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[en] Laser pointers are commonly used by teachers, students, and presenters in classrooms or meeting rooms as pointer devices. Laser pointers are used by some people as toys and as a hobby. These laser pointers are meant to emit laser power levels less than 1 mW, as required by several nations' regulations. However, developments in laser technology have enabled the manufacturing of low-cost laser pointer devices that give significant light output power across a wide range of visible wavelengths and are available to the general public. In fact, laser pointers and laser gadgets of various colours and power ranges from a few mW to several watts, are now widely available for purchase. As a result, laser pointers are in the hands of those who are unaware of the possible dangers of using these devices. In this study, the output power and the wavelength of 30 laser pointers purchased from various sources were measured, evaluated and compared with the safety level with respect to the limits stated in the American National Standard for the Safe Use of Lasers: ANSI Z-136.1 and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 60825-1. From the study, 80 % of the Laser pointers were emitting higher output power value and 67 % of the Laser pointers were displaying different wavelength value compared to the value labelled by the manufacturer. On the whole, 90% of the Laser pointers were emitting above the Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE). (author)

[en] The execution of attacks with radiological weapons are well within the capabilities of both local terrorist groups and transnational terrorist networks. In a research project, plausible attack scenarios have been developed, based on medical and industrial radioactive sources widely used in Germany. Special emphasis was put on how such sources could be obtained applying criminal tactics. To this end, working procedures in hospitals and companies have been analyzed. Furthermore, by means of simulations, the consequences of a terrorist attack using such sources were estimated. None of the scenarios we investigated led to doses at the site of the explosion which might cause acute radiation effects. However, in some scenarios, an attack would result in the necessity of a potentially very costly clean-up of large urban areas. Therefore, improvements in sources security are recommended. (orig.)

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[en] This work focuses on the main specific risks for those working with laboratory animals in a Research Center such as CIEMAT. First we present the general biological risks, their laws and rules. Next, we development the specific risks associated with the laboratory animals, zoonotic diseases and allergies. then we deal with the risks that can be consequence of working with laboratory animals, ionizing radiations, chemical products, genetically modified organisms, liquid nitrogen management, bio containment and human samples management. As they are subjects of interest, we also include the workers health assesment for those exposed to biological agents, including recommendations about hygiene and disinfections. (Author)

[en] Protection of heads of state/government from CBRN threats requires flexibility and advanced planning. The best approach to CBRN countermeasures in a close protection context combine traditional close protection techniques, sound security practices, and a good understanding of the technical nature of the threat. Poor general security practices make for poor CBRN protection. This paper addresses a methodology for assessing the viability of threats to protected persons/VIPs and provides an overview of close protection in the CBRN environment. It is important to define the scope of CBRN response in the close protection context. Some threat agents are more applicable to a military environment than to the type of attack consistent with assassination. By focussing the scope of CBRN close protection more specifically on the more technically viable threats, appropriate concepts of operation can be developed. Concepts of operation, developed with an understanding of the threat, determine the requirement for advanced preparation and the training and equipping of protective details. Most of the responses required in CBRN incidents are well served by tactically sound close protection procedures. The fundamental principles are: rapid identification of hazard, speed, use of protective technology, and medical interventions, including rapid decontamination and basic and advanced life support measures. This paper does not contain confidential or classified information and represents only the opinion of its author. It does not represent any official policy or opinion of the authors present or previous employers.(author)

[en] Containment of a tritium accident within a large fusion device building will be difficult and costly. Complete containment is impossible, and with this fact in mind, the global dispersion and health effects of tritium are reviewed. Atmospheric tritium emissions lead to an estimated population dose to the Northern Hemisphere of 5.6 x 10^-₃ man-rem/Ci, which may also be interpreted as 1 cancer fatality per MCi. Updating the NRC $1000 per man-rem criterion to 1982 costs gives 9.5 $/y per Ci/y as the unit annual health benefit rate from averting tritium release at a continuous rate. Present worth considerations lead to an estimate of $100 per Ci/y for the maximum capital investment justified per expected curie per year of tritium release averted. A simplified enclosure model is used to explore the trade-off between processing capacity and recycle time with the health cost of residual tritium release included in the analysis

[en] Short communication

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No abstract available