[en] An overview of the regulatory framework and licensing process for nuclear power plants in Canada is given along with an outline of the evolution of the safety philosophy followed and some comments on how this philosophy and process could be applied by a country embarking on a nuclear power program

[en] The increasing complexity of the Canadian nuclear programme, the problems of contamination and uranium mine safety and the national and international concern about proliferation have emphasized the need for a systematic and strong control over nuclear activities. Although the 1946 Atomic Energy Control Act provides the Atomic Energy Control Board with most of the powers necessary to achieve this, the new Act has been introduced to clarify jurisdiction and to strengthen the Board, which would then be renamed the Nuclear Control Board. Its duty would be to control health, safety and the environmental and other security aspects of the complete fuel cycle. (NEA)

[en] Several of the countries with advanced nuclear programs have established central organizations to take on the task of interpreting ICRP recommendations in their national context. This paper outlines the situation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany as background for a discussion of a possible structure for a national radiation protection council for Canada. In the United States the National Council on Radiation Protection is primarily devoted to gathering information and coordinating cooperative efforts. The British National Radiation Protection Board is a full research establishment. Germany has two senior level advisory committees, the Reactor Safety Commission and the Radiation Protection Commission (SSK) to advise the Minister of the Interior. In Canada the Atomic Energy Control Board has been concerned with radiation protection since 1960, and created an Advisory Committee on Radiological Protection (ACRP) in 1979. The ACRP would provide the basis for the establishment of a national radiation protection organization similar to the SSK if it reported to a suitable minister and was adequately supported

[en] The development of the Canadian nuclear power safety philosophy and practice is traced from its early roots at the Chalk River Nuclear Laboratory to the licensing of the current generation of power reactors. Basic to the philosophy is a recognition that the primary responsibility for achieving a high standard of safety resides with the licensee. As a consequence, regulatory requirements have emphasized numerical safety goals and objectives and minimized specific design or operating rules. The Canadian licensing process is described along with a discussion of some of the difficulties encountered. Examples of specific licensing considerations for each phase of a project are included

[en] The evolution of a distinctive Canadian nuclear safety philosophy is traced from the days of the Montreal Laboratory, during World War 2, to the present suggestions for future directions are offered. (author). 12 refs., 4 tabs., 2 figs

[en] A technical history of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited written by sixteen of Canada's pioneering nuclear scientists, Canada Enters the Nuclear Age focuses on Canada's nuclear program at AECL's laboratories at Chalk River, Ontario and Whiteshell, Manitoba between the years 1943 and 1985. Topics include the organization and operations of AECL's laboratories, nuclear safety and radiation protection, radioisotopes, basic research, development of the CANDU reactor, and management of radioactive wastes. 7 tabs., 132 figs

[en] The lecture will provide an outline of the Canadian nuclear organization and basic characteristics of the CANDU reactor as a background for a brief description of the nuclear power plant licensing process and the safety philosophy followed. The regulatory agency (Atomic Energy Control Board) follows a three step licensing procedure, Site Acceptance, Construction Approval, Operating Licence. Defense in depth is followed as a general safety concept, but is applied in a special way. Completely separate and independant safety systems are required and basic criteria established through reference dose limits for any assumed failure (or initiating event) in any process (operating) system and for any such failure combined with complete failure at any safety system. The application of the Canadian approach in other countries will be mentioned. (orig./RW)

[en] The present early stage of development of large nuclear power reactors has led to a requirement in Canada for siting restrictions and ''containment'' provisions. The latter, in conjunction with reliable operating and protective equipment, are intended to reduce to an acceptable level the probability of a serious release of fission products to the public. In considering the suitability of a site and the adequacy of the containment provisions, the Atomic Energy Control Board, which is the regulating agency, has developed siting criteria which consider: (1) normal releases of radioactive material from the plant, (2) die size of potential accidental releases, (3) the probability of accidents, and (4) the density of the surrounding population. Design guide values are given for the radiation exposure both of individuals and the total population at risk for three conditions: (1) normal operation, (2) failures of operating or ''process'' equipment only, (3) combined failures of process and protective equipment. From the application of known or stated meteorological conditions an ''acceptable'' release from the plant can be determined. When combined with predicted releases from the reactor for various accidents within the last two categories above, this will give the total ''allowable'' fractional release from the containment. The exposure limits for normal operation follow the recommendations of the ICRP. The limits for whole-body exposure for accidents are: Accident type Individual Total population Process failure only 0.5 rem 104 man-rem Process plus protective failure 25 rem 106 man-rem Limits have also been specified for exposure of the thyroid and other critical organs. These criteria have been used in evaluating the site and containment for the large multi-unit Pickering Generating Station and the 250 MW(e) Gentilly Station. Although the former is only 30 km from the centre of Toronto, a city of about two and one-half million, the exposure limit for an individual at the 1-km boundary was the deciding factor. It is hoped that operating experience will give assurance of the low probability of equipment failure so that the requirements for containment and siting can be reduced. (author)

[en] The CANDU nuclear power system has proven to be efficient, reliable, and economic. Its 'modular' type of pressure tube design permits development of larger size units without straining the manufacturing capabilities of the country. The design, especially suits the manufacturing capability of countries like Canada in that most of the components can be built by relatively small industries. It is likely that during the 1980's CANDU nuclear power units will provide the major part of new electrical generation capacity installed in Canada

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