[en] The increased production of nuclear fissile materials and the development of technology related to nuclear power generation also increase the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation. This book deals with the present situation in the field and with the measures planned to reduce proliferation risks arising from uranium enrichment and irradiated fuel reprocessing. It also contains an in-depth analysis of the safeguards presently applied, nuclear export policies, the lessons learned from INFCE and the conditions for implementing the Non-proliferation Treaty. (NEA)

[en] The historical and political aspects of relations between civil nuclear technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are analyzed. Many countries will soon be able to come close to making a bomb without violating their nonproliferation agreement. While peaceful nuclear power production should continue, there is a need for basic changes in its development and export. The driving forces behind proliferation are examined and the initial steps set out which need to be taken

[en] The reason for analyzing alternative fuel cycles is to identify those characteristics which provide weak links and to develop a balanced fuel cycle in which neither the front end, the reactor, nor the back end would provide an obvious pathway to a nuclear weapons capability. This balance can be achieved with identifiable technical, institutional, and political barriers. The economics, safety, environmental, and commercial feasibility of the barriers must also be evaluated to assess national and international acceptability. The choice between systems should be based on these factors in addition to the problem of proliferation

[en] This article sets out the principle and essentials of the process for reviewing the operation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970. In 1995 the NPT was extended. The 2000 review conference is of considerable importance for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly in the light of the fact that after the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states urged the nuclear-weapon states to take new steps towards nuclear disarmament. This article presents a review of the 30 year period of the application of NPT

[en] Different aspects and mechanisms of ensuring security assurance for non-nuclear-weapon states are discussed

[en] The paper concerns the findings of the September 1985 Geneva Conference, set up to review the non-proliferation treaty. The non-proliferation treaty; safeguards and inspection of nuclear material; arms control and nuclear disarmament; are all discussed. (U.K.)

[en] This document sets out some responses to ten criticisms of the notion that negotiations could be commenced, without delay, on a new international treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons, even without the participation of nuclear-armed states. It aims to promote discussion on this proposed approach, including how it may work with other initiatives and form the basis for collective work by civil society, international organisations and states committed to overcoming the current impasse in work on nuclear weapons. In the context of this paper, the idea of a ban on nuclear weapons refers to an international treaty establishing a comprehensive prohibition on the use, possession, stockpiling, production, development, deployment and transfer of nuclear weapons as well as a prohibition on assistance with these acts. Such a treaty could also require the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe, for those states with nuclear weapons that join. The process for negotiations should be open and inclusive, seeking common agreement by all negotiating states, but the treaty can and should be negotiated without the nuclear-armed states if they decide not to participate or attempt to thwart agreement

[en] The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

[en] Confidence-building has come into its own as a 'tool of choice' in facilitating the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) agenda, whether regional or global. From the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) to the ASEAN Intersessional Group on Confidence-Building (ARF ISG on CBMS), confidence-building has assumed a central profile in regional terms. In the Four Power Talks begun in Geneva on December 9, 1997, the United States identified confidence-building as one of two subject areas for initial discussion as part of a structured peace process between North and South Korea. Thus, with CBMs assuming such a high profile internationally, it seems prudent for Canadians to pause and take stock of the significant role which Canada has already played in the conceptual development of the process over the last two decades. Since the Helsinki accords of 1975, Canada has developed a significant expertise in this area through an unbroken series of original, basic research projects. These have contributed to defining the process internationally from concept to implementation. Today, these studies represent a solid and unique Departmental investment in basic research from which to draw in meeting Canada's current commitments to multilateral initiatives in the area of confidence-building and to provide a 'step up' in terms of future-oriented leadership. (author)

[en] Introductory remarks by the Moderator at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension conference are presented. 3 refs