Raveendran, P.S.; Ahmad, W.; Rautela, B.K.
Proceedings of the thirty-third IARP international conference on developments towards improvement of radiological surveillance at nuclear facilities and environment: book of abstracts2018
Proceedings of the thirty-third IARP international conference on developments towards improvement of radiological surveillance at nuclear facilities and environment: book of abstracts2018
AbstractAbstract
[en] Radionuclide are generated in the reactor by the processes of fission and neutron activation of corrosion and radiolytic products. TAPS 1 and 2 being a BWR type reactor, with primary steam reaching right up to the turbine, radionuclide generated in the reactor are carried along with steam to different parts of the plant covering larger portion of the operating area. This paper aims to share the operating experiences gained during the removal of hotspots at CRD housing area and Reactor Basin Cavity area of TAPS-1, using PVC-SCUI solution (PVC Solvent Cement solution) based on peeling techniques
Primary Subject
Source
Oza, R.B.; Shrivastava, R.; Kulkarni, M.S. (Radiation Safety Systems Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India)) (eds.); Indian Association for Radiation Protection, Mumbai (India); 314 p; 2018; p. 187; IARPIC-2018: 33. IARP international conference on developments towards improvement of radiological surveillance at nuclear facilities and environment; Mumbai (India); 16-20 Jan 2018; 2 refs., 2 figs., 1 tab.
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Book
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Conference
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Nagarajan, V.; Raveendran, P.S.; Parashar, Vivek; Mharse, R.S.; Phadnis, P.S., E-mail: vnagarajan@npcil.co.in
Proceedings of the thirtieth IARP conference on radiological protection and safety in nuclear reactors and radiation installations: book of abstracts2012
Proceedings of the thirtieth IARP conference on radiological protection and safety in nuclear reactors and radiation installations: book of abstracts2012
AbstractAbstract
[en] TAPS 1 and 2 comprises of twin units of boiling water reactors with vertical core. Cruciform shaped control blades are driven from the bottom through the core using hydraulic Control Rod Drives (CRD). Neutron flux monitoring is carried out by in-core devices such as Source Range Monitors (SRM) and Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) during the start up and later using Power Range Monitors located in the biological shield. In addition, Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) assemblies located symmetrically in the core gives information about axial and radial neutron flux. There are 18 LPRM locations out of which 13 are used for mounting the LPRMs and rest are spare locations. The lower head of the reactor vessel has 120 nozzles for CRD housings, SRM, IRM, LPRMs, vessel drain etc. Maintenance work on CRDs, removal and installation of in-core monitoring devices etc are carried out from under vessel area in the primary containment known as CRD housing area. While conducting radiation survey of CRD housing area after shut down of unit no. 1 for the 21st refueling outage, hotspot was observed at spare LPRM 40-21 location showing radiation level of 10 Gy/h and general back ground of 30-50 mGy/h. An attempt is made to bring out the ALARA efforts taken during hot spot removal. Options like hotspot shielding were not feasible. After core unloading, efforts were made to remove the hotspot. To assess the change in radiation levels, a high range silicon semiconductor based gamma monitor's detector was mounted on a pole and fixed near hotspot. Radiation level at the detector was 6 Gy/h. In addition detector of another low range area monitor was fixed at the trolley in the CRD housing area and radiation level was 7 mGy/h. Monitors of both the detectors were kept outside the primary containment in low back ground area at reactor building 103' El. Hotspot removal was attempted initially by vacuuming from the top of reactor vessel using 1 inch dia tube from spare LPRM location. Vacuum receiver was provided with adequate shielding anticipating accumulation of high active material. As it was not successful, high pressure waterjet was attempted. Increase in radiation levels in the CRD housing area was observed. This was probably due to change in the orientation of the hot object. Later further attempts of vacuuming using 0.5 inch dia tube, use of magnet, flower shape tube etc, were made and were not helpful. As a last resort, high pressure waterjet using 0.5 inch dia tube was attempted. It dislodged the hotspot and probably pushed it above bottom grid. Radiation level at spare LPRM reduced to 3 mGy/h confirmed the removal of hotspot. Underwater hotspot removal attempts were made from RB 200'El and the monitoring was done at RB 103'El with continuous communication. Collective dose consumed for hotspot removal was 23 person-mSv. Use of high range monitor, remote operations, dynamic planning, proper communication and above all management's commitment were helpful for executing the work with minimum dose consumption and without any violation. (author)
Primary Subject
Source
Sharma, D.N. (ed.) (Health Physics Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India)); Puranik, V.D. (ed.) (Environmental Assessment Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India)); Pushparaja (ed.) (Radiation Safety Systems Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India)) (and others); Indian Association of Radiation Protection, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India); 227 p; 2012; p. 25; IARPNC-2012: 30. IARP conference on radiological protection and safety in nuclear reactors and radiation installations; Mangalore (India); 15-17 Mar 2012
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Book
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Rautela, Bahadur Singh K.; Sahu, Sarat R.; Raveendran, P.S.; Kothare, Prakash K.; Mitra, Sudip Ranjan; Ramana Murthy, B.S.V., E-mail: bkrautela@npcil.co.in2016
AbstractAbstract
[en] Cleanup (CU) demineralizer of TAPS 1 and 2, containing mixed bed resins, is used to maintain reactor water chemistry. Once the bed is saturated, spent resin needs to be transferred to resin fixation facility for fixation and subsequent disposal in near-surface disposal facility. This is done by transporting the spent resin in a shielded resin transportation cask (SRTC) from radwaste building. The SRTC was manufactured with shielding thickness, based on methodology proposed by Rautela et al., 'Shielding adequacy of proposed cask for transporting TAPS 1 and 2 CU spent resins'. Extensive radiation monitoring was carried out during the entire transfer and transportation process. Observed radiation levels on cask surface were within the accepted and calculated radiation levels. This paper describes verification methodology proposed by Rautela et al. and health physics operating experience during first CU spent resin transfer process at TAPS 1 and 2. (author)
Primary Subject
Source
5 refs., 3 figs., 3 tabs.
Record Type
Journal Article
Journal
Radiation Protection and Environment; CODEN RPREFM; v. 39(3); p. 165-169
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Rautela, B.K.; Sahu, S.R.; Raveendran, P.S.; Kothare, P.K.; Mitra, S.R.; Ramana Murthy, B.S.V., E-mail: bkrautela@npcil.co.in, E-mail: srsahu@npcil.co.in
Proceedings of the international conference on radiological safety in workplace, nuclear facilities and environment: book of abstracts2016
Proceedings of the international conference on radiological safety in workplace, nuclear facilities and environment: book of abstracts2016
AbstractAbstract
[en] Clean-up (CU) deminilisers of TAPS 1 and 2, containing mixed bed resins are used to maintain reactor water chemistry. Once the bed is saturated, spent resin needs to be transferred to Resin Fixation Facility (RFF) for fixation and subsequent disposal in Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF). This is done by transporting the spent resin in a Shielded Resin Transportation Cask (SRTC) from Radwaste (RW) building. The SRTC was manufactured with shielding thickness, based on methodology proposed by BK Rautela et.al. Shielding adequacy of proposed cask for transporting TAPS 1 and 2 clean-up spent resins and accepted radiation levels on the surface of the cask. Extensive radiation monitoring was carried out during the entire transfer and transportation process. Observed radiation levels on cask surface were within the accepted and calculated radiation levels. This paper describes verification methodology proposed by B K Rautela et.al., and Health Physics Operating Experience during first CU spent resin transfer process at TAPS 1 and 2
Primary Subject
Source
Indian Association for Radiation Protection, Mumbai (India); 287 p; 2016; p. 75; IARPIC-2016: 32. international conference on radiological safety in workplace, nuclear facilities and environment; Kalpakkam (India); 22-25 Feb 2016; 2 tabs.
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Book
Literature Type
Conference
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BETA DECAY RADIOISOTOPES, BETA-MINUS DECAY RADIOISOTOPES, CASKS, CESIUM ISOTOPES, COBALT ISOTOPES, CONTAINERS, INTERMEDIATE MASS NUCLEI, INTERNAL CONVERSION RADIOISOTOPES, ISOMERIC TRANSITION ISOTOPES, ISOTOPES, MINUTES LIVING RADIOISOTOPES, MONITORING, NUCLEI, ODD-EVEN NUCLEI, ODD-ODD NUCLEI, ORGANIC COMPOUNDS, ORGANIC POLYMERS, PETROCHEMICALS, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, POLYMERS, RADIOISOTOPES, YEARS LIVING RADIOISOTOPES
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