No abstract available

[en] Variation in the toughness of 0.50% Mo steel and the presence of low-toughness materials resulting from this variation create problems as the steel which has been widely used for naphtha, kerosene, and light oil hydrotreating reactor vessels. The toughness behavior of 0.50% Mo steel was examined using specimens with various Mo content, C content, and different heat treatment. The effect of hydrogen attack was investigated as a factor in the loss of 0.50% Mo steel toughness. As described in this paper, the examination revealed of that: (1) The toughness of 0.50% Mo steel varies widely with changes in microstructure and in tempering temperature and, therefore, can be stabilized and improved by properly controlling those conditions. (2) A low carbon content produces high toughness. However, the carbon content must be determined taking trade-offs with strength into consideration. (3) It was found that the conditions if (1) increase resistance to hydrogen attack as well, though the deterioration in the toughness occurs due to hydrogen attack

[en] Published in summary form only

[en] Empirical evidence shows that power systems with high shares of nuclear and renewable energies make flexible nuclear reactors cycling more often and would push them to retire earlier. This paper analyses the French power system by 2050 and estimates the way the nuclear power plants operating load-following affects the dynamics of the uranium cycle under cost-efficiency considerations. This document is composed of an introduction and the slides of the presentation. (authors)

[en] The ANCRE (National Alliance for Coordinating Research in Energy) proposes a new energy scenario for France for 2050 complying to the new law about energy transition for a green growth (LTECV) and including elements from the multi-year programming of the French energy policy (PPE) decided in 2016. About 30 objectives have been reported among which: the reduction by 40% in 2030 of greenhouse gas emissions when comparing to 1990, the reduction of the use of fossil energies by 30% in 2030 when comparing to 2012, or to bring the nuclear share in the electricity production mix below 50% by 2025. In this scenario the demand for electricity grows by 15% between 2015 and 2050 and in the industry the consumption of energy decreases slightly all along the period despite an economic growth of 1.7% per year. The progressive upswing of renewable energies and the planned decline of nuclear power make necessary (between 2020 and 2030) to commission new gas-fueled power plants to compensate the role of nuclear plants to cope with the intermittency of renewable energies, which will increase CO_2 emissions. A technical breakthrough in the possibility of storing electricity could change the scenario. However this scenario takes into account a storing capacity of 30 GW in 2050 while today this capacity reaches only 5 GW. (A.C.)

[en] In the last decade a number of papers have analysed the consequences of achieving the greenhouse gas concentration levels necessary to maintain global temperature increases below 2 °C above preindustrial levels. Most models and scenarios assume that future trends in global GDP will be similar to the growth experienced in the past century, which would imply multiplying current output by about 19 times in the 21st century. However, natural resource and environmental constraints suggest that future global economic growth may not be so high. Furthermore, the environmental implications of such growth depend on how it is distributed across countries. This paper studies the implications on GHG abatement policies of low global GDP growth and high convergence levels in GDP per capita across countries. A partial equilibrium model (POLES) of the world's energy system is used to provide detailed projections up to 2050 for the different regions of the world. The results suggest that while low stabilisation could be technically feasible and economically viable for the world in all the scenarios considered, it is more likely to occur with more modest global growth. However, that will imply higher global abatement costs relative to GDP. Convergence in living standards on the other hand places greater pressures in terms of the required reduction in emissions. In general we find that there are major differences between regions in terms of the size and the timing of abatement costs and economic impact. - Highlights: • We study the implications of GDP growth and convergence on climate stabilisation. • A partial equilibrium model (POLES) of the world's energy system is used. • Low climate stabilisation is technically feasible and economically viable. • Low stabilisation is more likely to occur with more modest global growth. • Convergence places pressure in terms of the required reduction in emissions

[en] Because of higher penetration of variable renewable energies, nuclear energy should adapt to changes in power demand in particular in countries with high nuclear energy share like France. We will present some results of a benchmark of technology dispatching tools. The models aimed at reproducing the hourly production of France during year 2012. The total demand as well as the actual productions of wind and solar energies are known and common assumptions for variable and ramping costs as well as technology efficiencies are taken. The compared outputs are aggregated costs, CO₂ emissions, average load factors for the different technologies. Then we will present some simulation results for the 2030 horizon. The results for future nuclear power show shift from base load to semi-base and even peaks. Zero power appears more and more likely and there are frequent occurrences of deep hourly/daily variations. This document is composed of an introduction and the slides of the presentation.

[en] In this paper we present a new model of the impact of uranium scarcity on the development of nuclear reactors. A dynamic simulation of coupled supply and demand of energy, resources and nuclear reactors is done with the global model Prospective Outlook for Long Term Energy Supply (POLES) over this century. In this model, both electricity demand and uranium supply are not independent of the cost of all base load electricity suppliers. Only two nuclear reactor types are modeled in POLES. Globally one has the characteristics of a Thermal Neutron Reactor (TR) and the other one has the ones of Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). The results show that If both generations of nuclear reactors can be competitive with other sources, we see that in many countries their development would probably be limited by the availability of natural and recycled materials. Depending on the locally available alternative (hydro, coal) and local regulatory framework (safety and waste management for nuclear reactors but also environmental constraints such as CO₂ targets), both nuclear technologies could be developed. The advantage of the new model is that it avoids the difficult question of defining 'ultimate resources'. The drawback is that it needs a description of the volume of uranium resources but also of the link between the cost and the potential production capacities of these resources

[en] The aim of our program is to determine past, present and future emission inventories of carbonaceous particles from 1860 to 2100 for fossil fuel and biofuel sources. Emission inventories for savannah and forest fires have been developed by using burnt area products given by satellite for Asia and Africa. The strong collaboration with the different groups attending this GICC program has allowed to develop the following results. 1- With the improvement of algorithms and new choices for emission factors, emission inventories for black carbon (BC), primary organic carbon (OCp) and total organic carbon (OCtot) have been constructed for the period 1950 to 1997 for fossil fuel and biofuel sources. With these new development, biofuel sources have been seen to be significant, especially in the developing countries. 2- Past inventories have been developed for fossil fuel and biofuel sources from 1860 to 1997 by taking into account the evolution of fuel consumption, fuel use and emission factors. 3- Savannah and forest fire inventories have been constructed based on burnt area products, for Africa (1981-1991, 2000) and Asia (2000-2001). These results show the importance of using real time data instead of statistics. 4-Future emission inventory of black carbon by fossil fuel sources has been constructed for 2100 following the IPCC scenario A2 (catastrophic case) and B1 (perfect world). 5-Characterization of biofuel emissions has been realized by organizing an experiment in a combustion chamber where indian and chinese biofuels (fuelwood, agricultural wastes, dung-cake etc..). were burnt, reproducing the burning methods used in these countries. 6-Finally, the differences between the existing inventories of carbonaceous aerosols has been explained. (A.L.B.)

[en] Transition scenarios from a fleet based on generation III reactors to a fleet of generation IV reactors is simulated by using POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-Term Energy Systems) model up to 2100. POLES builds a complete model of the world energy market. As opposed to classical nuclear scenario codes, the demand of nuclear energy is an output of the model and not user-defined. A new nuclear fuel management model has been implemented. The results give a new understanding of the dynamics of both nuclear technology GEN III and GEN IV deployments. The effects of the most important parameters defining the evolution of the shares of nuclear reactor technologies are presented. Those parameters are defined in the field of economics (ex: relative extra costs of GEN IV reactors), or geology (ex: expected evolution of natural uranium price as a function of uranium already mined), or physics (ex: breeding gains...). The results show that there is no such thing as competition within nuclear technologies. The usage of GEN III is restricted only by legal regulations and uranium resources. GEN IV does not have to be competitive with GEN III to be started massively. Even if they may become less expensive than GEN III, as in the case of very high uranium prices, it still would need to compete with other base-load power technologies. Our model tends to show that there is no competition between investments in the mines and investments in reactor technologies. Our model tends also to show that GEN IV technologies should not be seen as competitors for historical nuclear reactor providers but as a completely new market to be opened to them