[en] Volume VI of this report examines the special nuclear material control and accountability requirements for the fuel rod storage demonstration program. The study included a review of the regulatory background for accountability of special nuclear material, the current accountability practices, accountability concepts applicable to fuel rod storage, and special safeguarding considerations. An operational procedure for control and accountability was developed for use during performance of the rod storage demonstration. The procedure involves placement of the fuel rods in well-defined and sealable canisters for unique identification and item accountability and the provision of assured containment and surveillance measures. The potential for supporting nondestructive assay measurements for spent fuel verification by an independent source was reviewed. Progress has been made in instrument development and NDT devices may be available near-term to supplement and reinforce safeguarding provisions

[en] This report describes the spent-fuel storage situation at reactors in the United States. The focus of the report is on the reactors that are developing a spent-fuel storage problem and the alternatives the utilities are utilizing and planning to use to minimize the problem. The alternatives the utilities are using and/or considering are described in the report and include: High-density storage racks; Double-tiered storage racks; Rod consolidation; Dry storage systems; Fuel transshipments; and At-reactor storage pools. All of these alternatives are not available to every reactor and utility that is faced with a spent-fuel storage problem. Generally, utilities are reracking or are planning to rerack those spent-fuel pools that can be reracked with higher-density racks or double-tiered racks. Where reracking is not feasible, then fuel transshipments are being performed or considered. Since none of these other alternatives have been fully approved and licensed, these alternatives are all being evaluated

[en] The spent-fuel storage situation at reactors in the US is described. The focus of the report is on the reactors that are developing a spent-fuel storage problem and the alternatives the utilities are utilizing and planning to use to minimize the problem. The alternatives the utilities are using and/or considering are described and include: high-density storage racks, double-tiered storage racks, rod consolidation, dry storage systems, fuel transshipments, and at-reactor storage pools. All of these alternatives are not available to every reactor and utility that is faced with a spent-fuel storage problem. Generally, utilities are reracking or are planning to rerack those spent-fuel pools that can be reracked with higher-density racks or double-tiered racks. Where reracking is not feasible, then fuel transshipments are being performed or considered. Since none of the other alternatives have been fully approved and licensed, these alternatives are all being evaluated. More specifically, this report concentrates on the reactors that are projected to lose full-core reserve discharge capability by the end of 1990. Reactor discharge dates, spent-fuel storage capacity, and inventory were integrated to project the loss of full-core reserve. The primary results from the integration of this data revealed that 40 reactors were projected to lose full-core reserve prior to 1990. These 40 reactors represent 23 different utilities. Each utility is aware of their own spent-fuel storage problem, and each utility is progressing to minimize the problem or evaluating all the alternatives

[en] The first three years of operation of Nuclear Assurance Corporation's (NAC) four (4) NAC-1 Casks have demonstrated that shipments of spent fuel, fuel rods and other highly irradiated reactor components can be moved routinely by legal weight truck transport. Shipments of these materials have involved some 800,000 miles of highway travel and cask handling at some fifteen different nuclear facilities. This paper presents details on NAC's operations experience with these casks including cask description, cask handling (loading and unloading), pre-shipment testing, facility turnaround and transit times, operator exposure, transport vehicles and shipper/carrier/cask owner responsibilities, actual experience with regard to facility interfacing requirements and operational procedures. Cask and equipment utilization is discussed together with the methods used to control operation costs and to improve the economics of truck transport

[en] The Nuclear Assurance Corporation (NAC) owns and operates four NAC-1 truck casks. These casks are used to ship spent reactor fuel assemblies and radioactive reactor-core components. The casks have been loaded or unloaded at a total of fifteen nuclear facilities in the United States. In addition, NAC has used another large, overweight-truck cask to ship radioactive reactor core components from a reactor to a waste burial site. There are many individual differences in the cask handling facilities at each of the reactor stations, nuclear research facilities and the storage and burial sites serviced. Various types of auxiliary lifting and handling devices for on-site cask operations have been required. The quality assurance requirements for the equipment used in interfacing casks with nuclear power plant facilities have become more stringent. This paper presents details on the type of special equipment being employed, the quality assurance requirements that are imposed, and the quality assurance audits that are being performed. The paper presents NAC's experiences in the development and procurement of a variety of cask-facility equipment and the implementation of quality assurance procedures for the design, manufacture, acceptance and in-service inspection and test of the equipment. Also, experiences in working with customers' engineering and quality assurance organizations are discussed with specific attention given to the establishment of interface equipment requirements and the documentation that must be developed. The paper discusses a number of factors that must be considered in the development of design criteria for cask lifting devices. In addition to the criteria that are important to the functional safety of the equipment, other considerations important to the equipment utilization and effectiveness are presented

[en] During the first one and one-half years of operation of Nuclear Assurance Corporation's (NAC) four (4) second-generation NAC-1 truck casks, shipments of spent fuel assemblies, fuel rods, and other highly irradiated reactor components have involved over 300,000 cask miles of travel by land, and cask handling at some ten different nuclear facilities. This on-site experience has included the use of various types of auxiliary lifting devices, operational problems with which have identified the need to establish related Quality Assurance procedures in the area of post-fabrication testing. During the course of pre-shipment checkout and testing of the casks minor defects in the upper impact limiter and lower cask shielding wall have been detected and repaired according to procedure. One enroute occurrence with the cask in which an emergency response was implemented has emphasized the need for rigid adherence to procedural checkout before shipment. Periodic inspection and testing are performed as part of the cask license requirement whereby cask components are inspected and/or replaced. During such test periods leaking ball valves and a leaking neutron shield tank have been detected and repaired. (author)

No abstract available

[en] This document is a compilation of data and reports that provide an overview of the capabilities of U.S. domestic transportation systems for the shipment of materials that are or may be classified as radioactive wastes