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[en] The Canadian Safeguards Support Program has developed the VXI Integrated Fuel Monitor (VFIM) which is based on the international VXI instrument bus standard. This equipment is a generic radiation monitor which can be used in an integrated mode where several detection systems can be connected to a common system where information is collected, displayed, and analyzed via a virtual control panel with the aid of computers, trackball and computer monitor. The equipment can also be used in an autonomous mode as a portable radiation monitor with a very low power consumption. The equipment has been described at previous international symposia. Integration of several monitoring systems (bundle counter, core discharge monitor, and yes/no monitor) has been carried out at Wolsong 2. Performance results from one of the monitoring systems which was installed at CANDU nuclear stations are discussed in a companion paper at this symposium. This paper describes the development of an effective multimedia computer-based training package for the primary users of the equipment; namely IAEA inspectors and technicians. (author)

[en] Full text: The Canadian Safeguards Support Program (CSSP) is one of the first safeguards support programs with an overall objective to assist the IAEA by providing technical assistance and other resources and by developing equipment to improve the effectiveness of international safeguards. This paper provides a brief discussion of the evolution of the CSSP, from the beginning when the program was under joint management between the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a Canadian crown corporation, until recent years when the AECB became responsible for all projects and financial management. Recently, new legislation came into force and the AECB became the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). However, the mandate and management of the CSSP under the CNSC remain fundamentally unchanged. Major CSSP activities are devoted to the following areas: (a) Human resource assistance through the provision of cost-free experts (CFEs) to the IAEA; (b) Training of IAEA inspectors and facility operators, development of training resources and integrated approaches for training; (c) System studies, e.g. the development of integrated safeguards approach for CANDU reactors, geological repository, and physical model; (d) Equipment development, e.g. the VXI Integrated Fuel Monitor, Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device, seals, remote monitoring, encryption and authentication; (e) Information technology which includes satellite imagery, Geographical Information System (GIS), and position tracking of spent fuel containers. The CSSP has continued to evolve during the past 25 years. Although formerly larger the CSSP budget has settled to a stable level of just slightly above (Canadian) $2M. Leveraging of the CSSP budget through collaborations with several Member State Support Programs and Canadian government departments has provided mutual benefits for all parties involved and useful results that have been put into practical use by the IAEA. (author)

[en] The Canadian Safeguards Support Program (CSSP) is one of the first safeguards support programs with an overall objective to assist the IAEA by providing technical assistance and other resources and by developing equipment to improve the effectiveness of international safeguards. This paper provides a brief discussion of the evolution of the CSSP, from the beginning when the program was under joint management between the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a Canadian crown corporation, until recent years when the AECB became responsible for all projects and financial management. Recently, new legislation came into force and the AECB became the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). However, the mandate and management of the CSSP under the CNSC remain fundamentally unchanged. Some of the emerging ideas with regard to resource allocation, current priorities, and shift in priorities will be discussed in this paper. (author)

[en] We describe briefly the process whereby a comprehensive, performance based training programme was created for the IAEA Department of Safeguards to prepare inspectors for their routine safeguards related activities at CANDU facilities worldwide. This was the first use of such a methodology by the IAEA as part of a major training programme, and the approach was designed and documented to serve as a model for future training requirements. The process was divided into five discrete phases - analysis, design, development, implementation and evaluation - which are described. 1 fig

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[en] The direct underground disposal of spent fuel from commercial nuclear power reactors is an option that is currently being explored by a number of countries. Implementation of this option for the final part of the nuclear fuel cycle requires construction and operation of two new types of facilities: (1) conditioning plants for preparation and packaging of the spent fuel in disposal containers (2) geologic repositories (operating and closed) for final emplacement of the filled containers. The introduction of these new facilities imposes an obligation on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna to develop and effectively implement new safeguards systems that will provide adequate assurance of nondiversion of nuclear material from both conditioning plants and repositories during all phases of operation and following repository closure. The safeguards support programs of Canada and several other member states have accepted the IAEA task on Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR) to develop generic safeguards approaches for these facilities. All members of the SAGOR project have agreed to participate in a number of formally defined activities. Normally, one member (or a small group of members) takes a lead role in a particular activity and produces a draft technical report on the subject. The report is then reviewed by all other members before final revisions are implemented. Following the completion of reports for all designated task activities, an integrated final report with safeguards recommendations will then be prepared by the SAGOR Technical Coordinating Committee and presented to the IAEA as a guideline for the development of facility-specific safeguards systems

[en] Canada supports international safeguards as a means by which the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be discouraged. Canada recognizes that,to meet that the IAEA must have effective safeguards techniques and the active cooperation of Member States. Therefore the Canadian Government decided in 1976 to initiate a program in support of IAEA safeguards, known as the Canadian Safeguards Support Program (CSSP). The CSSP is funded and administered by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB). The CSSP is a co-ordinated program for the development and the application of safeguards instruments and techniques for nuclear facilities and materials on behalf of the IAEA and also in support of Canada's own national nuclear material safeguards system, implemented by the AECB. (author)

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