[en] The cask storage capacity is 26 casks. The maximum daily cask transport capacity is 12 casks between the ship and the facility and 6 casks between the power plant and the facility. The cask inspection is a periodic, self-initiated inspection which includes a visual inspection, an air leakage test, pressure test, etc. The pre-transport test includes a surface temperature test, a leakage test, a surface contamination level test, etc. 7 figures

[en] This document provides the computer technician or software engineer with a way to study the algorithms that are actually used by the SSF PLC

[en] This report documents the appropriate ET No. 3 infiltration rates to utilize as part of the ET No. 3 Special Analysis (SA)

[en] The purpose of this document is: (1) to review the HTI Mission Analysis and related documents to determine their suitability for use in developing performance measures for AX Tank Farm closure, (2) to determine the completeness and representativeness of selected alternative closure scenarios, (3) to determine the completeness of current plans for development of tank end-state criteria, and (4) to analyze the activities that are necessary and sufficient to recommend the end-state criteria and performance measures for the AX Tank Farm and recommend activities not currently planned to support establishment of its end-state criteria

[en] This Volume II contains tables that describe DOE fuel storage facilities and the fuel contained in those facilities

[en] Thermal modeling of plutonium metal ingots stored in food pack cans provides information useful for performing stored material safety evaluations. Four storage can geometries were modeled, and several conclusions can be made from the 14 cases analyzed. The ingot temperature increased from 7 degrees F to 12 degrees F (depending on can configuration) per additional watt of power. Including internal convection lowers computed ingot temperatures by 70 degrees F. Accounting for the heat flow through the bottom of the cans to the storage rack lowered computed ingot temperatures by an additional 70 degrees F to 80 degrees F. In the rimmed can systems storing ingots with a power of 10.35 watts, the ingot temperature varies from 190 degrees F to 213 degrees F. Including a plastic bag between the inner and outer can increases the ingot temperature by 15 degrees F. Adding a label to the outer can side reduces the outer can side temperature by 13 degrees F. Changes in ambient temperature affect the outer can temperatures more than the ingot temperature by a factor of 3. Similarly, a 5 degrees F drop in outer can temperature due to increased convection lowered the ingot temperature by only 2 degrees F

[en] This appendix provides a detailed description of geology under the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site, emphasizing the areas around tank farms. It is to be published by client CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., as part of a larger, multi-contractor technical report

[en] This document identifies 241-SX Tank Farm (SX Farm) leak causes and locations for the 100 series leaking tanks (241-SX-107, 241-SX-108, 241-SX-109, 241-SX-111, 241-SX-112, 241-SX-113, 241-SX-114, and 241-SX-115) identified in RPP-ENV-39658, Rev. 0, Hanford SX-Farm Leak Assessments Report. This document satisfies the SX Farm portion of the target (T04) in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-045-91F

[en] This report describes the generic approach the Department of Energy plans to take in deploying Federal Interim Storage (FIS) facilities, and the background considerations that have led to the development of this plan. As soon as the Department has firm information as to the source and quantities of any spent fuel eligible for FIS, it will proceed with a more specific plan, including identification of specific sites. In formulating its plans for deployment of FIS facilities, the Department has considered a number of alternative storage methods, sites, and transportation arrangements. 7 references

[en] The technical basis for the nuclear criticality safety of stored wastes at the Hanford Site Tank Farm Complex was reviewed by a team of senior technical personnel whose expertise covered all appropriate aspects of fissile materials chemistry and physics. The team concluded that the detailed and documented nucleonics-related studies underlying the waste tanks criticality safety basis were sound. The team concluded that, under current plutonium inventories and operating conditions, a nuclear criticality accident is incredible in any of the Hanford single-shell tanks (SST), double-shell tanks (DST), or double-contained receiver tanks (DCRTS) on the Hanford Site