[en] Various current and near-future methods of detecting stress in humans are evaluated as to effectiveness and cost with a view to application as a screening mechanism at portals at NRC-licensed facilities. Also, similar and related techniques of stress detection and covert switches are evaluated for use by guards at NRC-licensed facilities as methods of informing the Central Alarm Station that the guard is under duress

No abstract available

[en] Low-enriched uranium oxide in bulk containers can be assayed for safeguards purposes, using the neutrons from spontaneous fission of ²³⁸U as a signature, to complement enrichment and mass measurement. The penetrability of the fast fission neutrons allows the inner portion of bulk samples to register. The measurement may also be useful for measuring moisture content, of significance in process control. The apparatus used can be the same as for neutron correlation counting for Pu assay. The neutron multiplication observed in ²³⁸U is of intrinsic interest

[en] This report presents a long-term research plan for addressing human factors which can adversely affect safeguards at nuclear power plants. It was developed in order to prioritize and propose research for NRC in regulating power plant safeguards. Research efforts addressing human factors in safeguards were developed and prioritized according to the importance of human factors areas. Research was also grouped to take advantage of common research approaches and data sources where appropriate. Four main program elements emerged from the analysis, namely (1) Training and Performance Evaluation, (2) Organizational Factors, (3) Man-Machine Interface, and (4) Trustworthiness and Reliability. Within each program element, projects are proposed with results and information flowing between program elements where useful. An overall research plan was developed for a 4-year period and it would lead ultimately to regulatory activities including rulemaking, regulatory guides, and technical bases for regulatory action. The entire plan is summarized in Volume 1 of this report

[en] To provide for the verification of UF₆ cylinder masses by the International Atomic Energy Agency at uranium enrichment facilities handling large-capacity UF₆ cylinders, an 18.14-metric-ton-capacity (20-ton) Load-Cell-Based Weighing System (LCBWS) has been developed. This system, which was developed at Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant (ORGDP) and calibrated at the US National Bureau of Standards, is described along with results from its initial testing. The principal components of the LCBWS are two 11.34-metric-ton-capacity (12.50-ton) load cells (with associated readout and ancillary equipment) and a lifting fixture that couples the load cells to a UF₆ cylinder. Results from testing of the system at the ORGDP followed by a comparative analysis of the apparent cylinder masses vs brass given by the LCBWS with the stated ORGDP accountability scale values indicates that the accuracy of the LCBWS is +- 1 kg and that the precision of an individual measurement is +- 2 kg. Initial experience wth the 18.14-metric-ton-capacity (20-ton) LCBWS indicates that it has the advantages of portability, ease of assembly and use, and high accuracy. Further testing to establish the long-term stability of the calibration and overall reliability of the system is described along with future work for the redesign of the system's readout and ancilliary equipment to ensure that a user-friendly interface for operations is available

[en] The document is intended to supply the NRC and nuclear power plant licensees with basic data on the times required to penetrate forcibly the types of barriers commonly found in nuclear power plants. These times are necessary for design and evaluation of the physical protection system required under 10CFR73.55. Each barrier listed is described in detail. Where minor variations in the basic barrier construction result in essentially the same penetration time, the variations are described. Figures of barriers requiring further clarification are presented in sequential order. For each barrier, the penetration time listed is that for the hand-carried portable countermeasure which would allow fastest penetration. If two alternative countermeasures could penetrate a given barrier in about the same time, both are given. The approximate weights of countermeasures are given in order to allow estimation of the total weight of equipment which might be required to penetrate a given series of barriers. In some cases, different kinds of countermeasures are specified for very similar barriers. For example, in the discussion of walls, heavy hand tools are specified in some cases and explosives in others. This apparent lack of consistency is due to a lack of systematically collected data. In all cases, only penetration times are cited which can be substantiated by reference to the literature, and thus consistent data were not always available. The penetration times are listed with a standard deviation range. This range is intended to give some idea of the possible variations in penetration times which might be expected between several roughly equally experienced adversaries. The source of the time listed is given for each barrier, and a complete list of the references used appears at the end of the report

[en] The possibility of diverting D₂O for use in clandestine reactors capable of weapons grade nuclear material production has created interest in safeguarding D₂O. As part of a program to investigate the technological aspects of safeguarding D₂O, several proposed nuclear based non-destructive measurement methods have been proposed which do not require the D₂O containers to be opened. These nuclear techniques all proved workable and could lend themselves, in principle, to field application. They are neutron transmission measurements, neutron capture gamma detection, photoneutron production, and measurements of the lifetime of neutrons injected in the barrel. Since much of the instrumentation is common to several methods, more than one technique may be employed to give added assurance. 6 figures, 2 tables

[en] This document is intended to supply the NRC and nuclear power plant licensees with basic data on the times required to penetrate forcibly the types of barriers commonly found in nuclear plants. These times are necessary for design and evaluation of the physical protection system required under 10CFR73.55. Each barrier listed is described in detail. Minor variations in basic barrier construction that result in the same penetration time, are also described

[en] The reader will find full descriptions of the technology and methodology of monitoring nuclear materials in civilian installations such a reprocessing plants, reactors, and reactor fuel manufacturers. The authors describe the methods and equipment available for monitoring a production cutoff of fissile materials as well. A quantitative description of the instruments and methods used to meet the requirements of monitoring generated by various types of possible arms control agreements aimed at stopping the production of weapons-grade fissile materials is given. Each reprocessing or manufacturing facility presents a special set of quantitative problems. Their technical solutions and the attendant level of confidence each offers are examined. The performance characteristics of the instruments used to implement the processes are described

[en] Mr. Fainberg states that no factual justification can be made for Israel's bombing of an Iraqi reactor under construction on the grounds that Iraq was diverting nuclear materials for weapons. Despite limitations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspection procedure, he feels the raid was premature even if Iraq's long-range goal is to develop a nuclear capability and renounce the non-proliferation treaty it signed. The effect of the raid has not enhanced Israel's security, but a precedent has been set that weakens the safeguards structure and threatens world security. Steps need to be taken to strengthen international safeguards and make them more acceptable to developing countries since there is no way to ban nuclear-produced electricity