[en] Russia (through Gazprom) is a major provider for the European Union, and Europe is a major export region for Russia. Despite these converging interests, relationships between these partners have been extremely conflictual since the beginning of the 2000's. Whereas the EU has a competitive and multilateral vision, Russia is still grounded on State companies. Difficulties are also the expression of the impossibility of the EU to express a common policy with respect to Russia. The author analyses gas-based inter-dependences between the EU and Russia: European dependence with contrasted situations among European countries, dependence of Gazprom on the European market. He comments the different visions both partners have on natural gas markets and industries: economic oppositions on the short term (issues of demand safety and supply safety from either side), diverging visions on gas market and industry structure

[en] Due to the emergence of shale gas in the USA, Russia has become the second world producer of natural gas but this industry remains one of the most important sectors of the Russian economy as natural gas exports are an essential component or the Russian economic policy. Addressing this industry, the author first comments the evolutions of gas production since 1960 and its perspectives by 2020 and 2030. He also outlines the importance of the cost issue associated with the choice between mega projects and smaller ones. In a second part, the author comments and discusses the evolutions of gas exports towards Europe and of the export strategy. He evokes the possibility of arbitration between price and quantity in Gazprom's strategy, the possibility of a strategy of downstream integration on European gas markets, the possibility of a diversification of export markets (notably LNG markets as several LNG projects are planned). In the third part, the author describes the Gazprom model, comments the recurring debate on a reform of this holding, and discusses its quantity-based management and the issue of Gazprom's efficiency. He briefly evokes the issue of reform of the Russian gas industry, the progressive emergence of new actors

[en] The main characteristics of the natural gas export strategy of the Russian gas company Gazprom on the European market are a response to the uncertainties (volumes, prices) created by the liberalization of the EU gas market. The asset acquisition policy implemented since the end of the 1980's, the multiplication of export networks and also the desire to maintain long-term contracts while taking advantage of new contractual opportunities are examples of this. But the industrial and commercial strategies that the gas company can develop are partly determined by the characteristics of its internal market (low gas prices, consumption quotas). In the absence of a genuine domestic gas market, strong constraints weigh on Gazprom's production and therefore export capacity. Consequently, the 'gas relations' between Russia and the EU - the later gas security but also Russia's ability to exercise real market power in Europe - will largely depend on Russia's ability to reform its internal market

[en] The objective of this article is to try to assess which strategy could be implemented by a European dominant provider (or a group of big providers) during the current phase of transition of the European gas market in order to keep (or increase) his market shares and maximise his revenues. The authors aim at exploring possibilities of strategic actions on the long term other than those of defence of volumes through a price war, or the possibility of a strategy similar to that of Saudi Arabia which instrumentalises uncertainty on future prices. This last type of strategy is defined for the case of natural gas. The authors show that it could be implemented on the EU gas market, provided some specific conditions. They show that Gazprom has not enough power to become a price maker, and explore which kind of strategy of uncertainty could be implemented by this actor

[en] The authors report a study of LNG markets. They first discuss their evolution towards globalization by addressing exchanges on the medium and long terms (Qatar aiming at remaining the leader, Australia as the first world exporter, USA as a game changer, Asia as a determining variable for balances on the medium term, focus on LNG in Africa), technological evolutions (floating LNG, floating storage and re-gasification unit or FSRU, platform LNG or PLNG, small scale LNG or SSLNG), and new usages in sea and road transports. Then, they analyse and comment price and market dynamics with the search for flexibility to face security and competitiveness stakes. They focus on some geopolitical and security issues proper to LNG: stakes about the North Dome/South Pars deposit, the securing of maritime routes (the Strait of Ormuz and other choke points), shipping stakes, and the security and safety of LNG transport and installations. The last part addresses the emergence of new actors and of a strategic competition: influence of large consumer countries, the choice of Russian exports between Europe and Asia, the possible emergence of a USA-Russia conflict on the European market, and the possible consequences of US-China relationships on US LNG exports

[en] The authors report a study of the presence of China, Russia and the USA, i.e. the three main actors of the geopolitics of European energy investments, and of the means implemented by European countries to protect themselves from them or to take the best out of them. They first address investments made by these three countries in EU oil-gas sector, and notably highlight the failure of the internationalization strategies of Russian oil companies in Central and Eastern Europe, the constraint of the third Energy Climate package for Gazprom on the EU market, and the more discrete presence of Chinese and US companies in this sector. Then, they address the investments of these countries in the EU electric power sector. The main noticed features are: a European system weakened by the Community's policy, a Chinese policy aiming at a world leadership, the failure of the Chinese Global Energy Interconnection Initiative (GEII), a Chinese technological and industrial dominance, a Russian strategy focussed on nuclear energy, and a US strategy characterised by the growing presence of the GAFAM. In the last part, the authors address sovereignty issues by discussing the existence or development of tools for the control of foreign investments, particularly in the EU energy sector. Similar tools of control of foreign investments in the USA, China and Russia are presented in appendix

[en] After a brief description of the role and posture of China in globalization, this report proposes an overview of the situation and perspectives of the Chinese energy mix: a strongly increasing consumption, with still prevailing coal, a strong development of renewable energies, and a frustrated ambition for nuclear. The authors then outline the increasing dependence on oil and natural gas imports, propose a discussion of the Chinese energy policy which aims at managing this dependence, at diversifying supply routes and sources, thus at securing shipping routes, and at internationalising Chinese oil companies. This results in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The objectives and means of this BRI are described. They deal with an economic expansion, a stronger energy security, the development of new diplomatic customers, at financing and developing projects. Then, after an evocation of the specific place of Africa in this BRI, the authors propose an overview of the African oil and gas landscape (a modest but strategic contribution, reasons for African attractiveness for foreign actors, a space wide open for competition, presence of Chinese companies in Africa), and more particularly focus on the Chinese presence in the African mining sector (targeted investments, the BRI as a support for investments in infrastructures). They finally discuss the new strategies implemented by China in Africa (objectives, consequences and limitations)

[en] Numerous tensions have emerged since the early 2000's between Russia and Europe as a result of differences in vision, an example being the difficulty of Gazprom to adapt to the competition rules of the European Union. Although it has not been easy to set in place, diversification of exports to Asia would appear to be the strategic response

[en] 2022 was the most turbulent year in the history of natural gas. At a time when its international market was slow to globalize, like that of oil, a major geopolitical event - the war in Ukraine - shook the balance to such an extent that new dynamics emerged. What form will they take in an international environment that is itself in turmoil in its energy, geopolitical and climatic dimensions? This book looks at the main features of this 'new world', with their repercussions on international markets, transactions and prices, as well as on the 'Great Gas Game' that is likely to involve the main players: the United States, Russia, the European Union, China, India and the gas-exporting countries

[en] This article is a first step of a research agenda on international hydrocarbon regulations. With regards to both: i) the new wealth and power equilibrium in the international political economy and ii) the new political economy of carbon that is emerging from The Paris agreement on Climate changes, this research agenda aims at analysing the changing national structures of governance and the ways these changes lead to international, bilateral, pluri-lateral or multilateral hydrocarbon regulation