[en] Transports of radioactive materials are regularly performed in an international context and the possibility of accidents with cross-border consequences cannot be excluded. Therefore, there is a need to harmonize emergency response or at least to have a clear understanding of other countries emergency plans. To that end, it was proposed to consider this topic in the framework of the European project PREPARE and to include various objectives relative to the off-site nuclear emergency response and preparedness in European countries notably in case of transport accident. The first step of this project was to clearly describe the national and local emergency organization and preparedness in the European countries participating to the project (France, United Kingdom and Belgium) especially in case of accident involving a transport of radioactive material. The second step of this project was to test, in case of an accident scenario involving an international transport of radioactive material, the emergency plans applied and the communications between two neighboring countries (France and Belgium). A table top exercise was organized to evaluate the accident management process including, on the one hand all phases relative to alerts, reflex actions, information exchange and concerted assessment, on the other hand public information and solution to bring back the transport in a safe status. This exercise, the first involving an international transport of radioactive materials, took place in the Emergency Technical Centre of IRSN located in Fontenay-aux-Roses in France. More than 30 peoples were involved including representatives of the Belgian competent authority (Federal Agency for Nuclear Control - FANC), the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) as well as their Technical Safety Organizations (TSO), respectively BEL V and IRSN, and the major French operator AREVA TN International. Lessons learned from this experience allowed participants to create a feedback and highlighted the importance of communication between competent authorities and the necessary coordination of local intervention teams. (author)

[en] Each year in France, almost one million packages of radioactive materials for civilian use are transported by road, railway, sea and air. Approximately one hundred events are declared annually to the French nuclear safety authority by the consignors or the carriers of these packages. These events are analysed by the French Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) and the lessons learned from this analysis are given public in reports published every two years. It includes an overall analysis of the transport-related events taking into account the number of events, the distribution by sector of activity, means of transport and type of package involved and a presentation of the main types of events occurred. The aim of this analysis is to highlight trends compared with previous years, to check whether the actions put in place to prevent the recurrence of events declared in the past are relevant and to identify issues that require additional vigilance and preventive actions by the companies involved (package designer, consigner or carrier), including operations conditions and safety management aspects. In addition, the feedback associated to these events is taken into account by IRSN in its assessment. The last two reports published by IRSN (2012-2013 and 2014-2015 periods) show that the number of events that have had potential radiological consequences or which have resulted in a degradation of the packaging components important to safety has reduced since the beginning of the century. Moreover, the decrease in the number of events related to package damages resulting from impacts during handling operations, to inappropriate package closure and to the presence of unexpected organic materials within the cavity, seem to confirm that the corrective actions implemented in recent years had a positive impact. Nevertheless, axes of improvement have been identified concerning the detection and the report of the events in the small-scale nuclear sector, the presence of contamination on the surface of some packages or transport vehicles as well as the tie-down and the preparation of the packages. (author)

[en] This report presents the Nuclear Inspectorate's (IGN) assessment on the state of nuclear installation safety and radiation protection at CEA. It presents the findings and lessons learned from audits and reactive inspections, as well as the action plans implemented following the recommendations and proposed by IGN as part of its continuous improvement

[en] The 'applicant's guide' of the French nuclear safety authority (ASN) is dedicated to the designers of radioactive material transport packages or any other entity who wish to apply for package or transportation approval. It describes the requirements and recommendations of the competent authority for such an application and presents the French positions concerning specific points of safety demonstration. (author)

[en] Since more than 20 years, IRSN, the French Institute for radiation and nuclear safety, assesses the safety analysis reports in order to provide technical support to the French Nuclear authorities. In this context, IRSN has recorded the list of specific points most frequently encountered during the assessment of the safety demonstrations to which a special attention should be paid. This experience feedback list has evolved over the last years to take into account the most recent evolutions of the regulations and the last technological knowledge. It appears that some issues shall be taken into account in the first stages of a package development. In particular, IRSN put in the light the necessity to justify the mechanical behaviour of the package, during a 9 m free drop test simulating the accident conditions of transport (ACT), considering the delayed impact of the content and the internal arrangements onto the components of the closure system of the cavity. Furthermore, some internal gaps, which could induce movements of the radioactive contents, should be minimized to justify notably that this phenomenon would not induce an external dose increase greater than 20% in normal conditions of transport. IRSN also highlighted that justifications relative to the transport of radioactive material under special form, such as sources, within the package cavity cannot be based only on the tests performed according the 2919 ISO norm. Complementary justifications have to be provided especially to conclude on the integrity of the source capsule during the regulatory ACT tests. Furthermore, due to recent tests results, IRSN considers that a specific attention should be paid on the thermal behaviour of packaging made of polyurethane foam in case of fire exposure. Finally, IRSN recommends to avoid the use of bolts with grade 14.9 due to the sensibility of the material to hydrogen embrittlement and the associated risk of fracture at ambient temperature. Concerning the bolts grades 10.9 and 12.9, IRSN considers that a specific attention shall be paid during manufacturing by introducing systematic hydrogen degassing. A relevant final control procedure has also to be put in place to guarantee the conformity of the bolts. IRSN’s experience feedback list for the transport package design is used as a guide by IRSN for the appraisals of the design safety reports and by applicants to improve their design safety reports. (author)

[en] Bolted impact limiters generally equip extremities of packages used to transport irradiated fuel or high-level waste. These shock absorbers, whose mass can reach 2 tons for some package designs, commonly include steel casing filled with wooden blocks aiming at absorbing mechanical impacts and protecting the closure system of the package containment system in case of fire. Over the last 5 years, around twenty events were declared in France after the observation, during the package unloading operations, that some of these bolts could be loosened by hand. The causes identified by the package designers and the involved consignors, such as non-compliances in the tightening operations, have led to additional controls of the bolt tightening before shipment. The decrease in the number of events declared subsequently show that these actions seem to be relevant but not sufficient to completely solve this issue. In this regard, IRSN decided to analyse the phenomenon which can initiate a self-loosening of the fixing bolts of the impact limiters. Several theoretical and experimental studies performed in the past decades show that a self-loosening of fastening bolts can be generated under external loads and vibrations. This phenomenon basically depends on the geometry of the bolt design (diameter, length and thread pitch), the mass of the bolted components and the vibrations transmitted by the transport frame. It especially appears that the bolts self-loosening is favoured by an unsufficient tightening torque, the use of lubricant on the bolt threads and the vibrations characterised by high frequencies and amplitudes in the perpendicular axis of the bolts. Considering the vibrations measurements performed during road and rail transports, these conclusions conducted IRSN to recommend, when possible, an increase in the tightening torque of the impact limiters fastening bolts for some package designs. The first results of this analysis also put in the light the necessity to perform a dedicated experimental program to determine precisely under which conditions the self-loosening of packages impact limiter fastening bolts is initiated. (author)

[en] This document gathers the content of a debate and Power Point presentations as contributions to this seminar on transports of nuclear materials. After an introduction, the different sessions addressed the actors of the transport of nuclear materials (regulation, parcel design, organisation on the shipper side and on the transporter side), transport safety and radiation protection (returns on experience by different actors and on event follow-up), the follow-up and safety of transports of nuclear materials (protection against malevolent acts, operational follow-up, case of rail transport), and issues related to crisis management (organisation in case of crisis, means of intervention implemented by the IRSN, return on experience for two accidents)