



IAEA Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 19 -22 March 2012

OECD/NEA Technical Assessments and Nuclear Safety Research

Responding to the Members' Needs Post-Fukushima

Greg Lamarre Nuclear Safety Division Nuclear Energy Agency





Outline

- ☐ Brief Overview of NEA/CSNI
- NEA Integrated Response Plan to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
- Areas of NEA Technical Study Being Considered in Response to Fukushima
- ☐ Joint International Research Projects
- □ NEA Safety Research Going Forward
- Concluding Remarks





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OECD/NEA Membership

- Australia
- Austria
- Belgium
- Canada
- Chile
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary

- Iceland
- Ireland
- Israel
- Italy
- Japan
- Korea
- Luxembourg
- Mexico
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Poland
- Portugal
- Slovak Republic



- Slovenia
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
- United States

Not member of NEA



NEA Strategic Plan 2011-2016



NEA Strategic Areas of Work

- □ 1. Nuclear safety and regulation:
 - > CNRA (Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities)
 - > CSNI (Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations)
 - > OECD/NEA Joint International Research Projects (on Safety Research)
- 2. Radioactive waste management
- □ 3. Radiation protection and public health
- 4. Nuclear science
- □ 5. Economics, resources and technology
- □ 6. Legal affairs



VEACSNI/CNRA Joint Strategic Plan



Main Challenges (2011 - 2016)



- Adequate Nuclear Skills and Infrastructure
- Effectiveness and Efficiency of Activities Related to Safety
- Safe Operation of Current Nuclear Facilities
- Safety in New Nuclear Facilities
- Safety in Advanced Reactor Designs


Plus Additional Challenges and Areas of Focus following Fukushima





Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI)





- > Senior regulators, TSO and research leaders, some utility representation
- Maintaining, harmonizing and further developing the scientific and technical knowledge base required to assess and enhance the safety of nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities
- > Main areas of work include:
 - Analysis and management of accidents
 - Integrity and ageing of components and structures
 - Risk assessment
 - Fuel safety
 - Safety of fuel cycle facilities
 - Human and organizational factors
 - Safety research projects and activities



Programme of Work within CSNI and its WGs

Baseline CSNI Programme of Work

- Risk Analysis Studies
- Fuel Safety Assessments
- Fuel Cycle Facility Safety Reviews
- Human and Organizational Performance Evaluations
- Accident Analysis Technical Studies (T-H, SA)
- Integrity of Structures and Ageing of Components Assessments
- Other

CSNI Follow-up Issues from Fukushima Daiichi Accident

- Probabilistic and Deterministic Assessments of Accident Initiating Sequences and Phenomena
- Plant Robustness and Defence-in-Depth Reviews (containment, hydrogen mitigation strategies, electrical systems, other)
- Studies of human and organizational performance under extended SA conditions
- Accident progression modeling comparative studies
- Off-site emergency preparedness





NEA Integrated Response to Fukushima Accident Cont'd

- Soon after accident CNRA Senior Task Group Fukushima established - group coordinates integrated NEA response
- CSNI, CNRA and CRPPH developed a cross-functional integrated process to support the development of new tasks and management of the program supporting post-Fukushima response
- Importance of maintaining strong links with IAEA (Fukushima Action Plan), EC and national bodies to ensure no overlap or duplication
- NEA to focus its Fukushima response actions on discrete shorter term products to assist TSOs, regulators in member countries





NEA Integrated Response to Fukushima Accident

- In immediate aftermath of accident, CSNI developed a Concept Paper on "Considerations and Approaches for Post-Fukushima Dai-ichi Follow-up Activities"
 - Provided initial technical opinions along the following topical lines:
 - External and Internal Hazards Assessments
 - Plant Robustness and Defence-in-Depth Evaluations
 - Review of Safety Management Approaches
 - Assessment of Emergency Preparedness and Response Arrangements (EPR Management) and Approaches
 - Research Needed to Close Technical Knowledge Gaps (e.g., severe accident progression phenomenon, modelling of human behaviour under SA conditions, etc.)





Considered

Ref. NEA Integrated Fukushima Safety Enhancements Programme

Improvements in the Characterization of Internal and External Hazards

Review of current methodologies for assessing risk due to postulated internal and/or external initiating events

- · Cliff edge effects
- Coupled initiating events
- Multi-unit scenarios
- Deterministic/probabilistic approaches

Review technical assessments of earthquakes, fires, floods, and other extreme environmental conditions

 Propose enhanced methods for properly characterizing the risk of external hazards

Review of effectiveness of the use of operating experience regarding internal and/or external initiating events

- Identify precursor events from available databases
- Carry out a detailed analyses of some of these
- Identification of new insights and commendable practices
- Identification of improvements to the implementation of OP EX lessons learnt






Considered

Ref. NEA Integrated Fukushima Safety Enhancements Programme

Plant
Defence-inDepth and
Robustness



Review and propose enhancements to work of CSNI TG on Elec Sys DiD in light of lessons from Fukushima

Review how safety functions (core cooling, containment, spent fuel pool cooling) can be maintained and monitored in case of prolonged loss of power and in case of prolonged loss of heat sink

Review what measures and modifications are needed to maintain safety functions and their monitoring.

Review if there are new design provisions or other measures to withstand a prolonged loss of heat sink and what measures and modifications are needed to maintain safety functions and their monitoring

Review and assess the effectiveness of current approaches to sustained spent fuel cooling, including an appropriate application of the defence-in-depth principle





Considered

Ref. NEA Integrated Fukushima Safety Enhancements Programme

To gain a thorough understanding of the Fukushima accident progression

Performance of a blind simulation study using common boundary conditions

To improve knowledge in the area of fuel degradation in the spent fuel pools

Carry out a fundamental review of current knowledge in the phenomenology and conditions promoting fuel degradation in SFPs

Enhancements in Accident Analysis and Management

Review of human performance and reliability under SA conditions

Assessment of current knowledge of HRA for actions under extreme conditions

Review of decision-making capabilities under very demanding situations

Study of procedural adequacy, resources, training for prolonged SA situations

Management of core melt situations

Review of containment venting approaches, hydrogen generation and management

Study of instrumentation survivability for core melt situations

Predictive capabilities of FP behaviour





Considered

Ref. NEA Integrated Fukushima Safety Enhancements
Programme

Improvement of Off-Site Emergency Preparedness

 Knowledge sharing on core melt accident progression and source term analysis to improve modeling tools and off-site emergency preparedness and response procedures

Advancements in Off-Site Emergency Preparedness

Enhance International Decision Coordination

 Study how national governmental recommendations and decisions could be better coordinated, how to coordinate these and with whom. Best practice review of effective international decision coordination approaches

Update NEA Short-Term Countermeasures Report

 Review report on national approaches and criteria for short-term countermeasures and propose enhancements





Considered

Ref. NEA Integrated Fukushima Safety Enhancements
Programme

Radiological Protection and Public Health

✓ Coordinate and facilitate member state sharing of lessons and feedback.



Assistance to member states in the collection of experience of national EM and recovery plans

Conduct of a practical review of the ICRP recommendations



√Recommendations on ICRP (publication 111) on recovery. √ Implementation of new ICRP recommendations for emergency exposure situations.

✓ Establish network to share methods and approaches – work towards greater harmonization.



Assessment of dispersion and dose estimation modeling

ORP in Severe Accident Management and Post-Accident Recovery



✓ Best practices in RP mgt procedures. ✓ New ISOE publication on occupational RP in SA mgt.





NEA Integrated Response to Fukushima – Next Steps

- Action list of technical issues being considered by CSNI, CNRA, CRPPH and its working groups and task groups
- New task proposals (CAPS) to be brought forth by WGs, TGs for support by the committees at their meetings between now and June 2012 (and beyond). Committees to direct that new working groups/task groups be formed if req'd
- CNRA Senior Task Group on Fukushima will continue to oversee and coordinate the integrated response going forward
- Short term/high priority actions to be completed within one year
- NEA website being created to track progress of integrated response plan



OECD/NEA Joint Projects



■ Motivations and Goals

- Resolve issues relevant for the nuclear community by means of research shared by many countries
- Enhance technical exchange, co-operation and consensus-building internationally
- Support the continued operation of unique test facilities which are of value to the OECD/NEA nuclear community
- CSNI is committed to promote and facilitate Safety Research, through scientific and technical cooperation between member countries
- The availability of safety research results is key in assuring the high level and long-term safety of nuclear facilities
- This goal can however only be reached if dedicated and sustained funding for safety research is maintained. The availability of experimental infrastructures is also essential





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NEA Joint International Research Projects





HALDEN	Fuel and Materia	als, Norway
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I&C, Human Factors

CABRI Fuel in RIA transients France

SCIP-2 Fuel integrity Sweden

SFP Spent fuel safety USA

PRISME2 Fire Safety France

ROSA System TH Japan

PKL-2 PWR SG behaviour Germany

BIP-2 lodine chemistry Canada

SERENA Steam explosion Korea & France


THAI-2 Containment (H2, I) Germany

STEM Source term mitigation France

Databases

1. FIRE 2. ICDE 3. CODAP 4. CADAK 5. COMPSIS







Safety Research Post-Fukushima



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- Importance of future safety research highlighted in CSNI Concept Paper on Fukushima, CNRA STG Recommendations to CNRA and other supporting strategy/policy documents
- Phased approach within NEA:
 - ✓ Compilation of past safety research conducted done
 - ✓ Comprehensive review of safety assessment and research already carried out - ongoing
 - ✓ Gap analysis based on research issues from Fukushima ongoing
 - Discuss possible expansion of existing projects and/or
 - ➤ New R&D project proposals
 - ✓ CSNI review of research direction ongoing



Overview of NEA Research Projects



Thermal Hydraulics Projects

Fuel Behaviour Projects

Severe Accident Phenomenology Projects

Other (Systems and Event Database Projects)

- LOFT, Loss-of-Fluid Test Project (1983-1989)
- BUBCON, Bubbler Condenser Project (2001-2002)
- SETH, SESAR Thermal-hydraulics Project (2001-2006)
- SETH-2, SETH Phase 2 Project (2007-2010)
- PSB-VVER Project (2003-2008)
- PKL, Primärkreislauf Project (2004-2007)
- PKL-2, PKL Phase 2 Project (2008-2011)
- ROSA, Rig of Safety Assessment Project (2005-2009)
- ROSA-2, ROSA Phase 2 Project (2009-2012)
- PRISME, Fire propagation in elementary, multi-room scenarios Project (2006- 2011), PRISME-2 Project (2011-2016)
- LOFC, Loss of Forced Coolant Project (2011-2013)

- HALDEN, Halden Reactor Project (1958-present)
- CIP, Cabri Water Loop International Project (2000-2015)
- PAKS, OECD-IAEA Paks Fuel Project (2004-2007)
- SCIP, Studsvik Cladding Integrity Project (2004-2009)
- SCIP-2, SCIP Phase 2 (2009-2014)
- SFP, Sandia Fuel Project (2008-2012)

- TMI-VIP, TMI-2 Vessel Investigation Project (1988-1993)
- RASPLAV Project (1994-2000)
- OLHF, Sandia Lower Head Failure OECD Project (1998-2002)
- MASCA, Material Scaling Project (2000-2003)
- MASCA-2, MASCA Phase 2 Project (2003-2007)
- MCCI, Melt Coolability and Concrete Interaction Project (2002-2005)
- MCCI-2, MCCI Phase 2 Project (2006-2010)
- BIP, Behaviour of Iodine Project (2007-2011); BIP-2 (2011-2014)
- SERENA, Steam Explosion Resolution for Nuclear Applications Project (2007-2012)
- THAI, Thermal-hydraulics, Hydrogen, Aerosols, Iodine Project (2007-2009); phase 2 (2011-2014)
- SFP, Sandia Fuel Project (2008-2012)
- STEM, Source Term Evaluation and Mitigation (2011-2015)

- SCORPIO Project (1996-1998)
- PLASMA Project (1998-2000)
- International Common-cause Failure Data Exchange (ICDE)
 Project (1994-2014)
- Piping Failure Data Exchange (OPDE) Project (2002-2011)
- Fire Incidents Records Exchange (FIRE) Project (2002-2014)
- Computer-based Systems
 Important to Safety (COMPSIS)
 Project (2006-2011)
- Stress Corrosion Cracking and Cable Ageing Project (SCAP) (2006-2010)
- Component Operational Experience, Degradation and Ageing (CODAP) Project (2011-2014)
- Cable Ageing Data And Knowledge Project (CADAK) (2011-2014)





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Concluding Remarks

- First priority for NEA countries is safety and regulation
- CSNI has a long history of supporting NEA member country safety institutions in producing valuable and timely outputs towards continual enhancement of nuclear safety including safety research
- > CSNI is a recognized forum to coordinate and where appropriate cooperate on safety R&D activities among NEA member countries
- CSNI products (e.g. SOARs, ISPs) have been key contributors to assisting in harmonizing national safety assessment practices
- NEA joint research projects have contributed to address common safety concerns and to retain countries' technical expertise and infrastructure in strategic fields of nuclear safety
- From NEA perspective, concerted actions among technical safety institutions should build upon the successful framework existing today





Concluding Remarks

- In the future, NEA/CSNI will continue to advance the science of nuclear safety through the work of its working groups, task groups and joint international research projects
- Clear focus in short to medium term on follow-up activities from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident ensuring continued strong coordination with IAEA, EC and other international nuclear safety partners
- Meeting the NEA member countries' needs in safety research will continue to be an important part of our mandate and work





The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd

