[en] Direct and root causes of Chernobyl accident have a complex character because many different events having independent origin happened jointly. The catastrophe occurred due to a systemic combination of objective and psychological factors, each of which was, in itself, not a source of danger. Human factor influence on the situation was net so much like operative personnel activity result but as activity of many workers on when previous phases of the plant life cycle. Systemic combination of those factors intensified their influence. Chernobyl operators erroneous actions could be classified as mistakes. The direct cause of the erroneous actions were a mistaken understanding of the neutron physics processes occurring in the reactor vessel. Theoretically operators could prevent the explosion if they would place faster absorbent rods in five seconds before they pushed “Automatic Defence—5” button. It is known that human error probability in that conditions, in 5-10 seconds, is practically unity. The root cause of the human errors was based on the fact that operation regulations provided the reactor unit safety. The regulations permitted (i.e., did not prohibit) the conditions the reactor unit was in before the accident in 1986. Examination of Chernobyl personnel motivation and attitude characteristics has shown that conflict “Human - Technology - Organization” could be presented quantitatively like motivation parameter. The conclusion is very important to solve a problem of the operator reliability. It has directed a search for psychological professional fitness criteria to the activity motivation and attitudes quality and also has drawn nearer nuclear unit safety concept and safety culture concept understanding. Operative personnel job descriptions and daily work practice formed attitude to diligence first of all. Presented approach in psychological analysis of the personnel activity when accident situation is developed by the comparison between personal aspect, cognitive and operational structures and formalized notation about personnel regulation activity. The researches have shown that individual psychological data of Chernobyl NPP personnel, which could be a direct cause of wrong actions and lead to the accident, were not differ from another nuclear power plant personnel ones. Analysis of psychological aspects of Chernobyl accident and investigation of plant personnel motivation changes in the accident consequences elimination environment confirm the necessity to develop concept of careful relation to worker. It is necessary to develop psychological support methodology to form human capital both in two aspects: professional personality formation and human resource management. The history asks the following questions: have the Chernobyl lessons been learned? Are our contemporaries and next generation ready to provide safety in the nuclear power plants? The terrorist attacks, military actions in the states who have nuclear power plants makes more complex problem of nuclear power plant, all mankind safety. (author)

[en] The approach to human factor definition, considered in the paper, consists of recognition of as many as possible factors for developing a complete list of factors, which have influence on mistakes or successful work of NPP personnel. Safety culture is considered as the main factor. The enhancement in nuclear power industry includes an optimization of organizational structures and development of personnel safety attitudes. The organizational factors, as possible root causes for human errors, need to be identified, assessed and improved. The organizational activities taken in Russia are presented

No abstract available

[en] Almost every event occurring in a nuclear power plant (NPP) has a human factors contribution and can be analysed from this point of view. National and international collections of unusual events in NPPs contain a large proportion of human dominated occurrences (up to 75%). At present, it is very important to analyse efficiently the accumulated operating of all NPPS in the world. The results of analysis of human dominated occurrences constitute a unique fund of information for improving nuclear safety. The paper presents the results of an analysis of NPP events by psychological means. The analytical efforts of the authors have concentrated on 'internal' attributes of the persons involved in NPP events and considered the problem of responsibility and autonomy in such events. The paper provides information on the concept of the authors and on analytical models developed (model of violation, model of mistake, model of dynamic errors, model of errors due to decomposition of a task, etc.) and gives examples of analyses of single human failures resulting in significant degradation of safety related equipment. The models presented allow different types of error to be distinguished. This differentiation facilitates the determination of adequate effective measures against reoccurrence of errors, since each error type has its own root causes in corresponding areas. (author)

[en] The paper presents pioneering data on the composition, texture, and crystal structure of molybdenite from various types of molybdenum mineralization at the Bystrinsky Cu–Au–Fe porphyry–skarn deposit in the eastern Transbaikal region, Russia. The data were obtained using electron microprobe analysis (EMPA), laser ablation–inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS), and high-resolution transmission electron microscopy (HRTEM). Molybdenite found at the deposit in skarn, sulfide-poor quartz veins, and quartz–feldspar alteration markedly differs in the concentrations of trace elements determined by their species in the mineral, as well as in its structural features. Molybdenite-2H from skarn associated with phyllosilicates occurs as ultrafine crystals with uniform shape and texture; no dislocations or inclusions were found but amorphous silica was. The molybdenite composition is highly contrasting in the content and distribution of both structure-related (Re, W, and Se) and other (Mn, Co, Ni, Cu, Zn, As, Ag, Cd, Sb, Te, Ag, Pd, Au, Hg, Pb, and Bi) metals. In the sulfide-poor quartz veins, highly structurally heterogeneous (2H + 3R) molybdenite microcrystals with abundant defects (dislocations and volumetrically distributed inclusions) are associated with illite, goethite, and barite. Some single crystals are unique three-phase (2H + 3R polytypes + amorphous MoS₂). The mineral has a low concentration of all trace elements, which are uniformly distributed. However, individual domains with uniquely high Pd, Te, Ni, Hg, and W concentrations caused by mineral inclusions are found in some grains. Molybdenite from quartz–feldspar alteration is characterized by low concentrations of all trace elements except for Re and Se, which enrich some domains of the grains. Our data indicate that the compositional and structural heterogeneity of molybdenite from the Bystrinsky deposit are its crucial features, which obviously correlate with the types of Mo mineralization.

[en] The results of an ultrasmall-angle X-ray scattering study of iron(III) oxide inverse opal thin films are presented. The photonic crystals examined are shown to have fcc structure with amount of stacking faults varying among the samples. The method used in this study makes it possible to easily distinguish between samples with predominantly twinned fcc structure and nearly perfect fcc stacking. The difference observed between samples fabricated under identical conditions is attributed to random layer stacking in the self-assembled colloidal crystals used as templates for fabricating the inverse opals. The present method provides a versatile tool for analyzing photonic crystal structure in studies of inverse opals made of various materials, colloidal crystals, and three-dimensional photonic crystals of other types.