[en] One of the 2002 MOST Mid-long-term Project for Nuclear R and D is 'Restructuring of Legal System and Optimizing of Technical Requirements for Nuclear Safety Regulation' in which the systems of foreign Safety and Regulatory Technical Requirements are reviewed and evaluated in order to improve the system of our technical requirements. This is a Korean version of 'Safety Review Guides of Japan Nuclear Safety Commission, revision 10, November 30, 2000'. Safety Review Guides of Japan Nuclear Safety Commission consist of Part 1 Guides and Part 2 Reports. Part 1 consists of guides on nuclear power rector facilities, test and research reactor facilities, and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. This is the translation version of the guides on nuclear power reactor facilities, including 17 guides as follows. - Siting : 1 guide, 'Review Guide and Criteria on Siting of Reactor Facilities', - Design : 6 guides, including 'Safety Review Guide for Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities' - Safety Review : 7 guides, including 'Safety Review Guide for Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities' - Objective Dose : 3 guides, including 'Guide on Objective Dose near Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities'. It is expected that this document would be useful for us to understand Safety Review Guides of Japan Nuclear Safety Commission, and to review the safety of domestic nuclear power reactor facilities

[en] The in-containment water storage system (IWSS) is a newly adopted system in the design of the Korean Next Generation Reactor (KNGR). It consists of the in-containment refueling water storage tank, holdup volume tank, and cavity flooding system (CFS). The IWSS has the function of steam condensation and heat sink for the steam release from the pressurizer and provides cooling water to the safety injection system and containment spray system in an accident condition and to the CFS in a severe accident condition. With the progress of the KNGR design, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has been developing Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidances for safety review of the KNGR. In this paper, regarding the IWSS of the KNGR, the major contents of the General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements, Safety Regulatory Guides, and Safety Review Procedures were introduced, and the safety review items that have to be reviewed in-depth from the regulatory viewpoint were also identified

[en] Three units of fuel fabrication plants are operating now in Korea. These fuel fabrication plants produce fuels for PWR, CANDU and HANARO research reactor, respectively. To enhance our regulatory systems for fuel cycle facilities including fuel fabrication plants, the related system of foreign countries is surveyed. In this study, the overall regulatory systems of the United States of America, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan are surveyed. The survey items consist of laws and regulations, regulatory organization, licensing procedure, documents to be submitted with a license application, regulatory inspection, and etc

[en] Two kinds of research reactor are operating now in Korea. One is HANARO (Open pool type, 30 MWth) in KAERI and the other is AGN-201 (HOMOG(S), 0.1Wth) in Kyunghee University. Because of the low power level, the small number and the size of the research reactors, the upgrading of domestic regulatory system for those facilities has not been so much concerned as the power plants. Recently, a study related to the SMART-P which is designed for the research and development was performed. In that study, licensing process and technical requirements for non-power reactor were investigated generally. In this study, the latest status of the regulatory system for research reactor in the countries, such as the United States of America, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan, are surveyed with comparing to that for power plants. The results of survey will be useful to find directions of enhancement in our own system

[en] The following five Safety Requirements publications were amended: Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1, 2010), Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3, 2003), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1, 2012), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (SSR-2/2, 2011), and Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4, 2009). Figure 1 shows IAEA Safety Standards Categories Major amendments of five Safety Requirements publications were introduced and analyzed in this study. The five IAEA safety requirements publications which are GSR Part 1 and 4, NS-R-3 and SSR-2/1 and 2, were amended to reflect the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident and other operating experiences. Specially, 36 provisions were modified and the new 29 provision with 1 requirement (No. 67: Emergency response facilities on the site) of the SSR-2/1 were established. Since the Fukushima accident happened, a new word, design extension conditions (DECs) which cover substantially the beyond design basis accidents (BDBA), including severe accident conditions, was created and more elaborated by the world nuclear experts. Design extension conditions could include conditions in events without significant fuel degradation and conditions with core melting. Figure 2 shows the range of the DECs. The amendment of the five IAEA safety requirements publications are focused at the prevention of initiating events, which would lead to the DECs, and mitigation of the consequences of DECs by the enhanced defense in depth principle. The following examples of the IAEA requirements to prevent the initiating events are: margins for withstanding external events; margins for avoiding cliff edge effects; safety assessment for multiple facilities or activities at a single site; safety assessment in cases where resources at a facility are shared; consideration of the potential occurrence of events in combination; establishing levels of hazard for the design basis for the installation and their associated uncertainties; consideration of hazards due to surface faulting and flooding; monitoring of hazards and periodic review of site specific hazards; strengthening the prevention of unacceptable radiological consequences to the public and the environment; preventing severe accident through strengthening the plant design basis, including strengthening the independence of level four of defense in- depth, consideration of external hazards and sufficient margins; periodic safety review; emergency preparedness; feedback of operating experience. The following examples of the IAEA requirements to mitigate the consequences of DECs are: role of the government and the regulatory body for emergency preparedness and response, strengthening severe accident mitigation measures; well defined and updated accident management program

[en] Japan has systematically revamped its technical standards for nuclear reactor facilities by formulating various performance regulations. Being part of a trend toward deregulation, such efforts toward social regulation is aimed at effectively operating administrative procedural laws to keep pace with global trends and enhance the benefits of deregulation under the principle of self-responsibility. Based on the collection of public opinions in February and March 2005, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency(NISA) presented its position that it was required to promptly perform a flexible assessment of the technical feasibility of formulated society and association standards. Current, pressing issues are summarized as an early revision of technical standards regarding nuclear facilities for power generation, use of society and association standards, and the overhaul of nuclear safety regulations subject to performance regulations. Subjecting technical standards to performance regulations means stipulating the qualitative aspects of performance and the targets that certain facilities must achieve, which are not specific standards, but general compulsory standards. This study examines the early revision of technical standards on nuclear facilities for power generation and the status of the use of society and association standards, as well as introducing the details of revisions in the concrete containment vessel standards as specific examples

[en] The IAEA safety standards encompass international consensus to strengthen the nuclear safety and to reflect the latest advancement of safety regulation related technologies. Also, they provide a reliable means to ensure the effective fulfillment of obligations under the various international safety conventions. Many countries have adopted the IAEA safety standards as their national standards in nuclear regulations. And Korea has exported nuclear power plant technologies abroad these days. The KINS (Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety) has performed a review of the IAEA safety requirements for the design of NPPs(Nuclear Power Plants) [1] comparing with those of Korea. The purposes of this comparative study are to harmonize the design safety requirements for the NPPs of Korea with those of the IAEA as a member state of the IAEA, and to encompass global efforts to enhance the nuclear safety and to reflect the latest advancement of safety regulation related technologies into the design safety requirements for the NPPs of Korea. Design requirements for structures, systems, and components of NPPs as well as for procedures and organizational processes important to safety, which are required to be met for assuring safe operation, for preventing events that could compromise safety, or for mitigating the consequences of such events, have been reviewed in this study

[en] A detailed time dependent behaviour of an unsteady shock wave through the T-type branched duct is investigated with both numerical and experimental methods. In order to study the effect of initial shock Mach number, M_s and the geometry of the duct on the unsteady shock motion, unsteady two-dimensional Navier-Stokes equations are solved by upwind scheme. The complicated flow fields including incident and reflected shock waves, vortex and expansion waves are visualized, and compared with experimented ones. The obtained results show when the shock wave with high initial shock Mach number generates the stronger vortex, increases the strength of reflected shock wave. Furthermore, it is found that the present computational and experimental results are good agreement

[en] In Korea, design concepts of sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR_s) have been developed since 1997 by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). The 255^th Atomic Energy Commission of Korea, held in Dec. of 2008, determined a long-term research and development plan for future nuclear systems including the SFR. According to the plan, it is scheduled to submit an application for licensing of an SFR demonstration reactor in 2017. In order to prepare the licensing of the demonstration reactor, the general design requirements (GDR_s) for the SFR should be established because they are used as rules in the safety evaluation of the design for the licensing by the regulatory body. The current GDR_s were developed based on the design of the LWR and enacted as the articles 12 to 49, including the article 2, in the 'Regulations on Technical Standards for Nuclear Reactor Facilities, Etc' (hereafter referred to as 'regulations on technical standards'), which is the Ordinance No. 1 of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. In this paper, the applicability of the current GDR_s for the LWR to the design of the SFR was evaluated as a part of activities to develop the GDR_s for the SFR

[en] Before May 17, 2005, Korea's nuclear power plant (hereinafter referred to as 'NNP') regulation system was two-pronged. Every NPP system consists of primary or secondary system, and each type was respectively regulated by the Atomic Energy Act(hereinafter referred to as 'AEA') and the Electric Utility Act(hereinafter referred to as 'EUA'). This unusual regulatory regime gave rise to a number of problems with respect to operation and safety. For this reason, the Enforcement Regulation of AEA and applicable Notice were revised on May 17, 2005 to the effect that all regulation on NPPs subject to EUA was brought under the purview of AEA, except regulation on business license for nuclear power generation under Article 7 of EUA and approval of plan of works for setting up electric installations (hereinafter referred to as 'construction plan') (including approval of any changes; the same shall apply hereinafter) under Article 61 thereof. From the point of view of the Ministry of Science and Technology, the regulation of NPPs by a single law has enhanced their safety. However, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy retains regulatory authority regarding NPPs. It reviews and approves construction plans for secondary system pursuant to Article 61 of EUA and Article 28 of the Enforcement Regulation thereof. This situation arose because Article 28 of the Enforcement Regulation of EUA continues to provide for matters related with nuclear power. Therefore, continued control of NPPs under EUA ignores the relationship and respective nature of AEA and EUA. There is also possibility of violation of a superseding law. Even if said provision is not in violation of a superseding law, Article 28 of the Enforcement Regulation of EUA poses the possibility of overlapping regulation, which may violate the principle of prohibiting excessive regulation, one of the principles of the Korean Constitution. Assessment of the dual regulatory system for review of secondary system requires (i) identifying problems by analyzing the nature of AEA and EUA and the regulatory law system on NPPs and (ii) ascertaining the legitimacy of the dual regulatory system according to the legal principles of the Constitution and administrative law