[en] The paper provides brief information on development of the legislative framework and regulatory requirements in transport of radioactive materials in Ukraine. The application of IAEA documents is demonstrated and their contribution to the improvement of the national regulatory control system and processes of its harmonization with international safety requirements is underlined. Proposals for coordination and interaction enhancement in order to improve safety in safe transport of radioactive materials are defined in the conclusion. (author)

[en] The presentation will introduce the unique experience in term of Global Acceptance developed by three industry partners (INS UK, AREVA France and ORC Japan) to secure overseas transports between Europe and Japan

[en] The principles of the nuclear liability regime, including their application to the case of transport, are described in the IAEA Handbook on Nuclear Law, and will not be repeated in this paper. Rather, this paper examines some specific aspects of liability during transport, and particularly draws on some of the work of the IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX). In that regard, particular reference is made to the Explanatory Texts published in 2004

[en] This paper gives an industrial perspective on safety and security issues based on the experience of WNTI members. It describes how safety is invested primarily in the package; not how the package is transported. Transport safety is therefore an engineering challenge, and all necessary technical information is available to enable this to be met. Security in transport involves various measures to guard against intentional malicious acts. The paper describes the international instruments relevant to security in the transport of nuclear fuel cycle materials and how both safety and security regulations must be coordinated and simplified to avoid conflicts. It considers potential risks, which must not be underestimated. However, the assessment of risks must be realistic and quantified, and the requirements placed on the industry appropriate. It is important to dispel exaggerated perceptions of danger in the minds of the public, politicians and regulators. (author)

[en] Regulations for nuclear material transport in Japan are based on international regulations. Safety and security regulations, however, have sometime different aspects which have caused a conflict of operations. This paper aims to introduce framework of safety and security regulations for nuclear material transport in Japan, and shows some issues in cooperation of these regulations. (author)

[en] Georgia is a small country with growing up economics. The number of shipment of radioactive materials increases. The country develops its regulatory system for transport of radioactive materials considering all aspects of safety and security issues. The system includes developed of national legal instruments and corresponded infrastructure based on these instruments. (author)

[en] This paper sets out the key issues for consideration at the transport conference. It will introduce each of the aspects of the framework for safe, secure and sustainable transport, building on the description of the existing situation presented in Session 1A. It will discuss purpose of the IAEA framework, and examine the scientific basis, the IAEA recommendations and requirements, the UN interface, the use of conventions, national implementation, industry compliance, communication and information, response and restoration. It will also look at the activities and related requirements outside of transport which could influence the transport frameworks either in a positive or negative manner. (author)

[en] How to attract and prepare a man to be a strong link in the system of nuclear safety and security and contribute to their development and social awareness? Why is this difficult task related to securing the funds from which the harmonization of regulations, technical equipment, equipment maintenance and systems will be financed? Do you sometimes make a mistake by dealing with individual partner organizations in attempts to establish an effective system of nuclear safety and security? The user has to be addressed in direct communication in to help him be faster, more efficient and to have the overall process less costly. This is fine when the inefficiency of some partner organizations only results of its internal organizational factors (management, size, strategy development, equipment, organizational culture). But what if this is not the case and if you neglect external factors (economic system in the country, institutional conditions, level of technology) and, finally, the culture of society as a critical factor? What are the problems then that arise in the system of nuclear safety and security in the country? Is a man again in the center of those problems and how can he deal with them? (author)

[en] As the world leader in the maritime transport of radioactive material (RAM) International Nuclear Service (INS) and its subsidiary, Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited (PNTL) have pioneered the standards for safe and secure transport operations. This paper will highlight these standards from an operator's perspective and provide an overview of how the company would respond to a safety or security related incident. In matching these standards against the national and international maritime regulations, INS will continue to lead the way on the worldwide transport of RAM thus supporting the nuclear fuel cycle and overall global threat reduction. (author)

[en] Development and implementation of safety and security requirements for transport of radioactive materials in the Russian Federation are addressed. At the outset it is worth noting that the transport safety requirements implemented are in full accordance with the IAEA's ''Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2009 Edition)''. However, with respect to security requirements for radioactive material transport in some cases the Russian Federation requirements for nuclear material are more stringent compared to IAEA recommendations. The fundamental principles of safety and security of RM managements, recommended by IAEA documents (publications No. SF-1 and GOV/41/2001) are compared. Its correlation and differences concerning transport matters, the current level and the possibility of harmonization are analysed. In addition a reflection of the general approaches and concrete transport requirements is being evaluated. Problems of compliance assessment, including administrative and state control problems for safety and security provided at internal and international shipments are considered and compared. (author)