[en] The simple answer to this question is no. But if you define the expression and decide transparency actually is, the answer might be different. Transparency means different things in different places. In one country transparency meant almost total access to anything that a government authority has in its possession. In another country transparency is more strict access to certain decisions, decisions makers or documents written with the sole purpose of informing the public. What variables could be found in the word transparent, what is a transparent regulator? In this short presentation we will deal with some important settings or fundamental prerequisites for a regulator calling itself transparent. Perhaps we should look at them in order of importance. Some days it is difficult to do all at once. As a final point, if we as regulators wish to call ourselves transparent in a future with diminishing national borders, fast electronic communication and increasing world wide media impact, what does the world require from us as regulators? (author)

[en] A short circuit at a switchyard broke some of the safety chains in the reactor safety system and created a difficult situation in the control room at the Forsmark 1 power plant in Sweden. After a scram two of four diesel generators failed to deliver power but the reactor could safely be controlled through remaining two systems and power could be distributed from external grid after 22 minutes. Surveillance systems in the control room also failed and the situation at the reactor was unclear. Analysis shows that there was never a risk to the public and no damage on the core. The incident exposed unknown weakness in the power supply systems of the reactor. Also it was found that maintenance had failed and some components were not properly installed. The regulator identified the problem as a serious failure but did not at once realize the public impact. The licensee was late in its decision making and did only publish local press releases that did not fully expose the nature of the incident. After some days an independent expert claimed that a core melt was a close possibility. He was widely quoted and created a media impact many European countries. In the light of the incident problems with safety culture was identified at the plant and additional findings showed problems in the management system of Forsmark. Growing media interest culminated in January when a critical internal report from staff members in Forsmark was made public. Some lessons learnt: - Media activity followed well-known patterns. - The regulator was an important source for media. - Regulator not fired upon until January, after a long autumn filled with negative reporting on Forsmark. - The plant was not proactive in its communication which created a problem for the regulator. (author)

[en] The NEA has an acknowledged role to assist its member countries in maintaining and developing, through international co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy. In this context, the NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) provides a forum for senior representatives from nuclear regulatory bodies to exchange information and experience on nuclear regulatory policies and practices in NEA member countries and to review developments which could affect regulatory requirements. Public confidence in government and in risk management structures is important to all developed countries with an open society. The use of nuclear power in a democracy is built upon a certain trust in the political system and the national authorities. To foster and maintain such trust in a period of greater public scrutiny of nuclear activities, a number of nuclear regulatory organisations (NROs) initiated various processes to pro-actively inform the public about their supervision and control of nuclear activities, or when appropriate to involve the public in decision making. In 1998 the question was raised within the CNRA of whether public trust in the regulator might be very different from one country to another, and an activity was started among member countries to exchange experience and best practices and to learn lessons about NRO communication with their publics. Three workshops were organised by the NEA, and a Working Group on Public Communication of Nuclear Regulatory Organisations was set up in 2001. The activities and findings are summarised below. (author)