[en] In this paper, we decompose the driving forces of global CO₂ emissions for the post-crisis era 2008–2011 from both production-based and consumption-based aspects. The results suggest that non-OECD economies have become the major drivers for the rapid global growth of CO₂ emissions after the crisis. More specifically, the increasing consumption and investment of non-OECD economies, as well as stagnation of their emission intensity reductions, have largely contributed to global growth of CO₂ emissions after 2009. On the contrary, OECD economies have a less carbon-intensive life style. Coupled with a decrease in investment and stagnation of consumption, the OECD economies have successfully reduced both their production-based and consumption-based emissions. However, the magnitude of their reduction is much lower than the increase led by non-OECD economies. In addition, both OECD and non-OECD economies have started to increase their purchases of intermediate and final products from non-OECD economies. Such changes of international trade caused an additional 673 Mt of global emissions from 2008 to 2011. The results of our decomposition provide both worries about and insights into future global climate change mitigation. - Highlights: • The impact of 2008 financial crisis on global CO₂ emissions was very short-lived. • Non-OECD economies are responsible for the global CO₂ emissions growth after 2008. • OECD economies have a less carbon-intensive life style. • The changes of international trade caused additional global CO₂ emissions.

[en] Highlights: • The share of fossil fuel in global primary energy consumption has remained steady since 1990. • CO_2 emissions from coal use increased the most (by 3.76 Gt) in developing countries. • CO_2 emissions from natural gas use increased the most in developed countries. • Infrastructure built was the dominant emission driving forces in developing countries. - Abstract: This paper analyzes global CO_2 emissions growth by fossil fuel type (coal, oil or gas), demand type (consumption or investment), country group (developed or developing country) and industry group. The results indicate that, among the three fossil fuels, CO_2 emissions from coal use grew the most rapidly in developing countries, by 3.76 Gt in the period 1995–2009. By contrast, CO_2 emissions from natural gas use grew the most rapidly in developed countries, by 470 Mt in the period 1995–2009. Further decompositions show that, despite improvements in energy efficiency, the upgrades in infrastructures and changes in electricity requirements in developing countries have led to significant CO_2 emissions growth from coal use. Among these countries, China accounts for a high contribution, causing a coal-use-related CO_2 emissions growth of up to 2.79 Gt in the period 1995–2009. By contrast, consumption by the public and social services as well as chemical products is the dominant force driving CO_2 emission growth from gas in developed countries; the US accounts for a very high contribution, causing a gas-use-related CO_2 emissions growth of up to 100 Mt.

[en] With rapid economic development, higher income levels, urbanization and other socio-economic drivers, people's lifestyles in China have changed remarkably over the last 50 years. This paper uses the IPAT model (where I = Impact representing CO₂ emissions, P = Population, A = Affluence, and T = emission intensity) to analyze how these main drivers contributed to the growth of CO₂ emissions over this time period. Affluence or lifestyle change has been variously recognized as one of the key factors contributing to CO₂ emissions. Through comparative analysis of the development of five regions in China, we trace lifestyle changes since the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 until 2002. We find that household consumption across the five regions follows similar trajectories, driven by changes in income and the increasing availability of goods and services, although significant differences still exist between and within regions due to differential policies in China and different possibilities for social mobility. There are considerable differences between the southeast and northwest and between urban and rural areas. We also found that technological improvements have not been able to fully compensate for the increase of emissions due to population growth and increasing wealth, which is also in line with results from other studies. Finally, this paper emphasizes that developing countries such as China, which is home to 22% of the world population and a growing middle class, and which is on a fast track to modernization, need to ensure that people's lifestyles are changing towards more sustainable ways of living. China has been investing heavily in infrastructure and thus creating the emissions of tomorrow. Thus investing, for example, in public transport and low energy building today will help reduce emissions in the future and will support more sustainable lifestyles. (author)

[en] In this study, we apply the inter-regional input–output model to explain the relationship between China’s inter-regional spillover of CO₂ emissions and domestic supply chains for 2002 and 2007. Based on this model, we propose alternative indicators such as the trade in CO₂ emissions, CO₂ emissions in trade and the regional trade balances of CO₂ emissions. Our results do not only reveal the nature and significance of inter-regional environmental spillover within China’s domestic regions but also demonstrate how CO₂ emissions are created and distributed across regions via domestic and global production networks. Results show that a region’s CO₂ emissions depend on its intra-regional production technology, energy use efficiency, as well as its position and participation degree in domestic and global supply chains. - Highlights: • An IO model is used to measure China’s inter-regional spillover of CO₂ emissions. • We focus on the relationship between CO₂ emissions and domestic supply chains. • New indexes for identifying the consumer–producer responsibility are proposed. • A region’s emission depends on its position and participation level in supply chains

[en] Highlights: • We simulated the global direct CO₂ emission cost of geographic shift of international sourcing. • Global CO₂ emissions would have been much lower without the geographic shift. • The geographic shift was mainly dominated by developed economies and occurred in high-tech industries. • The global climate change mitigation requires stronger energy technology breakthroughs, especially in the developing world. - Abstract: In this paper we simulated the global direct CO₂ emission cost of geographic shift of international sourcing for the period 1995–2011 by comparing the scenarios with and without geographic shift. Our simulations indicate that in 2011, had the share of trade by the sourcing economy remained at the level of 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008 whereas the global final demand remained the same, global CO₂ emissions in production processes would have been 2.8 Gt, 2.0 Gt, 1.3 Gt, and 540 Mt., respectively, lower than the actual emissions. As there is a general outsourcing trend shifted from developed economies to developing economies, the overall direct emission costs have always been significantly positive. Further investigations by economy and industry show that such a geographic shift was mainly dominated by developed economies themselves and occurred in high-tech industries, such as production of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) goods and machinery, leading to positive emission cost in developing economies, especially China. Moreover, there is potentially even larger influence of geographic shift of sourcing on global CO₂ emissions, as such a shift would stimulate the economic growth and consumptions in developing economies, consequently this may bring additional energy demand and CO₂ emissions. Our results addressed the urgency of eliminating in carbon emission intensity gap between developing and developed economies and the successful development of new, scalable low carbon energy sourcing and technologies across the world.

[en] Within 5 years, China's CO₂ emissions have nearly doubled, and China may already be the world's largest emitter of CO₂. Evidence suggests that exports could be a main cause for the rise in Chinese CO₂ emissions; however, no systematic study has analyzed this issue, especially over time. We find that in 2005, around one-third of Chinese emissions (1700 Mt CO₂) were due to production of exports, and this proportion has risen from 12% (230 Mt) in 1987 and only 21% (760 Mt) as recently as 2002. It is likely that consumption in the developed world is driving this trend. A majority of these emissions have largely escaped the scrutiny of arguments over 'carbon leakage' due to the current, narrow definition of leakage. Climate policies which would make the developed world responsible for China's export emissions have both benefits and costs, and must be carefully designed to achieve political consensus and equity. Whoever is responsible for these emissions, China's rapidly expanding infrastructure and inefficient coal-powered electricity system need urgent attention. (author)

[en] Within 5 years, China's CO₂ emissions have nearly doubled, and China may already be the world's largest emitter of CO₂. Evidence suggests that exports could be a main cause for the rise in Chinese CO₂ emissions; however, no systematic study has analyzed this issue, especially over time. We find that in 2005, around one-third of Chinese emissions (1700 Mt CO₂) were due to production of exports, and this proportion has risen from 12% (230 Mt) in 1987 and only 21% (760 Mt) as recently as 2002. It is likely that consumption in the developed world is driving this trend. A majority of these emissions have largely escaped the scrutiny of arguments over 'carbon leakage' due to the current, narrow definition of leakage. Climate policies which would make the developed world responsible for China's export emissions have both benefits and costs, and must be carefully designed to achieve political consensus and equity. Whoever is responsible for these emissions, China's rapidly expanding infrastructure and inefficient coal-powered electricity system need urgent attention

[en] Following a series of extreme air pollution events, the Chinese government released the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan in 2013 (China’s State Council 2013). The Action Plan sets clear goals for key regions (i.e. cities above the prefecture level, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Province, the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta) and establishes near-term control efforts for the next five years. However, the extent to which the Action Plan can direct local governments’ activities on air pollution control remains unknown. Here we seek to evaluate the air quality improvement and associated health benefits achievable under the Action Plan in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) area from 2012 to 2017. Measure-by-measure quantification results show that the Action Plan would promise effective emissions reductions of 34% of SO_2, 28% of NO_x, 26% of PM_2_._5 (particulate matter less than 2.5 μm in diameter), and 10% of VOCs (volatile organic compounds). These emissions abatements would lower the PM_2_._5 concentration by 17%, surpassing the 15% target established in the Action Plan, thereby avoiding more than 2900 deaths and 4300 hospital admissions annually. We expect the implementation of the Action Plan in the PRD would be productive; the anticipated impacts, however, fall short of the goal of protecting the health of local residents, as there are still more than 33 million people living in places where the annual mean ambient PM_2_._5 concentrations are greater than 35 μg m"−"3, the interim target-3 of the World Health Organization (WHO). We therefore propose the next steps for air pollution control that are important not only for the PRD but also for all other regions of China as they develop and implement effective air pollution control policies. (letter)

[en] Highlights: • China’s thermoelectric power consumed 3.8 billion m³ of water in 2010. • China’s hydropower consumed 14.6 billion m³ of water in 2010. • 60.2% of the power sector’s water use was driven by industries’ power demands. • 47.5% of the power sector’s water use was virtually transferred across provinces. • Water-scarce inland provinces are exporting virtual water via their power sector. Water consumption in thermoelectric and hydropower plants in China increased from 1.6 and 6.1 billion m³, respectively, to 3.8 and 14.6 billion m³ from 2002 to 2010. Using the concept of virtual water, we attribute to different electricity users the total water consumption by the electric power sector. From 2002 to 2010, virtual water embodied in the final consumption of electricity (hereinafter referred to as VWEF) increased from 1.90 to 7.35 billion m³, whilst virtual water in electricity used by industries (hereinafter referred to as VWEI) increased from 5.82 to 11.13 billion m³. The inter-provincial virtual water trades as a result of spatial mismatch of electricity production and consumption are quantified. Nearly half (47.5% in 2010) of the physical water inputs into the power sector were virtually transferred across provincial boundaries in the form of virtual water embodied in the electricity produced, mainly from provinces in northeast, central and south China to those in east and north China. Until 2030, VWEF and VWEI are likely to increase from 5.27 and 14.89 billion m³ to 7.19 and 20.33 billion m³, respectively. Climate change mitigation and water conservation measures in the power sector may help to relieve the regional pressures on water resources imposed by the power sector.

[en] The present study analyzed the consumption-based carbon emissions from fossil fuel consumption of Beijing in 2012. The multi-scale input–output analysis method was applied. It is capable of tracing the carbon emissions embodied in imports based on a global multi-regional input–output analysis  using Eora data. The results show that the consumption-based carbon emission of Beijing has increased by 18% since 2007, which is 2.57 times higher than the production-based carbon emission in 2012. Only approximately 1/10 of the total carbon emissions embodied in Beijing’s local final demand originated from local direct carbon emissions. Meanwhile, more than 4/5 were from domestically imported products. The carbon emission nexus between Beijing and other Chinese regions has become closer since 2007, while the imbalance as the carbon emission transfer from Beijing to other regions has been mitigated. Instead, Beijing has imported more carbon emissions from foreign countries. Some carbon emission reduction strategies for Beijing concerning different goals are presented on the basis of detailed discussion. (letter)