AbstractAbstract
[en] Definition of nuclear materials control. Materials accountancy and physical control as technical possibilities. Legal possibilities and levels of responsibility: material holders, national and international authority. Detection vs. prevention. Physical security and containment surveillance. Accountancy: materials balance concept. Materials measurement: inventory taking, flow determination. IAEA safeguards; verification of operator's statement. (HP)
[de]
Definition der Spaltstoffkontrolle. Inventarisierung und materielle Kontrolle als technische Moeglichkeiten. Gesetzliche Moeglichkeiten und Verantwortlichkeits-/Haftbarkeitsebenen: Besitzer des Materials, nationale und internationale Behoerden. Entdeckung/Aufklaerung gegenueber Vorbeugung. Materielle Sicherung und Ueberwachung der Lagerung. Inventarisierung: Konzept des Materialgleichgewichts. Messung des Materials: Inventarisierung, Flussbestimmung. IAEA-Spaltstoffkontrolle: Verifizierung der Angaben des Betreibers. (HP)Primary Subject
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1975; 9 p; IAEA interregional training course on nuclear power project planning and implementation; Karlsruhe, F.R. Germany; 8 Sep 1975
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[en] The paper discusses the problems related to non-Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreements emphasising changes which would make it possible to improve the technical and operational conditions affecting non-NPT safeguards
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Buechler, C.
International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials1982
International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials1982
AbstractAbstract
[en] This session will emphasize guidelines for the organization and functions of the SSAC with respect to obligations arising from safeguards agreements concluded by a State with the IAEA
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Los Alamos National Lab., NM (USA); p. 13p, Session 3; Dec 1982; p. 13p, Session 3; International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for a control of nuclear materials; Santa Fe, NM (USA); 15 - 30 Mar 1982; Available from NTIS, PC A23/MF A01; 1 as DE83007769
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Buechler, C.
International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings1984
International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings1984
AbstractAbstract
[en] Topics discussed include IAEA safeguards statutes, project and transfer agreements, agreements pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, implementation of IAEA safeguards, diversion strategies, accountancy and surveillance systems, and verification
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Los Alamos National Lab., NM (USA); Exxon Nuclear Co., Inc., Richland, WA (USA); p. 3.1-3.14; Jun 1984; p. 3.1-3.14; 4. international training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for the control of nuclear materials (SSAC); Santa Fe, NM (USA); 17 Oct - 4 Nov 1983; Available from NTIS, PC A99/MF A01; 1 as DE85004636
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Buechler, C.
International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings1985
International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings1985
AbstractAbstract
[en] Nuclear and non nuclear material, services, facilities, equipment and information which are to be used for legally defined purposes may be deliberately diverted from these purposes. Actions aimed at the detection and deterrence of this diversion are known as safeguards. The development of safeguard regulations within the IAEA is described from a historical perspective in part 1 of this report. In part 2 potential divertors and diversion methods are described. Part 3 contains a description of current IAEA safeguards implementation, including discussions of accountancy, surveillance, containment and verification
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Los Alamos National Lab., NM (USA); p. 3.1-3.15; Jun 1985; p. 3.1-3.15; Advanced international training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material; Santa Fe, NM (USA); 2-22 Jun 1985; Available from NTIS, PC A99/MF A01; 1 as DE86013067
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AbstractAbstract
[en] This paper compares two nuclear safeguards inspectorates. One is the international inspectorate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The other is the national inspectorate of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). First, the relationship of international safeguards, national safeguards, material control and accounting, and physical security are identified. Then, this paper focuses on the policies and practices of the organizations and staffs who implement international and national safeguards. This includes a comparison of the qualifications and responsibilities for these two inspectorates. Also addressed are working conditions and career opportunities for each. In the case study, comparison of these two inspectorates reveals their similarities and differences. This paper concludes with future prospects for professionals in the respective safeguards inspectorates
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28. INMM annual meeting on safeguards: a mature technology; Newport Beach, CA (USA); 12-15 Jul 1987; CONF-870713--
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[en] The paper first defines the term career and assesses its application in the IAEA safeguards inspectorate. It then identifies prerequisites for employment in the inspectorate and describes the selection process. The second part outlines the requirements for approval by the Board of Governors and designation to specific countries, together with designation difficulties and delays the Department of Safeguards encounters in its attempts to utilize its staff resources as efficiently as possible. The paper examines working conditions of the inspectorate, and considers the political-technical nature of inspection work, headquarters and field responsibilities, productivity standards, promotion possibilities, the rotation system, and career potential. The paper concludes that an opportunity for a career in the inspectorate is necessary to ensure the staff loyalty, independence, and competence required for the IAEA to maintain credibility in the international community. It stresses the need to recognize the political-technical nature of the work, the lack of glamour, and the need for steps to provide career development. (author)
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International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Proceedings series; 769 p; ISBN 92-0-070187-6; ; 1987; v. 1 p. 47-55; IAEA; Vienna (Austria); International symposium on nuclear material safeguards; Vienna (Austria); 10-14 Nov 1986; IAEA-SM--293/114
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[en] IAEA safeguards are at the present under critical review with regard to their purpose and effectiveness. This paper describes the development of the IAEA Safeguards System from the early days, when procedures were developed on an ad hoc basis, to the present day. The development of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), and of sophisticated instrumentation, has been necessary to deal with the rapid growth in the quantities of nuclear material and in the number of facilities under safeguards. The paper also discusses some of the managerial and organizational issues that are inherent in such a large international inspectorate. (author)
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International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Proceedings series; 659 p; ISBN 92-0-050483-3; ; 1983; v. 5 p. 355-365; IAEA; Vienna; International conference on nuclear power experience; Vienna (Austria); 13-17 Sep 1982; IAEA-CN--42/395
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AbstractAbstract
[en] Beautiful theories of magnetic hysteresis based on random microscopic disorder have been developed over the past ten years. Our goal was to directly compare these theories with precise experiments. To do so, we first developed and then applied coherent x-ray speckle metrology to a series of thin multilayer perpendicular magnetic materials. To directly observe the effects of disorder, we deliberately introduced increasing degrees of disorder into our films. We used coherent x rays, produced at the Advanced Light Source at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, to generate highly speckled magnetic scattering patterns. The apparently ''random'' arrangement of the speckles is due to the exact configuration of the magnetic domains in the sample. In effect, each speckle pattern acts as a unique fingerprint for the magnetic domain configuration. Small changes in the domain structure change the speckles, and comparison of the different speckle patterns provides a quantitative determination of how much the domain structure has changed. Our experiments quickly answered one long-standing question: How is the magnetic domain configuration at one point on the major hysteresis loop related to the configurations at the same point on the loop during subsequent cycles? This is called microscopic return-point memory (RPM). We found that the RPM is partial and imperfect in the disordered samples, and completely absent when the disorder is below a threshold level. We also introduced and answered a second important question: How are the magnetic domains at one point on the major loop related to the domains at the complementary point, the inversion symmetric point on the loop, during the same and during subsequent cycles? This is called microscopic complementary-point memory (CPM). We found that the CPM is also partial and imperfect in the disordered samples and completely absent when the disorder is not present. In addition, we found that the RPM is always a little larger than the CPM. We also studied the correlations between the domains within a single ascending or descending loop. This is called microscopic half-loop memory and enabled us to measure the degree of change in the domain structure due to changes in the applied field. No existing theory was capable of reproducing our experimental results. So we developed theoretical models that do fit our experiments. Our experimental and theoretical results set benchmarks for future work
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(c) 2007 The American Physical Society; Country of input: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
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Physical Review. B, Condensed Matter and Materials Physics; ISSN 1098-0121; ; v. 75(14); p. 144406-144406.23
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