[en] The determination of discharge authorized limits for a French nuclear site is initiated by the request of the operator, based on the maximum nuclear and chemical inventory that could be released during normal operating conditions, accompanied with justifications. Request and justifications are analyzed and discussed by the ASN and the IRSN, taking into account nuclear and chemical inventories expected inside BNI, current regulations (BNI specific regulation, environment code, public health code), operating feedback (release feedback for an operating BNI, feedback coming from other nuclear sites or installations, etc.) and best available technologies that can be used to treat liquid or gaseous waste before release. After taking into account potential suggestions coming from public information or public enquiry concerning the operator request, the discharge authorized limits are settled down in specific ASN prescriptions that have to be ratified by the State secretaries in charge of nuclear safety. The whole process runs through 2 or 3 years to be achieved. Communication has revealed to be quite an uneasy task, even for administrative procedures. This aspect is mostly tested while communicating about events. Consequences of this communication can hardly be foreseen because of multiple external parameters like: news on the front pages at the same moment; historic communication difficulties still in the public mind; technical vocabulary not easily understood; public fear of things being hidden; power of ecologist or non-governmental associations. (authors)

[en] Among nuclear installations, some fuel cycle facilities present a high level of chemical hazards. In France, the TSN law of the 13 June 2006 requires taking into account all the risks generated by a basic nuclear installation (BNI). But, as most of the implementing regulatory texts are under development at this time, part of the previous regulation settled down in the 1990's is still applying: the order of the 31 December 1999 concerning technical regulation in order to prevent and to limit hazards generated by nuclear facilities; the decree of the 4 May 1995 and the order of the 26 November 1999 that deal with BNI discharges. Moreover, some parts of BNI or of nuclear sites can be submitted to the general regulation concerning chemical hazards, which is part of the environment code. As a result, even if the TSN law and its implementing decree Nr 2007-1557 of the 2 November 2007 settle clearly that safety of BNI is not only radiological, but must take into account chemical hazards, the latter aspects are still under development. Moreover the application of the existing regulation, even if complex, has helped to assess chemical risks inside BNI and nuclear sites. (authors)

[en] The French regulation, especially the law Nr 2006-686 of 13 June 2006 concerning transparency and nuclear safety, called the 'TSN law', requires that basic nuclear installations (BNI) are submitted to a periodic safety review (PSR) every ten years. The same regulation requires an integrated approach for PSR, having the licensees to present all the risks, radiological and/or chemical, inherent in their installations, and to take into account human and organisational factors. PSR are also the opportunity to reassess bounding accidents. These accidents are assessed by a deterministic approach that can be completed by two methods: the 'operating conditions' method, that is still a deterministic method introducing some probabilistic matters like failure frequencies; and the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) which is only used in France for nuclear power plants. The main result of a PSR is to determine whether a facility can go on operating for 10 years more or not, and to determine the works and compensatory measures that must be done by the operator to reach the goals required by an update regulation. (authors)

[en] Managing the ageing of fuel cycle facilities (FCFs) means, as for other nuclear installations, ensuring the availability of required safety functions throughout their service life while taking into account the changes that occur with time and use. This technical opinion paper identifies a set of good practices by benchmarking strategies and good practices on coping with physical ageing and obsolescence from the facility design stage until decommissioning. It should be of particular interest to nuclear safety regulators, fuel cycle facilities operators and fuel cycle researchers

[en] WG E focused on facilities currently being dismantled or dismantled in France, as practices and regulations vary from country to country. The content of this report is based on the experience of each of the members, acquired on old facilities and very different from one another. Certain findings or analyses may prove to be incorrect or incomplete for the dismantling of recent facilities, particularly EDF's 2. generation reactors, which will benefit from a series effect, for which the problem of knowledge of the installations will have been taken into account right from the design phase. As there are few bibliographical references on the socio-organizational and human factors of dismantling, the group set itself the goal of understanding what dismantling is and the main issues it raises for the various stakeholders, rather than carrying out a targeted, exhaustive analysis of a particular subject. To this end, the Group has focused on the analysis of concrete cases, known to at least one of the group members. This choice was motivated by the desire to obtain real data on which to work, in order to avoid too theoretical considerations. The WG's work focused on three main objectives: 1- Understand the main challenges of dismantling and define the scope of the work of the WG; 2- Understand the main socio-technical obstacles to dismantling; 3- Identify avenues for reflection and action. The group worked on three concrete cases: Orano case study: Cutting the evaporator in workshop R7 at the La Hague site, the consequences of a technological choice. EDF case study: Contamination of a worker during preparatory work for underwater cutting operations on the internals of the Chooz A reactor vessel. CEA case study: Characterization of radioactive substances in the context of emptying the pools at INB 56 of Cadarache site, unsuccessful calls for tender

[en] On the occasion of its 50. Anniversary, the A.T.S.R is holding its 5. European Forum on the theme of Decommissioning. Dismantling a plant or a site is a key milestone that involves many actors and partners as well as related companies, methods and savoir-faire. In order to reach this milestone successfully, it is important to demonstrate the ability to master the following: Safety, Security, Economic and Media related stakes, Technical and Human challenges. Radiophysicists must adapt to the wide range of partners and activities that always require more performing tools. It is also necessary to take radiation protection into account as early as possible and as much as possible, in the earliest days of a project to ensure appropriate monitoring both of plants and employees and to limit radiological impacts. The objective of this event is to offer all professionals of the nuclear industry the opportunity to discuss specific themes such as challenges of decommissioning operations, feedbacks, tools and techniques used to ensure compliance with radiation safety requirements. This document gathers the 37 available presentations of this event: 1 - Dismantling of nuclear facilities at the CEA-DEN (Nuclear Energy Direction); 2 - The nuclear safety authority (ASN) and the control of cleansing operations; 3 - The 2013/59/Euratom directive transposition in the French labor code; 4 - The organisation of CEA workers' radiation protection in the occupational safety; 5 - The radiation protection certification: experience feedback; 6 - Training evolutions in dismantling and cleansing; 7 - Challenges of an asbestos removal site; 8 - The CEA Marcoule asbestos removal pilot workshop of building 214; 9 - The asbestos risk in Marcoule's dismantling sites; 10 - Asbestos in nuclear areas and its laboratory analysis; 11 - Experience feedback of an open ground waste recovery and management; 12 - Radiation protection experience feedback during the dismantling and decommissioning of the LURE facility (INB 106); 13 - Report of 15 years of radiation protection at dismantling sites; 14 - Dismantling of the SVAFO research reactors R2 and R2-0 in Sweden; 15 - Validation principle of the dynamic containment of operation enclosures in contaminated environment; 16 - Visual survey and radiological measurements using drones (Intre Group); 17 - Airborne gamma mapping with Helinuc^TM; 18 - Presentation of the calculation methods from the book 'Calculation of doses generated by ionizing radiations' (EDP Sciences 2012); 19 - Radiological characterization of 232 coils from the CERN's Proton Synchrotron (PS) before being eliminated by the Andra; 20 - Development of reinforced intermediate canisters; 21 - Radiological mapping means; 22 - Kartotrak, an integrated software solution; 23 - Simulation for radiation protection; 24 - Manuela, a 3D real-time mapping and radiological tool; 25 - In situ lab for the on-site characterization of dismantling samples; 26 - Measurements and expertises; 27 - Business combinations: chance or necessity? 28 - Making the invisible visible for a better radiation protection during the entire life of EDF's nuclear facilities; 29 - Implementation of the Radiation Protection European Directive at CERN; 30 - CADOR: a structured approach applied to biological protections setting up; 31 - Maintenance and upgrade of Cern's accelerators: optimization of handling operations in radioactive environment; 32 - Radiological investigation of the RNG reactor with OSL/FO dosimetry prior to its dismantlement; 33 - Dismantling of the big components of the Phenix reactor; 34 - Innovations in control and measurement operations; 35 - Integrated Operational Dosimetry system at CERN; 36 - Investigation of 71.21 A, B and C tanks at Marcoule's UP1 facility; 37 - Implementation of the augmented reading time method of the residual signal for the dose reevaluation in thermoluminescence dosimetry