[en] The needs and views of developing countries with regard to nuclear energy are reviewed. The main issue in international nuclear relations is the need to restore a climate of mutual confidence, in particular the proliferation risks of nuclear power. These risks have been examined by INFCE. Safeguards and the provision of supplies from abroad are discussed. (U.K.)

[en] The basic design elements (which have remained constant) and report on current and near term enhancements that have resulted from the evaluation process are presented. 2 figs, 1 tab

[en] The article considers new challenges and possibilities for improvement of safeguards implementation, presents recent results obtained, and concludes with a forward look at future challenges

[en] Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

No abstract available

[en] As part of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, PNL has developed a package of computer programs, called INSPECT, that can be used in planning and evaluating safeguards inspections of various types of nuclear facilities. The programs are based on the statistical methods described in Part F of the IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual and can be used to calculate the variance components of the MUF (Material Unaccounted For) statistic, the variance components of the D (difference) statistic, attribute and variables sampling plans, and a measure of the effectiveness of the inspection plan. The paper describes the programs, reviews a number of applications, and indicates areas for future work

[en] The objective of this research is the development of sample allocation program using hypergeometric distribution with objected-oriented method. When IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency) performs inspection, it simply applies a standard binomial distribution which describes sampling with replacement instead of a hypergeometric distribution which describes sampling without replacement in sample allocation to up to three verification methods. The objective of the IAEA inspection is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material, therefore game theory is applied to its sampling plan. It is necessary to use hypergeometric distribution directly or approximate distribution to secure statistical accuracy. Improved binomial approximation developed by Mr. J. L. Jaech and correctly applied binomial approximation are more closer to hypergeometric distribution in sample size calculation than the simply applied binomial approximation of the IAEA. Object-oriented programs of 1. sample approximate-allocation with correctly applied standard binomial approximation, 2. sample approximate-allocation with improved binomial approximation, and 3. sample approximate-allocation with hypergeometric distribution were developed with Visual C⁺⁺ and corresponding programs were developed with EXCEL(using Visual Basic for Application). 8 tabs., 15 refs. (Author)

[en] An intensified discussion of evaluation criteria for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards effectiveness is currently under way. Considerations basic to the establishment of such criteria are derived from the model agreement INFCIRC/153 and include threshold amounts, strategic significance, conversion times, required assurances, cost-effectiveness, and nonintrusiveness. In addition to these aspects, the extent to which fuel cycle characteristics are taken into account in safeguards implementations (Article 81c of INFCIRC/153) will be reflected in the criteria. The effectiveness of safeguards implemented under given manpower constraints is evaluated. As the significant quantity and timeliness criteria have established themselves within the safeguards community, these are taken as fixed. Detection probabilities, on the other hand, still provide a certain degree of freedom in interpretation. The problem of randomization of inspection activities across a fuel cycle, or portions thereof, is formalized as a two-person zero-sum game, the payoff function of which is the detection probability achieved by the inspectorate. It is argued, from the point of view of risk of detection, that fuel cycle-independent, minimally accepted threshold criteria for such detection probabilities cannot and should not be applied

[en] The authors describe a general randomized inspection scheme that satisfies initially stipulated quantitative requirements on detection probabilities and timeliness and at the same time makes more efficient use of inspection resources. The scheme reduces intrusiveness into the operations of the inspected plant and improves the effectiveness of the inspection by the unpredictability and the increased intensity of the inspections. The same formalism is applicable to sequential inspections, inspections by strata, and inspections of facilities over a large complex, such as a country. The description has been set in the context of IAEA safeguards, where preliminary estimates show that appreciable improvements could be made. However, the methodology is applicable to a much wider class of inspections

[en] This presentation explains the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention as they pertain to challenge inspections. It provides an overview of the role of challenge inspections in the verification system and describes the procedures involved in a challenge inspection. Some underlying principles are identified and compared with the strengthened IAEA safeguards system concerned with nuclear materials inspection