[en] Environmental sampling is the key method of the IAEA in searching signatures of a covert nuclear programme. However, it is not always easy to know the exact location of the sampling site. The satellite navigation system, utilizing a small receiver (GPS) and a PC, allows to have independent positioning data easily. The present task on the Finnish Support Programme was launched to create software to merge information about sampling and positioning. The system is build above a desktop mapping software package. However, the result of the development goes beyond the initial goal: the software can be used to real- time positioning in a mobile unit utilizing maps that can be purchased or produced by the user. In addition, the system can be easily enlarged to visualize data in real time from mobile environmental monitors, such as a Geiger counter, a pressurized ionisation chamber of a gamma-ray spectrometer. (orig.) (7 figs.)

[en] Satellite navigation has been used for in-field applications by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety since 1993. Because of this experience, training in the use of GPS positioning and desktop mapping was chosen as a task under the Finnish Support programme to IAEA safeguards. A lecture and a field experiment was held in the training course on environmental monitoring at the IAEA headquarters in June 1995. Real-time mapping of the co-ordinates and storing information on sampling sites and procedures can make safeguards implementation more efficient and effective. Further software development are needed for these purposes. (author) (6 figs.)

[en] The Estonian Ministry of Environment and the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK) agreed in 1995 on a radiation mapping project in Estonia. The country was searched to find potential man-made radioactive sources. Another goal of the project was to produce a background dose-rate map over the whole country. The measurements provided an excellent opportunity to test new in-field measuring systems that are useful in a nuclear disaster. The basic idea was to monitor road sides, cities, domestic waste storage places and former military or rocket bases from a moving vehicle by measuring gamma spectrum and dose rate. The measurements were carried out using vehicle installed systems consisting of a pressurised ionisation chamber (PIC) in 1995 and a combination of a scintillation spectrometer (NaI(TI)) and Geiger-Mueller-counter (GM) in 1996. All systems utilised GPS-satellite navigation signals to relate the measured dose rates and gamma-spectra to current geographical location. The data were recorded for further computer analysis. The dose rate varied usually between 0.03-0.17 μSv/h in the whole country, excluding a few nuclear material storage places (in Saku and in Sillamae). Enhanced dose rates of natural origin (0.17-0.5 μSv/h) were measured near granite statues, buildings and bridges. No radioactive sources were found on road sides or in towns or villages. (orig.) (14 refs.)

[en] Highly radioactive particulate material may be released in a nuclear accident or sometimes during normal operation of a nuclear power plant. However, consequence analyses related to radioactive releases are often performed neglecting the particle nature of the release. The properties of the particles have an important role in the radiological hazard. A particle deposited on the skin may cause a large and highly non-uniform skin beta dose. Skin dose limits may be exceeded although the overall activity concentration in air is below the level of countermeasures. For sheltering purposes it is crucial to find out the transport range, i.e. the travel distance of the particles. A method for estimating the transport range of large particles (aerodynamic diameter d_a > 20 μm) in simplified meteorological conditions is presented. A user-friendly computer code, known as TROP, is developed for fast range calculations in a nuclear emergency. (orig.) (23 refs., 13 figs.)

[en] ORIGEN2 is a computer code that calculates nuclide composition and other characteristics of nuclear fuel. The use of ORIGEN2 requires good knowledge in reactor physics. However, once the input has been defined for a particular reactor type, the calculations can be easily repeated for any burnup and decay time. This procedure produces large output files that are difficult to handle manually. A new computer code, known as OTUS, was designed to facilitate the postprocessing of the data. OTUS makes use of the inventory files precalculated with ORIGEN2 in a way that enables their versatile treatment for different safety analysis purposes. A data base is created containing a comprehensive set of ORIGEN2 calculations as a function of fuel burnup and decay time. OTUS is a reactor inventory management system for a microcomputer with Windows interface. Four major data operations are available: (1) Build data modifies ORIGEN2 output data into a suitable format, (2) View data enables flexible presentation of the data as such, (3) Different calculations, such as nuclide ratios and hot particle characteristics, can be performed for severe accident analyses, consequence analyses and research purposes, (4) Summary files contain both burnup dependent and decay time dependent inventory information related to the nuclide and the reactor specified. These files can be used for safeguards, radiation monitoring and safety assessment. (orig.) (22 refs., 29 figs.)

[en] An automated high-volume aerosol sampling station, known as CINDERELLA.STUK, for environmental radiation monitoring has been developed by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finland. The sample is collected on a glass fibre filter (attached into a cassette), the airflow through the filter is 800 m³/h at maximum. During the sampling, the filter is continuously monitored with Na(I) scintillation detectors. After the sampling, the large filter is automatically cut into 15 pieces that form a small sample and after ageing, the pile of filter pieces is moved onto an HPGe detector. These actions are performed automatically by a robot. The system is operated at a duty cycle of 1 d sampling, 1 d decay and 1 d counting. Minimum detectable concentrations of radionuclides in air are typically 1Ae10 x 10^-6 Bq/m³. The station is equipped with various sensors to reveal unauthorized admittance. These sensors can be monitored remotely in real time via Internet or telephone lines. The processes and operation of the station are monitored and partly controlled by computer. The present approach fulfils the requirements of CTBTO for aerosol monitoring. The concept suits well for nuclear material safeguards, too

[en] The Finnish early warning system for nuclear emergencies consists of the nation-wide automatic external dose-rate monitoring network and the control system, which is known as USVA. The monitoring network comprises of approx. 300 AAM95 central stations and substations equipped with RD-02 or RD-02L GM tubes. Stations are thoroughly inspected on a routine basis every 4-5 years. During the inspection the GM tube, battery and power adapters of the station are replaced with new ones, as is also the modem if necessary, and the alarm connections to USVA are tested. The USVA system utilizes advanced www technology (including a browser-based, easy-to-use user interface) and a network of PCs with dedicated tasks. USVA's central hardware is located at STUK. USVA began its operation in the beginning of the year 2000, replacing the older y2k incompatible system. In a routine situation, USVA collects the monitoring data once a day. The USVA is capable of connecting (via telephone lines) to eight AAM stations concurrently, and the results from the whole country are obtained in about 15 minutes. When the system receives an alarm message from the network, it sends a text message to the mobile phones defined in a separate list and starts an automatic data collection procedure at all the stations situated within a certain distance (100 km) from the alarm-causing station. (orig.)

[en] One of the primary concerns of employing remote monitoring technologies for IAEA safeguards applications is the high cost of data transmission. Transmitting data over the Internet has been shown often to be less expensive than other data transmission methods. However, data security of the Internet is often considered to be at a low level. Virtual Private Networks has emerged as a solution to this problem. A field demonstration was implemented to evaluate the use of Virtual Private Networks (via the Internet) as a means for data transmission. Evaluation points included security, reliability and cost. The existing Finnish Remote Environmental Monitoring System, located at the STUK facility in Helsinki, Finland, served as the field demonstration system. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) established a Virtual Private Network between STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority) Headquarters in Helsinki, Finland, and IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Data from the existing STUK Remote Monitoring System was viewed at the IAEA via this network. The Virtual Private Network link was established in a proper manner, which guarantees the data security. Encryption was verified using a network sniffer. No problems were? encountered during the test. In the test system, fixed costs were higher than in the previous system, which utilized telephone lines. On the other hand transmission and operating costs are very low. Therefore, with low data amounts, the test system is not cost-effective, but if the data amount is tens of Megabytes per day the use of Virtual Private Networks and Internet will be economically justifiable. A cost-benefit analysis should be performed for each site due to significant variables. (orig.)

[en] An automated air sampling station has recently been developed by Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The station is furnished with equipment that allows comprehensive remote monitoring of the station and the data. Under the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards, STUK and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) established a field trial to demonstrate the use of remote monitoring technologies. STUK provided means for real-lime radiation monitoring and sample authentication whereas SNL delivered means for authenticated surveillance of the equipment and its location. The field trial showed that remote monitoring can be carried out using simple means although advanced facilities are needed for comprehensive surveillance. Authenticated measurement data could be reliably transferred from the monitoring site to the headquarters without the presence of authorized personnel in the monitoring site. The operation of the station and the remote monitoring system were reliable. (orig.)