[en] The NUHOMS reg-sign dry storage system for spent fuel is now in use at two Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) and a third is under construction. This system can be used for economic storage at the MRS. Multi-assembly canisters may be shipped to the MRS directly from the ISFSI or the reactor spent fuel pool. Canisters also may be loaded with fuel assemblies at the MRS. The interfaces between the ISFSI, the DOE transportation system, and the MRS are described for the NUHOMS reg-sign system. The design criteria for the NUHOMS reg-sign systems and the applicability of the criteria to the MRS are also discussed

[en] The basic principles for the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel are presented in accordance to the author's understanding. The are: 1) Storage in the air at a low temperature (below 200 ^oC) or in a inert atmosphere (nitrogen, helium) at a temperature up to 300-400^oC; 2) Passive cooling by air; 3) Multiple barriers to the propagation of fission products and trans-uraniums: fuel palette, fuel pin cladding, a containment or a canister, a single or a double cover of the container; 4) Control of the condition of the atmosphere within the double cover - pressure monitoring, helium concentration monitoring (if the atmosphere in the container is of helium or contains traces of helium). Based on publications, observations and discussion during the recent years, several principles are propose for discussion. It is proposed: 4) Stored fuel must be regarded as defective; 5) Active control of the integrity of the protective barriers of of the composition of the storage atmosphere - principle of the 'control barrier' or the 'control atmosphere'; 6) Introduction of the procedure of 'check up of the condition of SNF' by visual control or sampling of the storage atmosphere for the technologies which do not provide for monitoring the integrity of barriers or of the storage atmosphere. Principle 4 is being gradually accepted in modern technologies. Principle 5 is observed in the double-purpose containers and in some of MVDS technologies. A common feature of the technologies of horizontal and vertical canister storage in concrete modules is the absence of control of the integrity of barriers or of the composition of the atmosphere. To these technologies, if they are not revised, principle 6 applies

[en] During the exploitation of the Kozloduy NPP with WWER-440 and WWER-1000 reactors the high and low radioactive wastes are produced and are stored in the temporary storages on the NPP territory. Recently some efforts had been made for the treatment and the storage of these in the special containers on the NPP territory too. The spent fuel has been reexported in the former USSR up to 1988 and after it the storage time has been extended from 3 to 5 years. This urged the NPP to create temporary use the storage prolongate disposal of the spent fuel. The Policy for safe management of radioactive waste and spent fuel has been developed and approved by National Electric Company for deciding non-solved in-time problems. Two founds have been established namely The safe Storage of Radioactive waste and Decommissioning the nuclear Facilities with financing from 01.01.1999

[en] This Preliminary Safety Evaluation (PSE) describes and analyzes the installation and operation of the Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (SPS) at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The SPS is a combination of components required to expedite the safe and timely storage of Plutonium (Pu) oxide. The SPS program will receive site Pu packages, process the Pu for storage, package the Pu into metallic containers, and safely store the containers in a specially modified storage vault. The location of the SPS will be in the 2736- ZB building and the storage vaults will be in the 2736-Z building of the PFP, as shown in Figure 1-1. The SPS will produce storage canisters that are larger than those currently used for Pu storage at the PFP. Therefore, the existing storage areas within the PFP secure vaults will require modification. Other modifications will be performed on the 2736-ZB building complex to facilitate the installation and operation of the SPS

[en] The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA) authorized the DOE to site, construct, and operate Monitored Retrievable Storage. The Modular Vault Dry Store is a technology which has been in commercial operation in the United Kingdom for 20 years. Recently, this technology has been adapted to the requirements of Light Water Reactor Spent Fuel. This technology is ideally suited for use in the US DOE's Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Program. It is available now for deployment, meeting all the requirements of a MRS

[en] This paper provides (a) an overview of the range of feasible Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility transfer and storage configurations that are available to the US DOE, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), and (b) a preliminary qualitative assessment of alternative configurations that identifies those proven or reasonably available technologies that appear to best meet the anticipated mission and functional requirements of the MRS. Twenty four spent fuel transfer options are discussed each of which can be configured with one or more of the 5 individual dry storage modes included in the assessment. A summary is provided of the recent work that has been performed on the MRS facility design program by OCRWM in preparation for the start of Title I - Preliminary Design, slated for October, 1991

[en] Results of calculation of the main parameters of a heavy concrete cask with 10 fuel assemblies, designed for dry storage of spent fuel in NPP Krsko are presented. Thermal load and heat conduction trough the concrete walls of a cask were calculated. The overall dimension an the thickness of the walls of the storage facility were determined by calculating the dose rate inside and outside the storage building. (author)

[en] The design objectives and criteria for an MRS must be responsive to the needs and concerns of the public and the industry. It is shown here that to the maximum extent, existing industry programs and demonstrated technologies should form the foundation of the MRS program. The dual-purpose cask (DPC) program features allow the MRS to meet the simplicity and flexibility that is needed. The DPC is also shown to be built on proven operating technologies that have withstood the rigors of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing reviews. The added safety in both personnel exposure reduction and more efficient transportation is a key benefit that the DPC MRS would achieve. Next-generation DPC designs offer significant cost improvements via higher payloads that are based on use of burnup credit or loading consolidated fuel assemblies

[en] Challenges in general today: ― Retrieval of waste: acceleration of planning work; ― Emergency preparedness: best possible implementation; ― Stabilisation of the old mine; ― Influent saline solutions: assurance of permanent disposal; ― Upholding dialogue: continuing the communication process with concerned region

[en] The Department of Energy has submitted to the NRC staff for review a topical safety analysis report (TSAR) for a Centralized Interim Storage Facility (CISF). The TSAR will be used in licensing the CISF when and if a site is designated. CISF1 design events are identified based on thorough review of design basis events (DBEs) previously identified by dry storage system suppliers and licensees and through the application of hazard assessment techniques. A Preliminary Hazards Assessment (PHA) is performed to identify design events applicable to a Phase 1 non site specific CISF. A PHA is deemed necessary since the Phase 1 CISF is distinguishable from previous dry store applications in several significant operational scope and design basis aspects. In addition to assuring all design events applicable to the Phase 1 CISF are identified, the PHA served as an integral part of the CISF design process by identifying potential important to safety and defense in depth facility design and administrative control features. This paper describes the Phase 1 CISF design event identification process and summarizes significant PHA contributions to the CISF design