[en] The overall goal of this strategy is to comply with all applicable environmental laws and regulations and/or compliance agreements during Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) stabilization, deactivation, and eventual dismantlement

[en] The Hanford site is subject to the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (HFFACO), an order on consent signed by the DOE, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, (EPA) and the Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE). Under the HFFCCO, negotiations for transition milestones begin within six months after the issuance of a shutdown order. In the case of the PFP, the Nuclear Materials disposition and stabilization activities, a DOE responsibility, were necessary as precursor activities to Transition. This situation precipitated a crisis in the negotiations between the agencies, and formal negotiations initiated in 1997 ended in failure. The negotiations reached impasse on several key regulatory and operational issues. The 1997 negotiation was characterized by a strongly positional style. DOE and the regulatory personnel took hard lines early in the negotiations and were unable to move to resolution of key issues after a year and a half. This resulted in unhappy stakeholders, poor publicity, and work delays as well as wounded relationships between DOE and the regulatory community. The PFP is a former plutonium metal production facility. The operating mission of the PFP ended with a DOE Headquarters shutdown letter in October of 1996. Generally, the receipt of a shutdown letter initiates the start of Transition (as the first step of Decommissioning) of a facility. In the 2000-2001 PFP negotiations, a completely different approach was suggested and eventually initiated: Collaborative or Relational Negotiations. The relational negotiation style resulted in agreement between the agencies on all key issues within 6 months of initiation. All parties were very pleased with the results and all parties were relieved that protracted negotiations sessions were not needed with the new style of working together collaboratively to serve each other's interests without compromising each party's needs. The characteristics of collaborative negotiations included building trust, emphasizing equality of team members, problem solving by the entire team, relying on individual communications, and self-management skills. A specific example of positional negotiations is given with the resultant increase in cost, duration of negotiations, and lingering questions regarding trust among the parties

[en] The new approach to negotiations was termed collaborative (win-win) rather than positional (win-lose). Collaborative negotiations were conducted to establish milestones for the decommissioning of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, PFP

[en] Cerium Nitrate has been proposed for use in the decontamination of plutonium contaminated equipment at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) located on the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in eastern Washington. A Treatability Study was conducted to determine the validity of this decontamination technology in terms of meeting its performance goals and to understand the risks associated with the use of Cerium Nitrate under the conditions found at the PFP. Fluor Hanford is beginning the decommissioning of the PFP at the Hanford site. Aggressive chemicals are commonly used to remove transuranic contaminants from process equipment to allow disposal as low level waste. Chemicals being considered for decontamination of gloveboxes in PFP include cerium (IV) nitrate in a nitric acid solution, and proprietary commercial solutions that include acids, degreasers, and sequestering agents. Fluor's decontamination procedure involves application of the chemicals, followed by a wipe-down of the contaminated surfaces with rags. This process effectively transfers the decontamination liquids containing the transuranic materials to the rags, which can then be readily packaged for disposal as TRU waste. As part of a treatability study, Fluor Hanford and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have evaluated the potential for self-heating and exothermic reactions in the residual decontamination materials and the waste packages. Laboratory analyses and thermal-hydraulic modeling reveal a significant self-heating risk for cerium nitrate solutions when used with cotton rags. Exothermic reactions that release significant heat and off-gas have been discovered for cerium nitrate at higher temperatures. From these studies, limiting conditions have been defined to assure safe operations and waste packaging

[en] This paper describes some of the basic issues identified to date related to the proposed closure of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) site. It is to be used as a preliminary planning supplement to enable application of the many guidance documents that are now available to describe the statutory and DOE requirements for closure of a Hanford site contaminated with low levels of plutonium. The major issues identified herein include: (1) Closure barrier performance, life expectancy and design criteria; (2) Public and interest group acceptability of closure approach; (3) Quantity of plutonium that will remain; (4) Void backfilling prior to barrier placement; (5) Identification of closure zone boundary; and (6) Impact of 241Z and 241Z-361 waste unit closure plans on the PFP surface barrier design

[en] An engineering evaluation/cost analysis (EE/CA) was performed at the Hanford Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The purpose of the EVCA was to identify the sub-grade items to be evaluated; determine the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) hazardous substances through process history and available data; evaluate these hazards; and as necessary, identify the available alternatives to reduce the risk associated with the contaminants. The sub-grade EWCA considered four alternatives for an interim removal action: (1) No Action; (2) Surveillance and Maintenance (S and M); (3) Stabilize and Leave in Place (Stabilization); and (4) Remove, Treat and Dispose (RTD). Each alternative was evaluated against the CERCLA criteria for effectiveness, implementability, and cost

[en] The Department of Energy is responsible for the safe management and cleanup of the DOE complex. As part of the cleanup and closure of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) located on the Hanford site, the nuclear material inventory was reviewed to determine the appropriate disposition path. Based on the nuclear material characteristics, the material was designated for stabilization and packaging for long term storage and transfer to the Savannah River Site, or a decision for discard was made. The discarded material was designated as waste material and slated for disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Prior to preparing any residue wastes for disposal at the WIPP, several major activities need to be completed. As detailed a processing history as possible of the material including origin of the waste must be researched and documented. A technical basis for termination of safeguards on the material must be prepared and approved. Utilizing process knowledge and processing history, the material must be characterized, sampling requirements determined, acceptable knowledge package and waste designation completed prior to disposal. All of these activities involve several organizations including the contractor, DOE, state representatives and other regulators such as EPA. At PFP, a process has been developed for meeting the many, varied requirements and successfully used to prepare several residue waste streams including Rocky Flats incinerator ash, hanford incinerator ash and Sand, Slag and Crucible (SS and C) material for disposal. These waste residues are packed into Pipe Overpack Containers for shipment to the WIPP

[en] In 2002, the Richland Operations Office (RL) of the US Department of Energy (DOE), the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) developed milestones for transitioning the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) facility to a clean slab-on-grade configuration. These milestones required developing an engineering evaluation/cost analysis (EF/CA) for the facility's sub-grade structures and installations as part of a series of evaluations intended to provide for the transition of the facility to a clean slab-on-grade configuration. In addition to supporting decisions for interim actions, the analyses of sub-grade structures and installations performed through this EE/CA will contribute to the remedial investigation feasibility study(ies) and subsequently to the final records of decision for the relevant operable units responsible for site closure in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site

[en] All Hanford facilities, including the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) were evaluated for chemical hazards in 1997, 1998 and 2000. The hazard evaluation, known as the PFP Facility Vulnerability Assessment (FVA), was prompted when chemicals in Tank A-109 in the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) exploded in May 1997. Actions were undertaken to eliminate or reduce what were thought to be the worst hazards following that evaluation. In 2001, a new PFP team was organized to review the progress to date in reducing hazards and to reassess hazards that might still remain within the facility. This reassessment continued into 2002 and is referred to as the 2002 PFP Residual Chemical Hazards Reassessment (RCHR). This report explains the results of the 2001/2002 reassessment of the chemical hazards at PFP. This reassessment effort forms the basis of the RCHR. The RCHR relied on previous assessments as the starting point for the 2001/2002 evaluation and used ranking criteria very similar to previous efforts. The RCHR team was composed of professionals representing Industrial Hygiene, Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Hazardous Materials Handling Specialists, Solid Waste Management Specialists and Environmental Specialists. All areas of concern that could be accessed were physically examined and photographed where possible. Information FR-om processing records, facility drawings and documents, design engineers, process engineers and work packages were compiled. The PFP vessel inventory was examined and expanded where required. New items listed in the vessel inventory were investigated. All items investigated were ranked using the hazard ranking criteria developed. This information was put on data sheets and compiled in a database

[en] This paper describes the unique challenges encountered and subsequent resolutions to accomplish the deactivation and decontamination of a plutonium ash contaminated building. The 232-Z Contaminated Waste Recovery Process Facility at the Plutonium Finishing Plant was used to recover plutonium from process wastes such as rags, gloves, containers and other items by incinerating the items and dissolving the resulting ash. The incineration process resulted in a light-weight plutonium ash residue that was highly mobile in air. This light-weight ash coated the incinerator's process equipment, which included gloveboxes, blowers, filters, furnaces, ducts, and filter boxes. Significant airborne contamination (over 1 million derived air concentration hours [DAC]) was found in the scrubber cell of the facility. Over 1300 grams of plutonium held up in the process equipment and attached to the walls had to be removed, packaged and disposed. This ash had to be removed before demolition of the building could take place