for use in I&C systems in nuclear power plants and describes the requirements for software development recommended by international standard.

Subject Keywords (About 10 words)	Digital I&C, Digital Software, Classification, Development Process, Design Requirements