[en] International confidence in the Non-Proliferation Treaty's safeguards system was dealt a severe blow by the belated discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The credibility of the present verification system associated with the NPT is low, a fact which could further undermine the treaty regime unless it is corrected. This report examines the weaknesses of existing safeguards and proposals for reform to reduce the risk of proliferation from activities at both declared and clandestine facilities. It also discusses the challenges for verification posed by ex-nuclear states that inherently pose special proliferation risks, and by the spread of nuclear materials and sensitive technologies. It proposes a range of measures that, taken together, would greatly improve the reliability of the NPT verification regime in the 1990s, and argues against some proposals that have recently gained some credence. So far, progress towards meeting the challenges of verifying the non-proliferation treaty in the 1990s has been painfully slow. Nuclear proliferation is a constant source of concern in the world today. In order to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its verification regime need urgent strengthening. This report identifies how that can be achieved. (author)