[en] This study describes and assesses the regulatory and administrative processes and procedures of the Atomic Energy Control Board, the AECB. The Atomic Energy Control Act authorized the AECB to control atomic energy materials and equipment in the national interest and to participate in measures for the international control of atomic energy. The AECB is authorized to make regulations to control atomic energy materials and equipment and to make grants in support of atomic energy research. (author)

[en] The implementation of IAEA safeguards is a subject which attracts the attention of virtually every IAEA Member State. The reasons for this attention are many and varied and although much has been said and written about the subject it is clear that there will be continuing debate. In the hope of establishing a forum for a systematic review of current and anticipated future safeguards implementation problems, in 1975 the Director General called together ten persons from Member States with nuclear programmes at varying stages of development to form the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. The Group was later expanded to twelve and changes were made in its membership from time to time. The Director General called upon the Group to: (1) Evaluate the technical objectives of IAEA safeguards, particularly with a view to ensuring their continued validity in the light of technical developments; (2) assess the effectiveness and efficiency of specific safeguards operating methods in meeting these technical objectives; (3) advise on techniques to be employed in safeguards operations in order to ensure that these techniques conform to the latest international standards; and (4) recommend areas where further work on methods and techniques is needed. This paper reviews the work of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation since its formation in 1975, summarizes the subjects that have been examined and the advice rendered, and outlines the problem areas requiring further study in the interest of maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards within the technical, legal and financial constraints which are expected to apply. (author)

[en] Regulatory bodies' requirements, international commissions' and missions' reviews, NPP Krsko self assessment and review, all resulted in Krsko NPP modernization plan which will be discussed in the second part of this article. The subject of the first part of this article are the requirements and recommendations made by regulatory and other bodies, as well as by the international missions. (author)

[en] Attention is paid to a number of issues which must be resolved before any firm commitment to build a commercial nuclear powered ship will be made. Basically, these can be grouped into three major problem areas: first, economic; second, indemnification and liability; and third, port entry and international clearance. It is concluded that there is reason for guarded optimism, as concerted efforts to solve the important issues are now underway. Some examples are briefly discussed

[en] This conference commemorates the 10th anniversary of the second of two Joint Verification Experiments conducted by the Soviet Union and the US. These two experiments, one at the Nevada test site in the US, and the second here at the Semipalatinsk test site were designed to test the verification of a nuclear testing treaty limiting the size underground explosions to 150 kilotons. By building trust and technical respect between the weapons scientists of the two most powerful adversaries, the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) had the unanticipated result of initiating a suite of cooperative projects and programs aimed at reducing the Cold War threats and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

[en] In November 2010 the IAEA Department of Safeguards launched its Long Term Strategic Plan at the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: 'Preparing for Future Verification Challenges'. A key element of the Long Term Strategic Plan is the further evolution of the State-level approach for safeguards implementation away from criteria driven safeguards approaches focussed at the facility level, to a safeguards system that is objectives-based and fully information-driven. The State-level approach is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States, incorporating comprehensive State evaluations and safeguards implementation approaches that make use of all information available to the IAEA. In further evolving the State-level concept State-specific factors and acquisition path analysis will become increasingly important in State evaluations and in the determination of safeguards approaches for each State. It will be important to determine objective modalities for incorporating these factors. Consideration of State-specific factors in determining safeguards approaches is not new - in fact, paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/153 (concluded June 1972) enumerates several such factors that can be considered. This paper will explore some ideas for State-specific factors that could be used in State-evaluations, and how these factors could be used for determining State-by-State safeguards approaches. Ideas for State-specific factors will include effectiveness of State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC), transparency of States in their dealings with the IAEA, and characteristics of a nuclear fuel cycle of a State.

[en] As the numbers and complexity of nuclear facilities increase, limitations on resources for international safeguards may restrict attainment of safeguards goals. One option for improving the efficiency of limited resources is to expand the current inspection regime to include random allocation of the amount and frequency of inspection effort to material strata or to facilities. This paper identifies the changes in safeguards policy, administrative procedures, and operational procedures that would be necessary to accommodate randomized inspections and identifies those situations where randomization can improve inspection efficiency and those situations where the current nonrandom inspections should be maintained. 9 refs., 1 tab

[en] While nonproliferation is no longer in the focus of international attention in the aftermath of the Afghanistan crisis, the problem of checking the spread of nuclear weapons was the subject of an intense controversy between the United States and Europe throughout the 1970s. Beginning with the Ford administration policy and continuing with the new Carter nonproliferation policy, a major nuclear controversy opposed the American and European nuclear suppliers. The first area of controversy was the question of technological transfers to the Third World and the conditions for such transfers (embargoes on sensitive technology, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards). The controversy also spread into the area of the plutonium economy - i.e., breeders and reprocessing. On both of these questions, most of the problems raised in the 1970s are still open despite some rapprochement between European and American positions. Major points of disagreement remain in the aftermath of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation full scope safeguards, the question of breeder reactors, and plutonium economy. The major uncertainty for the future will be whether nuclear energy as a whole will remain in the present state of depression or whether nuclear programs throughout the world will grow again. 24 references

[en] The safety of dams and dykes which are subject to International Joint Commission (IJC) orders was the topic of this report which was presented to the governments of the United States and Canada. The existing procedures and institutions responsible for dam safety were examined. The IJC is responsible for determining the requirements for comprehensive inspection programs, proper maintenance and repairs, adequate emergency action plans inundation maps, evacuation plans and public awareness programs. The geography and other features of a water shed that could affect dam safety fall under IJC jurisdiction. Organizations have been formed in both the United States and Canada to promote dam safety. Owners of regulated facilities must meet government requirements, and most have their own self-inspection programs to protect their investments and avoid liability. Nevertheless, the Commission strongly believes that government oversight is necessary to ensure that owners will follow up on recommendations coming from their own reviews, and that governments are ultimately responsible for public protection. In its examination of dam safety, the Commission found that emergency action plans do not exist for all regulated facilities, that emergency preparedness training was not always taken seriously by participants, and governments at all levels are not always involved as they should be. Commission recommendations include regular, periodic, complete and independent on-site inspections by qualified experts, establishment and regular testing of emergency action plans, and public access to all reports and documentation relating to safety issues. tabs., figs

[en] Ten witnesses from federal agencies, national laboratories, the nuclear industry, and the American Nuclear Society participated in a two-day hearing on research and development on domestic safeguards against theft and sabotage and international research and development on safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials for weapons use. Speaking as individuals and in panels, the witnesses described the purpose and nature of current research programs and the coordination of these activities on the domestic and international levels to avoid duplication. Additional materials for the record follow the statements and responses of the witnesses