[en] In a continuing effort to examine portable methods for implementing active neutron interrogation for detecting shielded fissionable material research is underway to investigate the utility of analyzing multiple time-correlated signatures. Time correlation refers here to the existence of unique characteristics of the fission interrogation signature related to the start and end of an irradiation, as well as signatures present in between individual pulses of an irradiating source. Traditional measurement approaches in this area have typically worked to detect die-away neutrons after the end of each pulse, neutrons in between pulses related to the decay of neutron emitting fission products, or neutrons or gamma rays related to the decay of neutron emitting fission products after the end of an irradiation exposure. In this paper we discus the potential weaknesses of assessing only one signature versus multiple signatures and make the assertion that multiple complimentary and orthogonal measurements should be used to bolster the performance of active interrogation systems, helping to minimize susceptibility to the weaknesses of individual signatures on their own. Recognizing that the problem of detection is a problem of low count rates, we are exploring methods to integrate commonly used signatures with rarely used signatures to improve detection capabilities for these measurements. In this paper we will discuss initial activity in this area with this approach together with observations of some of the strengths and weaknesses of using these different signatures.

[en] 3He proportional counters have long been used as neutron detectors for both passive and active detection of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). The optimal configuration of these detectors as far as gas pressure, amount of moderating material, and size are concerned is highly dependent on what neutron signatures are being used to detect and identify SNM. We present here a parametric study of the neutron capture response of 3He detectors, based on Monte Carlo simulations using the MCNPX radiation transport code. The neutron capture response of the detectors has been modeled as a function of time after an incident neutron pulse.

[en] Digital pulse shape analysis (dPSA) has been used with a Cuttler-Shalev type ³He proportional counter to measure the fast neutron spectra of bare ²⁵²Cf and ²⁴¹AmBe neutron sources. Measurements have also been made to determine the attenuated fast neutron spectra of ²⁵²Cf shielded by several materials including water, graphite, liquid nitrogen, magnesium, and tungsten. Rise-time dPSA has been employed using the common rise-time approach for analyzing n +³He → ¹H + ³H ionization events and a new approach has been developed to improve the fidelity of these measurements. Simulations have been performed for the different experimental arrangements and are compared, demonstrating general agreement between the dPSA processed fast neutron spectra and predictions.

[en] The INL's Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy System (PINS)1 non-intrusively identifies the chemical fill of munitions and sealed containers. PINS is used routinely by the U.S. Army, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and foreign military units to determine the contents of munitions and other containers suspected to contain explosives, smoke-generating chemicals, and chemical warfare agents such as mustard and nerve gas. The objects assayed with PINS range from softball-sized M139 chemical bomblets to 200 gallon DOT 500X ton containers. INL had previously examined2 the feasibility of using a similar system for the identification of explosives, and based on this proof-of-principle test, the development of a dedicated system for the identification of explosives in an improvised nuclear device appears entirely feasible. INL has been tasked by NNSA NA-42 Render Safe Research and Development with the development of such a system.

[en] Experiments have been performed at Idaho National Laboratory to study methodology and instrumentation for performing neutron active interrogation die-away analyses for the purpose of detecting shielded fissionable material. Here we report initial work using a portable DT electronic neutron generator with a He-3 fast neutron detector to detect shielded fissionable material including >2 kg quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium. Measurements have been taken of bare material as well as of material hidden within a large plywood cube. Results from this work have demonstrated the efficacy of the die-away neutron measurement technique for quickly detecting the presence of special nuclear material hidden within plywood shields by analyzing the time dependent neutron signals in-between neutron generator pulses. Using a DT electronic neutron generator operating at 300 Hz with a yield of approximately 0.36 x 10**8 neutrons per second, 2.2 kg of enriched uranium hidden within a 0.60 m x 0.60 m x 0.70 m volume of plywood was positively detected with a measurement signal 2-sigma above the passive background within 1 second. Similarly, for a 500 second measurement period a lower detection limit of approaching the gram level could be expected with the same simple set-up

[en] Active interrogation (AI) has been used as a technique for the detection and identification of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) for both proposed and field-tested systems. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been studying this technique for systems ranging from small systems employing portable electronic neutron generators (ENGs) 1 to larger systems employing linear accelerators as high-energy photon sources for assessment of vehicles and cargo2. In order to assess the feasibility of new systems, INL has undertaken a campaign of Monte Carlo simulations of the response of a variety of masses of SNM in multiple shielding configurations to a pulsed neutron source using the MCNPX3 code, with emphasis on the neutron and photon response of the system as a function of time after the initial neutron pulse. We present here some preliminary results from these calculations. 1. D.L. Chichester and E.H. Seabury, 'Using Electronic Neutron Generators in Active Interrogation to Detect Shielded Nuclear Material,' IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science 56 (2009) pp 441-447. 2. J.L. Jones et al., 'Photonuclear-based, nuclear material detection system for cargo containers,' Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research B 241 (2005) pp 770-776. 3. D.B. Pelowitz, 'MCNPXTM User's Manual version 2.6.0,' Los Alamos National Laboratory Report LA-CP-07-1473 (2008).

[en] Portable electronic neutron generators (ENGs) may be used to interrogate suspicious items to detect, characterize, and quantify the presence fissionable material based upon the measurement of prompt and/or delayed emissions of neutrons and/or photons resulting from fission. The small size (<0.2 m3), light weight (<12 kg), and low power consumption (<50 W) of modern ENGs makes them ideally suited for use in field situations, incorporated into systems carried by 2-3 individuals under rugged conditions. At Idaho National Laboratory we are investigating techniques and portable equipment for performing active neutron interrogation of moderate sized objects less than ∼2-4 m3 to detect shielded fissionable material. Our research in this area relies upon the use of pulsed deuterium-tritium ENGs and the measurement of die-away prompt fission neutrons and other neutron signatures in-between neutron pulses from the ENG and after the ENG is turned off.

[en] A Cuttler-Shalev (C-S) 3He proportional counter has been used to measure the energy spectrum of neutrons from a portable deuterium-deuterium electronic neutron generator. To improve the analysis of results from the C-S detector digital pulse shape analysis techniques have been used to eliminate neutron recoil artifacts in the recorded data. Data was collected using a 8-GHz, 10-bit waveform digitizer with its full scale corresponding to approximately 6-MeV neutrons. The measurements were made with the detector axis perpendicular to the direction of ions in the ENG in a plane 0.5-m to the side of the ENG, measuring neutrons emitted at an angle from 87.3? to 92.7? with respect to the path of ions in the ENG. The system demonstrated an energy resolution of approximately 0.040 MeV for the thermal peak and approximately 0.13 MeV at the DD neutron energy. In order to achieve the ultimate resolution capable with this type of detector it is clear that a higher-precision digitizer will be needed.

[en] Parametric studies using numerical simulations are being performed to assess the performance capabilities and limits of active neutron interrogation for detecting shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU). Varying the shield material, HEU mass, HEU depth inside the shield, and interrogating neutron source energy, the simulations account for both neutron and photon emission signatures from the HEU with resolution in both energy and time. The results are processed to represent different irradiation timing schemes and several different classes of radiation detectors, and evaluated using a statistical approach considering signal intensity over background. This paper describes the details of the modeling campaign and some preliminary results, weighing the strengths of alternative measurement approaches for the different irradiation scenarios.

[en] Prompt Gamma Neutron Activation Analysis (PGNAA) systems employ neutrons as a probe to interrogate items, e.g. chemical warfare materiel-filled munitions. The choice of a neutron source in field-portable systems is determined by its ability to excite nuclei of interest, operational concerns such as radiological safety and ease-of-use, and cost. Idaho National Laboratory's PINS Chemical Assay System has traditionally used a Cf-252 isotopic neutron source, but recently a Deuterium-Tritium (DT) Electronic Neutron Generator (ENG) has been tested as an alternate neutron source. This paper presents the results of using both of these neutron sources to interrogate chemical warfare materiel (CWM) and high explosive (HE) filled munitions