[en] An automated high-volume aerosol sampling station, known as CINDERELLA.STUK, for environmental radiation monitoring has been developed by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finland. The sample is collected on a glass fibre filter (attached into a cassette), the airflow through the filter is 800 m³/h at maximum. During the sampling, the filter is continuously monitored with Na(I) scintillation detectors. After the sampling, the large filter is automatically cut into 15 pieces that form a small sample and after ageing, the pile of filter pieces is moved onto an HPGe detector. These actions are performed automatically by a robot. The system is operated at a duty cycle of 1 d sampling, 1 d decay and 1 d counting. Minimum detectable concentrations of radionuclides in air are typically 1Ae10 x 10^-6 Bq/m³. The station is equipped with various sensors to reveal unauthorized admittance. These sensors can be monitored remotely in real time via Internet or telephone lines. The processes and operation of the station are monitored and partly controlled by computer. The present approach fulfils the requirements of CTBTO for aerosol monitoring. The concept suits well for nuclear material safeguards, too

No abstract available

No abstract available

[en] Radionuclides released from the Sosnovyy Bor nuclear power plant were detected along the south coast of Finland on 24th of March 1992. The composition of the radioactive material was similar to that found during the Chernobyl accident six years ago. However, the radionuclide concentrations were now about 1 mBq m^-3, i.e. five orders of magnitude smaller than the maximum concentration detected in Finland during the Chernobyl fallout. The consequences of the incident in Finland are only of theoretical interest. No countermeasures or protective means were needed. However, the studies showed that the release contained not only radioactive gases, such as noble gases and iodine, but also other substances that were attached to small uranium fuel particles. (orig.)

[en] A new gas-filled recoil separator, intended mainly for the study of reaction products in mass region of 100-200 produced in symmetric or nearly symmetric reactions, is under design at the Department of Physics in the University of Jyvaeskylae. The separator will be of the type DQQ where a horizontally focusing dipole (D) is followed by a quadrupole (Q) doublet. The bending radius of the dipole magnet will be 1850 mm and the bending angle 50 deg.

[en] Various laboratory assay techniques were applied to two particulate air filters from Kuwait and to one filter salted artificially. The monitoring system, run by the PIDC in Arlington, identified ¹³⁷Cs but no ¹³⁴Cs in the air samples. Long-term counting using a 100 % HPGe detector in laboratory did not reveal ¹³⁴Cs either. Upper limit of the activity ratio ¹³⁴Cs/¹³⁷Cs was estimated to be 0.015 which is below the expected average value of the Chernobyl fall-out (0.025). This finding may indicate that the Cs in the sample has other origin than Chernobyl fall-out. Radiochemical methods to purify Cs from the bulk material were investigated. However, because of low yield, the preliminary efforts failed to improve detection limits. The high-resolution gamma-spectrometry of the artificial sample (AFTAC) identified the following man-made radionuclides: ⁹⁵Zr/⁹⁵Nb, ¹⁰³Ru, ¹³⁷Cs, ¹⁴⁰Ba/¹⁴⁰La, ¹⁴¹Ce, ¹⁴⁷Nd. ²⁴¹Am was found in alpha spectrometry. The isotope ratios indicate that the sample is produced early in November 1996. The presence of Am shows that the material is most likely irradiated high-burnup uranium or plutonium containing transuranium elements before irradiation. Advantages of mass spectrometry were studied and the preliminary results are very promising. However, a separate programme for sample preparation should be launched. (orig.)

[en] Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Helsinki, Finland and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), working under the Finnish Support Program to IAEA Safeguards and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) funded International Remote Monitoring Program (Task FIN E 935), have undertaken a joint effort to demonstrate the use of remote monitoring for environmental air sampling and safeguards applications. The results of the task will be used by the IAEA to identify the feasibility, cost-effectiveness, reliability, advantages, and problems associated with remote environmental monitoring. An essential prerequisite for a reliable remote air sampling system is the protection of samples against tampering. Means must be developed to guarantee that the sampling itself has been performed as designed and the original samples are not substituted with samples produced with other equipment at another site. One such method is to label the samples with an unequivocal tag. In addition, the inspection personnel must have the capability to remotely monitor and access the automated environmental air sampling system through the use of various sensors and video imagery equipment. A unique aspect to this project is the network integration of remote monitoring equipment with a STUK radiation monitoring system. This integration will allow inspectors to remotely view air sampler radiation data and sensor/image data through separate software applications on the same review station. A sensor network and video system will be integrated with the SNL developed Modular Integrated Monitoring System (MIMS) to provide a comprehensive remote monitoring approach for safeguards purposes. This field trial system is being implemented through a multiphase approach for use by STUK, SNL, and for possible future use by the IAEA

[en] Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Helsinki, Finland and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), working under the Finnish Support Program to IAEA Safeguards and the United States Department of Energy (DOE)-funded International Remote Monitoring Program (Task FIN E 935), have undertaken a joint effort to demonstrate the use of remote monitoring for environmental air sampling and safeguards applications. The results of the task will be used by the IAEA to identify the feasibility, cost-effectiveness, reliability, advantages, and problems associated with remote environmental monitoring. An essential prerequisite for a reliable remote air sampling system is the protection of samples against tampering. Means must be developed to guarantee that the sampling itself has been performed as designed and the original samples are not substituted with samples produced with other equipment at another site. One such method is to label the samples with an unequivocal tag. In addition, the inspection personnel must have the capability to remotely monitor and access the automated environmental air sampling system through the use of various sensors and video imagery equipment. A unique aspect to this project is the network integration of remote monitoring equipment with a STUK radiation monitoring system. This integration will allow inspectors to remotely view air sampler radiation data and sensor/image data through separate software applications on the same review station. A sensor network and video system will be integrated with the SNL developed Modular Integrated Monitoring System (MIMS) to provide a comprehensive remote monitoring approach for safeguards purposes. This field-trial system is being implemented through a multi-phase approach for use by STUK, SNL, and for possible future use by the IAEA. The initial phase will allow monitoring data to be accessed remotely via modems, with follow-on phases to provide for monitoring system and environmental air sampling data availability over the Internet. (author)

[en] An automated air sampling station has recently been developed by Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The station is furnished with equipment that allows comprehensive remote monitoring of the station and the data. Under the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards, STUK and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) established a field trial to demonstrate the use of remote monitoring technologies. STUK provided means for real-lime radiation monitoring and sample authentication whereas SNL delivered means for authenticated surveillance of the equipment and its location. The field trial showed that remote monitoring can be carried out using simple means although advanced facilities are needed for comprehensive surveillance. Authenticated measurement data could be reliably transferred from the monitoring site to the headquarters without the presence of authorized personnel in the monitoring site. The operation of the station and the remote monitoring system were reliable. (orig.)

[en] The ^170,171Au isotopes were produced in the fusion-evaporation reaction of a ⁷⁸Kr ion beam with a ⁹⁶Ru target. For ¹⁷⁰Au the proton and α emission from the ground state were observed for the first time and the decay of the isomeric state was measured with improved accuracy. In addition, the decay of ¹⁷¹Au was measured with high statistics. A new α-emitting nucleus ¹⁷¹Hg and the previously known ¹⁷²Hg and ^{167,168,169,170}Pt isotopes were also studied. The ground-state proton emission was identified for a new proton emitter ¹⁷⁶Tl using the fusion-evaporation reaction of ⁷⁸Kr ions with a ¹⁰²Pd target. The previously known proton emitter ¹⁷⁷Tl and α-decaying nucleus ¹⁷³Hg were also identified in this reaction. The fusion products were separated in-flight using a gas-filled recoil separator and implanted into a position-sensitive silicon detector. Identification of the nuclei was based on position, time, and energy correlations between the implants and subsequent decays