[en] This paper provides (a) an overview of the range of feasible Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility transfer and storage configurations that are available to the US DOE, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), and (b) a preliminary qualitative assessment of alternative configurations that identifies those proven or reasonably available technologies that appear to best meet the anticipated mission and functional requirements of the MRS. Twenty four spent fuel transfer options are discussed each of which can be configured with one or more of the 5 individual dry storage modes included in the assessment. A summary is provided of the recent work that has been performed on the MRS facility design program by OCRWM in preparation for the start of Title I - Preliminary Design, slated for October, 1991

[en] The NUHOMS reg-sign dry storage system for spent fuel is now in use at two Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) and a third is under construction. This system can be used for economic storage at the MRS. Multi-assembly canisters may be shipped to the MRS directly from the ISFSI or the reactor spent fuel pool. Canisters also may be loaded with fuel assemblies at the MRS. The interfaces between the ISFSI, the DOE transportation system, and the MRS are described for the NUHOMS reg-sign system. The design criteria for the NUHOMS reg-sign systems and the applicability of the criteria to the MRS are also discussed

[en] In a resounding show of support for the development of a private monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facility for the storage of spent commercial nuclear fuel, 33 utilities and two nuclear industry contractors have signed on with the Mescalero Apache Tribe and Northern States Power Company to further explore such a project. Representatives from 34 utilities gathered on the Mescalero Apache Reservation in southern New Mexico on March 10-11 to hear the tribe's proposal for a privately owned and operated MRS. The preliminary business plan developed for the project sets forth the terms of facility use for utilities that are interested in joining, estimates implementation costs, and describes storage capacity requirements. The Mescaleros would have majority ownership in the venture, and a board of directors would represent equity holders. Completion of the project would be contingent on the ability of NSP and the Mescaleros to site and license the facility; to agree on a design; to finish construction and begin operation; to ensure an adequate system for transport of spent fuel to the site; and to plan for site remediation

[en] The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA) authorized the DOE to site, construct, and operate Monitored Retrievable Storage. The Modular Vault Dry Store is a technology which has been in commercial operation in the United Kingdom for 20 years. Recently, this technology has been adapted to the requirements of Light Water Reactor Spent Fuel. This technology is ideally suited for use in the US DOE's Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Program. It is available now for deployment, meeting all the requirements of a MRS

[en] The Department of Energy has submitted to the NRC staff for review a topical safety analysis report (TSAR) for a Centralized Interim Storage Facility (CISF). The TSAR will be used in licensing the CISF when and if a site is designated. CISF1 design events are identified based on thorough review of design basis events (DBEs) previously identified by dry storage system suppliers and licensees and through the application of hazard assessment techniques. A Preliminary Hazards Assessment (PHA) is performed to identify design events applicable to a Phase 1 non site specific CISF. A PHA is deemed necessary since the Phase 1 CISF is distinguishable from previous dry store applications in several significant operational scope and design basis aspects. In addition to assuring all design events applicable to the Phase 1 CISF are identified, the PHA served as an integral part of the CISF design process by identifying potential important to safety and defense in depth facility design and administrative control features. This paper describes the Phase 1 CISF design event identification process and summarizes significant PHA contributions to the CISF design

[en] This article discusses the political, social, and economic aspects of siting the Monitored Retrieval Storage (MRS) facility. The first focus is on siting in American Indian lands, specifically in Mescalero, New Mexico, followed by a more general discussion of the problems surrounding MRS siting

[en] Finding suitable accomodations for the temporary storage and permanent disposal of this nation's low- and high-level radioactive waste is proving an ever more difficult task in this era of volatile technology and science debate over the merits of the nuclear fuel cycle. Local constituencies become deeply immersed in the complex debate whether the site is chosen through a technical site selection process or is a voluntary entry. Rural communities with candidate sites need to initially shift their focus away from this, often acrimonious, debate; instead, the first discussion priority for such rural communities should be to develop a dynamic vision of their own economic and environmental future. The second discussion priority should be to determine if the array of accompanying incentives and benefits hosting this facility would afford the community the opportunity for vision fulfillment. If so, total focus should, then, be given to understanding and resolving to the satisfaction of the constituents issues related to nuclear technology, isolation of radioactive materials, management of risk, storage and disposal facility need, perceived and actual risk, oversight and power sharing authority, engineered safety barriers, and public trust. Too often, the nuclear-related science and technology debate is first, and the pragmatic discussion concerning the vision of the future is never accomplished

[en] This paper examines an increasingly urgent and surprisingly difficult task: siting potentially hazardous facilities that are intended to operate for a limited period, such as a Monitored Retrievable Storage facility (MRS) for radioactive waste. Other examples are at-reactor radioactive waste storage facilities (e.g., dry cask storage) an interim storage facilities for plutonium recovered from retired nuclear weapons. Conventional wisdom holds that such facilities will be easier to site than facilities that are intended to be permanent, such as a radioactive waste repository. Yet the record to date has not provided much support for this expectation. Efforts to site an MRS are approaching the decade mark, despite several acts of Congress and the implementation of a variety of innovative institutional mechanisms designed to facilitate the siting process. And there is no end in sight exclamation point As the title of this paper suggests, we argue that a distinctive challenge to siting interim facilities is meeting the concern of interested publics that the facility may turn out not to be interim and instead achieve de facto permanence. Unless this concern is successfully addressed, siting an interim facility becomes just as difficult as siting as permanent facility because the concerned publics have to assume the worst (that the interim facility will be permanent) and act accordingly. Our analysis of this challenge is in four parts. First, we describe a generalized scenario that captures the logic of the dilemma. Second, we briefly recount four cases where the scenario is being played out (or has the potential to do so). Third, we explore several more specific siting issues through the lens of the interim facilities dilemma. Fourth, we draw conclusions and policy implications

[en] The basic principles for the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel are presented in accordance to the author's understanding. The are: 1) Storage in the air at a low temperature (below 200 ^oC) or in a inert atmosphere (nitrogen, helium) at a temperature up to 300-400^oC; 2) Passive cooling by air; 3) Multiple barriers to the propagation of fission products and trans-uraniums: fuel palette, fuel pin cladding, a containment or a canister, a single or a double cover of the container; 4) Control of the condition of the atmosphere within the double cover - pressure monitoring, helium concentration monitoring (if the atmosphere in the container is of helium or contains traces of helium). Based on publications, observations and discussion during the recent years, several principles are propose for discussion. It is proposed: 4) Stored fuel must be regarded as defective; 5) Active control of the integrity of the protective barriers of of the composition of the storage atmosphere - principle of the 'control barrier' or the 'control atmosphere'; 6) Introduction of the procedure of 'check up of the condition of SNF' by visual control or sampling of the storage atmosphere for the technologies which do not provide for monitoring the integrity of barriers or of the storage atmosphere. Principle 4 is being gradually accepted in modern technologies. Principle 5 is observed in the double-purpose containers and in some of MVDS technologies. A common feature of the technologies of horizontal and vertical canister storage in concrete modules is the absence of control of the integrity of barriers or of the composition of the atmosphere. To these technologies, if they are not revised, principle 6 applies

[en] Indian tribes have been directly involved in the development of nuclear energy and weapons production by the United States from its very inception since many uranium mines are located on or in proximity to American Indian lands. Tribal involvement with nuclear energy is increasing and another milestone in the relationship is the siting of a Monitored Retrievable Storage facility. The MRS is not just another DOE facility but is a symbol of tribal sovereignity and a testing of tribal cultural values. For once, tribes were given the same opportunities as states and counties; yet, tribes were criticized for exercizing their rights under existing legislation. Fifteen tribes applied for grants on the basis of the non-coercive, and purely voluntary, nature of the Nuclear Waste Negotiators invitation. The zeal with which the tribal decisionmakers were verbally attacked was surprising and completely unforseen. The greatest lesson that can come out of the siting process is that a tribe has made its own decision about the MRS and has exercised its sovereignity in the face of severe opposition. Regardless of the decision, if it is made in an informed and wise manner, then it should be applauded as a statement of sovereign rights