[en] As a result of history Germany owns two repositories, Konrad and Morsleben, in deep geological formations licensed for LILW and one exploration mine, Gorleben, for investigating the site's suitability to erect a repository for HLW/SNF and heat generating ILW. Due to political decisions, exploration at Gorleben is interrupted presently and no waste emplacement takes place in any of the LILW repositories. The Morsleben repository for LILW now is under licensing for closure. To assess long-term safety of the repositories different safety strategies were applied linking site independent high level requirements to site specific conditions, constraints, and boundary conditions due to the type and amount of waste to be disposed of. Using the closure of the Morsleben repository as an example different safety strategies are shown leading to different technical closure concepts and multi-barrier systems. Evaluating these different closure concepts on a conceptual level qualitative criteria may be applied first, followed by performing a provisional safety assessment being quantitative approaches for deriving a first set of safety related quantitative requirements concerning the multi-barrier system and assuring that high level requirements are fulfilled. On this basis engineered barrier design is drafted and a set of criteria for evaluating their first design qualitatively is given. When assessing single barriers quantitatively to show their compliance with the derived requirements reliably, increasing knowledge in verifying the multi-barrier system as well as single barriers leads to changes of derived requirements and modifications of technical solutions regarding the engineered barriers. Within the repository project derived requirements are documented as well as design decisions. To guarantee traceability of requirement evolution and design decisions quality assurance measures are applied. However, today they solely allow traceability, active management is not possible. Finally, a brief description is given of how engineers, scientists and safety assessors having worked together up to now and their role within the projects at different project stages. A systematic approach to integrate information from engineers, scientists and safety assessors has not been applied until now. Integrating information within a repository project is a question of applying quality assurance from the start of the project. (author)

[en] Geologic repositories are sited, designed and operated to protect humans and the environment from the hazards associated with radioactive waste. Most challengingly, they are required to provide protection after their closure and over timescales that are considerably in excess of those commonly considered in most engineering projects, often up to several thousand or even a million years. This requirement is laid down in international guidance and in many national regulations. Various processes and events will drive the evolution of a repository and its environment, and hence could affect the containment and lead to possible release of radioactive substances from the repository and their migration to the surface. These processes and events are characterised by timescales ranging from a few tens or hundreds of years for transient processes associated with, for example, the re-saturation of the repository and its immediate surroundings following closure, to perhaps millions of years for changes in the geological environment. Safety assessments must consider consequences of releases of radioactive substances and verify that targets set by regulation are complied with. In order to evaluate compliance with dose or risk criteria, assumptions must be made regarding the habits of potentially exposed groups (e.g., diet, lifestyle and land use), and these may change over timescales of just a few years. The need to deal with such a wide range of timescales gives rise to a range of issues related to the methods and presentation of safety assessments and of safety cases. (author)

[en] License for the nuclear facilities such as radioactive waste repository demands documents of site characterization, environmental assessment and safety assessment. This performance will produce bulk of the relevant data. For the safe management of radioactive waste repository, data of the site and environment have to be collected and managed systematically. Particularly for the radwaste repository, which has to be institutionally controlled for a long period after closure, the data will be collected and maintained through the monitoring programme. To meet this requirement, a new programme called 'Site Information and Total Environmental data management System (SITES)' has been developed. The scope and function of the SITES is issued in data DB, safety assessment and monitoring system. In this respect, SITES is designed with two modules of the SITES Database Module (SDM) and the Monitoring and Assesment (M and A). The SDM module is composed of three sub-modules. One is the Site Information Management System (SIMS), which manages data of site characterization such as topography, geology, hydrogeology, engineering geology, etc. The other is the ENVironmental Information management System (ENVIS) and Radioactive ENVironmental Information management System (RENVIS), which manage environmental data required for environmental assessment performance. ENVIS and RENVIS covered almost whole items of environmental assessment report required by Korean government. The SDM was constructed based on Entity Relationship Diagram produced from each item. Also using ArcGIS with the spatial characteristics of the data, it enables groundwater and water property monitoring networks, etc. To be analyzed in respect of every theme. The sub-modules of M and A called the Site and Environment Monitoring System (SEMS) and the Safety Assessment System (SAS) were developed. SEMS was designed to manage the inspection records of the individual measuring instruments and facilities, and the on-lined environmental monitoring data. SAS was developed to combine various safety assessment codes in one system

[en] This report is a first step to create a documentation of the ecosystems close to the surface, that will be a part of the site characterization program. The variables list all the information that can be collected from a site. Local conditions and methodology development will influence the final choice of parameters and need for information collection. The variables are divided into the groups: Man, Climate, Physical geography, Biota and Hydrology and has been rated according to their expected importance for different application areas

[en] Having heard all participants along this day, the Rapporteur recalls, first, the shift we have to adopt in decision making process, and then gives three types of conclusions: the specificities of the decommissioning and dismantling (DD) compared with radioactive waste management; a first assessment of the decision making processes presented during this session, regarding the FSC criteria; and some others conclusions with some ideas for improvement: the need for stronger national policies, the 3 pillars of the local confidence, and the importance of mobilizing staff for a successful DD

[en] The quantities of residual materials in a KBS-3H type repository have been estimated in this report. The repository is assumed to be constructed at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki, Western Finland. Both the total quantities of the materials introduced into the repository and the quantities of materials that remain in the repository after closure have been calculated. The calculations are largely based on a similar work regarding the material quantities in the Finnish KBS-3V repository and the main goal has been to identify the differences between the KBS-3H and KBS-3V repositories with respect to the type and quantities of residual materials. As the design of the KBS-3H repository is not final yet, the results are only preliminary. Several alternative designs were assumed in the calculations, resulting in different total quantities of materials. The design alternatives that had the greatest effect on the total material quantities were the two different tunnel backfill options, bentonite-crushed rock and Friedland clay. If Friedland clay is used instead of a bentonite-crushed rock mixture, the total quantity of pyrite remaining in the repository is 20 times larger and the quantities of organic materials and gypsum are also increased significantly. The other design alternatives did not have a substantial effect on the total material quantities. The remaining quantity of cement can be reduced by some 20% by selecting the silica grouting alternative in the sealing of the rock mass and low-pH cement in the shotcreting of the repository, instead of using the ordinary cement alternatives. If the total quantity of steel should be minimised, the use of the DAWE design alternative would be better than the Basic Design, although the total reduction would be less than 10%. The main difference between the different drift end plug alternatives is related to the total remaining quantity of silica, which is some 80% smaller if the rock plug is used instead of the LHHP (Low Heat High Performance) concrete plug. The total quantity of silica is, however, also clearly dependent on the grouting and shotcreting alternatives. A comparison between the KBS-3H and KBS-3V repositories revealed that most of the total remaining material quantities are nearly the same or smaller in KBS-3H, the difference being typically -20%. Only very few materials had a clearly larger remaining quantity in the KBS-3H repository. One main reason for the generally smaller material quantities in KBS-3H is the smaller total volume of the KBS-3H deposition drifts as opposed to KBS-3V deposition tunnels. Furthermore, the quantities can be smaller because the deposition drifts are not excavated by drill and blast, they do not have any rock support or conventional installations and they probably require less grouting due to their smaller cross-sectional area

[en] This paper aims to characterise Swedish democracy in connection with the disposal of Swedish nuclear waste. To this end, an analysis is performed to discern which democratic ideals that can be found within the nuclear waste issue. The study analyses various actors' views on democracy and expertise as well as their definitions of the nuclear waste issue, and discusses this from the perspective of democracy theory. Which definitions that become influential has democratic implications. In addition, various actors' possible attempts to help or hinder other actors from gaining influence over the nuclear waste issue in the four municipalities are studied. In connection with the case studies the aim of the paper can be narrowed to comprise the following questions: Which democratic ideals can be found within SKB's siting process during the feasibility studies and in the consultation process during the site investigations? Which democratic ideals were influential during the feasibility studies and in the consultation process?

[en] The seminar was held Serpong, on 26 September 2017 as a media to disseminate research and development results in the field of radioactive and non-radioactive waste. The National Seminar on Waste Management Technology XV serves as a medium for exchanging information and experience, a place for scientific discussion, enhancing partnerships between researchers, academics and industry practitioners, sharpening the vision of policy makers and decision-makers, as well as increasing collective awareness of the importance of innovative waste management, reliable, and sustainable and as a form of concern for the environment. This proceeding includes 36 papers from various research results on radioactive, industrial and environmental waste management. Papers are grouped into four groups, namely waste management, disposal, environment, and legislation. The papers came from researchers circles in the BATAN, BAPETEN, and PUSARPEDAL, as well as academics from the University of Indonesia, Gadjah Mada University, Muhamadiyah University Jakarta, and STIKES Binawan.(PPIKSN)

[en] SKB has selected Forsmark as the site for the final repository for spent nuclear fuel. The site selection is the end result of an extensive siting process that began in the early 1990s. The strategy and plan for the work was based on experience from investigations and development work over a period of more than ten years prior to then. This document describes the siting work and SKB's choice of site for the final repository. It also presents the information on which the choice was based and the reasons for the decisions made along the way. The document comprises Appendix PV to applications under the Nuclear Activities Act and the Environmental Code for licences to build and operate an encapsulation plant adjacent to the central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel in Oskarshamn, and to build and operate a final repository for spent nuclear fuel in Forsmark in Oesthammar Municipality

[en] This Working Report presents the main results of Posiva Oy's environmental monitoring programme on Olkiluoto Island in 2007. These summary reports have been published since 2005 (target year 2004). The environmental monitoring system supervised by Posiva Oy produces input for biosphere modelling for long-term safety purposes as well as for monitoring the state of the environment during the construction (and later operation) of ONKALO underground characterization facility. Although some of the nuclear power production related monitoring studies by TVO (the power company) have been going on from the 1970s, the repository-related environmental monitoring of Olkiluoto Island has only recently been comprehensive. In the monitoring data, the ongoing construction work (OL3, ONKALO and related infrastructure) is seen for instance in raised noise levels and deposition of base cations and iron. The land-use continues to change, but where there is natural environment, it resembles other coastal locations. The nearby marine environment is affected by the cooling water from the nuclear power plant. (orig.)